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INTRODUCTION
"The Holocaust was not only the greatest murder, it was the
greatest theft in history."
-Deborah Senn, Washington State Commissioner of Insurance and
former chair of the Working Group on Holocaust and Insurance
Issues of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.'
"There can be no moral closure on the worst crime of this century,
of this millennium and possibly of all world history. There can only
be an effort to make some moral recompense to do imperfect justice
to those who still survive."
-Stuart E. Eizenstat, U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary and Special
Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for
Holocaust Issues.2
I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase "opening the floodgates of litigation" connotes a
pejorative meaning in American legal argument. Most often, it is
used by courts as a reason not to allow a certain case to proceed for
fear that it would overburden both courts and society with a new
class of lawsuits.3
1. Alan Abrahamson, Holocaust Victims' Kin Urged to Pursue Assets, L.A- TIMES, July
14, 1998, at A3. See generally RIcHARD Z. CHESNOFF, PACK OF THIEVES: How HITLER AND
EUROPE PLUNDERED THE JEWS AND COMITED THE GREATEST THEFT IN HISTORY (1999).
2. On the Record Briefing on Talks to Discuss Compensation for Forced and Slave Labor,
U.S. Dep't of State (Oct. 7, 1999).
3. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 547 (1982) (noting the "flood of litigation);
Radovich v. NalI Football League, 352 U.S. 445,450 (1957) (noting the "flood of litigation");
Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 997 F. Supp. 23, 34 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting "the
floodgates of litigation will be left ajar"); Healy v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 325, 329
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) (showing concern for "open[ing] the floodgates of litigation"); Gulf Research
& Dev. Co. v. Schlumberger Wells Surveying Corp., 10 F.R.D. 353, 355 (S.D. Cal. 1950)
(stating 'opening the floodgates of litigation"); Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 336, 349 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating "could open the floodgates of litigation"); Hoes v.
New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 66 N.E. 119, 120 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1903) (opining that "it would
open wide the floodgates of litigation); Oregon v. Huffman, 297 P.2d 831, 851 (Or. 1955)
(stating "open the gates to a flood of litigation").
20001
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In this article, the term has a positive meaning. It accurately
describes a recent-and surprising-phenomenon of suits suddenly
being brought in U.S. courts by survivors of the Holocaust 4 and their
heirs to recover compensation for losses suffered on the eve of, or
during, World War II.
The beginning date of this phenomenon can be traced to October
1996, when Holocaust survivors and their heirs filed a federal class
action lawsuit in New York against the three largest Swiss banks
stemming from the defendant banks' alleged failure to return
monies deposited with them during World War I.6
Since then, the floodgates of litigation have opened, with over fifty
additional civil lawsuits filed in both federal and state courts
against various foreign and American defendants-both corporate
and individual-arising from Holocaust-era events.7
4. The "Holocaust" is:
the term that Jews themselves have chosen to describe their fate during World
War II. At the most superficial level, the word "holocaust" means a great
destruction and devastation, but its etymological substratum interposes a
specifically Jewish interpretation.... The Holocaust, then, becomes another
link in the historic chain of Jewish suffering.
Lucy S. DAWIDOWICZ, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945 at xxxvii (1986).
More specifically, the Holocaust refers "[to the systematic attempt [by the Nazis] to
destroy all European Jewry," resulting in the death of six million Jews. MARTIN GILBERT, THE
HOLOCAUST 18 (1985). For a more recent study, see THE HOLOCAUST AND HISTORY (Michael
Berenbaum & Abraham J. Beck eds., 1998).
Books about the Holocaust are legion. Some comprehensive studies include the four-
volume work ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HOLOCAUST (Israel Gutman ed., 1990) and the three-
volume work RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS (rev. ed. 1985). See
also ABRAHAM J. EDELHEIT & HERSHEL EDELHEIT, HISTORY OF THE HOLOCAUST:A HANDBOOK
AND DICTIONARY (1994) (reference book that includes an 18-page bibliography of works on the
Holocaust).
5. The term "on the eve of, or during, World War II" is used in this article to refer to
events between 1933 and 1945, specifically the period from January 1933 (when Hitler
became Chancellor of Germany), to May 1945 (when Germany unconditionally surrendered).
6. As more fully described infra in Part III., the claims made against the Swiss banks
were not only for their allegedly wrongful withholding of monies belonging to Holocaust
survivors and their heirs, but also included claims for disgorgement of profits allegedly earned
by the banks in receiving assets looted by the Nazis from their Jewish victims and goods
produced by Nazi slave labor.
7. For a list of the lawsuits filed as of February 1, 2000, see infra Appendix A. The
author has been informed by plaintiffs' attorneys in the various cases already filed that
additional lawsuits are forthcoming. According to New York attorney Edward Fagan, one of
plaintiffs' attorneys: "The same way the Nazis marched across Europe and plundered from
all the survivors, we're going to march back across Europe in the opposite direction and take
all that money back." Michael Hirsh,After 50 Years, A Deal, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1998, at 41.
For a general discussion of such suits both in the United States and abroad, see Josh Karlen,
WWII Suits Clog Courts Worldwide, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 31, 1998, at 1.
In 1998, two legal conferences were held to discuss the ongoing Holocaust-era
[Vol. 34:1
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The filing of such lawsuits only now-over one-half century after
the events took place-is astounding.8 In the history of American
litigation, a class of cases has never appeared in which so much time
had passed between the wrongful act and the filing of a lawsuit.9
In contrast to the recent flood of lawsuits, only ten suits were filed
in American courts from 1945 to 1995 stemming from damages
suffered during the Holocaust-era.' °
litigation. On February 8-9, 1998, Cardozo Law School in New York held a symposium
entitled The Holocaust Fifty Years Later: Moral andLegal Issues. On March 1,1998, Whittier
Law School in California held a symposium (organized by the author) entitled Nazi Gold and
OtherAssets of the Holocaust: The Search for Justice. For proceedings of each symposium, see
20 CARDOZO L. REv. 415-730 (1998) and 20 WHITrIER L. REv. 3-140 (1998), respectively.
8. See David Rohde, Atrocities of the Past Now Mined by Some Seeking Justice, Profits,
Hous. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1998, at 34. ("Fifty-three years after it ended, the Second World War
is spawning a new form of international justice that victims hail as long overdue.").
9. American litigation dealt with this phenomenon of a long time-lag between the
wrongful act and the filing of suits in the DES litigation in the 1970s and 1980s. See generally
Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). In the DES litigation, daughters were suing
drug manufacturers for injuries suffered by them as a result of their pregnant mothers taking
the drug DES. See id. at 925. The DES daughters were able to discover the danger of the drug
to them (cervical cancer) only upon reaching adulthood. See id. The courts used the "discovery
rule" to toll the statute of limitations and, thereby, hold that the claims of the adult daughters
were not time-barred. See, e.g., Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671, 671-72
(Fla. 1981). The case precedent established by' the DES litigation is now being used by
Holocaust survivors and their heirs to file the lawsuits discussed here. See discussion and
notes infra Part Ill. (discussing claims against the Swiss).
10. The question of why so few suits were filed by Holocaust victims in the first fifty years
after World War I is beyond the purview of this article. It is noteworthy, however, that an
important factor that makes a Holocaust lawsuit brought in the United States viable is the
victory achieved by the human rights bar in the last two decades that convinced American
courts that human rights victims injured abroad can sue in the United States. That step
began with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), the landmark Second Circuit
opinion that held the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), can allow a
victim of state-sanctioned torture to bring suit against the torturer in the United States, even
though the torture took place on foreign soil. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
Since 1980, a number of other human rights victims injured abroad have been able
to successfully bring suit in the United States. See, e.g., Jotav. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d
Cir. 1998); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Marcos Estate , 25 F.3d 1467 (9th
Cir. 1994); Marcos Estate I, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1994); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina,
965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1017 (1993); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.
Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); NCGUB v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993);
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
Congress has also accepted the right of victims of foreign torture to sue in U.S. courts
by enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ('TVPA"), Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106
Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
Without the groundwork laid out by these cases and the TVPA legislation, the
recently-filed Holocaust suits, seeking compensation for damages inflicted in Europe over
one-half century ago and sometimes filed by foreigners, would have been "laughed out of
court."
Political and social changes also have had a great deal to do with the timing being
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The filing of such suits at the close of the twentieth century
presents the last opportunity for the elderly survivors of the
Holocaust to have their grievances heard in a court of law." Since
the Holocaust took place in Europe, courts in European countries
may appear on first blush to be the logical choice for such Holocaust-
era suits. However, as with almost all transnational litigation, the
highly-developed and expansive system of justice in this country
suggests that the United States remains the best forum for the
disposition of such claims.' 2 It is a tribute to the U.S. system of
right for filing the Holocaust-era suits. As explained in an interview by Abraham Foxman,
head of the Anti-Defamation League and himself a Holocaust survivor:
We have to remember why.., we're dealing with it now .... [T]here are some
practical reasons, and that is, after 50 years, the British opened some of their
books. The Soviet Union's disarray has made more documents available ....
But there's another reason that we didn't deal with this issue for 50
years-because the trauma of the human tragedy was so tremendous, so
enormous, so gargantuan, that nobody wanted to talk about material loss for
fear that it would lessen the human tragedy. Because when you begin talking
about property, then what about life? And so for at least two generations-yeah,
Israel decided to take reparations, it needed it-but individually we didn't deal
with it. Not that we didn't know that there were bank accounts, that there was
insurance, that there was property. My mother's family had a factory in
Warsaw. My father had some stores in Baranowicz. But nobody ever raised it.
Nobody ever said, look what we lost. I don't remember conversations ofmaterial
loss. Now I realize how significant the loss was, but nobody talked about it.
Because what they talked about was that they lost 16 members of their family.
We Bludgeoned Them and Bludgeoned Them... But at What Price?, FORWARD, Sept. 4,1998,
available in 1998 WL 11416531.
11. See Martin Rosenberg, Papers Show Nazi Misuse of Treasures, KAN. CITY STAR, May
15, 1998, at C3 ("New attention is being focused on Nazi robbery of Jewish and European
assets as the century draws to a close and Holocaust victims become fewer."). There are
approximately 100,000 survivors of the Holocaust still alive in the United States, and 360,000
more in Israel. See Tom Tugend, Jewish Leaders Optimistic about Swiss Settlement Offer,
JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 14, 1998, at 5. The average age of the survivors is 81. See John J.
Goldman, Insurer OKs $100-Million Holocaust Payoff, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, at A7.
According to the World Jewish Congress, Jewish losses during World War II ranged
from $23 billion to $32 billion as of 1945. See Marilyn Henry, U.S. Report on Neutral
Countries' War-time Conduct Due Tomorrow, JERUSALEM POST, June 1, 1998, at 3. However,
according to Neil Sher, former director of the Justice Department's Office of Special
Investigations that investigates Nazi war crimes, all estimates of losses should be suspect,
since "it's impossible to know how much was plundered. We can only make rough estimates."
Henry Weinstein, This is a Campaign for Truth .. . for Justice; Conference: Efforts to
Compensate Holocaust Survivors for Financial Losses Are Discussed, L.A. TmES, Mar. 2,
1998, at A3 (reporting on the Nazi Gold and Other Assets of the Holocaust Conference held at
Whittier Law School).
12. From the point of view of defendants, such an expansive and sophisticated system of
justice makes courts of the United States overly "plaintiff-friendly," providing large awards
in cases where a foreign forum would provide either a nominal remedy or no remedy at all.
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION INUNITED STATES COURTS, COMMENTARY
AND MATERIALS 3 -5 (3d ed. 1996). Defendants, therefore, even domestic ones, will invariably
attempt to shift the suit to a foreign forum. "The choice of forum has . . .become a key
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justice that our courts can handle claims that originated over fifty
years ago in another part of the world. Long-established principles
of judicial jurisdiction, choice-of-law, equity, our independent
judiciary, the American system of jury trials, and American-style
discovery, make the United States the most attractive (and, in most
cases, the only) forum in the world where Holocaust-era claims can
be heard today.
This article examines the major lawsuits filed to date, in U.S.
courts, involving claims for lost assets or wrongful activities that
took place in Europe during World War I. 1"
strategic battle fought to increase the chances of prevailing on the merits." Allan R. Stein,
Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA_ L. REV. 781,
783 (1985).
As a British jurist wryly observed: "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant
drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a
fortune." Smith Kline & French Labs v. Bloch [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Denning, MR).
For a short comment on the differences between law in the United States and Europe
in dealing with Holocaust-era claims, see Detlev F. Vagts, Restitution for Historic Wrongs,
The American Courts and International Law, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 232 (1998).
13. Outside the purview of this article are the lawsuits now being brought in U.S. courts
against Japanese corporations for their use of slave labor during World War II, and claims
being made against Japan for its wartime atrocities in Asia. For a list of the lawsuits as of
January 1, 2000, filed by victims of wartime Japan, see Japan, U.S. and World War II: The
Search for Justice Lawsuit (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http'//www.law.whittier.edu/sypo/final/
lawsuit.htm>. The claims being made against Japan appear to be the next wave of litigation
in U.S. courts arising out of World War IE. As one article states,
Justice or extortion? The transpacific perception is widening as stunned
Japanese corporations confront a tsunami of lawsuits filed in U.S. courts by
Allied prisoners of war and others who say they were used as forced laborers
during World War 11.
And the hostilities over history are likely to bring more bad blood in
the coming months as some of the attorneys [involved in the Holocaust
litigation] turn their legal guns on the Japanese corporations that allegedly
profited from the crimes of the imperial war machine.
Sonni Efron, Pursuit of WWIlRedress Hits Japanese Boardrooms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000,
at Al; see also Abraham Cooper, Tokyo Must Address the Actions of Its Wartime 'Killing
Machine', L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26,1999, atB5 (providing an op/ed editorial by the Associate Dean
of the Simon Wiesenthal Center); Shirley Leung, Suit Will Test State Law on War Labor,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 1999, at CAl; Doug Struck & Kathryn Tolber, WWII Vets Revive
Grievances with Japan, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2000, at A17; Mike Tharp, Past-due Bills for
Japan, U.S. NEWS &WORLD REP., Feb. 7,2000, at 30; Teresa Watanabe, Japan's War Victims
in New Battle, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at Al. For a Web site recently launched by some
of the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Japanese litigation, see Japanese WWII Claims (visited Feb.
20, 2000) <http://www. japanesewwiiclaims.com>.
Without a doubt, the lawsuits against the Japanese multinationals for their wartime
activities came as a direct result of the earlier litigation against the European corporations.
Aging victims of Japan's wartime activities began filing their lawsuits in U.S. courts only
after seeing the successes achieved by their counterparts in the Holocaust litigation.
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Part II will discuss the civil cases filed after World War II through
1996. As will be shown, the number of such cases filed for the first
fifty years after the Second World War are few, less than one dozen.
Cases filed beginning in 1996, with the emergence of modern
Holocaust-era litigation, can be divided into five types. Part III will
discuss the first type: claims filed against Swiss governmental and
private entities. Three categories of claims were made against the
Swiss.' 4 First, private Swiss banks were accused of failing to return
14. Discussions about the role of the Swiss government and Swiss private institutions
during World War II are numerous. All have focused on exposing Switzerland as profiting
from its neutrality during World War II by trading with the Nazis. See, e.g., TOM BOWER, NAZI
GOLD: THE FULL STORY OF THE FiFTY-YEAR SWISS-NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL BILLIONS FROM
EUROPE'S JEWS AND HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS (1998); GEORGE CARPOZI, JR., NAZI GOLD: THE
REAL STORY OF How THE WORLD PLUNDERED JEWISH TREASURES (1999); ADAM LEBOR,
HITLER'S SECRETBANKERS: THE MYTH OF SWISS NEUTRALITYDURINGTHE HOLOCAUST (1997);
ITAMARLEVIN, THE LAST DEPOSIT: Swiss BANKS AND HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ACCOuNTS (1999);
GREGGJ. RICKMAN, SWISS BANKS AND JEWISH SOULS (1999); ARTHURL. SMITH, HITLER'S GOLD:
THE STORYOFTHE NAZI WARLOOT (1989) (first book to discuss the subject); ISABELVINCENT,
HITLER'S SILENT PARTNERS: SWISS BANKS, NAZI GOLD AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1997);
JEAN ZIEGLER, THE SWISS, THE GOLD AND THE DEAD: HOW SWISS BANKERS HELPED FINANCE
THE NAZi WAR MACHINE (1998) (John Brownjohn trans.) (book written by Swiss sociologist
and parliamentarian).
Various Web sites have appeared dealing with the issue. See, e.g., Greg Bradsher,
U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by
Germany During World War II: Finding Aid to Records at the National Archives at College
Park (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.ushmm.org/assets/nazigold.htm> (site of the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum); Bruno Giussani, Switzerland & the Holocaust Assets
(visited Jan. 3,2000) <http'//www.giussani.com/holocaust-assets/welcome.html> (containing
news articles, documents, and other related papers); Lyonette Louis-Jacques, Law-Related
Resources on Nazi Gold and Other Holocaust Assets, Swiss Banks During World War II, and
Dormant Accounts (last modified Oct. 23, 1999) <http'//www.lib.uchicago. edu/-
llou/nazigold.html> (providing resources on Holocaust restitution assets by the University of
Chicago Law Library); Yves Magat, Confidential Switzerland and World War II, The
Documents (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/potomac/doc.
html> (containing copies of original documents collected by the World Jewish Congress, the
United States Senate and by Magat); Simon Wiesenthal Center (visited Jan. 3, 2000)
<http://www.audionet.com/eventsswc>.
For Web sites covering the issue from a Swiss perspective, see DormantAccounts Web
Site of the Swiss Bankers Association (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http://www.dormantaccounts.
ch/> (containing a list of the dormant accounts opened by non-Swiss individuals prior to the
end of World War II (May 9, 1945), along with information on how to file a claim, maintained
by the Swiss Bankers Association); Task Force (visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http'//www.
switzerland.taskforce.ch/> (containing Swiss government reports in four languages,
maintained by the Swiss Government Task Force "Switzerland-Second World War").
Law firms involved in the litigation against the Swiss, and also in the subsequent
Holocaust-era lawsuits fied in the United States, have set up Web sites containing
information regarding progress of the various lawsuits. See Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll
(visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http'///www.cmht.com>; Fagan & D'Avino (visited Feb. 20, 2000)
<http://faganlaw.com>; Klein & Solomon and the Law Offices of Mel Urbach (visited Feb. 20,
2000) <http'//holocaustrestitution.com>; Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP (visited
Feb. 20, 2000) <http://www.lchb.com>;Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach (visited Jan.
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monies deposited with them for safekeeping by victims of World War
II. These depositors were primarily, but not exclusively, Jews."5
3, 2000) <http//www.milberg.com>. Many of these law firm Web sites contain useful links
to other private and government sites dealing with Holocaust restitution.
In 1999, two Web sites were unveiled that aimed to help Holocaust survivors and
heirs find missing assets. See LivingHeirs (visited Feb. 20,2000) <http//www.avotaynu.coml
holocaustlist>; Living Heirs (visited Feb. 20, 2000) <http//www.livingheirs.com>. Both are
Web sites of Jewish genealogical organizations.
The evidence exposing Switzerland's role during World War II has transformed its
image throughout the world, and especially in the United States. See John-Thor Dahlburg,
The Alpine Glow Fades for Swiss, L. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at Al. Switzerland is no longer
viewed as a "land populated by peace-loving burghers and peasants, watchmakers, bankers
and hoteliers, committed to upholding Switzerland's 'everlasting neutrality,' as stipulated
by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 .... [and] the land of Heidi and the home of the
International Red Cross, 'Europe's pharmacy' and perpetual first-aid station." Amos Elon,
Switzerland's Lasting Demon, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 12, 1998, § 6, at 40. Rather, it is now
perceived as a nation that, as a result of its financial dealings with the Nazis, is guilty of
profiting from the deaths and misery of others, and for prolonging the war by at least one
year, ifnot longer. See id. (citing U.S. Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, the leading
U.S. official on the Holocaust-assets issue, and Swiss sociologist Jean Ziegler). As chillingly
put by one commentator: "History has caught up with William Tell and exposed him as a
pimp." Id. at 43 (quoting economist Gian Trepp).
InJune 1999, Switzerland unexpectedlylostits bid forthe 2006 Winter Olympics, and
the loss was blamed on negative publicity generated by the Holocaust-era events. 'I never
even dreamed that we had such a bad reputation. I heard delegates say they wanted the
Swiss to lose. People don't like Switzerland." Clare Nullis, Swiss at Loss Losing2006Bid, AP
ONLINE, June 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17816671 (quoting Swiss Sports Minister Adolf
Ogi).
For commentary defending the Swiss, see Thomas G. Borer, The Swiss and the
Holocaust, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, atA19. Ambassador Borer was the head of the Swiss-
government Task Force "Switzerland-Second World War," which existed until March 1999.
See also Political Scene: Ratification of OECD Pact on Corruption Delayed, ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRYREP.-SwTRLAND 2ND QUARTER, 1999, Apr. 6,1999, available
in 1999 WL 14365009 (containing section entitled "Nazi gold and Jewish assets" that
summarizes Swiss government and private industry efforts to correct wrongs committed
during World War H).
15. The commonly-used term for such lawsuits is the "dormant account" cases, referring
to the fact that such accounts have laid dormant in the Swiss private banks with no account
activity for the last 55 years. For other law review articles discussing the dormant account
claims, including the Swiss bank litigation, see Anita Ramasastry, Secrets And Lies? Swiss
Banks and International Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 325 (1998); Stephanie A.
Bilenkei, Comment, In re Holocaust Victims' Assets Litigation: Do the U.S. Courts Have
Jurisdiction over the LawsuitsFiled by Holocaust Survivors against the Swiss Banks?, 21 MD.
J. INT'L L. & TRADE 251 (1997); Jodi Berlin Ganz, Note, Heirs without Assets and Assets
without Heirs:Recovering and ReclaimingDormant Swiss BankAccounts, 20 FORDHAMINT'L
L.J. 1306 (1997).
In December 1999, an independent committee of experts, created by the Swiss
Bankers Association and headed by Paul Volcker, the former head of the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board, concluded a three-year study of the World War II-era dormant accounts held
by the Swiss banks. See INDEPENDENT COMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS, REPORT ON
DORMANT ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION (1999) [hereinafter INDEPENDENT
COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS]. The so-called Volcker Committee found 53,886 accounts
in Swiss banks linked to people persecuted by the Nazis. See id. at 10. The Committee report
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Second, both Swiss private institutions and the Swiss government
were alleged to have profited during World War II from trading in
gold 6 and other assets stolen by the Nazis and from goods made by
cautioned, however, that its numbers were imprecise because "[t]here can be no assurance
that all possible accounts have been identified or that some have not been misidentified as
those of victims." Id. at 6. Nevertheless, even this figure was much higher than the number
of dormant accounts the Swiss banks originally claimed to have uncovered. In February
1996, the Swiss Bankers Association announced that it knew of only 775 unclaimed bank
accounts opened by foreign clients before 1945. See VeilLifted onHolocaustAccounts in Swiss
Banks, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 6, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25156568.
Moreover, the figure issued by the Volcker Committee (estimating 53,886 accounts) is
probably underestimated. As the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz pointed out, the Committee
auditors were "able to examine only four million out of a total of 6.7 million accounts in Swiss
banks at the end of the war. Details of the remaining accounts were not kept." Yair Sheleg,
Israel: Volcker Panel Numbers Too Low, Ha'aretz (Israel), Dec. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL
29286184. The auditors then matched the names of holders of the discovered dormant
accounts to lists of those who perished in the Holocaust kept by the U.S. Holocaust Museum
and the Yad Vashem Holocaust Center in Israel. See id. Both these victims' lists, however,
are incomplete. For example, "the list of victims maintained by Yad Vashem includes only
about half of all those who died in the Holocaust." Id.
While the Volcker Committee report cleared the Swiss banks of any criminal
wrongdoing, the actions of the banks "led the Committee to question whether their duty of
due care in their dealings with customers was observed by a number of banks and their
officers in the special situations following World War II." INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF
EMINENT PERSONS, supra, at 14.
In a section entitled "Concluding Comment," that report summarized its findings:
The record is clear, certainly by today's standards, that the handling of
these funds was too often grossly insensitive to the special conditions of
the Holocaust and sometimes misleading in intent and unfair in result.
Our inquiry is one reflection of a willingness by Switzerland to deal with
that heritage more forcefully and openly.
Id. at 23.
16. The commonly-referred term used here is "Nazi gold." The term is actually a
misnomer, since it implies that the gold belonged to the Nazis. In fact, the gold was not Nazi
gold, but gold stolen by the Nazis during their plunder of Europe. The term "Nazi gold,"
however, has entered such common usage that it will be used throughout this Article. See,
e.g., BOWER, supra note 14; CARPOZI, supra note 14; Nazi Gold: The Biggest Heist in History,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16595258.
Two types of"Nazi gold" are at issue: (1) "monetary gold" stolen by the Nazis from the
central banks of the countries they conquered; and (2) "private gold" forcibly taken from the
Jewish victims killed by the Nazis, including gold teeth and fillings ripped from the victims'
mouths. Various reports recently have been issued to finally account for the gold stolen by the
Nazis from occupied governments and both Jewish and non-Jewish victims. See WILLIAM
SLANG, UNITED STATES AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER
ASSETS STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II (May 1997 & June 1998)
(report issued by the United States government); JONATHAN STEINBERG ETAL.,THE DEUTSCHE
BANK AND ITS GOLD TRANSACTIONS DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (July 30, 1998) (report
issued by an independent historical commission created by Deutsche Bank, Germany's largest
bank); Switzerland and Gold Transactions in the Second World War (visited Feb. 20, 2000)
<http'J/www.vek.ch/eindex.htm> (report issued by the Swiss government).
The current value of the gold stolen by the Nazis from occupied nations and
individuals is estimated to be worth approximately $6 billion. See Martin Rosenberg, Papers
Show Nazi Misuse of Treasures, KAN. CITY STAR, May 15, 1998, at C3 (referring to an
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slave labor under the Nazi regime." Such claims also have been
estimate made at the 43-nation Nazi gold conference held in London in November 1997).
Recent research has discovered that other nations, besides Switzerland, were involved
in trading gold and other assets stolen by the Nazis. See, e.g., John J. Allen, Jr., Digging for
Gold in the Archives, NAT'L CATH. REP., Dec. 4, 1998, at 5, available in 1998 WL 14873534
(discussing possible link to the Vatican); Argentina: Seeking Nazi Gold, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27,
1999, atA6 (reporting thatArgentina's central bank discovered to have dealtwith Nazi-stolen
gold during World War H); Anthony Faola, Argentinean Government Commission Lifts Veil
of Nazi Activities, JERUSALEM POST, May 12, 1999, at 6, available in 1999 WL 9002951;
Norway to Pay Shoah Victims, JEWISH J., May 5, 1999, at 9 (discussing Norway's creation of
a $60 million fund to compensate its Jewish victims); see also CHESNOFF, supra note 1, at 232-
55 (containing chapter entitled 'The Other Neutrals").
In June 1998, the United States government issued a 180-page report focusing on the
wartime commercial dealings with the Nazis by the so-called "other neutrals" (besides
Switzerland), specifically focusing on Argentina, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey.
According to then-Deputy Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, who was in charge of
preparing the report:
"Each of the wartime neutrals made a substantial contribution to the economic
foundations of the Nazi war effort.... Sweden was clearly among the most
helpful of the neutral countries to the German war effort. Not only did it
supply Germany with critical war supplies and receive substantial amounts
of looted gold, but it gave the Germans significant transit rights across its
territory to reach Finland in order to fight against Soviet forces, as well as to
facilitate the occupation of Norway."
Norman Kempster, Neutral Nations Kept Nazi Forces Going, U.S. Says, L.A. TIMES, June 3,
1998, at A8 (quoting Stuart Eizenstat).
In late 1999 and early 2000, two lawsuits were brought in federal courts in California
against the Vatican, alleging that during World War II, the Vatican Bank funneled loot from
the Croatian Nazi-puppet Utashu regime. See Michele Conlin, Did Nazi Loot End up at
Vatican Bank?, BUS. WK, Jan. 24, 2000, at 52 (discussing action filed in federal district court
in Los Angeles); Patrick Geodenough, Vatican Faces Lawsuit for Alleged Nazi-era War
Crimes, CNSNEWS.cOM, Nov. 23,1999 (discussinglawsuit fiedin federal district courtin San
Francisco).
17. Two other types of accusations have been made against the Swiss for their activities
during World War H.
First, Swiss insurance companies, like other insurance companies in Europe on the
eve of, or during World War 11, sold policies to Jews who eventually perished in the Holocaust.
After the death of the victims, the companies refused to make payment on the policies to the
victims' heirs. Suits have been fied against these insurance companies in the United States.
For a discussion of the Holocaust insurance litigation, including litigation against Swiss
insurance companies, see text and notes infra Part IV.
Second, the Swiss have been implicated in profiting from Nazi-stolen art that made
its way to Switzerland. According to one source,
A report by the [Swiss-government] Bergier commission, published in
December, 1998, stated that Swiss dealers and collectors were important
traffickers of artworks looted by the Nazis. No one was ever punished and afew
even received government compensations when they were obliged to return the
art. Some 71 artworks were returned to their legal owners... but Switzerland
made no effort to trace other stolen artworks and, according to the report,
placed considerable obstacles in the way of claimants.
PoliticalScene:Report on Nazi-LootedArtworks is Published, ECONOMISTINTELLIGENCEUNIT
COUNTRY REP.-SWrrZERLAND, 1st Quarter, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10723809. For a
detailed discussion of the Swiss role in Nazi-stolen art, see Joe Lauria, A Silent Conspiracy,
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made primarily, but not exclusively, by Jewish victims."8
Third, the Swiss government was accused of expelling during the
war Jewish refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe who sought safe
haven in neutral Switzerland, or preventing their entry into the
ARTNEWS, Feb. 1, 1999, at 54, available in 1999 WL 9955470. To deal with this issue, in
January 1999 the Swiss Federal Department of Interior opened the "Contact Bureau on
Looted Art" at the Interior Ministry's Federal Office for Culture. See Federal Department of
Interior, Berne, Switzerland, Press Release (Jan. 1999) (on file with author).
18. In August 1998, the two largest banks in Switzerland, Credit Suisse and Union Bank
of Switzerland (UBS), settled the class action lawsuits against them for $1.25 billion, to be
paid over three years. The figure represents the largest settlement of a human rights case in




country. 9 Almost all who were expelled, or were denied entry by
Switzerland, died at the hands of the Nazis.2 °
Part IV will discuss the second type of Holocaust cases: claims
made against various European insurance companies for failure to
19. The subject of Switzerland's reaction to the plight of Jews seeking safe haven during
the war is controversial, and subject to different interpretations. On the one hand,
Switzerland admitted 28,000 Jewish refugees during the war, more than were
admitted to the U.S. [On the other hand,] it turned away another 30,000.
Historians insist that the number was far higher, probably more than 100,000.
... [Moreover], Switzerland insisted in 1938 that the Nazis stamp Jewish
passports [i.e., passports of German citizens who were Jews] with the [letter]
"J," to make it easier to identify Jews at the border and prevent them from
entering.
Marilyn Henry, Victims of Omission, JERUSALEMPOST, July 23,1999, at 7B, available in 1999
WL 9006150.
Those Holocaust survivors who were allowed entry are grateful to Switzerland for
almost surely saving their lives, as the author has witnessed that emotion in various
conversations with such survivors. See generally KENNEWMAN, Swiss WARTIME WORKCAMPs:
ACOLLECTIONOFEYEWlTNESS TESTIMONIES 1940-1945 (1999) (containing collection of letters
by Holocaust survivors who were granted asylum by Switzerland, expressing their gratitude).
The editor of this book, Ken Newman, obtained refuge in Switzerland from 1942-45. See id.
at 146-47. Those who were expelled from Switzerland are bitter. See Henry, supra, at 7B
(telling story of Samuel Schachne, expelled at age seven with his family from Switzerland to
Nazi-occupied France: "[H]e is furious at Switzerland, and believes that Bern owes his family
an apology."). Id.
In December 1999, the Bergier historical commission, created by the Swiss
government, issued its report on Swiss policy toward the Jews fleeing Nazi-occupied Europe
during World War 1. The report concluded:
For persecuted people, the journey to the Swiss border was already
fraught with danger. When they reached the Swiss border, Switzerland was
their last hope. By creating additional barriers for them to overcome, Swiss
officials helped the Nazi regime achieve its goals, whether intentionally or not.
There is no indication that opening the border might have provoked an
invasion by the Axis, or caused insurmountable economic difficulties.
Nevertheless, Switzerland declined the help people in mortal danger. A more
humane policy might have saved thousand of refugees from being killed by the
Nazis and their accomplices.
INDEPENDENT CONMISSION OF EXPERTS, SECOND WORLD WAR, SWITZERLAND AND REFUGEES
IN THE NAZI ERA 271 (1999).
20. For further discussion of these claims, see infra note 343 and accompanying text. In
January 2000, Switzerland's highest court dismissed a lawsuit filed by a Holocaust survivor
who, during World War II, was handed over by Swiss border guards to the Nazis and then
deported toAuschwitz. See Clare Nullis, Swiss CourtRejectsHolocaust Suit, APONLINE, Jan.
21,2000, available in 2000 WL 9749442. Plaintiff Joseph Spring, age 73, survived the ordeal
but his two cousins, also expelled by Switzerland, perished in the gas chambers. See id. The
court, in a 3-2 decision, nevertheless, awarded plaintiff $63,000, the damages he requested,
on ethical grounds. See id. Spring was disappointed with the judgment: "An apology is enough
if you accidentally step on somebody's toe when you're dancing, but it's a different matter
when the active collaboration of Swiss border guards sends people to their death .... Justice
in my case means recognition that a crime was committed against me." See id. (quoting
Joseph Spring).
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pay on policies purchased by victims of the Holocaust during World
War II. While the "dormant account" and "Nazi gold" cases against
the Swiss have received the most publicity, it is estimated that the
claims now being made on these European insurance policies exceed
what was lost in monies deposited in Swiss banks.2
Part V will discuss the third type of Holocaust cases: claims made
by Holocaust victims and their heirs to art stolen by the Nazis that
made its way into private collections and museums in the United
States.22 The plaintiffs in these cases sought the return of such
artworks from the defendants who possessed the pieces. These Nazi-
stolen art cases were filed as individual lawsuits, 3 in contrast to the
previous categories, where both individual and class action lawsuits
have been filed.
Part VI will discuss the fourth, and most recent, type of Holocaust
cases: suits filed against major industrial companies for their use of
slave labor during World War II. The slave labor cases present the
latest category of Holocaust-era lawsuits filed in the United States.
While the overwhelming number of these suits are against German
enterprises, other nations' enterprises (including companies in the
United States) have been accused of using slave labor in Nazi-
occupied Europe during World War II.
21. See Marilyn Henry, supra note 11, at 3 (quoting Elan Steinberg, Executive Director
of World Jewish Congress).
In August 1998, Assicurazioni Generali, Italy's leading insurance company and the
issuer of the largest number of insurance policies to World War II Jewish victims, settled the
class action lawsuit against it for $100 million. The settlement, however, was never
consummated, and the action against Assicurazioni Generali continued. For a discussion of
the settlement and its subsequent breakdown, see discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.a.
22. For excellent treatises discussing the Nazi theft of art during World War II, see
HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MuSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD'S
GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997); LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF
EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994); JONATHAN
PETROPOULOS, THE FAUSTIAN BARGAIN: THE ART WORLD IN NAZI GERMANY (2000).
23. For a list of lawsuits, see infra Appendix A. Two cases were recently settled. See id.
In August 1998, the first case scheduled to reach trial for Nazi-stolen art, Goodman
v. Searle, 96 C 6459 (N.D. Ill. filed Sept. 24, 1996), settled on the eve of trial. The case
involved a Nazi-stolen Degas that made its way into the United States and was held by a
private collector. For a discussion of the case, see text and notes infra Part V.A.
In June 1999, the second individual lawsuit, Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Wash. 1999), filed in 1998 in federal court in Washington State, also
settled at the pretrial stage. The case involved a Nazi-stolen Matisse painting that was being
publicly exhibited at the Seattle Art Museum before its checkered history was discovered. For
a discussion of the case, see text and notes infra Part V.B.
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Part VII will discuss other lawsuits that do not fit within any of
the above four categories. These include: (1) suits against German
pharmaceutical companies alleging that they profited from cruel
medical experiments conducted by the Nazis against Holocaust
victims, including children; (2) a suit against Volkswagen for
allegedly maintaining a "Nazi nursery" where infants of slave
laborers were mistreated and perished; (3) suits against Austrian,
German and French banks for allegedly profiting from assets stolen
by the Nazis from Jewish victims; and (4) suits against American
companies accused of profiting from the Holocaust.
The article concludes with appendices containing a complete list
of Holocaust-era suits filed in the United States to date, and a
description of recently-enacted federal and state laws dealing with
Holocaust restitution. Most of these laws have been promulgated
directly as a result of the recent spate of litigation.

II. LITIGATING HOLOCAUST CLAIMS BEFORE 1996
As a general rule, victims of the Holocaust seeking compensation
against alleged wrongdoers have not been successful in obtaining
recovery in American courts.
A total of ten cases involving Holocaust-era claims were filed in
the United States between the end of World War II and October
1996, the start of the new era of Holocaust-claim litigation.24
This section reviews the most important cases filed during that
time period.
A. Generali Insurance Litigation
In 1942, even while World War II was raging, the first Holocaust-
era lawsuit was filed in the United States.
Interestingly, the lawsuit was an insurance case filed against
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. ("Geherali"), the giant Italian
insurance company against whom numerous federal and state
lawsuits are now pending for failure to honor pre-World War II
policies purchased by Holocaust victimsY
Max Buxbaum, a Czechoslovakian linen merchant, purchased
eight life insurance policies from Generali.2 ' Generali conducted
business throughout Europe and the United StatesY.2 Each of the
policies covered either Max Buxbaum or his sons and named
members of the family as beneficiaries. 28 The policies were payable
at any of the locations where Generali conducted business, with the
policy providing exact payment to be made by "dollar check New
York."
29
Generali refused to pay on the grounds that additional require-
ments had been imposed by the German Reich government on the
collection of life insurance policies by Jews. According to Generali,
24. This number does not include cases involving citizenship revocation and deportation
that were filed by the Department of Justice against Nazis and Nazi-sympathizers who came
to the United States under false pretenes after World War II.
25. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.
26. See Buxbaum v. Assicurazioni Generali, 33 N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 499.
30. See id. at 498.
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the Buxbaums, a Jewish family, did not meet these additional
requirements.31 The court ruled for the Buxbaums, requiring
payment on the policies on the basis of standard contract
principles.32
B. Bernstein Cases
Much like the Generali insurance litigation, the Bernstein cases 33
involved a contract dispute. Arnold Bernstein, a Holocaust survivor,
sought compensation for the forcible transfer of his business to a
Nazi trustee. 4 Bernstein was the owner of a German shipping line."
In January 1937, Bernstein was forcibly taken into custody by Nazi
officials and detained in a Hamburg prison.36 While imprisoned,
Bernstein executed documents purporting to transfer the shipping
line to a Nazi trustee, Marius Boege.37 This transfer of interest was
made under "duress and unlawful threats of bodily harm, indefinite
imprisonment and death."" Bernstein was released from prison in
July 1939 after friends paid a ransom for his release.3
Bernstein filed suit in the United States, seeking to attach the
assets of the company that assumed ownership of his business after
the illegal transfer.4" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit refused to address the substantive issues, stating that to do
so would require it to pass judgment on the acts of the German
government without a clear statement of intent from the U.S.
executive branch.4 ' The Second Circuit, in a subsequent Bernstein
suit, affirmed this decision.42
31. See id.
32. See id. at 499-500.
33. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d
71 (2d Cir. 1949), amended by 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres
Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947).







41. See id. at 249.
42. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatchappi, 173
F.2d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 1949), amended by 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
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The court in both cases looked to the State Department for
guidance.43 Finding none, the courts chose, on the grounds of the Act
of State doctrine,' not to address the issues.45
Following the second Bernstein decision, the State Department
issued a press release providing a definite expression of executive
policy on the issues involved in the cases.46 The Second Circuit, on
petition to amend its prior mandate, cited extensively from the press
release, which reaffirmed U.S. opposition to:
"[F]orcible acts of dispossession of a discriminatory and confiscatory
nature practiced by the Germans on the countries or peoples subject to
their controls; state[d] that it is this Government's policy to undo the
forced transfers and restitute identifiable property to the victims of
Nazi persecution wrongfully deprived of such property; and sets forth
that the policy of the Executive, with respect to claims asserted in the
United States for restitution of such property, is to relieve American
courts from any restraint upon the exercise of theirjurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials."47
With American policy clearly defined by the Executive Branch,
Bernstein's lawsuit could now proceed. The courts became free to
address the underlying claims for conversion and damages alleged
by Bernstein.'
The Bernstein litigation has entered the lore of U.S. case law, with
the case discussed in every standard international law text. The
litigation has created the so-called "Bernstein exception" to the Act
of State doctrine, holding that when the Executive issues a
"Bernstein letter," giving a green light to ongoing litigation, a court
will not dismiss the case on Act of State grounds.49
43. See id. at 74; Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F.2d at 250.
44. The judicially-created Act of State doctrine "allows U.S. Courts to abstain from
deciding a case involving an international transaction on the grounds that one of the actors
in the transaction is a foreign state." Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 325, 327 (1986).
45. See N.V. Nederlandsche, 173 F.2d at 74; Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F.2d at 250.
46. See U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 296, Jurisdiction of United States Courts
Re: Suits for Identifiable Property Involved in Nazi Forced Transfers (1949).
47. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatchappij, 210 F.2d
375, 376 (1954) (quoting press release).
48. See id.
49. For further discussion of the Act of State doctrine and the Bernstein exception, see
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,432 (1964); see also Bazyler, supra note
44, at 368-70.
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C. Handel v. Artukovic
In the 1980s, the first Holocaust-era class action was filed in the
United States.
Plaintiffs, elderly Holocaust survivors from Yugoslavia, alleged
that defendant Andrija Artukovic,5 ° a former pro-Nazi Croatian
official who emigrated to the United States after the war, perse-
cuted them.5' Plaintiffs presented four causes of action before the
federal court in California.52 All were based on international law or
foreign law. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Geneva and Hague
Conventions, war crimes in violation of international law, crimes
against humanity in violation of international law, and violations of
the Yugoslavian Criminal Code.53
The federal district court refused to address any of the claims,
dismissing the international law claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and as barred by the statute of limitations.54 The
Yugoslavian Criminal Code violations were dismissed for limitations
problems and because they were in conflict with California law.55
The court explained that plaintiffs' international law claims, like
their treaty claims, must arise under the laws of the United States
for jurisdiction to exist.56 The court found that plaintiffs may not
infer a cause of action from the law of nations, stating that "[w]hile
international law may provide the substantive rule of law in a given
situation, the enforcement of international law is left to individual
[nation] states.""
Having limited its examination to whether state and federal law
provided a remedy to the Holocaust victims, as opposed to interna-
tional obligations entered into by the federal government, the court
found that claims for war crimes and crimes against humanity were
50. Artukovic served as Commissioner of Public Security and Internal Administration,
and later Minister of the Interior, for the Nazi puppet government of wartime Croatia.





56. See id. at 1426.
57. Id. at 1427.
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barred by the California statute of limitations." Consequently, the
court never addressed the substance of the underlying claims.
D. Princz Litigation
Hugo Princz, a Jewish-American citizen, had the misfortune of
living in Eastern Europe when World War II broke out.59 Princz was
taken into custody by the Nazis.6 ° He and his family were engaging
in business and living in Czechoslovakia when they were arrested.61
Princz was detained in concentration camps as a slave laborer, and
forced on the death march from Warsaw to Dachau.62 He was
rescued from a freight car by American troops at the end of the war,
and was the only member of his family to survive.6
In 1952, Germany passed the first reparations law, providing
pensions for Holocaust survivors.' Princz filed a claim for a pension,
but was informed that he was not eligible based on a technicality: he
was a U.S. citizen at the time of his enslavement and detention.65
Therefore, under German reparations law, he was not eligible for
compensation.66
In 1984, Princz sought assistance from U.S. Senator William
Bradley in the hope that government intervention on his behalf
would change the status of his claim.6" The German government
responded that Princz did not qualify and refused to provide a
reparation payment outside the scope of the reparations program.68
58. See id. at 1431. The elderly Holocaust plaintiffs did not pursue an appeal of the case.
The United States Department ofJustice, however, throughits Nazi-hunting Office of Special
Investigations, brought denaturalization proceedings against Artukovic. See Artukovic v.
Rison, 784 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1986); Artukovic v. INS, 693 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Extradition of Artukovic, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Cal. 1986). Artukovic was subsequently
deported to Yugoslavia to stand trial, where he died of natural causes.
59. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 813 F. Supp. 22, 23 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd,
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Princz then sought adjudication in the German courts in 1986.
The German Supreme Court held that the claims were barred by the
statute of limitations.69 Not finding relief in German courts, Princz
brought his claim against the German government in U.S. federal
court.
The German government moved to have the action dismissed on
the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the acts of a
sovereign state.v The district court denied the motion. Judge
Stanley Sporkin held that
a United States citizen, who was a victim of the Holocaust, has a
constitutional right to proceed in a United States Court against the
very nation that subjected him and his family to the most unspeakable
and barbarous acts known to humankind. To hold otherwise would
complete the stripping of Mr. Princz's most valuable rights of
citizenship.71
The German government appealed the decision72 and moved to stay
the proceedings until the appeal was decided.73 In a sharply worded
opinion, Judge Sporkin denied the request for the stay, stating that
[ilt is totally mystifying to this Court why the German Government not
only wants to attack this Court's jurisdiction, but also wants to reserve
the right to contest the substance of Plaintiffs claim in the event it
loses on the jurisdictional issue. Of course, if the German Government
wants to try the Holocaust, this Court has no choice but to
accommodate its wishes.74
Again, the German government appealed. This appeal was suc-
cessful, and Princz's case was dismissed.75
In an opinion by Judge Ginsburg, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit first found that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")76 "provides the sole basis for
69. See id.
70. See id. at 25.
71. Id. at 27.
72. The court ofappeals affirmed the lower court's decision denying the motion to dismiss.
See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 998 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
73. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, Civ. A. No. 92-0644, 1993 WL 121501, at
*1 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 1993).
74. Id.
75. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11(1994 & Supp. IH 1997).
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obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in federal court."77 Judge
Ginsburg then addressed the applicable exceptions to foreign
sovereign immunity found in the FSIA.78 Finding that neither the
commercial activity nor the direct effect exceptions of the FSIA
covered plaintiffs claims, the appellate court dismissed the lawsuit
on sovereign immunity grounds.79
Ultimately, however, Princz won, though not in court. In 1995,
one year after dismissal, the German government settled the claim
with him and ten other Holocaust survivors who were American
citizens during the war for $2.1 million. 0 The settlement came as a
result of efforts in Congress to enact legislation that would allow
Princz's claim to go forward.8 Facing prolonged litigation and
negative public opinion, the German government wisely opted for
settlement.
E. Cases against the Claims Conference
The Claims Conference, made up of the Conference on Jewish
Material Claims Against Germany and the Committee for Jewish
Claims on Austria, has sustained both bitter criticism and litigation
in American courts. The Claims Conference was established in 1951
when West Germany agreed to pay hundreds of millions of dollars
in reparations to survivors of the Holocaust. 2 Monies were paid to
Israel and to the Claims Conference, which was responsible for the
distribution of funds to Holocaust survivors.83
77. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1169 (quotingArgentine Republicv. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,
488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989)).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1172, 1176.
80. See Kimberly J. McLarin, Holocaust Survivor Will Share $2.1 Million in Reparations,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at B1.
81. See S. Res. 162, 103d Cong. (1993).
82. For general information aboutthe Claims Conference, see Claims Conference (visited
Feb. 20, 2000) <http'//www.claimscon.org>. In 1999, the Claims Conference published a
helpful handbook on the various restitution programs it administers. See CLAIMS
CONFERENCE, GUIDETO COMPENSATIONANDRES&TruTiONFORHOLOCAUSTSURVIVORS (1999).
83. See Who WeAre, UPDATE (Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany),
May-June, 1999, at 4. This newsletter states:
The Claims Conference is an international umbrella organization of 23 major
Jewish organizations. Headquartered in New York with offices in Germany,
Austria and Israel, it represents world Jewry in negotiations for compensation
and restitution from the German and Austrian governments and other entities
controlled by the Nazis. The Claims Conference, which was founded in 1951,
also is an operating agency that administers compensation funds, recovers
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The Agreement between Germany and Israel provided that 450
million Deutsche marks would be paid to the Claims Conference "for
the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims of
National-Socialist persecution, according to the urgency of their
needs as determined by the Conference." 4
Jewish property and allocates funds to institutions that provide social welfare
services to Holocaust survivors and preserve the memory and lessons of the
Shoah.
Id.
In 1999, the long-time administrator of the Claims Conference, Saul Kagan, resigned
after 47 years. See id. at 3. Kagan had been criticized during his tenure, and was replaced by
Gideon Taylor, an Irish-born attorney, who aims to improve the performance of the
organization. See id.
For criticism of the Claims Conference, see David A- Lash, Poor Justice, L.A. DAILY
J., Sept. 19,1992, at 6. The author, head of a Los Angeles-based legal aid service representing
many Holocaust survivors, observes:
The claims conference, however, has not focused on the tens of thousands of
faceless, voiceless, individual indigent Holocaust survivors who now so
desperately need the safety and salvation that a few hundred dollars a month
can bring. Instead, the claims conference finds itself immersed in high profile
matters pushed to center stage by the rich and powerful ....
The claims conference currently takes more than three years to process
claims. The cruel reality of this interminable delay is that many aged and
suffering applicants simply do not survive.
Id.; see also Netty C. Gross, The Old Boys Club, JERUSALEM REP., May 15, 1997, at 31; Netty
C. Gross, The Outrage Grows, JERUSALEM REP., May 29, 1997, at 30; Netty C. Gross, Taking
Stock, JERUSALEM REP., Aug. 7, 1997, at 32 (series of articles exposing the problems of the
Claims Conference).
In August 1999, the Claims Conference changed its long-standing policy of denying
Jewish heirs some of the profits from the sale of Nazi-confiscated property. The above-cited
Jerusalem Report articles exposed this policy, which led to its cessation. See After Years of
Stonewalling, The Claims Conference Changes Policy, JERUSALEM REP., Aug. 16, 1999, at 4.
The same month, however, a New York state court judge dismissed another lawsuit
against the Claims Conference by a Holocaust survivor. See Order Dismissing the Action on
Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens, Hammerstein v. Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Against Germany, Inc., No. 114355/98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Aug. 5,1999). Plaintiff claimed that
the Claims Conference unreasonably interfered with and converted property in Germany
rightfully belonging to her family that was previously confiscated by the Nazis. See id. at 1-6.
The Claims Conference argued that since the property was located in Germany, the suit
should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens. See id. at 1. The court accepted
this argument, forcing plaintiff to pursue her remedies, if any, in German courts. See id.
Ironically, as the following sections of this article will show, the Claims Conference relied on
the same argument that European corporate defendants have raised when sued by Holocaust
survivors or heirs in the United States.
84. Revici v. Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, 174 N.Y.S.2d 825,
827 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (quoting Article 2 of the Protocol signed by Germany and the Claims
Conference on Sept. 10, 1952). For a Web site that provides useful information about the
Claims Conference and German reparations, see German Restitution Law (visited Jan. 4,
2000) <http://www.ushmm.org/assets/frg-restitution.htm> (site provided by the Embassy of
the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States, discussing"German Restitution Law").
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As early as 1958, survivors began bringing suits against the
Claims Conference for alleged mismanagement of funds." These
suits were brought despite a provision in the Israeli-West German
agreement requiring arbitration of disputes.86
In the first suit, Tullio Revici, a Holocaust claimant, brought suit
in New York state court alleging that the Claims Conference had
shown improper favoritism among the beneficiaries entitled to
relief." Revici asked the New York court to subsume the role of the
Claims Conference and to determine a fair and proper amount of
compensation for his rehabilitation.88 The New York court refused
to hear the claim, finding that Revici was "without a justiciable
right capable of enforcement."89
This decision appeared to have settled the matter for several
decades. In 1995, the same questions regarding management of the
Claims Conference were raised in federal court by Irving Wolf, a
Holocaust survivor who alleged that he was denied his rightful
compensation by the Claims Conference." The district court held
that the exceptions to the FSIA articulated by Wolf were not
applicable, and that Wolf lacked standing to pursue the claim in
federal court.9' The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the decision, finding that the agreements governing the
Claims Conference failed to establish a legally-protected interest of
the plaintiff that was subsequently invaded.92
Other aggrieved claimants attempted to collect from the Claims
Conference, asserting more substantial harm. Jacob Sampson
brought suit in federal court alleging that the Claims Conference
had embezzled or converted funds intended for Holocaust
survivors.93 Again, the court found that none of the exceptions to the
FSIA were applicable, and that plaintiff lacked standing to pursue
the claim.94
85. See Revici, 174 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
86. See id. at 828.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 829.
90. See Wolfv. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 93 C 7499,1995 WL 263471, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. May 1, 1995).
91. See id. at *13, 14.
92. See Wolf v. Federal Republic of Germany, 95 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 1996).
93. See Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1114 (N.D. Ill.
1997).
94. See id. at 1120.
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In 1995, Holocaust survivors brought a class action suit against
the Claims Conference, also alleging mismanagement and embezzle-
ment." Plaintiffs sought $40 billion in damages.9" The complaint
asserted that (1) Israel was liable for funds lost to mismanagement
and embezzlement; and (2) newly-unified Germany was liable for
the reparations that should have been paid by East Germany.97 The
court held that none of the asserted exceptions to the FSIA were
met, and that jurisdiction was not created under the Alien Tort
Claims Act.9"
F. Early Nazi-Stolen Art Cases
The first lawsuit involving Nazi-stolen art was filed in the 1960s. 9
Erna Menzel brought suit in New York state court to reclaim a
painting by Marc Chagall that was pillaged from her home in
Brussels in 1941.10 The painting was left in the apartment when
she and her husband fled from the Nazis.' The painting was seized
by the Centre for National Socialist Ideological and Educational
Research, an organ of the Nazi party.0 2 The whereabouts of the
painting were unknown between the years 1941 to 1955.103
In 1955, the Chagall painting was purchased by defendant Perls
from a reputable Paris art gallery.0 4 Perls sold the painting to
defendant List that same year.10 5 It was admitted by all parties that
both Perls and List were bona fide purchasers for value.0 6 This
status alone, however, did not protect the defendants.
First, the court found that even though defendant List purchased
the painting in 1955, the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until plaintiff asked defendant List for the return of the painting.' 7
95. See Hirsh v. Israel, 962 F. Supp. 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
96. See id. at 379.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
100. See id. at 806.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 808.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 807.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 809. For severe criticism of this portion of the Menzel decision, see Ashton
Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance between the Rights
of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 49, 71-76
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Under this rule, plaintiffs claim for the return of the painting,
stolen over two decades earlier, was not time-barred.
The court also found defendant's arguments regarding sovereign
immunity inapplicable because the pillage was accomplished by
individual Nazis, and not by a foreign sovereign, Nazi Germany.
08
The court, therefore, ordered the Chagall returned to the plaintiff.'0 9
Another effort to recover stolen art involved watercolors painted
by Adolf Hitler and a catalog of German photographs." 0
Heinrich Hoffman, Sr., was adjudged at the Nuremberg tribunal
to be a profiteer."' He was sentenced to jail, and was dispossessed
of 80 percent of his property."2 He retained, however, ownership of
the watercolors and photographs in question." 3 These items were in
the possession of the U.S. government at the time of the litigation." 4
Previously, the U.S. government used them for evidence at the
Nuremberg Tribunal, and later displayed them at the National
Archives in Washington, D.C." 5
Hoffman's heirs discovered the whereabouts of the watercolors
when they were advertised as part of a display by the U.S. Army.
116
Plaintiffs sought their return and were denied."17
The Hoffman heirs assigned their rights to plaintiffs, who filed
suit and initially won. The district court found that when the
photographs were originally taken by the U.S. government, the
express agreement was that they were held in trust and would be
returned when the U.S. government no longer needed them."' When
the heirs demanded the return of the photographs in 1982 and were
denied, the U.S. government, according to the court's opinion,
(1995).
For discussion of the so-called "demand and refusal rule" as it presently exists in New
York to determine the statute of limitations for stolen art cases, see infra notes 684, 764-73
and accompanying text.
108. See Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 813, 816.
109. See id. at 820.
110. See Price v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd, 69 F.3d 46 (5th
Cir. 1995).
111. See Price, 707 F. Supp. at 1468.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1467.
115. See id. at 1468.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1470.
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converted the photographs.1 ' The district court held that both the
photographs and the watercolors belonged to the Hoffman heirs, and
ordered their return.120
On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed.' 2' The appellate court held that the district court
was without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, and that
the claims were also time-barred. 22
119. See id. at 1472.
120. See id. at 1473.
121. See Price v. United States, 69 F.3d 46,54(5th Cir. 1995).
122. See id. at 52-53.
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III. CLAIMS AGAINST THE SWISS
The claims against the Swiss consisted of. (1) a consolidated
federal class action against the three largest Swiss banks for failure
to return monies deposited with them during World War II, and for
other damages; 23 (2) an individual action against the same Swiss
banks filed in California state court; and (3) a suit against the
central bank of Switzerland accusing the bank of accepting looted-
assets from Nazi Germany.
125
A. Federal Class Action against Swiss Banks
The modern era of Holocaust asset litigation began in October
1996 with the filing of a class action lawsuit against the three
largest private Swiss banks-Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzer-
land ("UBS"), and Swiss Bank Corporation-in federal district court
in Brooklyn, New York. 26 Later that month, a second action was
filed against the three banks.'27 A third action, also against the
same defendants and in the same court, was filed in early 1997.128
The three actions were consolidated in April 1997 and collectively
titled In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation.29
123. See Complaint, Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switz., No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Oct. 3, 1996 & Amended Complaint filed July 30, 1997) [hereinafter Weisshaus Amended
Complaint] (filing of a class action by Holocaust survivors against Union Bank of Switzerland,
Swiss Bank Corporation, Credit Suisse (the three largest Swiss banks) and others); Friedman
v. Union Bank of Switz., No. CV-96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. fied Oct. 21, 1996 [hereinafter Friedman
Complaint] & Amended Complaints filed July 30, 1997, sub nom. Trilling-Grotch v. Union
Bank of'Switz. [hereinafter Trilling-Grotch Amended Complaint] & Sonabend v. Union Bank
of Switz. [hereinafter Sonabend Amended Complaint]) (filing of a class action by heirs of
Holocaust victims against same three banks); Complaint, World Council of Orthodox Jewish
Communities, Inc. v. Union Bank of Switz., No. CV-97-0461 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 1997)
[hereinafter World Council Complaint] (filing of a class action by Jewish group on behalf of
Holocaust survivors and heirs against same three banks).
For a short description of the allegations contained in the three lawsuits, see Jodi
Berlin Ganz, Note,Heirs withoutAssets andAssets withoutHeirs:RecoveringandReclaiming
Dormant Swiss Bank Accounts, 20 FoRDHAMi INTL L.J. 1306, 1356-62 (1997).
124. See Complaint, Markovicovav. Swiss Bank Corp., No. BC 996160 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed
June 30, 1998) [hereinafter Markovicova Complaint] (filing ofa class action under California
law by Holocaust survivors against Swiss Bank Corporation, Credit Suisse, and Union Bank
of Switzerland for restitution of profits allegedly made by banks during World War II).
125. See Complaint, Rosenbergv. Swiss Nat'l Bank, No. 98-CV-1647 (D.D.C. filed June 29,
1998).
126. See Weisshaus Amended Complaint, supra note 123, 19 1.
127. See Trilling-Grotch Amended Complaint, supra note 123, 1 1.
128. See World Council Complaint, supra note 123, 1 1.
129. The Weisshaus case was labeled the lead case on the court's master docket. The judge
hearing the three cases is The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge.
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The three actions listed a total of ten plaintiffs and one institu-
tional plaintiff. The ten plaintiffs were either Holocaust survivors
or children of victims who perished in the Holocaust.'30 The
institutional plaintiff-World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communi-
ties, Inc.-the plaintiff in the third lawsuit filed against the Swiss
banks, is an association of hundreds of Jewish religious communi-
ties comprised of Holocaust survivors and their descendants.' 3'
The Swiss class action is important in many respects. First, while
it was the second, and not the first, class action filed in the United
States involving the Holocaust, 32 it was the first Holocaust-era class
action lawsuit to achieve a successful result.
Second, as every experienced international litigation attorney
recognizes, the most important stage of an international litigation
lawsuit, apart from the trial, is the court's decision whether to grant
or deny defendant's motion to dismiss. In the Swiss bank litigation,
the defendant banks filed extensive motions to dismiss. 3u The
dismissal motions presented every conceivable reason why a
Holocaust-era suit should not be adjudicated in U.S. courts.
Plaintiffs, in turn, filed extensive briefs to counter defendants'
positions. 34 While the arguments were never resolved (the action
having settled before the motion to dismiss was decided), attorneys
litigating the still-ongoing-and future-Holocaust and other World
War II-era restitution suits will find it useful to closely examine the
parties' arguments at the dismissal motion stage.
Third, the Swiss bank action resulted in the largest settlement of
a human rights case in the history of American litigation. 35 As the
first Holocaust-era case to reach the settlement stage, the Swiss
bank settlement exposed the various problems associated with
determining both how to allocate and distribute funds to elderly
Holocaust survivors and other victims of World War II.136 Associated
with the distribution issue, the Swiss bank settlement raised, for
130. See Weisshaus Amended Complaint, supra note 123, 1 5-14; Trilling-Grotch
Amended Complaint, supra note 123, 11-19; Sonabend Amended Complaint, supra note
123, IT 10-19.
131. See World Council Complaint, supra note 123, 6-7.
132. The first Holocaust-era class action lawsuit was Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp.
1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985), discussed supra in Part II.C.
133. See infra Part III.A.2.
134. See infra Part III.A.2.
135. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
136. See discussion and notes infra Part III.D.3.
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the first time, the ethical question of whether lawyers working on
Holocaust restitution should be taking a fee for their services.137
Since the issues and problems first encountered in the Swiss bank
litigation are bound to appear in both ongoing and future World War
II-era lawsuits, this section will focus on such issues and problems.
1. Plaintiffs' Claims
While each of the lawsuits against the Swiss banks alleged
slightly different causes of action, the gravamen of the three
lawsuits was similar. The lawsuits presented three types of
claims. 138
a. Dormant Account Claims
Plaintiffs' first set of claims were based upon "dormant accounts"
or "deposited assets" in the Swiss defendant banks. Thirteen
individual plaintiffs alleged that their family members deposited
monies for safekeeping in one or more of the Swiss banks, or their
predecessors, on the eve of World War II, and that these monies
were never returned by the banks. 39 Plaintiffs demanded the return
of these monies, compensatory and punitive damages for the banks'
failure to do so for the last fifty years, and imposition of a construc-
tive trust upon these monies. 40
The historical background of the dormant accounts claims can be
traced back to Switzerland's enactment in 1934 of strict bank
secrecy laws.' The laws made the Swiss banks attractive to Jews
137. See discussion and notes infra Part III.D.3.c. (discussing how the attorneys were paid
for their work in Holocaust-era litigation).
138. Plaintiffs sought to establish three classes of plaintiffs, each based upon one of the
three claims. See Memorandum of Law submitted by Burt Neuborne at 11-12, In re Holocaust
Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 16, 1997) [hereinafter Neuborne
Memorandum]. For discussions of the allegations made in the lawsuits, see Anita
Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and International Human Rights, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 325 (1998); Stephanie A. Bilenker, Comment, In re Holocaust Victims'Assets
Litigation: Do the U.S. Courts Have Jurisdiction over the Lawsuits Filed by Holocaust
Survivors against the Swiss Banks?, 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 251 (1997); Ganz, supra note
123, at 1306.
139. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 2. Professor Neuborne, of the New
York University School of Law, is serving as plaintiffs' co-counsel for each of the three cases.
140. See id. at 2-3.
141. See id. at 4-6 (discussing the historical background of the dormant account claims).
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seeking to shield their assets from the German Nazi government,
first in Germany, and later in other countries occupied by the
Nazis.142 To avoid tracing of the accounts, the Swiss banks allowed
accounts to be opened in the name of nominees, and also merged
deposits into consolidated custodial accounts.143 As a result,
identification of the accounts became more difficult: first, to the
Nazis seeking to ferret out accounts deposited by Jews in Germany,
Austria, and other occupied countries; and thereafter, to individuals
and institutions attempting to locate these accounts."M
Plaintiffs claimed that "European Jews . . .poured enormous
sums into defendant banks, lured by promises of confidentiality and
trustworthiness."'45 Plaintiffs also alleged that "more than 100
million dollars was deposited by Jews in Swiss banks between 1933-
1945."' 46 Moreover, plaintiffs accused the defendant banks 47 of
engaging in "obstructive and evasive behavior in seeking to prevent
return of the deposited assets for more than 50 years."'48
142. See id. at 4.
143. See id. at 5.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiffs estimated "the current value of the Jewish deposits at
substantially in excess of one billion dollars." Id. at 6 n.4.
147. The three defendant banks-Credit Suisse, Union Bank of Switzerland ("UBS") and
Swiss Bank Corporation ("SBC")-represent, according to plaintiffs, approximately 75% of the
private banks operating in Switzerland between 1933-1945, having acquired their
predecessors by merger, acquisition, or transfer. See id. at 9.
In December 1997, UBS and SBC themselves merged, creating the world's second
largest bank, called UBS United Bank of Switzerland. See Swiss Merger Will Create No.2
Bank, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at D1.
148. Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 2. According to plaintiffs:
[Slurvivors of the death camps, and families of those who failed to survive,
approached the defendant banks, and their predecessors, in an effort to trace
and recover sums deposited by Jews prior to the Holocaust. In one of the tragic
moral perversions of recent times, Swiss bankers, including the defendant
banks and their predecessors, relied upon the 1934 Swiss bank secrecy laws to
frustrate efforts to trace the Jewish deposits; the same bank secrecy laws that
had been used to induce Jews to deposit assets in Swiss banks in the first place.
Id. at 7.
Paul Volcker's Independent Committee of Eminent Persons ("ICEP-) report on
dormant prewar accounts, issued in December 1999, see supra note 15, did not go that far in
blaming the Swiss banks for their behavior. In a section entitled "Evaluation of Bank's
Conduct," the report made the following findings:
In setting the record straight, the Committee has come to certain
conclusions about the appropriateness of the actions of the Swiss banks in
dealing with the accounts of victims of Nazi persecution. Assessing the record
as a whole, the committee concluded:
(a) The auditors have reported no evidence of systematic
destruction of records of victim accounts, organized discrimi-
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nation against the accounts of victims of Nazi persecution, or
concerted efforts to divert the funds of victims of Nazi
persecution to improper purposes; and
(b) There is, however, confirmed evidence of questionable and
deceitful actions by some individual banks in the handling of
accounts of victims, including withholding of information
from Holocaust victims or their heirs about their accounts,
failure to keep adequate records, many cases of insensitivity
to the efforts of victims or heirs of victims to claim dormant
or closed accounts, and a general lack of diligence-even
active resistance-in response to earlier private and official
inquiries about dormant accounts.
No less important were various actions resulting in the closing of
accounts. Normal fees and charges, assessed on all dormant accounts, were
applied even to victims where banks knew or should have known that the
account holder was dead or had disappeared leading to eventual closing by
exhaustion of the account values. Moreover, long dormant accounts were
transferred to the banks' profit accounts, most without retaining readily
available documentation necessary to easily identify the accounts of returning
depositors. The criticism, applicable in this case to the treatment of all dormant
accounts, of such actions is even more pointed with respect to the extraordinary
charges for searches for victims accounts or to close accounts. This criticism
also applies to the placing of accounts in fee-free suspense accounts without
payment of interest and, in many cases, without adequate documentation. In
these cases, tracing of ownership was difficult or impossible, with a consequent
greater impact on Holocaust victims whose accounts became involuntarily
dormant. These actions.., led the Committee to question whether their duty
of due care in their dealings with customers was observed by a number of banks
and their officers in the special situation following World War II.
Finally, the Committee also notes that a factor in the indifferent
treatment of many claimants to the accounts of victims of Nazi persecution was
a fear of embarrassment and litigation arising out of transfers of victims
accounts to Nazi authorities after these victims had been coerced into signing
transfer papers. At the time, ethical and business dilemmas were plainly
created for the bank in this situation. However, the practice apparently adopted
after the War by a few banks or bank officials of denying to claimants in such
cases all knowledge of the existence of an earlier closed account relationship is
impossible to justify.
INDEPENDENT COMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS, supra note 15, at 13-15.
The Swiss newspaper Dier Bund commented on the findings as follows:
So now we know: Swiss banks don't hold $6.3 billion belonging to
victims of the Nazis, our financial institutions didn't embezzle victims' money,
they didn't systematically destroy documents-and, after more than five
decades, they still have an astounding quantity of account details.
So far, so good.
But if the Swiss Bankers Association and the federal banking
commission insist only on seeing a "positive reference" ... that smacks of
self-delusion, of exactly the sort that Switzerland can no longer afford on this
subject.
The Swiss banks didn't emerge as the devil in Volcker's verdict-but
they were far from innocent lambs....
One can try to dismiss the dozens of cases of improper behavior cited in
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Plaintiffs alleged that in 1962 the Swiss government promised to
return to Jews the assets deposited by them in the Swiss banks.'49
However, the Swiss did not keep their promise. According to
plaintiffs:
Of the vast sums that plaintiffs will prove flowed into Swiss banks in
the years before the Holocaust, only a pittance has ever been
acknowledged. The vast bulk of the assets have simply disappeared
into the Swiss banking system, constituting the single most egregious
example of unjust enrichment in banking history.150
the report as "isolated cases."
But the banks' postwar behavior in searching for missing assets is
described in the report as it obviously was-stonewalling, 'widespread,'
'generalized' and in some cases even leading to 'active resistance.'
AP ONLINE, Dec. 8, 1999, available in 1999 WL 28147530.
Alan Hevesi, Comptroller of the City of New York and head of the Executive
Monitoring Committee group overseeing local government efforts on Holocaust restitution,
stated: "The findings in this report reveal what we have believed all along-namely that some
Swiss banks conducted a despicable campaign of deceit and immorality by bleeding dry the
accounts of Holocaust victims and lying to survivors trying to claim assets worth hundreds
of millions of dollars." AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Dec. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25156758.
Paul Volcker, in an interview following the issuance of the report, made the following
comment: "'They were lackadaisical, to say the least.... The banks had no incentive to find
out the truth about the assets because they felt they should protect the honor of Switzerland.
They could have solved this problem a long time ago if they really wanted to." William
Drozdiak, Panel Discovers 54,000 Accounts of Nazi Victims; Swiss Banks Cleared of
Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1999, at Al (quoting Paul Volcker).
George Krayer, president of the Swiss Bankers Association, "said the report absolved
the banks from any criminal liability. The dramatic and sweeping accusations leveled against
Swiss banks four years ago have proved to be unfounded."' Id. (quoting George Krayer).
Krayer did apologize to the families of Holocaust victims for "the disappointment and hurt
feelings' that banks may have caused in their past failures to help them seek redress for the
missing assets. But he said the report's findings proved that, with the exception of a few
isolated cases, the banks' conduct during the period in question was correct." Id. (quoting
George Krayer).
Abraham Foxman, head of the Anti-Defamation League and a Holocaust survivor,
called this conclusion to be "'unwarranted and offensive."' ADL Commends Report on Swiss
Banks and Holocaust Assets, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22284188
(quoting Abraham Foxman). According to Foxman, "the Swiss still have a way to go to in
confronting their actions during the war era." Id.
Finally, "[a] prominent Swiss Jewish leader, Sigi Feigel, said the banks' behavior 'was
based on anti-Semitism and sheer hunger for money.' But he praised the banks' cooperation,
sayingit showed a change in attitudes." Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Banks Criticized on Holocaust
Accounts, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 7, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 5115219. And
according to Israel Singer, secretary-general of the World Jewish Congress, '"What happened
here today is a worldwide mea culpa." Id.
149. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 8.
150. Id.
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b. Looted-Assets Claims
The Nazis, as part of their effort to systematically exterminate the
Jews of Europe, also forcibly took from the Jews their property, both
before and after killing them. The property included gold (at times,
literally forced from the victims' mouths) and other valuables.
Nazi Germany then used Swiss public and private institutions to
launder the assets stolen from the Jewish victims. 151 Plaintiffs
accused the Swiss defendant banks of "knowingly and repeatedly
act[ing] as receivers of stolen property on behalf of officials of the
Third Reich in connectionwith assets looted from Jews."'52 Plaintiffs
alleged that the three defendant banks "willingly cooperated with
the Nazis by knowingly receiving property looted from the Jews, and
laundering it into Swiss francs," and that "defendant banks were
paid substantial commissions bythe Nazis for knowingly laundering
vast quantities of looted Jewish assets.' 53
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant Swiss banks earned more
than $75 million by knowingly trafficking in looted assets and in
151. Switzerland was a neutral country during World War II, and, therefore, able to trade
with both the Allied and Axis powers. As a result, Switzerland benefitted enormously from
such trade. See generally STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, TARGET SWITZERLAND: SWISS ARMED
NEUTRALiTY IN WoRLD WAR II (1998); LEBoR, supra note 14; ZIEGLER, supra note 14.
According to plaintiffs:
In order to transform looted Jewish propertyinto negotiable instruments usable
for the German war effort, it was necessary to find an international receiver of
stolen property willing to fence the looted assets by laundering them into
currency that could be used to purchase war material. Swiss banks knowingly
assumed that role.
Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 6.
152. Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 3.
153. Id. at 6; see also Plaintiffs' Counterstatement of Facts at 6-7, In re Holocaust Victim
Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 16, 1997) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Counter-
statement of Facts]. The plaintiffs alleged:
Looted valuables were transferred to the Reich Bank or sold through Berlin
pawn shops by the Reich Bank and largely disposed of through or deposited in
Swiss banks.... The Union Bank of Switzerland, the Swiss Bank Corporation
and Credit Suisse, as well as other banks in Switzerland, were a critical link
and instrumentality in knowingly financing, participating and aiding and
abetting Nazi Germany's war crimes and genocide and in knowingly preserving
their fruits of plunder ....
" [The banks] knowingly transferred and exchanged and disposed of
looted property and provided Germany with the necessary currencies to
'purchase needed products' to perpetrate their atrocities.
Id. at 6-7.
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assets produced by Nazi slave labor.14 According to plaintiffs, the
current value of such profits earned by the defendant banks is in
excess of one billion dollars.'55
In 1946, the Swiss government admitted that it held gold looted
by the Nazis from nations the Nazis occupied. The Swiss promised,
under an agreement entitled the Washington Accords, to return the
gold to its rightful owners. According to plaintiffs, "the Swiss never
carried out their promises under the Washington Accords.""5 6
c. Slave Labor Claims
The Nazis not only plundered occupied Europe of property but
also forced their victims, both Jewish and non-Jewish, into slave
labor.'57 Plaintiffs' third set of claims were based upon benefits the
defendant banks allegedly received from slave labor during World
War II.
Plaintiffs alleged that "[t]he defendant banks . . . knowingly
provided Nazi Germany with Swiss francs in return for goods
produced by Jewish slave labor."5 ' Plaintiffs stated that at trial
they would "demonstrate that Swiss banks, including the three
defendant banks and their predecessors, were paid enormous sums
by the Nazis for their complicity in knowingly financing the
importation into Switzerland of goods produced by Jewish slave
labor."'59 Plaintiffs also maintained that the Nazis deposited the
profits made from the use of slave labor in Swiss banks. 6 ° For these
claims, plaintiffs alleged that the banks "knowingly and repeatedly
trafficked in goods produced by Jewish slave labor with knowledge
that they were trafficking in the fruits of war crimes."'6 '
154. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 7.
155. See id. at 7 n.5.
156. Id. at 8.
157. For further discussion of slave labor in Nazi-occupied Europe and claims being made
against German companies that used slave labor, see discussion and notes infra Part VI.
158. Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 7.
159. Id. at 7.
160. See, e.g., World Council Complaint, supra note 123, T 34-35, 81-96. The Weisshaus
lawsuit did not contain any slave labor claims.
161. Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 3; see also Plaintiffs' Counterstatement
of Facts, supra note 153, at 6-8. The plaintiffs alleged:
Profits of slave labor exploitation were deposited, cloaked and harbored in
accounts in Swiss banks.... [Tihe Swiss banks knowingly received, laundered
and/or concealed German plunder and knowingly accepted concealed profits of
slave labor. The Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation and
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Plaintiffs demanded "disgorgement of any profits unjustly earned
by defendant banks by knowingly assisting Nazis in the consumma-
tion of crimes against humanity, together with the return of any
assets (or the value thereof) for which the banks acted as knowing
receivers of stolen property.
" 162
2. Defendant Banks' Defenses
In response to the complaints filed in the three cases, the Swiss
banks, in lieu of filing answers, filed motions to dismiss. The
dismissal motions, fied on May 15, 1997, were massive, totaling
over 500 pages.'63 In the motions, the defendant banks set out
numerous reasons, covering both procedural and substantive
grounds, as to why the lawsuits should be dismissed. 64
Credit Suisse derived significant profits of their own on these deliberate
transactions.
Id.
162. Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 3.
163. In addition to defendant banks' motions, the Swiss Ambassador to the United States
wrote a letter to the court urging the dismissal of the lawsuits. See Letter from Alfred Defago,
Ambassador of Switzerland to the United States, to The Honorable Edward R. Korman (June
3, 1997) (on file with author). According to Ambassador Defago, "The most effective and just
means for dealing with these matters are in Switzerland, not in a United States court ....
The Government of Switzerland... urges the Court to dismiss the lawsuits." Id. at 6.
The briefing by the parties was so voluminous that both sides submitted overview
memoranda, summarizing the arguments made in the various individual briefs.
164. Interestingly, the particular legal arguments made by the Swiss banks in support of
dismissal, discussed herein, and the responses by plaintiffs to these arguments, can be found
in every other Holocaust-era suit filed after the Swiss bank litigation. The reason is obvious:
every Holocaust-era lawsuit revolves around a similar set of facts and, thereby, raises almost
identical legal issues.
All defendants, ranging from Swiss banks sued in 1997 to German corporations sued
in 1999, have adopted a common legal strategy. Defendants invariably admit that wrongs
may have been committed by them during World War II, but argue that courts in the United
States cannot provide a remedy for such wrongs. Compare Reply Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds at 1, In re
Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 19, 1997) [hereinafter Reply
Memorandum ofLawin Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens
Grounds] ("Plaintiffs' opposition . . . rests heavily on attacks on the integrity of the
Government, courts, and people of Switzerland. This case indeed raises emotional issues, but
a U.S. court of law is bound to proceed based solely on the dispassionate application of
governing legal standards."), with Memorandum in Support ofBayer AG's Motion to Dismiss
at 1, Kor v. Bayer AG, No. TH99-036-C M/H (S.D. Ind. filed June 30, 1999) (presenting the
question of whether an American court is the appropriate forum in which to address German
war crimes). The Memorandum in Support of Bayer AG's Motion to Dismiss states:
The surrender of Nazi Germany on May 8, 1945 ended the largest conflict in
European history. As the war ended, the world learned the full scope of Nazi
crimes .... This motion does not-and could not-seek to diminish the judgment
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a. Defendant Banks' Procedural Grounds for Dismissal
i. Existence of Alternative Resolution Mechanisms
Defendant banks argued that the resolution of any claims to
dormant accounts could be resolved without the extreme measure
of filing a lawsuit in U.S. courts. 6 '
The banks admitted that they may have been holding monies
belonging to Holocaust victims or their heirs. However, they pointed
out that extensive nonadversarial mechanisms have now been set
up by them to ferret out any such monies and deliver it to their
rightful owners.'66 According to the banks: "Plaintiffs were not
required to come to a court of law to seek redress . . . superior,
cooperative mechanisms are available, and those alternatives
become more attractive every day." 67
Defendant banks argued that the district court should abstain
from deciding plaintiffs' claims "in order to [1] avoid interfering with
Swiss sovereign interests, [2] encroaching on the conduct of U.S.
of history. Thus, the question presented here is not whether the conduct
described in the complaint is wrong. Rather, the question is whether a lawsuit
in an American federal court against a German corporation, alleging wrongs
that occurred in Germany more than 50 years ago, can be reconciled with the
clear parameters that define the reach of the United States' civil justice system.
The answer is no.
Id.
165. The argument that resolution of Holocaust claims should not be decided by litigation
in the United States, but rather through some other nonadversarial mechanism, was taken
up by other defendants after they were sued in the United States for their World War II
activities. For discussion of the nonadversarial mechanisms created by other defendants to
counter U.S.-style litigation, see discussion and notes infra Part IV.C. (discussing European
insurance companies creating and funding the "International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims" after being sued for failing to pay on Holocaust-era policies along with
German government and industry creating and fumding the "Remembrance, Responsibility
and the Future Fund" to compensate former slave laborers after slave labor lawsuits are filed
in the United States).
166. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss on
Abstention Grounds and in the Alternative to Stay These Proceedings at 1-7, In re Holocaust
Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 9,1997) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum
of Law in Support of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss on Abstention Grounds and in the
Alternative to Stay These Proceedings].
167. Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum at 1, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No.
CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1997) [hereinafter Defendants' Overview Reply
Memorandum].
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foreign policy and [3] impeding superior alternative processes for
resolving Holocaust-related claims."16
In support of their position, defendants relied on statements made
by then-Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, chief U.S.
government official on the Swiss claims issue, and Paul A. Volcker,
Chairman of the Swiss Government's Independent Committee of
Eminent Persons ("ICEP"), that the class action litigation may
frustrate the resolution of the claims process under way in Switzer-
land.16
9
Defendant banks, therefore, sought for the district court either to
dismiss the lawsuits on grounds of abstention or, in the alternative,
to stay the proceedings pending resolution of the dormant account
claims by the Volcker Committee and the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission's program of both publishing names of dormant account
holders and processing any claimant inquiries. °
Defendants argued that the Swiss Government's alleged "compre-
hensive claims resolution process for all accounts dormant in Swiss
banks since 1945 . . .offer[s] a far superior alternative to class
action litigation for resolving claims fairly and efficiently."17'
168. Id. at 22.
169. See id. at 24. In fact, Paul Volcker wrote to the court opposing this litigation, fearing
that it would threaten to cripple the resolution process of the dormant account claims being
conducted by the Volcker Committee. See Letter from Paul A.- Volcker, Chairman,
Independent Committee of Eminent Persons, to The Honorable Edward R. Korman, U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York 6-7 (July 24, 1997) (on file with author).
This letter was cited in Defendants' Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum of Law. See
Defendants' Post-HearingReply Memorandum of Law at 6,In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No.
CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 12, 1997) [hereinafter Defendants' Post-Hearing Reply
Memorandum].
170. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 5, 22-25.
171. Id. at 23-24; see also Defendants' Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum, supra note 169,
at 4-6 (discussing the issue of whether plaintiffs can proceed on their claim without
interfering with or duplicating the Volcker Commission's work). But see Neuborne
Memorandum, supra note 138, at 61-63, 71-72. Professor Neuborne wrote:
[Diefendants urge the Court to decline to exercise Congressionally mandated
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Court should abstain in favor of a
private effort sponsored and financed by the Swiss Bankers Association, and
headed by Paul Volcker.
Defendants' argument for abstention is, at bottom, that plaintiffs will
receive a better quality of justice in a non-judicial forum than in this Court.
With due respect for defendants' newly discovered sense ofjustice, that decision
is for the plaintiffs to make. Defendants are hardly in a position to give advice
to their victims about where to find the best quality of justice. Indeed,
defendants' strenuous effort to deflect this litigation into a non-judicial forum
of their own choosing and design speaks volumes about the importance of
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ii. Lack of Standing
Defendant banks also claimed that plaintiffs' slave labor and
looted-assets claims should be dismissed because plaintiffs lacked
standing to sue.
172
Defendants pointed out that plaintiffs did not allege that any
profits from slave labor conducted by any individual plaintiff or by
a plaintiffs heir could be traced to any individual defendant bank. 73
Similarly, for the looted-assets claims, plaintiffs did not allege that
any profits from looted assets were deposited in or transacted
through any individual defendant bank.174 Therefore, defendants
argued, plaintiffs could not meet the "traceability" requirement of
constitutional standing. 75
Defendants also pointed out that the damages plaintiffs sought for
looted assets and slave labor could not be tied to any particular
plaintiffs injury.176 Therefore, the damages, according to defen-
dants, would have to be arbitrarily divided among plaintiffs and
their class members. 177 Defendants thus argued that plaintiffs could
continuing this judicial proceeding. For 50 years, defendants have avoided
making restitution of assets deposited byJews on the eve of the Holocaust, and
have avoided disgorging unjust profits they earned from assisting in Nazi war
crimes ....
Defendants' abstention motion is nothing less than an effort to dictate
the forum in which plaintiffs may seek redress against defendants for 50 years
of duplicity. The one forum defendants fear is the one forum they cannot
control-an American court.
Id. at 61-63, 71-72.
172. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Standing to Sue at 7-10, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y.
filed May 15, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Standing]; Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing to Sue at 2-17, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-
96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1999) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum in Support of
Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing].
173. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19-20.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 18; Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Standing to Sue, supra note 172, at 6-15.
176. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 20-21.
177. See id. at 18-19.
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not meet the "redressability" requirement of constitutional stand-
ing.178
iii. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
a. Lack of Diversity Jurisdiction
The Swiss defendant banks argued that complete diversity was
lacking between plaintiffs and defendants, and, therefore, the fed-
eral district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 179
Specifically, defendants pointed out that there were both alien
plaintiffs and alien defendants in each case, thereby destroying
178. See id; see also Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Standing, supra note 172, at 16-18. Defendants also argued that in the third lawsuit,
institutional plaintiff World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities "lacks associational
standing and therefore may not pursue its slave labor or looted asset [sic] claims."
Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19; see also Memorandum in
Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, supra note 172, at 18-
22.
Plaintiffs, in their reply brief, argued that each of the named plaintiffs had standing
to file their suits. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss for Lack of Standing, Failure to State Claims upon which Relief Can Be Granted,
Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages at 22-24, In
re Holocaust Victims Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 16, 1997) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing,
Failure to State Claims upon which Relief Can Be Granted, Failure to Join Indispensable
Parties, and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages].
Professor Neuborne argued, in his brief, that the standing argument was premature,
and should await the discovery process, allowing plaintiffs to be able to connect assets held
by defendants to individual plaintiffs. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 76.
Even if discovery fails to make such a link, Professor Neuborne argued that"theories of group
entitlement and collective liability" should provide standing to plaintiffs. Id. As explained by
Professor Neuborne:
In the end, the issue may come down to permitting defendant banks to retain
money that is not theirs' as a form of unjust enrichment, or requiring the banks
to disgorge the unjust enrichment to close family members of the true owners,
or, if no close family members survived, to appropriate institutional
representatives of the victims for distribution to the communities from which
the money was stolen.
Id. at 77.
179. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 8; Reply
Memorandum of Law in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction at 4-11, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. fied July 9,
1997) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Subject Matter Jurisdiction]. For a discussion of the jurisdiction issue in the Swiss bank
litigation, see Bilenker, supra note 138.
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complete diversity between the parties necessary to invoke the
federal diversity statute.'
b. Lack of Federal Question Jurisdiction
It is undisputed that using individuals as slave laborers, even
during a time of war, and looting assets of civilians during war are
both today, and during World War II, clear violations of interna-
tional law.' War is not a free-for-all, where all rules of conduct are
suspended. 82
It is also undisputed that if plaintiffs had been able to show that
the Swiss banks knowingly participated with the Nazis in profiting
from the slave labor and looted assets they would be, at the least,
civilly responsible as accomplices for such violations.'83 The difficult
question is the ability of having both the slave labor and looted-
assets claims heard in U.S. courts.
Plaintiffs sought to invoke federal question jurisdiction,'" arguing
that the slave labor and looted-assets claims "arise under" the
180. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 17-18 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1994)). To deal with this problem, plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the nondiverse
alien plaintiffs, and have the remaining U. S. plaintiffs serve as class representatives for both
alien and resident members of the class. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 52.
In fact, after defendants filed their motion, plaintiffs filed amended complaints attempting
to cure any diversity jurisdiction problems by separating the alien and nonalien plaintiffs.
Compare Weisshaus Amended Complaint, supra note 123, at 2 (arguing that all plaintiffs are
U. S. citizens; jurisdiction primarily based upon diversity statute), with Sonabend Amended
Complaint, supra note 123, at 4 (arguing that all plaintiffs are aliens; jurisdiction is based
upon the Alien Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)).
181. See The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T. 3516,3548-50,75 U.N.T.S. 287,318-20; The Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49,6 U.S.T. 3316,3354,75
U.N.T.S. 172; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
arts. 4, 6, 46, 36 Stat. 2277, 2290, 2306-07; see also The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 123
(1946) (stating that ill treatment or deportation of civilians in an occupied territory is a war
crime).
182. See generally GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINcE 1945 at 39-59 (1994); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Regulation of Armed Conflicts, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAw 201 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1986); Yves Sandoz, Penal Aspects of International Humanitarian Law, in id.
at 209-21; James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders against the Laws and Customs of War,
14 AM. J. INT'LL. 70 (1920). For a recent symposium issue devoted to the laws of war, see War
Crimes and War Crimes Tribunals: Past, Present and Future, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL SYMP. 1
(1999).
183. See generally Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that
'private actors may be liable for violations of international law even absent state action").
184. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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various international human rights treaties existing both presently
and during World War II.'
The defendant banks responded that the treaties cannot be used
to invoke section 1331 "arising under" jurisdiction because the
treaties are not self-executing.16 Moreover, defendants argued that,
even if self-executing, the treaties were not in force at the time of
the defendants' alleged wrongful conduct and could not be applied
retroactively. 87
Finally, defendants argued that customary international law does
not provide federal question jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.'
185. See Plaintiffs'Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants'Motions to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim Under International
Law at 46-48, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed June 16, 1997)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim Under International
Law].
186. See Memorandum ofLaw in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaints
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 10-35, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-
4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 15, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaints for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction];
Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 15-16.
187. See Memorandum ofLawin Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaints
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, supra note 186, at 30-35.
188. See id. at 35-41; Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19;
Defendants' Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum, supra note 169, at 7-9.
This argument is basically a reformulation of the argument made by defendants that
customary international law does not provide plaintiffs with a cause of action against the
Swiss banks. For a discussion of this argument, see discussion and notes infra Part III.A.2.b.
It appears that plaintiffs ultimately abandoned reliance upon any treaty ofthe United
States to provide them with anyjurisdiction or a cause of action, relying solely on customary
international law. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions
to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim Under
International Law, supra note 185, at 39 (stating that treaties set out in the complaints are
being cited not as basis for suit but as "evidence of binding principles of customary
international law that can be applied by federal courts whether or not the treaties are
considered 'self-executing"); see also Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 56. That
memorandum states:
[Clustomary international law [is an] integral part of federal common law
.... Plaintiffs have demonstrated claims arising under customary international
law for the disgorgement of all profits earned by defendants in participating in
the commission of Nazi war crimes. Federal question jurisdiction exists over
such claims because they arise under federal common law.
Id. at 56.
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c. Lack of Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act189
Plaintiffs alleged that their slave labor and looted-assets claims
came within the jurisdictional requirements of the Alien Tort
Claims Act ("ATCA"). 9 °
The ATCA grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over
"cany civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'9'
Defendant banks claimed that plaintiffs could not properly invoke
the ATCA because (1) not all of the plaintiffs are aliens;92 (2) not all
of the claims sounded in tort; and (3) defendants' activities were
commercial in nature and did not rise to the level of conduct in
violation of the Law of Nations, or international law.193
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994).
190. See Sonabend Amended Complaint, supra note 123, $ 9(b).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). The ATCA was originally enacted in the Judiciary Act of
1789, but remained dormant until the monumental Second Circuit decision of Filartiga v.
Pena-Inala, 630 F.2d 876, 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that "whenever an alleged torturer is
found and served with process by an alien within our borders, [28 U.S.C.] § 1350 provides
federal jurisdiction"). For a selective list of articles discussing the ATCA, see Kathryn Lee
Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims:Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in U.S. HumanRights
Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 101, 105 n.19 (1998). For a recent treatise, see RALPH G.
STEINHARDT&ANTHONYD'AMATO, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT:AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY
(1999).
192. On July 29, 1997, plaintiffs' counsel cured this defect by filing amended complaints,
in which the alien plaintiffs filed their own separate lawsuit. See Sonabend Amended
Complaint, supra note 123, 9(b).
193. See Memorandum ofLaw in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaints
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, supra note 186, at 42-62; Defendants' Overview Reply
Memorandum, supra note 167, at 16-17; Defendants' Post-Hearing Reply Memorandum,
supra note 169, at 13-14.
Plaintiffs filed a detailed rebuttal brief countering each of these arguments and
showing that the claims under the ATCA are proper. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for
Failure to State a Claim Under International Law, supra note 185, at 16-45. According to
plaintiffs, they
have alleged that defendants knowingly aided and abetted the Nazi Regime by
providing them with the financing necessary to continue World War H for at
least a year longer than it might otherwise have lasted; that the banks
knowingly engaged in transactions with the Nazi Regime that furthered
criminal activities; that the banks knowingly accepted and disposed of assets
they knew, or should have known, were the result of looting, plunder and slave
labor engaged in by or on behalf of the Nazi Regime; and that the banks
knowingly took advantage of the chaos during and after the War to unjustly
enrich themselves at the expense of the very victims to whom they held out
their institutions as safe havens. These claims sufficiently state a violation of
recognized international law principles against knowingly aiding, abetting, and
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iv. Forum Non Conveniens
Defendant banks filed a separate motion to dismiss the com-
plaints on the ground of forum non conveniens.'94 In their motion,
the Swiss banks argued that the doctrine of forum non conveniens
mandates dismissal of the suits, since both public and private
interest factors favored dismissal.'95
Specifically, the defendant banks claimed that Switzerland should
be the sole forum for adjudication of plaintiffs' claims because: (1)
the challenged conduct occurred in Switzerland; (2) most of the
potentially relevant evidence is found in Switzerland and is not in
the English language; (3) Swiss law would apply to most claims; (4)
litigating the case in the United States creates unnecessary
administrative burdens; (5) Switzerland has a strong national
interest in this dispute; and (6) Swiss courts could adequately
adjudicate plaintiffs' claims.'96 As succinctly explained at one point
by defendants: "[AIlmost everything about these cases relates to
assisting genocide, slave labor, discriminatory treatment based on race, and the
plundering of public and private property.
Id. at 48-49.
194. See Memorandum ofLaw in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non
Conveniens Grounds, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 15,
1997) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non
Conveniens Grounds]. For a recent discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens as it
applies to litigation in the United States against corporate entities for commission of
international human rights abuses, see Boyd, supra note 191, at 101.
Unlike defendants in the insurance and slave labor cases, the Swiss banks could not
argue lack of personal jurisdiction, since the banks do extensive business in the United
States, includinghavingbranchesinNew York, where the suits were filed. See discussion and
notes infra Parts IV & VI (discussing the insurance and slave labor cases, respectively).
Denied the argument of lack of personal jurisdiction, the Swiss banks resorted to the
alternative argument that, despite existence of personal jurisdiction over them, the cases,
nevertheless, should be dismissed because of the availability of an adequate foreign forum.
See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens
Grounds, supra, at 1.
195. See Memorandum of Law in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss On Forum Non
Conveniens Grounds, supra note 194, at 5-30; Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds, supra note 164, at 6-7.
196. See Memorandum ofLawin Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss On Forum Non
Conveniens Grounds, supra note 194, at 10-39; Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds, supra note 164, at 7-29.
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Switzerland and very little relates to the Eastern District of New
York or even the United States."97
v. Failure to Join Necessary Parties
Defendant banks also filed a separate motion to dismiss plaintiffs'
looted-assets claims and slave labor claims for failure, under Rule
19(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("F.R.C.P."), to join
necessary parties. 19
Defendants maintained that if they dealt in any looted assets or
assets derived from slave labor, then individual Nazis and Nazi-
related German companies that brought to them such assets are
necessary parties to these suits and must be joined in the actions.'99
According to the Swiss banks, "[s]ince it will be impossible to join
many or all of these necessary parties, dismissal [of the looted-
197. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Forum
Non Conveniens Grounds, supra note 164, at 6. But see Neuborne Memorandum, supra note
138, at 72-75 (countering defendants' arguments). Professor Neuborne points out that "the
bulk of the plaintiffs reside in the United States. Almost none reside in Switzerland." Id. at
74. Moreover,
much of the evidentiary material in this case is present in the United States,
and in archives throughout Europe [and not just in Switzerland]. Indeed, much
of the material is collected in the archives of the United States Holocaust
Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. Finally, plaintiffs believe that a
substantial proportion of the deposited assets were transferred to banks in New
York State for safekeeping during the war years, and were unlawfully returned
to Switzerland in violation of New York, and federal law, rendering a United
States forum particularly appropriate.
Id. at 75.
Professor Neuborne also pointed out a practical problem of having these suits, or any
other Holocaust-era lawsuit, tried outside the United States: "the refusal of Switzerland to
recognize the class action." Id. at 73. Professor Neuborne explained:
Many of the claimants in this case are too poor to afford counsel. Indeed, as
defendants note, most of the attorneys for the plaintiffs are participating
without a fee. Transferring the case to Switzerland would require each
individual claimant to prosecute a separate action, making pro bono
representation prohibitively expensive. Indeed, even ifthey wished to do so,pro
bono counsel herein cannot serve the plaintiffs in a Swiss court because of
language, bar membership, and expense.
Id. at 73 (footnote omitted).
198. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Claims of
Looted Assets and Slave Labor Classes for Failure to Join Necessary Parties, In re Holocaust
Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 15, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Claims of Looted Assets and Slave Labor
Classes for Failure to Join Necessary Parties]; see also Defendants' Overview Reply
Memorandum, supra note 167, at 20-21.
199. See Defendants Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 20-21.
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assets and slave labor claims] is appropriate under [F.R.C.P.] Rule
19(b)."20 °
vi. Need for Stay of Discovery
Defendant banks asked that discovery be stayed pending resolu-
tion of their motion to dismiss.20 ' The district court issued a stay of
merits discovery, but allowed limited discovery for the purpose of
plaintiffs being able to respond to defendants' motion to dismiss. 20 2
b. Defendant Banks' Substantive Grounds for Dismissal
i. Choice of Law
The Swiss banks argued that, under applicable choice of law
principles, Swiss law governed plaintiffs' claims.0 3 Under Swiss
law, defendants argued, plaintiffs' claims fail.2 4
200. Id.; see also Memorandum ofLawin Support ofDefendants'Motion to Dismiss Claims
of Looted Assets and Slave Labor Classes for Failure to Join Necessary Parties, supra note
198, at 13-19.
201. See Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order Staying Discovery at 1, In re Holocaust
Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 28, 1997).
202. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at3 (citingTranscript
of Civil Cause for Conference before The Honorable Edward R. Korman at 43 (May 1, 1997)).
203. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law and Swiss Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim at 5-15, In re Holocaust
Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 15, 1997) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-Law and Swiss Law
Claims for Failure to State a Claim]; Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants'
Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim at 3-10, In re
Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 9, 1997) [hereinafter Reply
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-Law
Claims for Failure to State a Claim].
204. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law and Swiss Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 16-36;
Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-
Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 11-12.
As is often the practice in international litigation cases where foreign law may be
applicable, defendant banks submitted declarations from two experts on Swiss law in support
of their arguments that plaintiffs' claims fail under Swiss law. See Declaration of Pierre
Tercier, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 13, 1997)
[hereinafter Declaration of Pierre Tercier] (Swiss law professor); Declaration of Robert
Karrer, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-964849 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 13, 1997) (Swiss
attorney). F.R.C.P. 44.1 allows the court to consider such declarations. Rule 44.1 states:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country
shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in
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Even if New York law is applicable, defendants argued, the
complaints failed to state a claim.2 °5
ii. Failure to State Causes of Action
The defendant banks argued that regardless of which substantive
law is applied, plaintiffs failed to state proper causes of action for
their dormant account, looted assets, and slave labor claims.0 6
a. Dormant Account Claims
For the dormant account claims, a major contention between the
parties was the amount of evidence plaintiffs were required to
produce to show that they, or their heirs, deposited monies in the
Swiss defendant banks.20 7
determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source,
including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination shall be treated as a
ruling on a question of law.
FED. R. Crv. P. 44.1.
205. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law and Swiss Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 36-51;
Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-
Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 12-27.
206. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19, 21; see also
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-Law and
Swiss Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 1; Reply Memorandum of
Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-Law Claims for Failure
to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 1.
207. The evidentiary issue, first raised in the Swiss bank litigation, has reappeared in
every Holocaust-era lawsuit. Essentially, the issue comes down to the question of which party
has the burden of proof in the lawsuit.
In response to the complaint, defendants argue that the case should be dismissed
because the Holocaust victims or their heirs are not able to prove their case by the civil
evidentiary standard of preponderance of the evidence. See Reply Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Common-Law Claims for Failure to State
a Claim, supra note 203, at 11-12. Plaintiffs, in turn, argue that they should be allowed to
engage in discovery to determine whether defendants, or third parties, are in possession of
such evidence. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 21. Such discovery, invariably,
is difficult, because it involves a focus upon activities conducted and documents located
abroad (primarily in Central and Eastern Europe) and going back over fifty years. In the
alternative, plaintiffs argue that the burden should shift to defendants to dispute plaintiffs'
allegations. See id. For a discussion of the evidentiary issue as it applies to the Swiss bank
litigation, see Ramasastry, supra note 138, at 379-80.
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In ordinary bank litigation, an alleged depositor seeking to collect
money from a bank must show proof that the depositor maintained
an account at the defendant bank. 2 ' The Swiss banks essentially
sought for the plaintiffs to prove such a link for each plaintiff to
each of the defendant banks.0 9
It appears that defendant banks did not dispute that an individ-
ual can recover monies from a bank if the plaintiff can identify the
particular bank where a Holocaust-era account was opened.210
The three consolidated lawsuits listed thirteen individual
plaintiffs. Of these, four plaintiffs appeared to have satisfied the
defendant banks' standard, since they directed their claim against
a particular bank.21'
However, most Holocaust survivors and heirs of deceased victims
cannot provide such specific identification. The depositors' records
were either lost or destroyed during World War II, and the depositor
is no longer alive to provide testimony about the deposit. This is the
case, plaintiffs concede, for the other nine individually-named
plaintiffs.21
2
Since the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs to prove their case,
the Swiss banks claimed that the lawsuits of these nine plaintiffs
208. Defendants maintained thatordinary contractprinciples, found inboth Swiss law and
New York law, require each plaintiff to provide such evidence of a depositor-bank
relationship. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law and Swiss Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 18-21,
36, 44 (discussing Swiss and New York contract law).
209. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 12-18.
210. See id. at 14 (stating that "with the exception of four plaintiffs' dormant accounts
claims, plaintiffs allege nothing linking their claims to any of the defendants"); Defendants'
Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19 (stating that "with respect to the
common-law claims, dismissal is required for all but four dormant account claimants").
211. Plaintiff Gizella Weisshaus made a claim against the Union Bank ofSwitzerland. See
Weisshaus Amended Complaint, supra note 123, 5. Plaintiff Estelle Sapir made a claim
against Credit Suisse. See id. T 11. PlaintiffJacob Friedman made a claim against the Union
Bank of Switzerland and the Swiss Bank Corporation. See id. 10. Plaintiff Rudolfine
Schlinger made a claim against Union Bank of Switzerland. See id. 6; see also Neuborne
Memorandum, supra note 138, at 15-16.
Defendant Swiss banks concede that these four plaintiffs state proper causes of action
and also have standing to sue the defendant banks. See Defendants' Overview Reply
Memorandum, supra note 167, at 21; see also Declaration of Pierre Tercier, supra note 204,
at 6. Defendants maintain, however, that these four plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note
167, at 21.
212. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 15-16.
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(and all other class members similarly situated) must fail for lack
of evidence.213
Plaintiffs argued, however, that they should be allowed to conduct
discovery of the defendant banks' records to search for documents
showing that they, or their heirs, held an account in one or more of
the defendant banks.214 Plaintiffs argued that they should be able,
pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 20(a),215 to join the defendant banks in
one action, and then "use the mechanism of discovery to ascertain
the precise bank into which a deposit was made."216
Defendant banks, in response, argued that discovery cannot be
used by a plaintiff to determine whether a claim exists in the first
instance. Quoting a federal district court opinion, defendants
maintained that "'[t]he discovery rules are not a hunting license to
conjure up a claim that does not exist.' 217
As an alternative, plaintiffs argued that even if they could not
prove that a particular bank held an account belonging to them,
defendants still may be liable under theories of joint and several
liability.218 Plaintiffs based their arguments that joint and several
liability can be imposed upon the banks on two theories existing in
American law.219
First, plaintiffs claimed that if they could show that the defendant
banks acted in concert to deprive plaintiffs of their assets, and also
obstructed plaintiffs' efforts to prove that the banks held funds
213. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 11-12.
214. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 21 (stating that plaintiffs should be
"given an opportunity, through discovery, to determine the name of the Swiss bank into which
their relatives deposited assets in an effort to safeguard them from the Nazis").
215. Rule 20(a), dealing with joinder, states, in pertinent part:
All persons... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted
against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.
FED. R. CIv. P. 20(a).
216. Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 19. Plaintiffs point out that joinder is
especially appropriate on the particular facts here, where the "defendant banks represent,
through merger or succession, approximately 75 percent of the private Swiss banks operating
during the years in question." Id.
217. Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 18 (quoting Avnet, Inc.
v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 115 F.R.D. 588, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
218. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 20.
219. See id.
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belonging to them, equity requires that the banks should be held
collectively liable.22°
Second, plaintiffs maintained that their facts fall within the
"market share" or "enterprise liability" category of cases, in which
each defendant is held severally liable according to the share of the
market held by the defendant in the thing causing injury to the
plaintiff.221
The market share doctrine was created by the California Supreme
Court almost two decades ago in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,222
a case involving products liability actions against numerous
pharmaceutical companies who were alleged to have caused birth
defects by their sale of the drug DES.223 In Sindell, the California
Supreme Court abandoned the rigid traditional tort liability require-
ment of showing a direct causal link between each defendant and
the harm suffered by each plaintiff in favor of a less-stringent basis
of liability based on the percentage of the market share of sales of
the dangerous product held by each corporate defendant.224
According to plaintiffs, the market share doctrine should be
applied to the dormant account claims of those plaintiffs who cannot
identify a particular Swiss bank that is holding plaintiffs' monies.225
Each defendant bank, plaintiffs maintained, should be held liable in
220. See id. (citing Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co, 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), and Richler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982)).
221. See id.
222. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
223. As explained by a leading treatise on torts:
The [California Supreme Court] imposed liability on each of eleven drug makers
of DES that were joined in the lawsuit for a proportionate share of particular
victim's damage attributable to DES. The requirements for market-share
liability seem to be: (1) injury or illness occasioned by a fungible product
(identical-type product) made by all of the defendants joined in the lawsuit; (2)
injury or illness due to a design hazard, with each having been found to have
sold the same type product in a manner that made it unreasonably dangerous;
(3) inability to identify the specific manufacturer of the product or products that
brought about the plaintiffs injury or illness; and (4) joinder of enough of the
manufacturers... to represent a substantial share of the market.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 714 (5th ed.
1984).
224. See Sindell, 607 P.2d. at 938. In New York, whose law is applicable to the case, the
market share doctrine was most recently reaffired by the New York Court of Appeals in
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), where the market share theory
using the national market was applied in determining liability and apportioning damages in
DES cases in which identification of the specific manufacturer of the injury-causing DES was
impossible. See id. at 1078.
225. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 20-21.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
proportion to the share of deposits taken in by the bank, without the
necessity of each plaintiff singling out the particular defendant bank
holding monies belonging to the plaintiff.226 To do otherwise,
plaintiffs argued, would result in an unjust enrichment to the
banks. Plaintiffs alleged that, despite their inability to meet the
traditional legal standards of proof, the court's equitable powers
allow the court to order the banks to pay damages for monies held
and profits derived at the expense of Holocaust victims.227 Defen-
dants argued that the doctrine of market share liability is inapplica-
ble to a commercial case, which is entirely different from a suit
involving defective products, where the market share liability
doctrine was created.228
Application of a market share liability regime to the Swiss
dormant account claims would have been a novel use of the
doctrine.229 Without such an extension of the doctrine, or some other
relaxation of the standard of proof, however, it appears that the
dormant account claims of nine of the thirteen named plaintiffs (and
all other similarly situated dormant account claimants) would have
failed.
226. See id.
227. The unjust enrichment argument is best made in the brief filed by Professor Burt
Neuborne, in which he traces the history of unjust enrichment from its origins in Greek and
Roman law to the present-day American Restatement of Restitution and the Swiss Code of
Obligations. See id. at 12-14.
228. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss
Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim, supra note 203, at 14-17.
229. One commentator to the Swiss bank litigation, while supporting the use of market
share liability in the case of Swiss dormant account claims, nevertheless acknowledged that
"[c]ollective liability is indeed a controversial theory" and cited a comment from a recent New
York Court of Appeals opinion that collective liability is a "radical departure from
fundamental tenets of tort law." Ramasastry, supra note 138, at 381 (citing Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989) (Mollen, J., concurring and dissenting)); see also
Kingv. Cutter Lab., 714 So. 2d 351, 354 (Fla. 1998) (extending market share liability doctrine
to other products besides DES, but limiting the doctrine solely to negligence actions involving
dangerous products). In imposing such limitations, the Florida Supreme Court explained:
The market share doctrine is a new, evolving tort theory. The doctrine is
designed to provide plaintiffs access to the courts in the limited class of cases
where the injured party cannot identify, after diligent inquiry, which product
manufacturer in fact caused a specific injury.... While the doctrine is still
evolving, it has some specific restraints that limit its application.
Id. at 354. Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court recognized its "continuing responsibility
to the citizens of this state' to modernize traditional principles of tort law when such becomes
necessary 'to ensure that the law remains both fair and realistic as society and technology
change.' Id. at 355 (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447,
451 (Fla. 1984)). Plaintiffs in the Swiss bank litigation, undoubtedly, would have reminded
Judge Korman of the same responsibility.
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b. Looted-Assets Claims
Defendant banks claimed that plaintiffs also failed to state
legally-cognizable causes of action for their looted-assets claims
under New York common law, Swiss law, and international law.30
The banks argued that regardless of whether New York or Swiss
law was applied, the looted-assets claims had to be dismissed
because they suffered from a fatal defect: Plaintiffs' factual allega-
tions failed to link any individual defendant bank to any damages
suffered by any particular plaintiff.231 Put another way, none of the
plaintiffs could show that any of the assets looted from them by the
Nazis ended up in any of the banks that they sued. At most,
plaintiffs could only show that the Swiss banks ended up with some
assets looted by the Nazis, but could not trace the looted assets to
any individual victim. 2 2 Defendants essentially recast their pro-
cedural lack of standing objection, argued earlier,233 into a substan-
tive objection, namely that plaintiffs failed to state facts upon which
to base a claim for looted assets either under New York or Swiss
law.234
Defendants also claimed that plaintiffs' looted-assets claims fail
to state a cause of action under international law.235
230. For a discussion of the looted-assets claims, see notes and text supra Part IIIA.1.b.
For a brief analysis of the looted-assets claims as they were set out in the earlier stages of the
Swiss bank litigation, see Ramasastry, supra note 138, at 382-87.
231. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 18-19.
232. The eventual settlement made by the Swiss banks, see infra Part III.D., proved the
defendants correct: When it came time to distribute the settled funds to victims of Nazi
looting and their heirs, the "looted-assets" claimants were not required to show that their
looted assets made their way to a Swiss bank. See id.
233. See supra Part I.A.2.a.(ii).
234. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19-20.
235. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
International Law Claims in Friedman and World Council for Failure to State a Claim at 2-
69, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 15, 1997) [hereinafter
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss the International
Law Claims in Friedman and World Council for Failure to State a Claim]; Reply Memo-
randum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the International Law Claims
in Friedman and World Council for Failure to State a Claim at 2-46, In re Holocaust Victim
Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 9,1997) [hereinafter Reply Memorandum of Law
in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the International Law Claims in Friedman and
World Council for Failure to State a Claim]. The Weisshaus complaint did not allege claims
under international law, and, therefore, defendants' motion to dismiss the international law
claims was directed only to the latter two lawsuits.
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International law is part of U.S. law and can be used in U.S.
courts to state a cause of action.2 36 In fact, the complaints in
Friedman and World Council specifically seek damages from
defendant banks for violations of international human rights law by
their alleged knowing dealings with looted assets.237
International law claims can be based either upon specific self-
executing treaties or upon international customary law.238 Plaintiffs
initially based their looted-assets claims upon both treaties and
international custom, but apparently abandoned their reliance on
treaties since they could not find a treaty that was both self-
executing and in existence when the looting took place during World
War 11.239
Defendants-relying specifically on precedent established at the
Nuremberg Tribunal-claimed that plaintiffs' customary interna-
tional law claims were defective for a variety of reasons. 24 0 First,
defendants argued that plaintiffs sought to apply international law
norms recognized only after 1945 to defendants' pre-1945 conduct.24'
236. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our
law and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction."); Marcos Estate I, 978 F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that "it is... well
settled that the law of nations is part of federal common law"); see also FRANK NEWMAN &
DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS; LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 499-552 (2d
ed. 1996) (discussing U.S. adjudicative remedies for violations occurring outside the United
States); Louis Henkin, International Law as U.S. Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555 (1984).
237. See Friedman Complaint supra note 123, TT 207-16; World Council Complaint, supra
note 123, 134-48. Plaintiffs argued that defendant banks are liable for the human rights
abuses committed by the Nazis as knowing aiders and abettors of such crimes, and, therefore,
are liable as accomplices to the Nazis. See Plaintiffs' Counterstatement of Facts, supra note
153, at 6-7 (stating that defendant banks "were a critical link... in knowingly... aiding and
abetting Nazi Germany's war crimes and genocide").
238. See generally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 175-286
(3d ed. 1999). For a critique of the use of customary international law as a basis for stating
a claim in U.S. courts, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815
(1997); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997). For a response to the Bradley and
Goldsmith analysis, see Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense about Customary
International Law:A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAML. REV. 371
(1997).
239. See Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 28-35, 39-45 (referring solely to
customary international law as a basis for plaintiffs' international law claims).
240. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
International Law Claims inFriedman and World Council for Failure to State a Claim, supra
note 235, at 8-42.
241. See id. at 8-17.
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Moreover, defendants claimed that their conduct was not so
egregious as to amount to violations of international human rights
law.24 2 Similarly, as corporate-banking entities of a neutral country,
defendants claimed that their dealings with the Nazis do not expose
them to civil liability under customary international law.243
c. Slave Labor Claims
Defendant banks likewise claimed that plaintiffs failed to state a
proper cause of action for their slave labor claims under New York
common law, Swiss law, or international law.244 The banks argued
that the slave labor claims also suffered from the fatal defect of
failing to link any individual defendant bank to any damages
suffered by any plaintiff.245 Finally, defendants argued that the
cause of action for violations of international law for the slave labor
242. See id. at 18-19.
243. See id. at 36-42. The defendant banks also claimed that the conviction of Karl Rasehe,
chairman of Dresdner Bank, by the U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, did not establish
a precedent for the defendant banks' civil liability under international human rights law. See
id. at 21-36. The Swiss banks distinguished the Rasche case from the accusations made
against them as follows:
Rasche was a high-ranking Nazi and the speaker of the board of directors of the
Dresdner Bank. As such, he personally used brutal physical coercion to loot and
plunder property from victims in Nazi-occupied territories .... [Ift was for these
activities-and not his actions as a commercial banker-that Rasche was
convicted of war crimes. The U.S. Military Tribunal acquitted Rasche of war
crimes and crimes against humanity charges based on his activities as a
banker.
Id. at 22.
According to the Swiss banks, the Tribunal
squarely held that the provision of commercial banking services-specifically,
the s[ale of] money or credit-did not violate customary international law, even
where the financial institution knew that the recipient of these services was
utilizing the services as part of an ongoing war crime or crime against
humanity. That reasoning applies directly to, and precludes, plaintiffs' claim
that the defendant Swiss banks committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity by knowingly purchasing or receiving deposits of looted property
and/or slave labor profits.
Id. at 26-27. But see Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 32: ("[Tlhe very Nuremberg
Tribunal that acquitted Karl Rasche for making ordinary loans to the Third Reich, convicted
him for knowingly trafficking in assets looted from Jews, and sentenced him to seven years
in prison.").
244. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19-20.
245. Id. at 18-19.
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claims, stated in Friedman and World Council, must fail for the
same reasons as the looted-assets claims.
246
B. Other Actions against the Swiss Banks
1. Action in California State Court
In June 1998, plaintiffs' attorneys in the federal class action in
New York opened a second front against the Swiss banks by filing
a separate class action lawsuit in California state court.24 v The
Swiss banks now began to defend themselves on both coasts of the
United States.
The state class action was filed against the same three Swiss
banks, but by different claimants.248 Plaintiffs were four elderly
Holocaust survivors, all U.S. citizens and residents of California.249
None of the plaintiffs alleged that they, or their families, depos-
ited monies with Swiss banks. Rather, plaintiffs' claims were based
solely on allegations that the defendant banks profited from
"knowingly accepting for deposit and concealing the existence of
slave labor profits and assets looted by the Nazis."25° Plaintiffs were
suing on their own behalf and on behalf of all "victims of Nazi
246. See Defendants' Overview Reply Memorandum, supra note 167, at 19; see also supra
notes 230-43 and accompanying text. But see Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 34.
That memorandum states:
Plaintiffs' "slave labor" claims are, similarly, not based on ordinary commercial
banking transactions. They are based on defendants' repeated actions in
earning substantial profits from knowingly acting as the vendor and/or financial
conduit for products that they knew were being produced by Jewish slave labor
under conditions that sink to the level of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.
Id.
247. See Markovicova Complaint, supra note 124, 1.
248. See id. 1 15-18.
249. See id. 9 (stating claim ofplaintiffIrene Markovicova, who survived the Auschwitz
concentration camp by doing slave labor for the German multinational Krupp, while family
assets were confiscated and seventy members of her family were killed in Auschwitz); id.
10 (stating claim ofplaintiffDr. Barbara Schwartz-Lee, who survived the Chrznanow Ghetto
by doing forced labor at various concentration camps); id. 1 11 (stating claim ofplaintiffLia
Atschul Fishman, who survived the Holocaust by going into hiding while her family assets
were looted and her parents were killed in Auschwitz); id. 9 12 (stating claim of plaintiff
Liliane Schmidt-Escobar, a Romani ("Gypsy") who, along with her family, was deported to
Auschwitz-where she was subjected to medical experiments-while family assets were looted
and six siblings died at Auschwitz or other concentration camps).
250. Id. T 1.
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persecution during the period 1933-1945, whose assets were lobted
by the Nazis and deposited in and/or laundered through the
Defendants, and/or whose forced labor generated profits that were
deposited in and/or laundered through the Defendants."25'
In their complaint, plaintiffs specifically sought to distinguish
their action from the class action litigation before Judge Korman.2
The California plaintiffs made the same accusations against the
Swiss banks as were found in the looted assets and slave labor
claims in the East Coast litigation: namely, that the Swiss banks
"intentionally concealed the looted assets and slave labor profits
they possessed and/or laundered, intentionally preventing their
discovery, and allowing the Banks to escape for years the serious
scrutiny of their Holocaust-related misconduct."253 However, the
California plaintiffs sued under a state statute, the California
Unfair Competition Act ("UCA") 4 In fact, the complaint contained
only one cause of action: violation of the UCA 5 The UCA prohibits
companies doing business in California from gaining a competitive
advantage as a result of engaging in "any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice"256 and allows the general public
to sue to collect restitution from the wrongdoer who has gained a
competitive advantage from engaging in such wrongful conduct.257
251. Id. 9 14.
252. See id. 9] 20.
253. Id. T 40.
254. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17500 (West 1997). For a discussion of the UCA,
see WiLuAiL. STERN, CONSUMER INVESTOR EEMEDIES:USINGTHE BUusiNEss & PROFESSIONS
CODE SECTION 17200 (1996).
255. See Markovicova Complaint, supra note 124, 1 43-46. Interestingly, in March 1999,
the same attorneys who earlier filed this California state action under the UCA against the
Swiss banks repeated their tactic in two other Holocaust-era lawsuits, presently being
litigated.
On March 24, 1999, suing on behalf of one Holocaust survivor residing in Southern
California, the attorneys filed a second UCA action stemming from the Holocaust, this time
against six French banks and two American financial institutions-Chase Manhattan Bank
and J.P. Morgan & Co-alleging their profiteering from looted and slave labor assets during
World War II. See Complaint 91 1, Mayer v. Banque Paribas, No. BC 302226 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
filed Mar. 24, 1999).
One week later, on March 31, 1999, yet another group of Holocaust survivors,
represented by the same set of attorneys, filed a third UCA action against three German
banks, the German airline Lufthanza, and American automotive giants Ford and General
Motors, accusing them of profiting from the use of slave labor and looting during World War
11. See Complaint T 1, Simon Wiesenthal Ctr. v. Deutsche Bank, No. BC 302420 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
filed Mar. 31, 1999).
256. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
257. See id. § 17203.
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This was a novel use of the California UCA statute. Trying to fit
the Swiss banks' conduct under the UCA, plaintiffs alleged that the
banks' "wrongful retention, handling, disposition and/or conceal-
ment" of looted and slave labor assets amounted to an "unlawful,
unfair and/or fraudulent business act and/or practice" prohibited by
the UCA" 8
2. Action against the Swiss National Bank
On June 29, 1998, one day before filing the second action in
California against the three private Swiss banks, the attorneys
prosecuting these actions filed a separate lawsuit against the Swiss
government.259 The third action, filed in federal district court in
Washington, D.C., on behalf of yet another group of Holocaust
survivors, was against the Swiss National Bank ("SNB"), the central
government bank of Switzerland.26 °
Recently-discovered documentation has revealed that the SNB
was extensively involved in laundering Nazi-stolen gold. The SNB
was "the central relay point for gold the Nazis sold to neutral
nations during World War II. "261 A May 1998 Swiss government
historical report issued by the Bergier Commission stated that
"Switzerland was the leading center of German gold transactions
abroad during World War II and the [SNB] was the biggest client,
258. See Markovicova Complaint, supra note 124, T 44.
259. See Complaint 1, Rosenberg v. Swiss Nat'l Bank, No. CV-98-1647 (D.D.C. filed June
29,1998) [hereinafterRosenberg Complaint]. Named as co-conspirators with the central bank
of Switzerland, but not included as defendants, were the central banks of Argentina,
Liechtenstein, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Germany's two largest private banks-Deutsche Bank
and Dresdner Bank-and "the private banks of Switzerland." Id. 25. All these banks were
alleged to have "knowingly operated with [the] Swiss National Bank to design a web of
financial and gold transactions intended to benefit the Nazi Regime." Id. Thereafter, both
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner were sued in the United States for their World War II activities.
See discussion and notes infra Part VII.A.1. (discussing claims against the German and
Austrian banks).
As more information is uncovered of dealings by the central banks of these other
neutral countries with the Nazis during World War II, additional lawsuits may be filed
against these other banks. See supra note 16 (citing articles discussing other nations'
financial involvement with the Nazis).
260. See Rosenberg Complaint, supra note 259, T 1.
261. Swiss Central Bank Rejects Holocaust Agreement, L.A. TIMs, Aug. 22, 1998, at A9.
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buying 1.2 billion Swiss francs' worth, or about $280 million at
wartime prices... worth more than $2.5 billion today."262
The Bergier Commission found that part of the gold the SNB
purchased from the Nazi Reichsbank included "119.5 kilograms of
fine gold (worth $1.2 million at today's prices) that could be
identified as being melted down by the Nazi bankers into gold bars
from teeth fillings and wedding rings, torn away from victims in the
Nazi concentration camps."263
C. Factors Leading to Settlement of the Swiss Bank Litigation:
The Sapir Settlement, the Meili Episode, and the Power of
Sanctions
In August 1997, Judge Korman heard oral arguments on the
Swiss banks' motions to dismiss the consolidated class actions in
New York. Earlier, in July 1997, plaintiffs filed amended com-
262. Report: Swiss Knew Nazi Gold Stolen, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1998, at A8. The Bergier
Commission, consisting of a panel of nine Swiss, American, Israeli, Polish, and British
historians, concluded:
There is no longer any doubt: The governing board of the National Bank was
informed at an early point in time that gold from the central banks of occupied
nations was being held by the Reichsbank, and the Swiss National Bank was
also aware of other methods used by the Germans to confiscate gold from
private individuals before and after the outbreak of the war .... Although it
was plain for all to see that Germany was acquiring gold by illegal means, the
[Swiss central bank] authorities appear to have remained wedded to "business
as usual."
Id.
Under a 1946 treaty with the United States, Britain, and France, known as the
Washington Agreement, see Multilateral Liquidation of German Property in Switzerland, May
25, 1946, 13 U.S.T. 1118, the SNB contributed 40% of the 250 million Swiss francs
Switzerland paid to end all Nazi-gold-related claims. See William Hall, Swiss Bank Spurns
Nazi Gold Deal, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 22, 1998, at 2, available in 1998 WL 23267472.
The SNB maintained that the Washington Agreement released the Swiss government from
all future obligations with regard to Nazi-stolen gold acquired by the SNB. See id.
Nevertheless, in 1997, the SNB contributed 100 million Swiss francs ($70 million) to
a special Holocaust Needy Fund set up by Swiss private industry and government. See Report:
Swiss Knew Nazi Gold Stolen, supra, at A8. The SNB also announced at that time that it
would attempt to use 7 billion Swiss francs of its gold reserves to set up a so-called Solidarity
Foundation to help both Jews and others who suffered during World War IH, and for other
social projects. The proposal required an amendment to the Swiss Constitution and approval
from the Swiss Parliament; unfortunately, in June 1999, the Swiss Parliament vetoed the
proposal. See Swiss Parliament Stalls Gold Foundation, JERUSALEM POST, June 20,1999, at
4, available in 1999 WL 9004642.
263. Gisela Blau, More Swiss Stonewalling, JERUSALEM REP., Sept. 14, 1998, at 34 ("The
119.5 kilos of shame,' wrote one newspaper in the French part of Switzerland, discussing the
'body gold' issue.").
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plaints, reconfiguring some of the named plaintiffs, dropping some
parties, and adding others.264
Thereafter, Judge Korman did something brilliant: nothing.
Rather than ruling on the motions, he made no decision for over one
year.
In August 1998, Judge Korman, without ever issuing a decision on
the dismissal motions, achieved a settlement of the litigation.26 The
settlement was all-inclusive, requiring plaintiffs to dismiss every
lawsuit filed against the Swiss banks and Swiss government,
discussed above, as a condition of the settlement.266
During this one-year waiting period, critical events transpired
that led to the settlement of the lawsuits.
1. Settlement with Estelle Sapir
In May 1998, Credit Suisse reached a separate settlement with
Estelle Sapir, the most visible and persistent dormant accounts
plaintiff.267 While the settlement terms remain secret, various media
sources reported that Credit Suisse paid Sapir $500,000 to settle the
matter.26
The seventy-two-year-old Estelle Sapir emerged as the most
prominent symbol of the Swiss banks' bad faith dealings with regard
to World War II-era dormant accounts.2 69 Her story was featured in
264. For a discussion of the amended complaints, see Ramasastry, supra note 138, at 376-
78.
265. See Settlement Agreement, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Jan. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement].
266. See id. $ 12.
267. See David Sanger, Crack in the Vault: Swiss Bank Yields to a Nazi Victim's Daughter,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 5, 1998, atA27. Sapir testified before the Senate Banking Committee during
its investigation of the Swiss banks' dealings with Holocaust-era dormant accounts. See id.
268. See id.; see also Settlement by Credit Suisse Leaves Open Precedent Issue, INT'L
HERALD TRiB., May 6, 1998, at 5.
269. See Sanger, supra note 267, at A27. That article states:
By settling individually with Miss Sapir, who is down to 65 pounds and clearly
in poor health, Credit Suisse has taken care of one of the most visible examples
of its failure to investigate accounts opened by Holocaust victims .... [Sapir]
became a 4-foot-9-inch symbol of the Holocaust survivors whom the Swiss
banks summarily dismissed.
Id. The other case symbolizing the Swiss banks' nefarious dealings is that of fired bank guard
Christoph Meili, who saved pre-World War II documents about to be shredded by UBS. See
discussion and notes infra Part III.C.2.
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two television documentaries on Switzerland's role during World
War 11.270
Embarrassed by the negative publicity generated by its poor
handling of Sapir's claim,271 Credit Suisse took the extraordinary
step of settling with her, even while continuing to deny payments to
the other class action plaintiffs. 2
The next year, in April 1999, Estelle Sapir died. 3 A true hero, she
remains a symbol of the struggle by elderly Holocaust survivors to
obtain long-delayed justice from the Swiss banks and other Euro-
pean institutions. Even though she enjoyed her settlement for less
than one year, she lived long enough to see not only a personal
victory of her claim, but also the Swiss banks' acknowledgment of
the claims of the other Holocaust survivors. 4
270. The first was a documentary produced by BBC Television and rebroadcast in the
United States by the Public Broadcasting System ("PBS"). See Switzerland: Neutral or
Cowardly? (BBC television broadcast, rebroadcast in United States by PBS, May 21, 1997).
The second was a documentary shown on A&E Television as part of its "Investigative
Reports" series. See Blood Money: Switzerland's Nazi Gold (Arts & Entertainment television
broadcast, July 26, 1997). Both documentaries were first broadcast in 1997.
271. In 1946, when Sapir attempted"to retrieve millions of dollars she believed her father,
Josef, left in the Credit Suisse Bank, officials said she needed a death certificate [for her
father], a document most Holocaust survivors didn't have." Chrisena Coleman, Swiss Bank
Pays in Holocaust Suit, N.Y. DAiLY NEWS, May 5, 1998, at 8.
Sapir did not give up. "Between 1946 and 1957, while living in Paris, Sapir made 20
trips to Credit Suisse. Each time, she said, they refused to deal with her." Elaine Woo, Estelle
Sapir: FirstHoloctrust Survivor to Recover Wartime Claim from Swiss Bank, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1999, at A30. More than 50 years later, in 1998, Credit Suisse finally admitted that it
"found a card under the name of J. Sapir that appeared to confirm that he held an account
[at Credit Suisse], without an indication of how much the account may have once contained."
Sanger, supra note 267, at A27.
272. See Sanger, supra note 267, at A27 ("Perhaps to make it clear that it did not intend
Miss Sapir's case to be precedent-setting, the bank went out of its way today to describe it as
an exceptional case.").
273. See William H. Honan, Estelle Sapir, 73, Who Fought Bank over Holocaust Assets,
N.Y. TIEs, Apr. 16, 1999, at A20; Woo, supra note 271, at A30.
274. As Sapir related in interviews: "'I promised my father the last time I saw him in the
concentration camp. He made me promise that I would find his account with the Swiss.
Before I die, I must do this.'" Richard Sisk, At 71, She's Still Trying to Redeem Swiss
Holdings, N.Y. DAILYNEws, Oct. 31,1997, at 40. "I felt that my father was always behind me
and with me,' she said after her lawsuit was settled last year. 'When I die and go to heaven,
I will see him and say, "I accomplished it.'" Honan, supra note 273, at A20.
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2. The Meili Episode
UBS, the other Swiss bank defendant, also suffered an embarrass-
ing episode during the course of the litigation.
Between the evening of January 8 and the morning of January 9,
1997, Christoph Meili, a security guard at UBS in Zurich, discovered
in the bank's shredding room pre-World War II financial documents
that were about to be shredded by the bank." 5 Shredding of such
documents was illegal under Swiss law." 6
Meili saved the documents and turned them over to a Jewish
cultural group that, in turn, gave them to the Zurich police.277 Meili
was subsequently fired from his job, and a criminal investigation
was opened against him for violating Swiss bank secrecy laws.
Ten months later, the criminal investigation was dropped. 79
Earlier, however, Meili and his family, facing death threats in
Switzerland, fled to the United States. In July 1997, Congress
passed special legislation, signed by President Clinton, granting
Meili and his family permanent residency.2 8' According to Meili: "I
have become the first Swiss person to seek and acquire political
asylum in the United States."281
275. See Complaint T 11-23, Meili v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 98 Civ. 0630 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1998).
276. See John-Thor Dahlburg, Legendary Swiss Neutrality Rocked by WWII Charges, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997, at Al ("On Jan. 8 [1997], while on duty at the Union Bank of
Switzerland, [Meili] came across two hoppers of historical documents waiting to be shredded.
The previous month, banks had been ordered to keep paperwork from World War H-era
transactions.").
277. See id. at A6.
278. See Probe of Former Bank Guard Ends, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1997, at A10.
279. See id. As reported byNewsday:"In Zurich, Swiss authorities issued a terse statement
dropping the charges. 'The Zurich district attorney's office has halted the proceedings against
former night watchman Christoph Meili,' it said. District Attorney Peter Cosandey had no
further comment." NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 1997, at A21. At the same time, "the Zurich district
attorney's office also dropped its probe of[Erwin Haggenmueller,] the chief archivist at Union
Bank of Switzerland, who released the papers [Meili rescued] for shredding." Probe of Former
Bank Guard Ends, supra note 278, at A10.
280. See Swiss Bank Guard, Family Get Permanent Residence in U.S., L.A. TIMES, July 31,
1997, at A3.
281. Christoph Meili, Christoph Meili Tells His Story, 20 WHIT1=ER L. REV. 43,45 (1998).
For other articles on Meili, see Beverly Beyette, A Modern-Day Schindler Faces the
Consequences, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1998, at El; Eric Carpenter, Ex-bank Guard Is Honored
by Jews, ORANGE CouNTY REG., June 7, 1999, at B1, available in 1999 WL 4303835; David
Haldane, Schooled in Heroism: Swiss Who Helped Free Jewish Assets Gets Chapman
Scholarship, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at B1; Margot Hornblower, Of Mercy, Fame-and Hate
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The negative publicity generated from being caught illegally
shredding prewar financial records was a factor in UBS coming to
the bargaining table and eventually settling the litigation.2
3. The Power of Sanctions: September 1, 1998 Sanctions Deadline
As will be discussed more fully in Part III.D., in August 1998 the
Swiss banks reversed their earlier position and raised what they
had publicly labeled their final offer of $600 million 283 to $1.25
billion. Plaintiffs, demanding $1.5 billion, agreed to accept this
amount, and the case was settled.
284
Asked to explain the banks' sudden reversal of their position,
Rabbi Marvin Hier, head of the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenth-
al Center, explained: "'It was for only one reason: they were
pressured into it. Without the pressure, with Sen. D'Amato's
banking committee, without the threat of sanctions, the Holocaust
survivors would have gotten nothing."
285
The London-based Financial Times, in a story examining how the
settlement was achieved, came to the same conclusion:
Mail, TIME, May 25, 1998, at 4; Patricia Lefevere, Bank Guard Enters Ranks of'Righteous
Gentiles" NAT'L CATH. RPTR., Apr. 16, 1999, at 10, available in 1999 WL 8554114; Miriam
Stawowy, Swiss Guard Called Traitor for Exposing Bank Scandal, SUN-SENTINEL, May 30,
1999, at 1G, available in 1999 WL 2491484; John Wiener, Saving History from the Shredder,
THE NATION, Sept. 6-13, 1999, at 1.
Meili also appeared on the July 30, 1998 episode of Oprah, and was featured on the
July 3, 1998 episode of Dateline NBC. See Oprah (Harpo Productions television broadcast,
July 30, 1998); Dateline (NBC television broadcast, July 1998).
282. See Stewart Yerton, Guard's Actions Still Resonates; Vigilance Led to Historic
Settlement, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 16, 1999, at C1, available in 1999 WL
4409816; Swiss Bank Employee Helped Tip Balance, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 14, 1998,
at A6.
In 1998, Meili, now living in the United States, sued UBS. See Complaint 9 1, Meili
v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 98-100630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1998). As part of
the global settlement with the Swiss banks, see infra Part III.D., Meili was forced to dismiss
his lawsuit. Meili, 31 years old, presently resides in Southern California, and attends college
there. See David Haldane, Schooled in Heroism: Swiss Who Helped Free Jewish Assets Gets
Chapman Scholarship, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1998, at B1.
283. See Swiss Banks Offer $600 Million to Close Holocaust Claims, L.A. TIMES, June 20,
1998, at A5 ("Switzerland's three biggest banks offered $600 million Friday [June 19, 1998]
to settle claims they stole assets of Holocaust victims. The banks called it their top offer;
outraged Jewish leaders called it insultingly low.").
284. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265.
285. Lisa Anderson, Jewish Leaders Hail Decision by Swiss on Stolen War Assets, CII.
TRIB., Aug. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2885236 (quoting Rabbi Marvin Hier).
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The clearest lesson from the Swiss banks' $1.25bn settlement with
holocaust survivors is this: threatening to impose sanctions can work. Every
important breakthrough in the negotiations came soon after threats from US
local government officials to impose sanctions (banning, for example, Swiss
banks from certain kinds of business in New York). The settlement itself
came two weeks before a threat to start the sanctions and a week after
Moody's, the rating agency, published a report saying that UBS,
Switzerland's (and Europe's) biggest bank, might lose its triple-A rating if
sanctions were imposed."8
Economic sanctions are increasingly viewed as an ineffective
means to conduct foreign policy. A recent study concluded that they
do not work in changing the behavior of other countries.2 87 For
instance, despite an economic blockade for close to forty years, the
United States has not been able to remove from power or change the
behavior of the Communist government of Fidel Castro in Cuba.288
The only success story has been the sustained economic pressure
brought against the apartheid government of South Africa, leading
eventually to the white minority in the 1980s gradually giving up its
power, and the ascension of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's
president.8 9
The sanctions applied against the Swiss, leading to the $1.25
billion settlement in August 1998, will be viewed as another case
where sanctions proved effective.29 °
286. John Authers & Richard Wolffe, When Sanctions Work, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 9,
1998, at 14; see also James D. Besser, Behind the Scenes:A Curious Synergy, JEWISH J., Aug.
21, 1998, at 14 ("Without doubt, the Swiss banks were pushed into a settlement because of
their fear of being shut out of vital U.S. markets.").
287. See Eric Schmitt, U.S. Backs off Sanctions, Seeing Poor Effect Abroad, N.Y. TIMES,
July 30, 1998, at 1.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. The strategy undertaken by top state and local financial officials against the Swiss
banks was first to threaten sanctions, and then to impose them in stages until the Swiss
banks would come to an agreement. See John J. Goldman, Pressure Rises for Holocaust Fund
Pact, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1998, at 3.
On July 3, 1998, New York State Comptroller H. Carl McCall and New York City
Comptroller Alan Hevesi announced at a news conference in Manhattan this system of so-
called "rolling sanctions," specifically "designed to pressure Swiss banks into reaching an
agreement with Holocaust victims who claim the institutions held their assets for decades."
Id. The sanctions would have been implemented as follows: (1) if a settlement would not have
been reached by September 1, 1998, the New York state and city comptrollers would have
stopped depositing their short-term investments with the Swiss banks, and would have
barred Swiss banks and investment firms from selling state and city debt; (2) if a settlement
would not have been reached by November 1, 1998, private investment managers investing
for the state and city would be instructed to cease trading through Swiss firms; and (3) if a
settlement still would not have been reached, other sanctions and penalties would follow in
the future. See id.
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There are a number of unique factors, however, in this success
story.
First, the sanctions were applied by state and local governments
in the United States, contrary to clear opposition by the Clinton
Administration.29'
Second, doubts remain whether the sanctions were legal under
U.S. law. While their legality was never tested in court, since the
case settled before any court challenge to them was heard, it is
possible that they could have been declared unconstitutional.292
State and local officials in other jurisdictions would have followed suit, since New
York City Comptroller Hevesi heads the so-called Executive Monitoring Committee,
"representing 800 financial officers throughout the nation [which also] recommended
sanctions against Switzerland's three biggest banks." Id. The Executive Monitoring
Committee is composed of nine leading state and local officials that coordinate strategy, on
behalf of its 800 members, on how to best exert financial and political pressure upon various
foreign companies to settle Holocaust-era claims. For a description of the work of the
Executive Monitoring Committee, see Update on Swiss Restitution to Holocaust Survivors,
August 1998 (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http/vww.finance net.gov/nycnet.htm>.
California Treasurer Matt Fong went one step further and ordered his staff not to do
business with the Swiss banks. See id; see also Tom Tugend, California Imposes Sanctions
against Swiss Banks, JEWISH J., July 10, 1998, at 12.
The sanctions had the potential of denying the Swiss banks billions of dollars in
investments.
The Swiss government, in response, labeled the sanctions "counterproductive,
unjustified and illegal" and asserted that Switzerland would not be influenced by "attempts
to exert pressure." Id.
291. See Nancy Dunne, Court in U.S. Bars State Sanctions, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 5,
1998, at 10.
292. In June 1999, the use of sanctions by state and local governments for political
purposes was dealt a blow when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declared the
so-called Massachusetts Burma Law ("MBL") unconstitutional. See National Foreign Trade
Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,77 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (Nov. 29, 1999). The
MBL, enacted in 1996, severely restricted the ability of Massachusetts agencies to purchase
goods or services from individuals or companies that engage in business in Burma, also
known as Myanmar. See id. at45. The law was passed to express Massachusetts's disapproval
of the dictatorial regime in Burma, and as a means to impose economic pressure upon the
repressive Burmese regime to allow democratic reform in the country. See id. at 46-47.
The First Circuit, following the lead of the district court, found that the MBL
unconstitutionally infringes on the federal government's power over foreign affairs. See id.
at 51-59. Going beyond the district court's holding, the First Circuit also held that the MBL
violated the foreign commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 61-71.
On November 29,1999, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Massachusetts'
appeal to overturn the First Circuit's Natsios decision. See National Foreign Trade Council
v. Natsios, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999) (granting certiorari). Until the Supreme Court finally decides
the issue, the First Circuit's Natsios decision puts any sanctions by state and local
governments to force settlement of Holocaust-era claims in serious jeopardy.
The relevance of the Natsios decision to the sanctions threatened in the Swiss banks
case-and the other Holocaust-era claims-was underscored by the fact that New York
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Third, the sanctions were not applied against a foreign govern-
ment, but against private banks involved in the federal class action
litigation.
Fourth, the sanctions were applied for a single, limited purpose:
to effect the outcome of a single lawsuit. Never before have sanc-
tions, either in the United States or abroad, been applied with such
a narrow focus.
Finally, the sanctions were effective even without their full
implementation. The actual sanctions applied against the Swiss
banks, before they came to bargaining table, were minimal. It was
the threat of future, more serious punitive actions that forced the
Swiss banks, first, to come to the bargaining table and offer $600
million, and then to raise this "last offer" to $1.25 billion to resolve
the litigation.
One important lesson from this experience is that private
commercial institutions can behave rationally, even when sovereign
governments may not. Looking at the economic bottom-line, the
Swiss banks made the rational decision that it would cost them less
to settle rather than to fight the lawsuits and face the looming
economic threats about to be imposed upon them by state and local
governments in the United States.
D. The August 1998 Settlement
On August 12, 1998, a comprehensive "rough justice" settlement
for $1.25 billion was reached by the Swiss banks with the plaintiffs
in the various actions filed against the banks.293 The $1.25 billion
Comptroller Alan Hevesi, who heads an inter-governmental Holocaust "watchdog" group, see
discussion supra note 290, filed an amicus brief urging the First Circuit to uphold the MBL.
See INT'L MONITOR, July 1999, at 2. The July 1999 issue of the International Monitor, for
instance, announces that "[tihe Executive Monitoring Committee plans to reconvene in
September [1999] to review the apparent lack of progress in resolving restitution issues
involving German banks and industry, as well as French and Austrian banks." Id. The
obvious implication of this statement is a not-too-subtle threat of economic sanctions against
these entities by state and local officials for their "apparent lack of progress" in making
restitution to Holocaust claimants. See id.
293. See John Authers & William Hall, Holocaust Deal Ends Sanctions Threat, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 14, 1998, at 2; Joseph P. Fried, Swiss Banks Reach Holocaust Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1998, at 1; John J. Goldman & Henry Weinstein, 2 Swiss Banks to Pay $1.25
Billion in Holocaust Suits, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1998, at 1; Stephen D. Moore, Choices Few
to Swiss Banks on War Claims, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1998, at 1.
For discussions of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers leading to the settlement, see
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figure is the largest settlement of a human rights case in U.S.
history.294
The $1.25 billion figure was not a lump-sum settlement. Rather,
under the agreement struck between the parties, the two Swiss
banks, UBS and Credit Suisse,295 agreed to pay out the $1.25 billion
in four installments: (1) an initial payment of $250 million to be
paid 90 days after Judge Edward Korman, the trial judge, formally
approved the settlement; and (2) the next three payments of $333
million each to be paid on the first, second and third anniversary of
Judge Korman's approval order.296
Pursuant to a settlement agreement subsequently signed by the
parties on January 26, 1999-more than five months after the
settlement was orally agreed upon and preliminarily approved by
Judge Korman in open court-the $1.25 billion should be fully paid
off by the Swiss banks by November 23, 2001.297
Under a time frame set out by Judge Korman in mid-1999 to meet
the requirements of class action litigation in the United States,
nearly 900,000 potential beneficiaries were notified by late summer
Stewart Ain, How the Swiss Deal was Done: Inside the Historical Bank Settlement Talks
Carried out in a Steamy Brooklyn Restaurant, JEWISH WEEK, Aug. 21, 1998, at 1, available
in 1998 WL 11411115; John Authers et al., Banks Pay a High Price for Putting the Past
Behind Them, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 9, 1998, at 4; James D. Besser, Behind the Scenes:
A Curious Synergy, JEWISH J., Aug. 21, 1998, at 8; Susan Orenstein, Gold Warriors: The
Inside Story of the Historic $1.25Billion Settlement Between Holocaust Victims and the Swiss
Banks, AIER. LAW., Sept., 1998, at 62.
294. See Michael J. Bazyler & Paul L. Hoffman, A Measure of Justice for Holocaust
Survivors, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug. 23, 1998, at B7. In addition, "the settlement sets a
record in American litigation for the longest elapsed time, more than 50 years, between 'the
wrongful act and the filing of a lawsuit." Tom Tugend, Fong, Other California Officials, Laud
Swiss Settlement, JEWISH BULLETIN, Aug. 21, 1998, at 9 (quoting Michael Bazyler).
295. During the pendency of the litigation, two of the three defendant Swiss banks-Union
Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank Corporation-merged. See Swiss Merger Will Create No.
2 Bank, supra note 147, at D1. The merged banks retained the name Union Bank of
Switzerland.
296. See Transcript of Settlement Before the Hon. Edward R. Korman at 2, In re Holocaust
Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849, (E.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Settlement
Transcript]; see also Fried, supra note 293, at A6.
297. The first installment of $250 million was paid by the Swiss banks on November 23,
1998 and deposited into an escrow account. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 5.1.
As a result, the subsequent three installments are to be made as follows: "(2) $333 million
('Installment 2') on November 23, 1999; (3) $333 million ('Installment 3') on November 23,
2000; and (4) $334 million (Installment 4') on November 23, 2001." Id.
Interest on the unpaid amount does not begin to accrue until January 23,2001, after
Installment 3 is made, and at the rate of 3.78% per annum. See id. 5.5. Apparently, no
logical reason exists for the 3.78% interest rate. Rather, it was a figure suggested by Senator
D'Amato during the August 1998 settlement negotiations. See Orenstein, supra note 293.
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1999 of the class action settlement,29 and had until October 22,
1999 to opt out of the settlement so as to pursue their individual
actions.299 The notifications were made by direct mail, through
notices in 500 newspapers published in forty countries,00 and in
various languages, including Yiddish.3°' A toll-free number and a
Web site were set up to provide information to potential
claimants. °2 The notification process was hailed as "the most
ambitious effort ever to notify potential beneficiaries of a legal
settlement."
3 3
298. Survivors who have registered with the various plaintiffs' law firms or are members
of organizations representing their interests, such as the Holocaust Museum in the United
States or Yad Vashem in Israel, obtained legal notices of the class action settlement through
the mail. Additionally, advertisements were published in newspapers around the world,
including those with a special audience, such as those with a large Jewish or Romani (Gypsy)
readership, to notify the readers of the settlement and procedures for "opting out." See
Marilyn Henry, Swiss Banks Reparations Only Expected in One Year, JERUSALEM POST, June
6, 1999, at 3, available in 1999 WL 9003995.
An estimated $25 million, an astounding sum, though still only 2% of the $1.25 billion
settlement, was allocated by Judge Korman to meet the notification and distribution
requirements necessary to conclude this class action settlement. See id.
299. See Letter from Professor Burt Neuborne, Court-Appointed Settlement Counsel, to
Class Members at 2,In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. June
9, 1999) [hereinafter Letter from Professor Neuborne to Class Members].
300. See, e.g., To Victims of Nazi Persecution and Their Heirs Who May Have Claims
against Swiss Banks or other Swiss Entities Relating to the Holocaust, L.A. TIMES, July 11,
1999, at A32 (advertising the class action settlement).
301. See Henry Weinstein, Search Opens for Holocaust Claimants, L.A. TIMES, June 29,
1999, at A3.
302. See id. The toll-free number is 1-888-635-5483 and the Web site is
<http'//www.swissbankclaims.com>. See id.
303. See id. The notice dated June 11, 1999 that was mailed to potential class members
and posted on the Internet contains a summary of the settlement in a helpful question-and-
answer format. See Notice ofPendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement and Hearing;
Initial Questionnaire, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y.
filed May 10, 1999) [hereinafter Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement
and Hearing].
The notice also contained an "Initial Questionnaire." Individuals seeking to obtain a
share of the settlement were asked to return the completed questionnaire (or, at least, send
a letter to register their name) to the Notice Administrator by October 22, 1999. See id. The
questionnaire was criticized by some as being unduly complicated. "'Clients look at this 20-
page thing and they don't understand it,' said Elihu Kover, director of social services at
Selfhelp, the preeminent New York agency assisting survivors. 'It's not like filling out a
welfare application. It is an emotional issue. This is pretty complicated and stressful." Henry,
supra note 298, at 3.
In fact, failure to fill out the questionnaire did not prejudice any claimant in sharing
in the settlement proceeds. "'The truth is that if they do absolutely nothing with the
[questionnaire], that's fine,' [Professor] Neuborne said. Ignoring the questionnaire does not
affect a survivor's legal right to make a claim against the banks settlement." Id. (first
alteration in original). Professor Burt Neuborne heads the committee of plaintiffs' lawyers
representing the claimants. See id.
Of course, failure by a member of one of the settling classes to notify the court that
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In addition, Judge Korman held a "fairness hearing" on November
29, 1999 to determine whether the settlement is "fair, adequate and
reasonable."3 °4
With the various notice and fairness requirements imposed by
class action litigation, it unfortunately appears that the Nazi
victims, most of them elderly, will not be receiving any payments
until mid-2000, two years after the Swiss bank settlement was first
announced.305
While the historic settlement ended the question of how much
money should be paid out, it left many other questions unanswered,
including: (1) Who would pay the $1.25 billion?; (2) Who would
receive the $1.25 billion?; and (3) Which defendants would be
released from further litigation?
With the September 1, 1998 deadline for the issuance of further
sanctions against the Swiss banks looming just two weeks away, the
parties in the Swiss bank litigation cannot be blamed for settling
the case in mid-August 1998 without first deciding these critical, but
the member is opting out of the settlement would prejudice such member: the person would
be precluded from filing a separate lawsuit against the Swiss banks or any other entities
released in this litigation. See Notice of Pendency of Class Action and Proposed Settlement
and Hearing, supra, at 9.
304. Weinstein, supra note 301, at A3. Of course, in this case, the "fairness hearing" was
nothing more than a formality required under rules of federal class action litigation. Since
it was Judge Korman who crafted the $1.25 billion settlement in August 1998, it is unlikely
that in November 1999 he would have found the settlement not to be "fair, adequate and
reasonable."
305. See Henry, supra note 298, at 3. Distribution might begin even later. As reported by
the Los Angeles Times:
Elan Steinberg, executive director of the World Jewish Congress, one of the
organizations that has played a key role in the Swiss bank campaign, said he
expects that distribution of funds will start in the second half of [2000].
However, Melvin [sic] I. Weiss, one of the lead lawyers for the plaintiffs, said
he would "not predict when distribution would begin."
Weinstein, supra note 301, at A3 (quoting Melvyn I. Weiss); see also Letter from Professor
Burt Neuborne to Class Members, supra note 299, at 2 ("If all goes according to plan, we hope
to be able to begin disbursing the funds within one year."). In his letter to class members,
Professor Neuborne acknowledged that the process of distribution was taking too long, but
also explained the reasons for the delay:
All of us who have worked on this Settlement regret that we cannot move more
quickly in distributing the funds. It is our duty, however, to assure that
everyone affected by the Settlement is given a chance to comment on its
fairness, and to have an opportunity to express an opinion about the fairest way
to allocate and distribute the funds. That takes time.... Because we all feel so
deeply about the Holocaust, we want this process to treat every survivor with
scrupulous fairness.
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thorny, issues. This mentality, however, of "let's just take the money
and run," created a host of problems. Many of these problems
continue to this day. Each will be discussed separately below.
1. Parties Paying the $1.25 Billion
The parties obligated to make the payment of $1.25 billion are
Credit Suisse and UBS, the defendant banks in the federal class
action litigation.3°6 The two banks, however, will receive a credit
against this amount for any payments made by them or by any other
Swiss banks on World War II-related dormant accounts, whether
the payments are made voluntarily or as a result of an award issued
by the bank-created Claims Resolution Tribunal. °7
306. See Settlement Transcript, supra note 296, at 2 ("The defendant banks will pay
$1,250,000,000 in four payments over the course of three years."); Settlement Agreement,
supra note 265, 1 (defining "Settling Defendants").
Credit Suisse will pay one-third of the settlement, or $416,667,000, and UBS will pay
two-thirds, or $833,333,000. See Moore, supra note 293, at A12. UBS, Europe's biggest bank,
is paying two-thirds of the amount since, during the course of the litigation, it merged with
the third Swiss defendant bank, Swiss Bank Corporation. See discussion supra note 295. Soon
after the settlement, UBS reported a third-quarter loss of $660 million. See Swiss UBS
Reports 3rd-Quarter Loss, AP ONLINE, Nov. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22419424. It
appears, however, that the loss was due to UBS's investments, rather than from its obligation
to pay the settlement. See Edmund L. Andrews, Swiss Banks Stagger after Several Investing
Missteps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at S4; Alan Cowell, Big Swiss Bank is Shaken up by
Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at B1.
307. See Settlement Transcript, supra note 296, at 2-3; Settlement Agreement, supra note
265, 9 5.2, 5.3.
The probe of 63 Swiss banks to locate Holocaust dormant accounts-created and
funded by the Swiss Bankers Association ("SBA") and chaired by former Federal Reserve
Chairman Paul Volcker-has turned out to be both more costly and more time-consuming than
originally anticipated. See Delay Seen in Report on Holocaust Assets, WALL ST. J.-EUR., Nov.
17, 1998, at 2, available in 1998 WL 21154259. In November 1998, Volcker's ICEP reported
that it would not meet its original deadline of December 31, 1998 to finish the audit of the
Swiss banks. See id. That same month, Swiss bank officials announced that the cost of the
audit "'is definitely a multiple of what we're looking for.'" Tani Freedman, Cost of Swiss-Bank
Audits to Trace Nazi-era Accounts Causes Anger, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 16, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 16640465 (quoting Michel Derobert, head of the SBA). According to the
French-language newspaperLe Temps, the entire ICEP operation might cost one billion Swiss
francs, or $719 million. See id.
According to one report, "it cost [the Volcker Committee] nearly $10 in accounting
expenses for every $1 found." Marilyn Henry, Holocaust Victims'Ardent Umpire, JERUSALEM
POST, June 15, 1999, at 9, available in 1999 WL 9004416.
In June 1999, Professor Thomas Buergenthal of George Washington University Law
School, former president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and one of the most
respected international human-rights law scholars, was appointed to head the Claims
Resolution Tribunal in Zurich. See id.
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Immediately after the settlement, the two defendant banks
expressed a desire for the Swiss government to contribute funds to
the $1.25 billion settlement. °8 However, the Swiss government,
despite obtaining the tangible benefit of having a lawsuit dropped
against the government's SNB as a condition of the settlement,
refused to make any contribution.0 9
The two banks, except for payments made by the other Swiss
banks for provable World War II-era dormant accounts found
deposited with them,310 are being stuck with the bill for the entire
Swiss nation for wrongs committed during the Holocaust."'
308. See Elizabeth Olson, SwissAre Relieved, But Sour, atBanks'HolocaustAccord, N.Y.
TmIEs, Aug. 16, 1998, at 8. That article states:
[T~he question of exactly who will pay the $1.25 billion to Holocaust survivors
seemed to ignite real worry. Many Swiss, particularly those who lived through
World War II, view any use of taxpayer money for this purpose as an
unacceptable admission of wartime wrongdoing. This belief is combined with
the fact that Switzerland is now climbing out of its most serious recession.
... Mr. [Pascal] Couchepin, [the Swiss Minister for the Economy] said that
"there is no reason for the Swiss Government to pay anything."... The Swiss
National Bank, which has been singled out as a major buyer of looted gold from
Nazi Germany, was not part of the accord and has not yet taken a position.
Id. (quoting Pascal Couchepin).
309. The position of the Swiss government is regrettable, since the Swiss National Bank
("SNB") "was the biggest single purchaser of looted gold acquired by Nazi Germany from
countries it occupied and from individual Jews robbed as they faced death in extermination
camps." Alan Cowell, Biggest German Bank Admits and Regrets Dealing in Nazi Gold, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1998, at A2.
Immediately after the settlement, the Swiss government issued a statement in which
it both distanced itself from the result and took pains to confirm that it would not be
contributing any monies to the settlement:
The Federal Council noted today that a settlement was finalized last night
between the CS Group, UBS AG, and the American plaintiffs. It hopes that this
settlement calms the tense situations of recent months and promotes good
economic relations. The precise content of the settlementis notyet known. The
Federal Council has always stressed that negotiating such a settlement is a
matter for the parties affected. Accordingly, it did not take part in these
negotiations. For this reason no obligation ensues for the Swiss Confederation
from the settlement. The Federal Council reserves the opportunity to make a
more detailed comment as soon as it has had the opportunity to analyze the
settlement's text and conditions. Moreover, the Federal Council will continue
to proceed along the way it has determined, as in the past.
Declaration of the Swiss Federal Council, Aug. 13, 1998 (on file with author) (emphasis
added). See also Blau, supra note 263, at 34; Swiss Banks to Begin Holocaust Pay, AP ONLINE,
Nov. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23031526 ("The Swiss National Bank, the central bank,
has refused to pay into the settlement. For now UBS, the biggest bank, will pay two-thirds
and Credit Suisse the remaining one-third.").
310. For discussion of dormant accounts discovered in Swiss banks, see supra note 15.
311. See The End of the Beginning for Holocaust Victims, PRIVATE BANKER INT'L, Oct. 1,
1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 10780489. ("To some extent the two banks are pickingup the
tab for a number of Swiss institutions which may have faced separate lawsuits in the absence
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In November 1998, the two banks timely made the first $250
million payment. 12 The monies were deposited in an escrow
account, awaiting distribution.
13
2. Parties Released from Further Litigation
In return for $1.25 billion, plaintiffs in the class litigation agreed
to drop their instant lawsuit against the two defendant Swiss
banks.1 4 However, the release obtained by the defendant banks
went substantially beyond just a dismissal of the New York federal
class action litigation.
First, the class action plaintiffs agreed to dismiss not only the
New York lawsuit, but also to drop their California lawsuit and to
release the defendant banks "for all claims of any kind arising out
of a [sic] Nazi era World War II or its aftermath."315
Moreover, plaintiffs agreed to release not only the two defendants
for all World War II-related claims, but also "the government of
Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank, all other Swiss banks, and
all other members of Swiss industry, except for the three Swiss
insurers who are defendants in the [federal class action insurance
litigation]."31 6 As a result, plaintiffs had to dismiss their federal
lawsuit against the SNB for claims involving Nazi-looted gold. 1'
Additionally, as part of the settlement, defendants sought and
obtained the dismissal of the lawsuit against UBS filed by fired
Swiss bank guard Christoph Meili.318
of a global settlement."); see also Authers et al., supra note 293, at 4.
312. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 5.1; see also Swiss Banks to Pay 250
Million Dollars under Jewish DormantAccountsAccord, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov. 20,1998,
available in 1998 WL 16643369.
313. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, T 5.1.
314. See id. T 12.1.
315. Settlement Transcript, supra note 296, at 3.
316. Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, T 1 (providing definition of"Releasees" and
stating that the term Releasees excludes "Basler Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, Ziirich
Lebensversicherungs-Gesellschaft, and Winterthur Lebensversicherungs Gesellschaft and
their subsidiaries in the insurance business, but only to the extent of insurance claims of the
type asserted in Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y. [filed
June 26, 1997])"); see also Settlement Transcript, supra note 296, at 3. For discussion of the
Cornell case and other Holocaust-era insurance lawsuits, see text and notes infra Part IV.
Unfortunately, as of March 1, 2000, the releases still had not been finalized.
317. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, T 13; Settlement Transcript, supra note
296, at 3.
318. See Interview with Christoph Meili (Feb. 11, 2000).
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The dismissal of the claims against the Swiss National Bank,
which paid no money to be dismissed, has come under harsh
criticism. The major Holocaust survivor group in Israel initially
balked at the settlement specifically for that reason.319
Finally, as a condition of settlement, all sanctions and threats of
sanctions against Switzerland and any of its businesses were
dropped. 2 °
In effect, the settlement obtained by the two defendant Swiss
banks insulates the entire nation of Switzerland and all its busi-
nesses from any kind of litigation-anywhere in the world-having
any connection to World War 11.321
By agreeing to pay $1.25 billion, the two Swiss banks essentially
bought peace for the entire Swiss nation (except for three Swiss
insurance companies) for any acts committed by the Swiss during or
related to World War 11.322
319. See Marilyn Henry, Slave Labor Suit under Way as WJC Satisfies Israeli Survivors,
JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 11, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 9000437. "The [World Jewish
Congress] is only now repairing its acrimonious dealings with Israeli survivors, who had
resisted approving the $1.25 billion settlement.... Moshe Sanbar, chairman of the Center
of Organizations of Holocaust Survivors in Israel, said the settlement was flawed because it
released the Swiss National Bank from all claims." Id.
320. See Settlement Transcript, supra note 296, at 6.
321. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 1 1. The Settlement Agreement defines
"Releasees" to include:
[1] the Settling Defendants [defined as "Credit Suisse and UBS AG (as
successor to Union Bank of Switzerland and Swiss Bank Corporation)"]; [2] the
Swiss National Bank; [3] Other Swiss Banks; [4] the Swiss Bankers Association;
[5] the Swiss Confederation (including, without limitation, the Cantons and all
other political subdivisions and governmental instrumentalities in Switzer-
land); and [6] all business concerns (whether organized as corporations or
otherwise) headquartered, organized or incorporated in Switzerland as of
October 3, 1996.
Id. The rest of the definition includes foreign corporations with Swiss subsidiaries and foreign
offices of Swiss corporations, ifat least 25% of the entity's shares are owned by a Swiss-based
corporation. See id. In effect, the settlement release states to the plaintiffs: "If it's Swiss, you
can't touch it."
322. The Settlement Agreement defines "Claims or Settled Claims" in the following broad
terms:
Claims or Settled Claims means any and all actions . . whether in law,
admiralty, or equity, whether class or individual, under any international,
national, state, provincial, or municipal law, whether now accrued or asserted
or hereafter arising or discovered, that may be, may have been, could have
been, or could be brought in any jurisdiction before any court, arbitral tribunal,
or similar body.., by reason of, or in connection with any act or omission in
any way relating to the Holocaust, World War II and its prelude and aftermath,
Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution transactions with or actions of the Nazi
Regime, treatment of refugees fleeing Nazi persecution by the Swiss
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On January 26, 1999, the Settlement Agreement was finalized
and signed by the parties.3 2' The five-month delay was due to
disagreements among the claimants' attorneys as to who would be
eligible for compensation.324 The distribution issues are discussed
below.
3. Distribution Issues
The $1.25 billion class action settlement did not solve the issue of
distribution. While the settlement decided how much the Swiss
banks were going to pay to end the class action litigation both
against them and Switzerland, it did not decide who was going to
receive this money. This thorny question was left for future
determination.15
Immediately after the settlement, various individuals and
institutions, both Jewish and non-Jewish, began making claims to
the funds.326 Disputes also arose as to how much the attorneys
Confederation... or any related cause or thing whatever...."
Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 1 1 (emphasis added). Commenting on the
strangeness of the settlement obtained by the Swiss banks, Robert Swift, one of plaintiffs'
attorneys said, 'You've never seen a release like this."' Henry Weinstein, Holocaust
Survivors, Swiss Banks OK Settlement, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1999, at A3 (quoting Robert
Swiff, plaintiffs' attorney).
323. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265; see also Weinstein, supra note 322, at A3.
324. See id. ('"The main "hang-up" in wrapping up the settlement was defining the class
ofpersons eligible for compensation,' said NewYork Universitylaw professor Burt Neuborne,
a member of the plaintiffs' lawyers steering committee.").
325. The Settlement Agreement contemplates for Judge Korman to appoint a
Special Master ... [who] shall develop a proposed plan of allocation and
distribution of the Settlement Fund, employing open and equitable procedures
to ensure fair consideration of all proposals for allocation and distribution. The
proposed allocation and distribution plan must be approved by the Court before
the Settlement Fund may be distributed.
Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 7.1. Manhattan attorney Judah Gribetz has been
appointed "Special Master." See Marilyn Henry, Swiss HolocaustAgreement Finalized: Terms
Reached forDefiningEligible Victims., JERUSALEMPOST, Jan. 24,1999, at 4, available in 1999
WL 8998755.
326. One day after the settlement, I was reminded by a journalist covering a press
conference where the Swiss settlement was announced of a Chinese proverb that "failure is
an orphan but success has many parents." The journalist was commenting on the various
individuals and organizations at the conference claiming credit for the settlement.
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representing the plaintiffs should receive from the settlement. $2
Such disputes continue as of January 1, 2000.321
a. Claimants to the Settlement Proceeds
While at first blush it may appear that the only claimants to the
class action settlement should be Jews, in fact, the class of plaintiffs
described in the lawsuit seems to encompass other groups perse-
cuted by the Nazis.
One group making a claim to a portion of the settlement funds are
the Romani people, more commonly known as Gypsies. According to
one Romani (Gypsy) representative, "'[tlhe 1.25 billion dollars which
is to be paid by two Swiss banks belongs to Jews. But they are going
to give 10-12 percent of this sum to the gypsies of Europe."329
Second, even among the Jewish community, there is a debate as
to who should receive the funds. As described in a news story a few
months after the settlement:
Abattle is flaringbetween Jewish humanitarian groups, plaintiffs'
lawyers and concentration camp survivors over the $1.25 billion paid
by Swiss banks to settle Holocaust-related lawsuits, and potentially
billions more from claims against companies in Germany, Austria and
other countries.
At the core of the dispute is the emotionally charged question of
how to divide the bulk of the settlement, because only a small fraction
of it will go to the heirs of Jews who had Swiss bank accounts on the
eve of World War H and were killed by the Nazis. As a result, up to $1
billion may be up for grabs.3 0
327. See, e.g., Elli Wohlgelernter, Lawyers and the Holocaust, JERUSALEM POST, July 2,
1999, at 4B.
328. For a discussion of the distribution issues in the Swiss bank settlement, see James
D. Besser, Seeking Moral Restitution, JEWISH J., Dec. 4, 1998, at 22; Charles Krauthammer,
Reducing the Holocaust to Mere Dollars and Cents, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at B9; Daniel
Kurtzman, Money:Last Word on the Holocaust?, JEWISHJ., Dec. 11, 1998, at 26; Barry Meier,
Jewish Groups Fight for Spoils of Swiss Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, at 1; Susan
Orenstein, Gold Warriors: The Inside Story of the Historic $1.25 Billion Settlement between
Holocaust Victims and the Swiss Banks, AM. LAW., Sept., 1998, at 62.
329. Romanian Gypsies Seeking Part of Jewish Compensation, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Nov.
10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16637114 (quoting Florin Cioaba, Romanian gypsy leader).
330. Meier, supra note 328, at Al.
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Different proposals have been made for distribution of the funds
that remain leftover after the Holocaust-era Swiss bank depositors
and their heirs have been compensated.33' These proposals include:
(1) the monies should go only to Holocaust survivors; 3 2
331. See Henry Weinstein & John J. Goldman, Cutting the Cloth ofAtonement, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1998, at Al ("There is general agreement that first payments should be made to
survivors or their heirs with accounts clearly identified in the Swiss banks.").
332. See Sample Letter to Object toAny Deduction from Restitution Proceeds, NAHOS, THE
NEWSLETTER OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF JEWISH CHILD HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS, May
2, 1999, at 8. That sample letter states:
No amount of money, neither in bulk dollar figures nor in percentages, should
be taken from any restitution-proceeds that have been obtained in the name of
Holocaust-victims. Any proposed allotments, no matter how worthwhile the
cause, be it for Holocaust education, support ofreligion, erection ofmonuments,
or any other reason, must be entirely voluntary on our part!
Id.
The objection to monies being spent for Holocaust education or other social causes was
made by NAHOS in reaction to a proposal made by some Jewish organizations in the United
States that an 80/20 formula be adopted, with 80% of the proceeds going directly to Holocaust
survivors and 20% allocated to Jewish organizations for social causes. See id. at 1; see also
Richard Cohen, The Money Matters, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at A21. That article states:
An immense crime was committed in Europe, a moral calamity that left a
black hole in the middle of the 20th century. Money is the least of it. But
money is part of it. Holocaust victims paid once for being Jewish. Now, in a
way, they or their heirs are being asked to pay again-a virtual Jewish tax
which obliges them not to act as others would in the same situation. But in
avoiding one stereotype, they adopt a worse one-perpetual victim.
Id.; see also Marilyn Henry, Desperately Vying for a Piece of the Pie, JERUSALEM POST, Oct.
16, 1998, at 17, available in 1998 WL 6536585. That article states:
Along with a number of other survivors, Weisshaus has generated a proposal
calling at least 70% of the funds to be distributed directly to survivors and
heirs, while 25% of the settlement would be used for medical care of ill
survivors. The Weisshaus group.., also is vehement that the World Jewish
Congress and the Claims Conference should have no role in the allocation, and
they receive none of the funds.
Id.; see also Jodie Morse, Restitution, But at What Price?, TIME, Dec. 14, 1998, at 78 ("Gisella
Weisshaus, the 69-year-old survivor who brought the first claim against the Swiss banks
... claim[s] that the money should go only to those who suffered."). Even if all the funds
received go to survivors of the Holocaust, a problem remains: determining who is a "survivor."
See Weinstein & Goldman, supra note 331, at Al. The authors state:
Complicating matters is the difficulty of precisely defining Holocaust
survivors. Hundreds of thousands of people around the world may file claims.
Some think the definition should be limited to people who were
imprisoned in concentration camps and managed to stay alive. Others believe
in a broader definition, including people in forced labor camps, people who fled
from their homes and lived underground, others who left Germany after the
Nazi regime started taking draconian measures and still others who managed
to flee other Eastern European countries after the Nazis invaded.
Exacerbating the issue is the fact that many of those who perished in
the Holocaust died without wills.
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(2) the monies should go to the State of Israel, where the majority
of the survivors live;333
(3) the monies should be spent for Holocaust education; 334 and
(4) all Jews, including Holocaust survivors, should reject the
funds, and, instead, the monies should be distributed to survivors
of other, more recent human rights tragedies (such as to the victims
of the Rwandan massacres and the Bosnian conflict of the 1990s,
and the Khmer Rouge Cambodian auto-genocide of the 1970s).335
In January 1999, more than five months after the settlement was
announced, the parties finally agreed on who should receive com-
333. See Abraham H. Foxman, The Dangers of Holocaust Restitution, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4,
1998, at A18. The author, head of the Anti-Defamation League, states:
I believe, first and foremost, that those who have claims should receive
payment. Holocaust survivors without specific claims should be included in the
disbursement of funds. After claims are satisfied and after needy survivors, who
are mostly in Eastern Europe, are provided for, I suggest the remainder go to
Israel. Not only would this make an important statement, but Israel has the
greatest number of Holocaust survivors who need support. Israel has
proportionately more children and grandchildren of survivors than any other
nation.
Id.
334. See Morse, supra note 332, at 78 ("Under one proposal being floated by the World
Jewish Restitution Organization, after specific [Swiss dormant bank account] claims are
settled, 80% of what's left would go to destitute survivors and 20% to Holocaust education.");
see also Besser, supra note 328, at 22 ("'Survivors are entitled to get what was stolen from
them or their parents.... But we believe Holocaust education is more important; we believe
the last chapter of the Holocaust cannot be gold and it cannot be bank accounts.'" (quoting
Miles Lerman, chair of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council)); Weinstein & Goldman, supra
note 331, at Al ("[Slome individuals clearly are entitled to compensation. But... money left
over... 'should be used to rebuild and continue the Jewish people. The way to rebuild the
Jewish people primarily is through education.'" (quotingRabbi Shmuel Bloom, executive vice
president of Agudath Israel of America, "a major orthodox organization")).
335. See Jeff Jacoby, Jews Can Set a Moral Example with Holocaust Funds, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 7, 1998, at A15. Jacoby states:
I propose an entirely different idea, one that emerged in a conversation
with Dennis Prager, an [sic] Los Angeles broadcaster renowned for his writings
on ethics and Judaism: Once the cheated depositors have been paid, let the
Jewish people relinquish any claims to the balance of the money. Let it be used
instead to help human beings whose lives have been shattered by genocide and
ethnic slaughter. -
Rather than earmarking the money for Jewish causes, spend it to heal
the still-suffering survivors of the Rwandan massacre. Or the deeply scarred
victims of the Cambodian holocaust. Or the Bosnian women brutalized in
Serbia's rape camps.
"We Jews wanted to awaken the world to what the Swiss did," Prager
says. "We don't want to profit by it."
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pensation from the Swiss banks.336 Five classes of eligible claimants
were agreed upon:3
37
(1) the "Deposited Assets Class," consisting of "Victims or Targets
of Nazi Persecution" ("VTNP") claimants and their heirs seeking to
recover World War II-era assets deposited in a Swiss bank, invest-
ment fund, or other custodian, prior to May 9, 1945;338
(2) the "Looted Assets Class," consisting of VTNP claimants and
their heirs seeking to recover compensation for assets belonging to
them and stolen by the Nazis, which made their way to the Swiss
banks3 39 or Nazi assets that were "fenced" by the Swiss banks;3 40
(3) "Slave Labor Class I," consisting of VTNP claimants who per-
formed slave labor for companies or entities that deposited assets
derived from that slave labor in Switzerland;
341
336. See Weinstein, supra note 322, at A13. Again, Judge Korman came to the rescue,
successfully intervening to settle the five-month impasse. Accordingto the LosAngeles Times,
the January 1999 final settlement with the Swiss banks "was reached only after a lengthy
late night meeting in the chambers of a Brooklyn federal judge who has been supervising the
massive case." Id.
337. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, TT 8.1-.2; Weinstein, supra note 322, at
A13; Richard Wolfe, Putting a Price on the Holocaust, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at 15,
available in 1999 WL 14002124.
338. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, T 8.2(a). Germany surrendered to the
Allied powers on May 9, 1945.
Individuals in this class, forming the original basis for the class action lawsuit against
the Swiss banks, will be treated preferentially. The claimants in this class will be receiving
payment directly from the Claims Resolution Tribunal in Zurich, established and funded by
the Swiss banks under the auspices of Paul Volcker. These so-called "Volcker accounts"
claimants will be paid individually as they are able to prove to the Tribunal the existence of
the accounts, and need not wait for the release of funds from the court-created escrow
account.
The Claims Resolution Tribunal, headed by international law professor Thomas
Buergenthal and staffed by arbitrators and research attorneys, is using a relaxed standard
of proof to determine whether a claimant has proven the existence of a World War H-era
dormant account at a Swiss bank. As explained by Professor Buergenthal:
"I can't tell you how many similar names we get and stories that 'my mother
told me we had a very wealthy uncle who lived in this town.'... Our test is
plausibility .... Sometimes you have some people with the same name, the
same town, with a profession where you would expect to have money. It is
plausible that both are entitled to it."
Henry, supra note 307, at 9 (quoting Professor Thomas Buergenthal).
339. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 1 (defining "looted assets").
340. See id. (defining "cloaked assets").
341. See id. I 8.2(c).
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(4) "Slave Labor Class II," consisting of individuals who performed
slave labor at a facility or business concern headquartered, orga-
nized, or based in Switzerland;342 and
(5) the "Refugee Class," consisting of VTNP claimants, and their
heirs, who sought entry into Switzerland to escape the Nazis and
were either denied entry, or, after gaining entry, were either sent
back or mistreated by the Swiss.
343
A close analysis of these five categories reveals, however, that
they make little sense. First, the "Deposited Assets," "Looted
Assets," and "Slave Labor I" classes require a claimant in these
three classes to prove that the Swiss government or private Swiss
industry (the "Releasees" specified in these classes) did business
with the Nazis. For example, a claimant who worked as a slave
laborer for the Nazis does not fall under the "Slave Labor I" class
unless the company for which the slave laborer worked "deposited
the revenues or proceeds of that labor with, or transacted such
revenues or proceeds through... [Switzerland]."3 "
Of course, a now-elderly Holocaust survivor whose only goal was
to stay alive, would almost never be able to offer proof that the
benefits of his or her labor for the Nazis were eventually sent to
Switzerland. This requirement is nonsensical, and exists only
because this was the allegation made against the Swiss in the class
action complaints.
It appears, however, that this nexus to Switzerland will never
have to be made, since a mere allegation of such a charge by a
342. See id. 8.2(d).
343. See id. I 8.2(e). For a comprehensive discussion of this class of claimants, see
INDEPENDENT COMULSSION OF EXPERTS, SECOND WORLD WAR, SWITZERLAND AND REFUGEES
IN THE NAZI ERA (1999) (reporting on the findings of the Swiss-government-created Bergier
historical commission); see also Marilyn Henry, Victims of Omission, JERUSALEM POST, July
23, 1999, at 7B, available in 1999 WL 9006150. According to the Jerusalem Post:
The banks made the inclusion of the refugee class a condition of the settlement
at the insistence of the Swiss government, sources said. The government, while
not a party to the class actions, wanted to exploit the settlement to be freed of
all Holocaust-era claims. Neither, though, did the survivors' lawyers take the
refugee class seriously. Their focus had been on Nazi victims' claims for
material losses and for compensation for slave labor. The refugees became a
"minor" class that was both an afterthought and an indispensable part of the
deal.
Id.
344. Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 9 8.2(c).
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claimant seems to be sufficient for the claimant to come within the
class.
Second, the term VTNP,346 appearing in four of the five class
categories, 347 does not comport with reality. It was not utilized in the
Nuremberg Trials nor has it been used by any Holocaust scholar.
Rather, the term was invented solely, and appears for the first time,
in the Settlement Agreement.3 4' The Settlement Agreement's
345. See id. 8(c). "Slave Labor Class I consists of Victims or Targets of Nazi Persecution
who actually or allegedly performed Slave Labor for companies or entities that actually or
allegedly deposited the revenues or proceeds of that labor with [Switzerland]." Id. (emphasis
added).
In the letter to Class Members, Professor Burt Neuborne, Court-Appointed Settlement
Counsel, confirms the actual irrelevancy of this nexus between slave labor or looted assets
and their proceeds being sent to Switzerland. In encouraging all former slave laborers to
complete and remit the initial settlement questionnaire, thereby registering the applicant to
possibly receive funds, Professor Neuborne advised:
Even if you are unsure of whether you have a claim against a Swiss
entity, you should complete the enclosed Initial Questionnaire, and follow the
procedures described in the enclosed Notice to preserve your rights. For
example, if you performed slave labor, you may not know whether revenue or
proceeds ofthat slave labor were deposited with Swiss banks. Or, you may have
had assets looted by the Nazi regime, but you may not know whether those
assets were disposed of through a Swiss bank. In both instances, you may still
be entitled to share in the Settlement Fund. Although there is no guarantee
that you will recover any money, you should complete the enclosed Initial
Questionnaire.
Letter from Professor Burt Neuborne to Class Members, supra note 299, at 2.
That same month, Douglas M. Bloomfield of the World Jewish Congress likewise
confirmed the irrelevancy of this requirement. According to Bloomfield, "because ofthe Nazis'
intimate financial relationship with Switzerland during the war, practically all Holocaust
survivors are eligible [for the $1.25 billion settlement]. 'Every single Holocaust survivor
should receive something,' Bloomfield said." Liz Halloran, Holocaust Survivors Face Evil
Memories in Swiss Atonement, Victims of Banks' Nazi Appeasement Sought, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 18, 1999, at A13, available in 1999 WL 19941039 (quoting Douglas M.
Bloomfield).
Of course, Bloomfield's explanation still leaves an important question unanswered:
Who is to be considered a "Holocaust survivor"?
346. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 1. That agreement states:
Victim or Target of Nazi Persecution means any individual, corporation,
partnership, sole proprietorship, unincorporated association, community,
congregation, group, organization, or other entity persecuted or targeted for
persecution by the Nazi Regime because they were or were believed to be
Jewish, Romani, Jehovah's Witness, homosexual, or physically or mentally
disabled or handicapped.
Id.
347. The term is not used in category four, "Slave Labor Class II," covering individuals
working as slave laborers for Swiss-based companies. This class covers any person, whether
or not fitting the definition of VTNP. See id. I 8.2(d).
348. Earlier, in the Trilling-Grotch amended complaint, plaintiffs utilize the term "targets
of Nazi persecution," but, unlike in the Settlement Agreement, never define the term. See
Trilling-Grotch Amended Complaint, supra note 123, 9 20, 24, 35, 38-39, 41.
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definition of VTNP both limits and expands the categories of
individuals who can recover from the Swiss settlement.
Most striking is that VTNPs are not limited to Jews. Rather, it
also contemplates that, in addition to Jews, the following four
groups persecuted by the Nazis are also VTNPs, and, therefore, will
receive a part of the $1.25 billion settlement: (1) homosexuals; (2)
physically or mentally disabled or handicapped persons;349 (3) the
Romani (Gypsy) peoples; and (4) Jehovah's Witnesses °
At the time of filing of the class action lawsuits, the common
understanding was that the lawsuits were being filed on behalf of
the Jewish victims of Nazi Germany."' Throughout the course of the
litigation, the Jewish non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"),
such as the World Jewish Congress in New York and the Simon
Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, led the fight against the Swiss
banks.
Later, the parties in the Austrian banks' settlement also utilized the term VTNP to
define the class of persons entitled to compensation from the Austrian banks. See discussion
and notes infra Part VII.A.1. However, that settlement gave the term a much broader
meaning:
"Victim or Target of Nazi Persecution" shall mean any person who was a
member of a group that was systematically persecuted or targeted for
persecution by the Nazi Regime, its agents or sympathizers, based on race,
ethnic origin, nationality, political belief or affiliation, sexual orientation, or
mental or physical disability, and their heirs, devisees, legatees, successors,
beneficiaries and/or assigns and any person persecuted or targeted for assisting
the foregoing groups.
Settlement Agreement with Creditastalt AG & Bank Austria AG 1(c), No. 99 Civ. 0387
(S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 15, 1999).
The Austrian banks' VTNPs, unlike the Swiss banks' VTNPs, are not limited to Jews,
homosexuals, Romanis (Gypsies), Jehovah's Witnesses, and the disabled, but includes any
group targeted by the Nazis. See id. Moreover, the Austrian banks' definition of VTNPs
specifically includes heirs, while the Swiss bank Settlement Agreement is unclear as to
whether heirs can recover.
349. See Maria L. LaGanga, Fighting for 'Other' Victims of Holocaust: Hundreds of
Thousands of Disabled People Were among Those Killed by the Nazis, L-A TIMES, Jan. 19,
1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 2121932 (discussing the claims of disabled people
persecuted by the Nazi regime).
350. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 265, 8.2(d). The Settlement Agreement
contemplates one other category of persons entitled to recover: slave laborers of any ethnic
group or religion who worked for Swiss firms during the war. See id.
351. This belief-that only Jews would recover in the Swiss class action litigation-existed
even at the time of the settlement. For instance, the press release of Cohen, Milstein,
Hausfeld & Toll-one of plaintiffs' lead attorneys-announcing the August 13,1998 settlement
states: "In an historic, unprecedented legal settlement, Swiss private banks will pay
Holocaust survivors $1.25 billion to settle legal claims arising from the banks' conduct during
and after World War 1." Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, E-Journal (visited Nov. 6, 1999)
<http://www.cmht.com/ipsltmt.htm> (emphasis added).
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Little notice was paid, however, to the fact that the class of
plaintiffs listed in all but one of the complaints352 filed against the
Swiss banks went beyond just Jewish victims. Rather, the putative
plaintiff classes covered all targets of Nazi persecution, including
Jewish and non-Jewish victims. 353
352. Of the five complaints filed against the Swiss and consolidated under the caption of
In re Holocaust Victim Assets, only one, the World Council complaint, seeks to represent
solely Jewish victims of the Nazis. See World Council Complaint, supra note 123, 1 1.
The class action against SNB, filed in the District of Columbia federal district court,
forms part of the settlement, and likewise covered both Jewish and non-Jewish claimants. See
Rosenberg Complaint, supra note 259, 26 (discussing the class allegation).
The class action against the same three private Swiss banks, filed in the California
state court in San Francisco, also covers both Jewish and non-Jewish claimants. See
Markovicova Complaint, supra note 124, 114. In fact, the California action even includes one
non-Jewish named plaintiff, a Romani (Gypsy). See id. T 12.
Throughout the complaints and other pleadings filed by plaintiffs in the course of the
litigation, references are made to claims of Jews and other "civilian populations" of Nazi-
occupied Europe. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Counterstatement of Facts, supra note 153, at 4. With
regard to dormant bank accounts, plaintiffs specifically assert that such accounts were opened
by both Jews and non-Jews in the defendant banks: "From 1934 to 1945, numerous Jewish
persons, as well as others who were members of groups subjected to religious, racial and
political persecution by the Nazi regime, made deposits of assets in various forms in the
Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Bank Corporation and Credit Suisse." Id.
On the other hand, the named plaintiffs-save one-in all the complaints are Jewish.
Moreover, the complaints also refer throughout to "victims of the Holocaust," a term
specifically referring to Nazi persecution of Jews. See discussion supra note 4.
An important legal memorandum submitted in the case refers, at one place, to "The
Looted Assets/Slave Labor Claims" as representing the claims of only "Jewish slave labor."
Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 138, at 3. However, at another part, the Neuborne
Memorandum sets out to list the three classes of plaintiffs, and defines one as including the
claims of only Jews, and the other two as including claims of both Jews and non-Jews. See
id. at 11. That section states:
Plaintiffs intend to move for class certification .... Plaintiffs anticipate at least
three sub-classes: The Deposited Assets/Constructive Trust Class (1) a class of
persons seeking to recover assets deposited by Jews in defendant banks .... ;
The Looted Assets Class (2) a class of persons seeking to recover assets looted
by the Nazis and knowingly laundered into Swiss banks by defendant banks on
behalf of the Nazis .... ; and The Slave Labor Class (3) a class of persons
seeking to recover profits earned by defendants by knowingly acting as the
financial conduit on behalf of the Nazis of the importation and sale of goods
produced by slave labor.
Id. (emphasis added).
353. See Trilling-Grotch Amended Complaint, supra note 123, T 20. That complaint states:
The putative plaintiff class (the "looted assets/slave labor" class) consists of
targets of Nazi persecution whose property was subject to systematic looting by
the Nazi Regime .... Class members also seek appropriate compensatory and
punitive relief, including disgorgement of all profits, for damages caused by
defendant bank's trafficking in the products and profits of Nazi slave labor.
Id. 1 20. "Slave labor" is defined as "work done by an individual . . . for which no, or
insubstantial, compensation is paid often under circumstances that include confinement." Id.
919.
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Faced with these admissions, and pressure by the non-Jewish
victims of the Nazis to receive a portion of the settlement, the
settling parties expanded the categories of beneficiaries of the Swiss
settlement to include some (but not all) non-Jewish victims.3 5 4
However, the non-Jewish victim group included in the settlement
is small, and excludes the entire category of Slavic
peoples-primarily Poles and Russians-forced to work as slave
laborers for the Nazis.355 These victims of Nazi persecution will not
The Sonabend amended complaint contains virtually the same putative class
language as the Trilling-Grotch amended complaint. See Sonabend Amended Complaint,
supra note 123, T 20.
The term "targets of Nazi persecution" is not defined in the two complaints, and
invariably must include both Jews and non-Jews whose property was looted by the Nazis.
Similarly, the term "slave labor" appears to cover any individual who forcibly worked for the
Nazis, Jewish or not. In fact, most of the slave laborers were not Jews. See Barry A. Fisher,
The Victims of Nazi Persecution, JEWISH J., Feb. 2, 1999, at 39 (stating that "Poles made up
perhaps the single largest group of slave laborers").
Similarly, the Weisshaus complaint appears to cover both Jewish and non-Jewish
victims of the Nazi regime. See Weisshaus Amended Complaint, supra note 123, 18. "The
putative plaintiff class (the 'deposited assets' class) consists of persons seeking to recover
assets deposited by targets of Nazi persecution in defendant banks, or their predecessors,
between 1933-1945 which have not been returned to their lawful owners." Id. Like in the
Trilling-Grotch and Sonabend amended complaints, the term "targets of Nazi persecution"
is not defined in the Weisshaus amended complaint. Rather, the Weisshaus amended
complaint uses another term, "persecutees," which it defines as "persons who were persecuted
for religious, racial or political reasons by the Nazi Regime." Id. 3. Either way, it is clear
that the Weisshaus amended complaint likewise seeks recovery for both Jewish and non-
Jewish claimants.
The manner in which the settlement was announced in open court in August 1998
also seems to underscore that the $1.25 billion was meant to compensate both Jewish and
non-Jewish victims of Nazi Germany:
The plaintiffs in behalf of the worldwide classes delineated in the complaints
will provide complete and total releases, the broad[est] possible releases, for all
claims of any kind arising out of [the] Nazi era[,] World War H or its aftermath,
including, but not limited to, claims actually made in this case and in the
California case.
Settlement Transcript, supra note 296, at 3.
354. See Weinstein, supra note 322, at A13. According to Professor Burt Neuborne, one of
plaintiffs' lead settlement counsel:
"We had to walk a line between everyone harmed by the Nazis-which is
virtually all of Europe-or only the Jews.... Both extremes were unacceptable.
The first would have so diluted the recovery it would have rendered the whole
suit meaningless. The second would have made it unfairly parochial."
Id. (quoting Professor Burt Neuborne).
355. See Fisher, supra note 353, at 39. The article represents an incisive analysis of this
problem, written by one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in the Swiss bank litigation and
representing the only non-Jewish named plaintiff in the suits. As explained by Fisher,
The suffering of non-Jewish Poles and other Slavs-whom the Nazis
deemed untermenschen (subhumans)-under German occupation was also
extreme. In pursuit of German policy to "see to it that only people of purely
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receive anything from the Swiss settlement. Rather, these still-
uncompensated victims (who, like the Jewish victims, are also
elderly) must await recovery from the slave labor lawsuits filed after
the Swiss settlement.356
Finally, the Settlement Agreement left unsolved the share of the
$1.25 billion that each group will be entitled to receive.35 7 It is
anticipated that the bulk of the monies will go to the Jewish victims
of the Holocaust.35
One thing is clear: almost all the individuals and organizations
who will be receiving a share of the $1.25 billion paid by the Swiss
banks have not been harmed, at least directly, by the Swiss banks'
actions during and after World War II. As conceded by Stuart
Eizenstat, the U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary who led the investi-
gations into Swiss complicity during the war: "After all, the great
bulk of the people who will be paid under the Swiss settlement will
Germanic blood live in the East," Hitler ordered the SS to "send to death,
mercilessly and without compassion, men, women and children of Polish
derivation."... [Bly the end of 1940, the SS had expelled more than 325,000
Poles from their homes and looted their property. Scholars estimate that
between 1.8 million and 1.9 million non-Jewish Poles became victims ofGerman
occupation policies and the war.
Slave labor was a favored fate for the Polish people. Indeed, Poles made
up perhaps the single largest group of slave laborers. By war's end, at least 1.5
million Poles had been impressed into forced labor ....
Id. (quoting United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Poles at 5).
356. It might be asked whether this is a fair result. If the Swiss settlement seeks to
disgorge profits earned by the Swiss from proceeds of slave labor deposited with the Swiss by
the Nazis, and if a substantial amount of the slave laborers were Poles and Russians, then
the surviving Polish and Russian slave laborers should be entitled to share in the $1.25 billion
settlement.
357. According to the Los Angeles Times,
attorneys and Jewish leaders said there are deep divisions over how to
equitably distribute the funds . . .Rabbi Marvin Hier, dean of the Simon
Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles ... said it will not be easy to reach a formula
for distributing the money. He said there are serious splits among Jewish
organizations on two major issues: who is a "survivor," and whether all the
money should go to individuals or whether some of the funds ought to be
allocated to Jewish organizations.
Weinstein, supra note 322, at A13.
358. Special Master Judah Gribetz began taking suggestions on how to allocate and
distribute the settlement funds, and class members were encouraged to make such
suggestions. See Letter from Professor Neuborne to Class Members, supra note 299, at 2.
Professor Neuborne wrote, "you can let Mr. Gribetz, as Special Master, know your views
about how you believe the $1.25 billion settlement fund should be allocated and distributed.
You may communicate with him at any time. He welcomes your views." Id.
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have had no relationship to Swiss banks. When we were developing
the structure of the deal we called that the rough justice amount."359
The Swiss banks' settlement-distribution process will also be
looked at as a model for subsequent Holocaust-era restitution
settlements, such as the insurance settlement process being created
by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims, and the German slave labor fund. This makes the creation
of a fair, efficient, and speedy distribution system for the Swiss
bank settlement even more critical.
b. Distribution System for the Settled Funds
Another major issue is choosing the entity responsible for
distributing the funds paid by the Swiss banks under the settle-
ment. A system needs to be created to distribute at least $1 billion
to eligible claimants, both in the United States and abroad, as the
Swiss banks make their annual payments.
With an average age of eighty-one for Holocaust survivors,360
speed is of the essence.
Two organizations exist today with experience in distribution of
funds to Holocaust survivors: (1) the Conference on Jewish Material
Claims Against Germany, responsible since the 1950s for distribut-
ing German payments; and (2) the World Jewish Restitution
Organization, handpicked to distribute a $200 million fund set up
by Swiss banks and industry for needy Holocaust survivors world-
359. Wolfe, supra note 337, at 15 (quoting then-Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat,
who now serves as Deputy Treasury Secretary).
Plaintiffs attorney Deborah Sturman argues that individuals who will be receiving
payments from the Swiss banks settlement were, in fact, directly harmed by the Swiss banks.
According to Sturman,
after publication of the Eizenstat and Volcker Commission reports, there is
virtually no doubt that the Swiss banks' contributions to the German war effort
prolonged the war and made precisely that expansion of the duration of the war
more profitable for the banks. Any slave laborer or looted asset victim who
remained in a concentration or slave labor camp longer than the Germans
would have been able to economically maintain those camps without Swiss
funding can easily be said to have been harmed by [the] Swiss banks.
Letter from Deborah Sturman to Professor Michael Bazyler (Mar. 6, 2000) (on file with
author).
360. See John J. Goldman, Insurer OKs $100-Million Holocaust Payoff Settlement, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 1998, at A3, available in 1998 WL 2456470.
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wide. However, both organizations have been accused of undue
delays in their efforts to distribute funds to Holocaust survivors.361
It is possible that these groups, because of their possession of
established procedure and personnel for distributing World War II-
era reparations, will be appointed to handle the distribution of the
Swiss funds (even for the non-Jewish claimants). On the other hand,
in the face of strong protest by Jewish survivors, either the "special
master"362 or Judge Korman might set up another procedure for the
fund distribution.
c. Payment of Attorneys' Fees
As with any large class action settlement, controversy has arisen
about the fees requested by the attorneys for the successful
plaintiffs.363 By the time the three separate actions against the
Swiss banks in the Eastern District of New York were consolidated
before Judge Korman, twenty-nine different law firms or consul-
tants were listed as representing plaintiffs.364 While almost all of the
plaintiffs' firms that worked on the Swiss cases did so on a pro bono
361. See Michael Hirsh, What's Taking So Long?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1998, at 49; Barry
Meier, Survivor Aid By 2 Groups Called Slow, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, at A12, available
in 1998 WL 22334778; see also Henry, supra note 332, at 17. That article states:
Gisella Weisshaus of Brooklyn, who in October 1998 filed the original class-
action suit against the [Swiss] banks[,] . .. [allong with a number of other
survivors .... has generated a proposal calling [for] at least 70[%] of the funds
to be distributed directly to survivors and heirs, while 25% of the settlement
would be used for medical care for ill survivors. The Weisshaus group ... also
is vehement that the World Jewish Congress and the Claims Conference should
have no role in the allocation, and that they receive none of the funds.
Id; see also text and notes supra Part II.E. (discussing the various lawsuits and accusations
made over the years against the Claims Conference).
362. According to a letter sent out to the class members by Court-Appointed Settlement
Counsel Professor Burt Neuborne, Special Master Judah Gribetz-appointed by Judge Korman
to create a plan of distribution-will "circulate a draft proposed plan of allocation and
distribution for comment by approximately December28, 1999.... [Gribetz] will prepare and
submit a final proposed plan of allocation and distribution to the Judge by approximately
April 28, 2000." Letter from Professor Burt Neuborne to Class Members, supra note 299, at
2 (emphasis added).
363. See Elli Wohlgelernter, Lawyers and the Holocaust, JERUSALEM POST, July 2, 1999,
at 4B, available in 1999 WL 9005172.
364. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim Under
International Law, supra note 185, at 50-53.
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basis, some firms have requested a fee.3 65 The firms requesting a fee
have been accused of profiting from the Holocaust at the expense of
the victims.3
66
The attorneys have also been involved in fighting among them-
selves, with two groups of lawyers "spending their time denigrating
365. Of the almost thirty law firms representing plaintiffs in the Swiss litigation, only
three are seeking attorneys' fees from the Swiss settlement. However, many of the lawyers
working pro bono on the litigation against the Swiss banks are seeking fees in the subsequent
cases they filed. See Wolfe, supra note 337, at 15. According to one prominent lawyer
representing Holocaust survivors in the post-Swiss bank cases, -'[as a fee,w]e are trying to
keep it in single-digit percentages if possible.'" Id. (quoting Michael Hausfeld concerning the
fees lawyers are seeking from settlements with the German companies).
366. See id. That article states:
For Holocaust survivors, the lawyers' fees and tactics are little short of
reprehensible. Roman Kent, chairman of the American Gathering of Jewish
Holocaust Survivors, said: "When we have lawyers running around from one
country to another trying to ambulance chase, then of course it gives people the
wrong sense of what the Holocaust was and is to be. From my point of view, if
the lawyers want to help us, that is one thing. But if they want to work on a
contingency basis then it has no place in this. You just see the glitter gold in
front of the eyes of the lawyers."
Id. (quoting Roman Kent). According to another commentator,
mhe extent to which an already wealthy group of lawyers will be receiving
additional riches from the booty collected in these cases is a cause of additional
concern .... I am concerned that lawyers, one way or another, are going to reap
huge fees from these cases. Such fees are contrary to the principle... that no
one should profit (directly or indirectly) from the crimes of the Nazis against the
Jews. I see some similarities between the profits that lawyers will be earning
from these cases and the profits earned by the Swiss banks during World War
II.
Lawrence W. Schonbrun, TimeBandits, How Similar are Holocaust-Litigation Lawyers to the
Swiss Banks?, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 9, 1999, at 7. Another reporter wrote:
In the wake of last month's $1.25 billion settlement.., some officials and
lawyers involved in the litigation say they fear that opportunistic lawyers may
see a potential gold mine in the precedent, and will seek every opportunity to
file suits on behalf of victims of past atrocities.
"I worry about an explosion ofthese kinds of suits," said Burt Neuborne,
a New York University law professor working without fee on the Holocaust
cases. 'That a lot of people will see a potential for what they think is a fast
buck."
David Rohde, Atrocities of the Past Now Mined by Some Seeking Justice, Profits, Hous.
CHRoN., Sept. 20,1998, at 34, available in 1998WL 16771540; see also Henry, supra note 332,
at 17; Holocaust Survivor Attorney Embroiled in Fee Dispute, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 14,
1998, available in 1998WL 16618716; Charles Krautharnmer,Reducing theHolocaust to Mere
Dollars and Cents, LA TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at B9; Barry Meier, Jewish Groups Fight for
Spoils of Swiss Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,1998, at Al; Hanan Sher, Let the WranglingBegin,
JERUSALEMREP., Sept. 14, 1998, at 34; Hanan Sher, Opening Salvos, JERUSALEMREP., Oct.
12, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 10353456; Corky Siemaszko, Accusations Swapped on
Holocaust Payment, N.Y.DAILYNEWS, Oct. 19,1998, at20; Weinstein & Goldman, supra note
331, at Al.
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each other, their ability, parentage, [and their] ethnic heritage." 7
Recalling the "ambulance-chasing" style of lawyers flying to India
to sign up clients in the aftermath of the Bhopal chemical plant
disaster in December 1984, American attorneys have been criss-
crossing Europe to sign up clients for future Holocaust lawsuits in
the United States.36 s
On the other hand, Rabbi Abraham Cooper, Associate Dean of the
Simon Wiesenthal Center, one of the Jewish organizations inti-
mately involved with the Holocaust restitution issues, applauds the
role of the lawyers:
"The only reason the Swiss were at the table, the only reason these
guys [in the other cases] are quaking is because lawyers came in and
things moved forward.
I'm not giving them all the credit, but there's no question without
[lawyers getting involved in] these issues, there wouldn't be a heck of
a lot to be talking about in the year 1999."369
367. Meier, supra note 366 at Al (detailing a statement of Burt Neuborne).
368. For criticism of the lawyers involved in the Holocaust litigation, see Krauthammer,
supra note 366, at B9 (labeling the lawyers representing Holocaust victims as "shysters" out
to commit a "shakedown of Swiss banks, Austrian industry [and] German auto makers"); see
also Meier, supra note 366, at Al. In an editorial for the Wall Street Journal, Abraham H.
Foxman wrote:
Since the Swiss settlement there has been a rush for restitution. Some lawyers
see it as an opportunity of a lifetime .... But, I do not want Holocaust victims
used as political footballs or tickets for financial gain .... There is no place for
ambulance chasers in this serious and sacred undertaking.
Foxman, supra note 333, at A18.
369. Wohlgelernter, supra note 363, at 4B (alterations in original). Abraham Foxman, head
of the Anti-Defamation League, also gives credit to the lawyers. Foxman admits that "[t]he
$1.25 billion Swiss settlement would not have been achieved without the dogged efforts of
lawyers and politicians, many of whom worked pro bono and because it was the right thing
to do." Foxman, supra note 333, at A18.
Irwin Levin, one of the lead attorneys in the Swiss litigation, countered the comments
ofthe officials of the World Jewish Congress and some Holocaust-survivor groups deprecating
the role of the lawyers in the Holocaust restitution process:
"The WJC has many accomplishments under its belt, but one of the
accomplishments it does not have is obtaining money from the Swiss or the
Germans or from others, for slave labor, for the banking cases, for all the money
that we have now gotten .... We worked hand-in-hand against the Swiss banks
with the World Jewish Congress, [but] they had 50 years to try and get that
money before we filed the lawsuits, and they couldn't do it. Remember, the
Swiss swore that they would never pay more than $600 million, and they ended
up paying $1.25 [billion]."
Wohlgelernter, supra note 363, at 4B (quoting Irwin Levin) (first alteration in original).
A columnist for the Washington Post puts it more directly:
Yes, there is something unseemly about a bunch of lawyers trolling
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The Settlement Agreement signed by the parties in January 1999
answered some, but not all, questions about attorneys' fees to be
paid from the $1.25 billion settlement.
In June 1999, Judge Korman approved the maximum amount of
fees for attorneys not working pro bono on the Swiss bank litigation,
and costs for all attorneys. An estimated $25 million, or 2% of the
settlement amount, was allocated for legal fees and costs, about the
same amount as allocated for notification costs and other expenses
of concluding this class action litigation.37 °
According to one attorney working on the case, "'if the judge gave
100% of that which was requested, it would be to my knowledge the
lowest percentage of fees ever awarded for a case of that size in the
history of American litigation.' 371 It is expected that the actual fees
awarded to the three law firms taking fees would be substantially
less than $25 million.
Eastern Europe for the few remaining Holocaust survivors on whose behalfthey
can-with near-absolute justification-sue everyone in sight.
But this is the way of the world-not just of Jews and Holocaust
settlements ...
Who, then, are better suited to taking European insurance companies
and banks which, smiling and always cordial, insisted on death certificates for
the poor souls who went into the atmosphere as ash from the Nazi
crematoriums? Who better to demand an accounting from companies whose
management in the 1930s and '40s did business as the Nazis wanted? No one
is suggesting the present management of these companies is antisemitic, but
I am suggesting they would never own up-open their files, never mind their
wallets-if those awful contingency lawyers had not surrounded them and run
up the Jolly Roger.
Cohen, supra note 332, at A21.
370. See Notice of Pendency of ClassAction and Proposed SettlementAnd Hearing (visited
June 10, 1999) <http:I/www.swissbankclaims.com/>. The 2% figure was divided as follows:
1.8%, or $22.5 million, for attorneys' fees, and 0.2%, or $2.5 million, for costs expended by the
attorneys. See id.; see also Henry, supra note 298, at 3 (discussing the maximum attorney's
fees and costs allowed by the court); Wohlgelernter, supra note 363, at 4B (discussing the
same).
371. Wohlgelernter, supra note 363, at 4B (quoting Irwin Levin, one of the lead attorneys
in the Swiss bank litigation).

IV. CLAIMS AGAINST THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE COMPANIES
A. The Claims against the European Insurance Companies
1. Factual Background of the Insurance Claims
Prior to World War II, insurance policies were commonly pur-
chased by the local Jewish population of Europe.37 2 In fact, an
insurance policy was known as a "poor man's Swiss bank
account."
373
372. See Deborah Senn, Private Insurers and Unpaid Holocaust Era Insurance Claims,
WASH. STATE INS. COMM'N REP., Apr. 30, 1999, at 3-4 (report of the Washington State
Insurance Commission discussing Holocaust-era claims). A copy of this report can be found
on the Washington State Insurance Web site at <http://www.insurance.wa.gov>. As cogently
explained in this report:
In addition to affording protection against loss or injury to life and property,
insurance was widely perceived by Jews as a sound means of saving and
investment, an issue of heightened concern to a vulnerable minority group.
Across [prewar] Europe, Jews were more likely than the population in
general to purchase insurance, due to their relatively high socioeconomic
standing. Jewish family breadwinners were more likely to be self-employed
business owners and professionals who purchased insurance directly from
agents, rather than through group or workplace plans.
The anecdotal evidence is that Jewish families were more likely to
purchase larger-than-average policies.
Id. at 3-4; see also Alan Gersten, Making Amends-European Insurers Are Finally Accepting
Some Liability for Unpaid Holocaust Victims' Claims, LIFE INS. INT'L, Oct. 1, 1998, at 7,
available in 1998 WL 12138659. The article states:
In the time between the two world wars, life insurance policies and annuities
were popular investments. Then, investors had no US bull market, zero-coupon
bonds or an abundance of other financial opportunities. During that time,
Jewish families bought policies worth an estimated $2 billion to $2.5 billion in
today's dollars, about ten times higher than the pre-war value.
Note that a number of other experts estimate the figure to be much
higher, closer to $10 billion in today's value. One common policy was a dowry
policy, to be paid upon a girl's reaching adulthood, to be used to cover her
dowry.
Id.
As explained by one Holocaust survivor, '"When I was born, my father bought an
insurance policy in my name. And at 211 was supposed to get 5,000 gold dollars to be used
for my dowry.... I have looked forward to this day for a long time."' LeAnn Spencer, Quest
for Holocaust Insurance Benefits: Survivors, Heirs Testify about Their Unpaid Claims, CHi.
TRIB., Nov. 11, 1997, at 1 (NAIC hearing testimony ofErna Gans, born in Poland and survivor
of three concentration camps, now in her seventies and residing in the United States).
373. See Tom Orewyler, God's Work, CAL. L. Bus., Sept. 28, 1998, at 25 (quoting Renee
Siemens, one of the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Holocaust-era insurance class action litigation
who stated that "there's a catch phrase that the insurance lawsuit is the poor man's Swiss
bank case").
According to some estimates, the value of the Holocaust-era insurance policies in
today's dollars may exceed the claims made against the Swiss banks. Edward Fagan, one of
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Like the Swiss banks, the insurance companies selling insurance
to the local Jewish populace either are still in existence today or are
successor companies to the insurers who sold prewar insurance
policies to Jews throughout Eastern and Central Europe.374 Many of
these European insurance companies significantly expanded after
the war and now conduct extensive operations in the United States,
either directly or through subsidiaries." 5
the plaintiffs' attorneys, estimates that policyholders and their heirs are due "10 times what
Swiss banks [will] eventually pay to Holocaust survivors." David Cay Johnson, Accord Signed
to Name Tribunal on Holocaust Insurance Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1998, at AS. If correct,
the European insurers eventually would be obligated to pay over $10 billion.
In May 1999, Bobby Brown, the Israeli government official in charge of Holocaust
restitution issues, provided an estimate on the present values of Holocaust-era insurance
policies, which was quoted in the Jerusalem Post. "An expert on economics and insurance
from the Holocaust era gave a formal estimate that the amount of Jewish insurance without
any interest but brought up to today's value would be worth between $2.25 and 2.5 billion."
Elli Wohlgelernter & Tom Tugend, California Pressures Insurance Companies on Holocaust-
Related Payments, JERUSALEM POST, May 3, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 9002452
(emphasis added).
In June 1999, it was reported that the claims by Holocaust survivors and their heirs
for lost or destroyed properties insured by the European insurers may exceed the claims
based upon life insurance policies. As reported by a leading insurance trade journal:
Although it's a complex and lengthy process, means to track the billions
in unclaimed claims do exist, says Terrell E. Hunt, president of Risk
International Services, Inc....
Three sources of information on outstanding [property] claims are
family records, asset registries and Gestapo confiscation orders, Hunt said.
Jews were required to report everything they own and list it on a preprinted
asset registry form. The Nazis told the Jewish community they were going to
buy their homes and businesses and wanted to ensure the full value of the
properties were distributed, Hunt said.
"The sections listing personal property were particularly upsetting to
read because they listed items like three teddy bears and children's furniture,"
[Hunt] said.
Property Holocaust Claims Could Surpass Total Life Policies, BEST'S INS. NEws, June 17,
1999, available in 1999 WL 5827157.
374. See Senn, supra note 372, at 4 tbl.1. For instance, Italy's Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.
("Generali") had a market share of between one-fourth to one-third in prewar Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. See id. Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta S.p.A., ("Riunione
Adriatica") another Italian insurance company, now owned by Germany's Allianz, had a 37%
market share in prewar Yugoslavia and an 18% market share in prewar Romania. See id.
375. See, e.g., Life Insurance and the Holocaust, INS. F., Sept. 1998, at 81,83; see also Senn,
supra note 372, at 21 ("The largest Central and Eastern European insurers who sold policies
to Holocaust victims are among the world's largest insurance carriers in existence today, with
substantial operations in the United States that are subject to government regulations."). In
1996, Germany's Allianz collected $6.2 billion in premiums in the United States, and owns
31 U.S.-based subsidiaries, including the Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. See Senn,
supra note 372, at 21. Switzerland's Zurich collected $5.8 billion in premiums in the United
States that year, and owns 33 U.S.-based subsidiaries, including Farmers Insurance and
Kemper Insurance. See Life Insurance and the Holocaust, supra, at 83. Switzerland's
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Since many of the prewar governments of Eastern and Central
Europe were not politically or economically stable, and since the
local Jewish population had long been exposed to anti-Semitic
persecution,376 the foreign insurance carriers doing business in this
region were able to attract business from the Jewish merchant class
by guaranteeing that claims would be paid not only in local currency
but, "at the policyholder's option, in gold or U.S. dollars anywhere
in the world."377
Upon coming to power in Germany in 1933, the Nazis' persecution
of Jews included confiscation of insurance policies from the Jewish
citizenry.37
A particularly poignant example of the theft of insurance proceeds
by the Nazis occurred in the aftermath of Kristallnacht ("Night of
Glass"), the state-sponsored attack on Jews and their property
taking place in Germany on November 8-10, 1938.379 Since many of
the Jewish merchants, whose shops and other properties were
damaged or looted during the campaign, held casualty insurance to
cover such losses, the Nazis ordered the insurance companies to pay
all such claims to the state rather than to the injured parties. This
confiscation was later "expanded to include denial of life insurance,
health insurance, and pension benefits for [Germany's] Jews."" °
Winterthur collected $1.4 billion in premiums in the United States that year and owns 27
U.S.-based subsidiaries, includingVanguard Insurance. See id. Italy's Generali collected $624
million in premiums in the United States that year. See Senn, supra note 372, at 21.
376. For discussion of anti-Semitism in prewar Europe, see PAULJOHNSON,AHISTORYOF
THE JEWS 444-48, 456-59, 471-72 (1987).
377. Senn, supra note 372, at 8. For example, Solomon Heitner, a Holocaust survivor now
living in California, holds an insurance policy that was issued to his grandfather in 1931 by
Italian insurer Riunione Adriatica. The policy, issued in Poland, states, "We are responsible
for all the obligations with all our assets in Poland or outside." George Raine, RecoveringNazi
Plunder: Insurance Industry Watches Nervously as California Joins Effort to Help War
Victims Collect on Policies, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 16, 1997, at D1.
378. See Senn, supra note 372, at 16. The report states:
After April 1938, German Jews were required to report to the Nazi authorities
all their property and personal valuables, including insurance policies. These
comprehensive property declarations enabled the [Nazi] regime to seize the
assets of German Jews. After the 1938 Anschluss-the annexation of
Austria-this technique was used to seize assets of Jews in that country as well.
Id.
379. See Senn, supra note 372, at 17.
380. Life Insurance and the Holocaust, supra note 375, at 84. The insurance companies
made deals with the Nazis, allowing them to pay less on the claims to the German
government rather than to their Jewish claimants. For another discussion of the insurance
scheme concocted by the Nazis in the aftermath of Kristallnacht, see Senn, supra note 372,
at 16.
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As Nazi Germany began its invasion of Europe, the insurance
companies in the conquered territories became subject to Nazi
laws.3"' Many of the local companies' assets were simply taken over
by the Nazis, with their insurance portfolios transferred to German
companies that were favored by the Nazi regime.3 8 2
The insurance companies, however, also have been accused of
participating with the Nazis in the confiscation of insurance-related
assets of Jews in conquered Europe (known as "Aryanization" of
Jewish-owned assets)383 and of using the Nazi conquest as an excuse
not to pay on the policies." 4
381. See Senn, supra note 372, at 9-10. It is disputed, however, whether Italian insurance
companies, such as Generali, benefitted or suffered as a result of the Nazi conquests.
Compare Senn, supra note 372, at 11 (stating that Generali's policies and premium income
"increased dramatically, while total reported losses expanded faster than liabilities"), with
Life Insurance and the Holocaust, supra note 375, at 96-97 (stating that Generali resisted
Nazification of its offices in occupied Europe, lost assets as a result of the Nazi occupation,
and assisted its Jewish employees to escape to safety, per Scott Vayer, attorney for Generali,
testifying before the U.S. House of Representatives).
382. See Senn, supra note 372, at 9. Since the Nazis forcibly took over the insurance
policies of Jews in Germany, Austria, and conquered Europe, the insurance companies often
paid the cash values or other insurance benefits on those policies to the Nazis. See id. at 17.
As a result, the companies are claiming that after such payment they are no longer obligated
to original Jewish policyholders or their heirs. See id.
383. See, e.g., id. at 9; Tales of Nazis and Insurers, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 22, 1997, at A8. The
article in the National Law Journal states:
A 1941 form letter from Austrian police suggests Nazi Germany routinely filed
claims with life insurance companies for benefits due relatives of Holocaust
victims.... The one-page document was issued by the state police in Vienna
[on] Aug. 8, 1941, after the Third Reich had annexed Austria. The letter
instructs the Italian insurance company Riunione Adriatica di SicurtA to pay
the insurance benefit due on a policy purchased by a Viennese "emigrant,"
Solomon Israel Korner. "The confiscated valuables will be disposed of and the
proceeds will be paid to the Reich's treasury," a translation of the document
says. The confiscation is done "in the spirit" of a 1933 German law authorizing
property seizures from those deemed enemies of Germany. The document bears
a stamp that it was received by Riunione Adriatica on Aug. 21, 1941, and a
handwritten notation dated Aug. 22, suggesting it may have been processed
that day.
Id.
384. See Senn, supra note 372, at 14-15. The report explains:
Private insurers in Eastern and Central European markets participated in
elaborate, coordinated schemes to confiscate insurance-related assets of Jews,
political prisoners and other persecuted groups and then transferred them to
state control.... Companies also enriched themselves by retaining and not
refunding pre-paid or unearned premiums on large numbers of non-life policies
canceled as a result of anti-Jewish laws.
Id. at 15.
The Jewish policyholders in Nazi-occupied Europe were unable to make premium
payments during the war because many of them perished. See id. at 17. Such policies often
were canceled by the European insurers for"non-payment" ofpremiums, and the beneficiaries
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After the war, the offices of the European insurance companies
located behind the Iron Curtain were nationalized by the new
Soviet-dominated governments in those countries." 5 The insurance
companies maintain that such nationalization relieves them from
paying any policy issued in a country where its office had been
nationalized by the Communist regime after the war.86
The European insurance company with the most notoriety in the
field of Holocaust Era Insurance Claims is Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A. ("Generali"). It is the largest insurance company in Italy, with
over $35 billion in assets,387 but is virtually unknown in the United
States.388
Generali, as the company is commonly known, was founded in
1831 by a group of Jewish merchants, and until recently, its
chairman was a Holocaust survivor of Auschwitz.8 9 It was known
were refused benefits upon making claims after the war ended. See id. at 18. Other policies
had an accumulated cash value and, therefore, failure to pay premiums did not automatically
cancel the policy. See id. at 31. Such policies, however, were still not paid since the
beneficiaries never presented themselves to collect on the policies. See id.
385. See Life Insurance and the Holocaust, supra note 375, app. B. at 98.
386. See id. app. B. at 97-98. Counsel for Generali argued that:
The question with respect to Generali, then is more pointed-why were
policies that were issued in Eastern and Central Europe not paid? The short
answer is that Generali's businesses, as well as those of other insurers in those
countries were nationalized, expropriated, or liquidated by the governments
that came into power in those countries after the war. The assets and property
which backed insurance throughout Central and Eastern Europe were
confiscated.
The Communist regimes that swept across Central and Eastern Europe
and seized control in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and other countries
became the successors to our insurance business. They became legally and
morally obligated to the Holocaust victims and their families who were the
beneficiaries of policies issued by Generali before the war, when it had control
of its business and assets. And if, for whatever reason, their claims may or may
not have been made before, it is to the governments and successors entities in
those countries that the families of the victims should be looking, morally and
legally, for recompense.
Hearing Before the House of Representatives' Comm. on Banking, 105th Cong. 175 (1998),
reprinted in Life Insurance and the Holocaust, supra note 375, at 97-98 (statement of Scott
Vayer, Lead Counsel, Generali).
387. See Gersten, supra note 372, at 7.
388. Because Generali was the largest seller of insurance to Jews prior to World War 1,
it is listed as either the lead or only defendant in most of the Holocaust-era insurance
lawsuits filed in the United States. It has now become well-known in the arena of human
rights litigation and among the American Jewish community.
389. See Gersten, supra note 372, at 7; see also Greer Fay Cashman, Grapevine,
JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at 18, available in 1998 WL 6534116 ("Except for the period
from 1938 until the end of World War Two, Jews were always leaders in the company, and
continue so today.").
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
in prewar Europe as a "'Jewish company,' whose agents saturated
the major Jewish population centers before the war." 0°
Generali originally maintained that it had no records of prewar
policies.39' In late 1997, however, it revealed that a warehouse at its
headquarters in Trieste, Italy, was found to contain partial records
of Generali policies written in prewar Central and Eastern
Europe.392
390. Marilyn Henry,AHolocaust Paper Trail toNowhere?, JERUSALEMPOST, May 12,1999,
at 11, available in 1998 WL 6529646 ("[Generali] says that while it cannot estimate its share
of the Jewish insurance market, it dismisses as exaggerated published reports that it wrote
80 percent of the Jewish policies."); see Gersten, supra note 372, at 7 ("The most vulnerable
and eager to settle [is] Assicurazioni Generali, Italy's largest insurer.... Generali ha[s] the
greatest exposure, selling the most life insurance and annuity policies in eastern Europe
during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, frequently to Jews.").
In 1937, in prewar British Palestine, Generali founded Migdal Insurance, the largest
insurance company in Israel. See Gersten, supra note 372, at 7. In 1997, Generali purchased
a majority stake in Migdal to become Israel's largest insurance company. See id.
That same year, Generali created a $12 million fund in Israel "in honor of Generali
policyholders who perished in the Holocaust." Open Letter from Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A-
to the Families of Holocaust Victims (June 1997) (copy on file with author) (published in
various newspapers throughout the United States). As of January 1999, Generali paid out
only $70,000 from the fund to two individuals. It was processing 440 other applications. See
Heidi J. Gleit, Generali Board of Trustees Group: Fund Has Paid out More Than $70,000,
JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 19, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 8998532.
391. In mid-1997, Generali published ads in major newspapers throughout the United
States entitled An Open Letter to the Families of Holocaust Victims. In the "Open Letter"
Generali explained:
During and after the dark years of World War II, Generali faced expropriations
of its properties and the properties of its insureds. The racial laws of the Nazi
and fascist era and the state action of Soviet-dominated regimes in Central and
Eastern Europe severely damaged Generali's ability to do business there. The
cold-war Communist regimes in Eastern Europe nationalized and expropriated
all major businesses, seizing all of Generali's insurance business there.... As
a result, Generali today has very little information and few records regarding
policies issued by its former branches in Central and Eastern Europe.
Open Letter from Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. to Families of Holocaust Victims (June 1997)
(copy on file with author).
392. For a fascinating account of the warehouse and its contents, described by a reporter
who was allowed to tour the facility, see Henry, supra note 390, at 11. The article describes
the tour as follows:
Down in the industrial zone by the Adriatic port of Trieste sits a
warehouse building that has taken on an aura of mystery.
It is there that the Italian insurer Assicurazioni Generali stores its
Holocaust-era files-along with its personnel records, office supplies and bottles
of wine.
The old binders came from Prague and Poland and other parts east.
Generali, having found the documents that were all but forgotten in its
nondescript warehouse, now calls the trove its "legacy archive"....
The files are only fragments .... Each subsidiary in the far-flung
company was responsible for its own records, including the complete
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Originally said to contain records of between 330,000 to 384,000
prewar policyholders,39 Generali culled the list down to 100,000
policies, which it transferred to a CD-ROM disc. 94 In mid-1998, it
turned over the disc: first, to the Yad Vashem Holocaust Center in
Israel to match with names of Holocaust victims found in Yad
Vashem's archives;3 9 5 and then, in May 1999, to the International
Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims. 96 Unlike the
Swiss banks, however, Generali declined to publish the list, despite
pleas to do so. 3
91
documentation of insurance policies. The subsidiary, in turn, forwarded to the
head office so-called "water copies," not the actual policies.
These documents-which are carbon-like copies on onion skin
paper-were used by Generali's central actuarial department to calculate the
reserves required for the company. They provide basic information about an
individual policy, including the client's name, date of birth, where the policy
was issued, the policy number, the original premium and the amount of the
annuity or insurance. Generali was pushed to resurrect the lives of these old
policies after a class-action suit filed a year ago in federal court in New York
charged more than a dozen European insurers with failing to honor Holocaust-
era insurance policies.
Id.
393. See id.; Generali's Open Account, JERUSALEMPOST, Sept. 24, 1998, at 10, available in
1998 WL 6535583 (reporting that 337,000 wartime insurance policies have been located by
Generali); John M. Goshko, Italian Insurer Reaches Pact on Holocaust Claims: Tentative
Settlement Includes $100 Million Payment, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1998, atA3 (reporting that
Generali's prewar policies totaled 384,000).
394. See Generali's Open Account, supra note 393, at 10. The article reports that:
Following the initial disclosure concerning Generali's refusal to acknowledge
insurance policies, the Italian media discovered an entire warehouse in which
the wartime insurance policies were stored. Generali, to its credit, has already
transferred all the data from these records onto computer discs. Of the 337,000
policies found from that period, about 100,000 have been determined to be
"active"-meaning they were paid for, but never redeemed. Many, if not most,
of these policies are thought to have been taken out by Jews who perished in
the Holocaust.
Id.
395. See Elli Wohlgelernter, Kleiner Calls for Release of Holocaust Insurance Holder's
Names, JERUSALEM POST, June 23, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 9004739.
396. See id.; see also Isaac Harari, Photo-Delivering the Disc, JERUSALEM POST, May 25,
1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 9003441. For a discussion of the International Commission
on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, see discussion and notes infra Part IV.C.
397. See Wohlgelernter, supra note 395, at 5. Israeli parliamentarian Michael Kleiner has
suggested that the names be posted on the Internet, for access to potential claimants
worldwide. See id.
Examining the Swiss bank experience, the request appears reasonable, since it might
lead heirs of Holocaust victims to discovery of claims for insurance benefits. For instance,
after the Swiss banks published their lists of prewar dormant bank accounts, Madeline
Kunin, United States Ambassador to Switzerland, discovered her mother's name on the list.
Secretary of State Madeline Albright's grandparents were also victims of the Nazi regime. See
Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Deluged by Claims afterList of WartimeAccountsAppears, CHMSTIAN
SCIENCEMONrrOR, Aug. 25,1997, at 7. Neither was previously aware ofthis information. See
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The other insurance company with a large stake in the prewar
European insurance market is Allianz of Germany, presently the
second largest insurance company in the world.398 Allianz had
significant and close relations with the Nazis. Its CEO, Kurt
Schmitt, was Hitler's Minister of Economy. 99 Allianz also insured
California to Probe European Insurance Firms for Unpaid Holocaust Claims, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, June 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2626441; Olson, supra, at 7.
398. See David Cay Johnston, New Panel is Planned to Press Insurance Firms on
Holocaust, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at A5. Allianz is the largest insurer in Europe. In the
United States, its most famous holding is Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. See George
Raine, Chasing Past Policies, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan. 15, 1998, at Bi; see also Brendan Noonan,
On a Grand Scale, BEST'S REVIEw-LIFE-HEALTH INS. ED., Dec. 1, 1999, at 41, available in
1999 WL 29605916. Providing detailed analysis of Allianz's world-wide business from the
insurance industry, the Noonan article states:
A visitor looking for the nerve center of Germany's Allianz Group would
be hard pressed to find it. Even at the Munich headquarters ofAllianz AG
Holding, the nondescript main building blends into a rambling, low-rise
complex that stretches across a quiet neighborhood.
Allianz's home base is a bricks-and-mortar expression of the
decentralized structure of this European giant, which with little fanfare
has extended its reach around the world in all lines of personal and
commercial insurance and, most recently, into asset management ....
Allianz pursues its goal of market leadership through a web of
subsidiaries, joint ventures and branch offices in 68 countries on six
continents. A few of the major names under the Allianz umbrella are Life
USA and Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. in the United States; Australia's
MMI Insurance Group; AGF of France; and Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta
of Italy.
Id.; see also Greg Steinmetz & Anita Raghavan, Big Insurer Calls Shots in Germany, Inc.,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1999, at A41. As aptly explained by the Wall Street Journal, "Not much
happens in corporate Germany without input from the country's largest insurer, Allianz AG."
Id.
399. See Raine, supra note 398, at B1; see also Noonan, supra note 398, at 41. The Noonan
article describes the Allianz atmosphere:
As Allianz strives to maintain market leadership in a rapidly changing
industry, it looks to its sometimes-painful past. The company has reserved a
portion of its Munich headquarters complex as the Allianz Center for Corporate
History, remembering nearly 110 years that are full of growth and innovation,
but also recalling embarrassing ties to the Nazi era.
A forthright attitude can't quite hide the discomfort of the subject when
it is broached during an interview at the headquarters. Official remarks float
between directness and euphemisms, at times referring explicitly to the Nazis,
at others speaking ["]of the years from 1933 to 1945."
Especially awkward are the ties of the one former Allianz chairman to
the early years of Adolf Hitler's regime. Kurt Schmitt left Allianz in 1933 to
become second minister for economic affairs in the Nazi government. In what
the company casts as a kind of blessing in disguise, Schmitt suffered a heart
attack in 1934, from which he never recovered. He stepped down in 1935 for
health reasons, avoiding the peril of a public break with Hitler on ideological
grounds.
The picture of Schmitt that has been assembled [by Allianz] reveals an
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a number of concentration camps, including Auschwitz and
Dachau."'
More than one dozen other insurance companies headquartered
in Europe are accused of failing to honor policies sold before World
War 11.401
2. Litigation against the European Insurers
Litigation of Holocaust-era insurance claims began in the United
States in late March 1997, six months after the first suit against the
ambivalent figure who saw real opportunities to do good from an economic
perspective. Schmitt was part of SS Chief Heinrich Himmler's circle of friends,
but he also had a French wife and English relatives and never embraced all of
Hitler's policies, especially his racial ideology, according to the company.
In June 1997, Allianz named Professor Gerald D. Feldman, director of
the Center of German and European Studies at the University of California,
Berkeley, to study the topic and publish an account of its activities in the Nazi
era. Feldman's book might be completed next spring [2000].
Id.
400. See John Marks & Jack Egan, Insuring Nazi Death Camps: History Catches up with
Another German Corporation, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Feb. 22, 1999, at 52. The article
explains:
Documents unearthed in Poland in 1997 also revealed that the company
insured buildings and civil employees connected to Auschwitz, the most
notorious of the Nazi concentration camps. Then last week, Der Spiegel, the
German magazine, disclosed that the company had actually insured those
employees and buildings against damage caused by "careless or malicious
actions on the part of prisoners." History, it seems, has finally caught up with
Allianz.
Id. But see Noonan, supra note 398, stating that "Allianz also takes pains to explain the
nuances behind accusations that it insured concentration camps. In fact, the company says,
it participated with other insurers in covering industrial companies that happened to have
facilities in the camps. The government self-insured its own property." Id.
401. Other major players in the prewar insurance market included:
(1) AXA of France, now part of the AXA-UPA (Union de Assurances de Paris) Group,
which is the largest insurance company in the world and the world's second largest by
revenue. In the United States, it operates the Equitable Companies and the Donaldson,
Luflkin and Jenrette securities brokerage.
(2) Victoria Insurance Company of Germany, which is now part of Munich Re, the
largest reinsurance company in the world.
(3) Winterthur Group of Switzerland, which is now owned by Credit Suisse Bank. Its
United States operations include Unigard Insurance and Southern Guaranty Insurance.
(4) Zurich Insurance Group of Switzerland, whose United States operations include
Farmers Insurance, Zurich Kemper Insurance, Fidelity and Deposit Insurance and the
Maryland Companies.
See California to Probe European Insurance Firms for Unpaid Holocaust Claims, supra note
397.
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Swiss banks was filed. The first such lawsuit was a class action filed
in federal court in New York against sixteen European insurance
companies.0 2 It was followed by a series of individual actions filed
in California state court.4 °3
As of January 2000, five insurance suits are pending: three are
federal cases (two consolidated class actions in New York 4°4 and one
4051sindividual action that originated in California, which is now on
appeal before the Ninth Circuit40 6); and two are California state
actions.4 °7
The European insurers, therefore, are presently defending law-
suits on both coasts of the United States.
a. Federal Litigation
i. Cornell v. Generali408
The first lawsuit filed against European insurance companies was
similar to the first lawsuit filed against the Swiss banks.4 9 Like the
Swiss bank lawsuit, the action against the European insurance
companies was a federal class action filed in New York.410 Brought
by twenty-nine plaintiffs, almost all elderly Holocaust survivors, it
accused sixteen European insurance companies of failing to pay out
on insurance policies and annuities taken out by European Jews
before or during the Holocaust.1 1
402. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.a.
403. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.b.
404. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.a.(i)-(ii).
405. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.a.(iii).
406. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.a.(iii).
407. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.b. Originally, the number was higher, but
some of the suits recently settled. See id.
408. Complaint, Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Mar. 31, 1997).
409. The similarity is not coincidental; both suits were filed by the same set of attorneys.
410. The lawsuits against the Swiss banks were filed in the Eastern District of New York
in Brooklyn. The instant lawsuit was filed in the Southern District of New York in
Manhattan.
411. See Amended Complaint 1, Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 97 Civ.
2262 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 26, 1997) [hereinafter Cornell Amended Complaint] ("The Plaintiff
Class... consists of policyholders and beneficiaries of insurance policies including, but not
limited to, life, property and casualty insurance policies and/or annuities... sold by the
defendant insurance companies to victims of Nazi persecution in the years leading up to the
Holocaust.").
One of the insurance companies, Mannheimer, was voluntarily dismissed from the
[Vol. 34:1
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The lead plaintiff, Marta Drucker Cornell, and her family were
deported from Czechoslovakia during the war to Auschwitz.412 Prior
to the deportation, Cornells father, a doctor, purchased various
insurance policies in Czechoslovakia from defendants Generali and
Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta S.p.A.("Riunione Adriatica"), both
Italian insurance companies.413 Cornell's entire family was killed in
the concentration camps, and she was the only survivor.4"4
As a beneficiary, Cornell requested that defendants Generali and
Riunione Adriatica"acknowledge her father's insurance policies and
pay her the proceeds, cash accumulated value and other benefits" of
the policies.41 5 Both Generali and Riunione Adriactica refused to
honor the policies taken out by Cornell's father.416
Like Marta Cornell, the additional twenty-eight plaintiffs are
beneficiaries of their parents' and/or grandparents' insurance
policies that were bought before or during World War II. Some
plaintiffs, along with their families, were deported to concentration
camps; the plaintiffs remained the only survivors."' Others fled
Europe or went into hiding with their families to avoid Nazi
persecution.419 All policyholders are alleged to have purchased the
insurance, faithfully paid the premiums, accumulated cash values
from the insurance, and lost it all during the Holocaust.4 2°
The amended complaint further alleges that the defendant
insurance companies capitalized on the fear of Nazi persecution by
encouraging and assisting Jews to deposit their assets and purchase
insurance to safeguard their families' future.42' The defendant
lawsuit, and the action is continuing against the remaining fifteen defendants. See
Stipulation and Order for Dismissal without Prejudice, Cornell v. Assicuriazioni Generali
S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 26, 1998).





417. See id. SS 5-32. Since the filing of the action in 1997, a number of the named




421. See id. 63. The amended complaint states:
The defendant insurance companies, with a reputation for confidentiality and
professionalism, encouraged and assisted citizens and non-citizens of Austria,
France, former Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Switzerland
and other countries, fearful of Nazi persecution, to deposit their assets with,
and purchase insurance from, defendant insurance companies for safeguarding
2000]
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insurance companies "marketed the insurance as an investment, to
pay dividends or provide savings for weddings ['dowry policies'], old
age or funerals."422 As Nazi persecution became well known
throughout Europe, the defendant insurers are alleged to have
advertised and marketed insurance policies to provide "safety and
peace of mind [to] the policyholder."42 ' The amended complaint
asserts, however, that the proceeds from the insurance polices of
Holocaust victims were used to further the Nazi war effort or enrich
Nazi war criminals.424
The amended complaint asserts that,
[a]t the end of the war all defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of
deception of policyholders and beneficiaries consisting of, inter alia, (i)
failing to give information to policyholders and beneficiaries about their
policies, (ii) demanding that policyholders produce evidence of their loss and
beneficiaries produce evidence of the death of the policyholders, which
defendants knew would be impossible under the circumstances of the




423. Id. 64. The amended complaint alleges: "Persecution by Nazi Germany and the Axis
countries became sufficiently well known throughout Europe to cause many people to attempt
to emigrate abroad. Those who were unable to emigrate tried to hide their assets to avoid
confiscation." Id. T 61. It further states: "Upon information and belief, the defendant
insurance companies advertised and/or otherwise marketed insurance in ways designed to
attract members of the Class into purchasing insurance products, with an emphasis on
providing for the safety and peace of mind of the policyholder." Id. 64.
424. See id. 1.
425. Id. T 69. Likewise, "[m]any of the plaintiffs... notified the defendants that they were
beneficiaries entitled to benefits due under the Insurance Policies." Id. 70.
The amended complaint further asserts that "[n]o statute of limitations has begun to
run ... since the plaintiffs... have remained in ignorance of vital information, without any
fault or want of diligence or due care on their part, essential to pursue their claims." Id. 72.
Furthermore, "[elvidence of the defendants' participation in the above-described common
course of conduct only recently has come to light as a result of the disclosure of archived
documents." Id. 1. Moreover, according to the amended complaint:
The defendant insurance companies misrepresented to and concealed vital
information from the plaintiffs and members of the Class by, inter alia:
a. falsely statingthey had conducted exhaustive searches and had not
found the Insurance Policies;
b. falsely stating they had conducted exhaustive searches and had
found no proceeds, accumulated cash values or other policies' benefits
under the Insurance Policies;
c. requiring the Class to produce death certificates in order to collect
proceeds, accumulated cash values or other policy benefits under the
Insurance Policies knowing that Nazi Germany and its allies did not
issue death certificates for victims of their persecutions;
d. failing and refusing to give Insurance Policy information to the
plaintiffs and members of the Class even though such persons are
[Vol. 34:1
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The amended complaint sets out seven causes of action: (1) breach
of insurance policies; (2) breach of fiduciary duties; (3) breach of
duty to disclose; (4) conversion; (5) bad faith; (6) unjust enrichment;
and (7) accounting.4 26
Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory damages in an amount in
excess of $1 billion from each of the insurance companies, for a total
of at least $16 billion.427
From July to November 1997, the defendant insurance companies,
after being served with the lawsuit, filed various motions to dismiss.
The motions covered the typical "laundry list" of procedural defenses
alleged by foreign defendants when sued in the United States,
including: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction;428 (2) lack of subject
matter jurisdiction;4 29 and (3) forum non conveniens.4" °
Judge Michael Mukasey in Manhattan, presiding over this
lawsuit, has not ruled on defendants' motions in the two years since
they were filed.431 It appears that Judge Mukasey has borrowed
entitled to such information under applicable law; and
e. failing and refusing to provide full information about the Insurance
Policies, policy proceeds, accumulated cash values and other policy
benefits.
Id. 73.
426. See id. J 83-110 (citing counts I-VII).
427. See id. at Prayer for Judgment T A-F. The amended complaint also seeks punitive
damages, an accounting, pre- and post- judgment interest, and attorneys' fees. See id.
428. See Defendants' Joint Meniorandum of Law In Support of Their Motions to Dismiss
For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 24,1997) [hereinafter Cornell Defendants' Joint Memorandum of Law In
Support of Their Motions to Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction]. This Motion was filed
by 12 of the 16 foreign insurance defendants. See id. n.1.
429. See Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendant Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A-'s
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Cornell v.
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.-, No. 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y. fied Oct. 24, 1997) [hereinafter
CornellMemorandum of Law In Support ofDefendantAssicuriazioni Generali S.p.A.'s Motion
to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction].
430. See Joint Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint on the Ground of Common Law Forum Non Conveniens, Cornell v.
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter
Cornell Joint Memorandum of Law In Support of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint on the Ground of Common Law Forum Non Conveniens]. This Motion
was filed by 14 of the 16 foreign insurance defendants. See id. n.1.
For a more complete discussion of the various defenses, procedural and substantive,
being asserted by the European insurance companies in the various lawsuits being filed
against them, see discussion and notes infra Part IV.B.
431. In 1997 and 1998, Judge Mukasey allowed plaintiffs to conduct limited jurisdictional
discovery. For a summary of jurisdictional discovery propounded by plaintiffs upon the
defendant insurers, see Defendants' Joint Memorandum ofLawin Support of the Application
2000]
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Judge Korman's "game plan" from the Swiss bank cases, hoping that
the matter will settle without him having to rule on defendants'
motions.432
ii. Winters v. Generali 433
In December 1998, another group of Holocaust survivors and heirs
brought a second class action lawsuit against the same European
insurance companies named in the Cornell lawsuit (and some
additional insurers434) for selling, confiscating, converting, and/or
otherwise unjustly retaining insurance policies of victims of the
Holocaust.4 35 Like the plaintiffs in Cornell, plaintiffs in this suit are
the children or grandchildren of Holocaust victims who purchased
and paid for insurance policies during World War 11.436
The plaintiffs allege that they have "never received restitution for
[the] wrongly misappropriated Insurance Policies."437 Moreover, the
of International Comity Principles, Including the Hague Evidence Convention, to Any Further
Forum Non Conveniens and Personal Jurisdiction Disclosures That Might Be Ordered By
This Court at 6, Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y. filed July
30, 1998).
432. As quaintly put by one attorney involved in the litigation, in a telephone discussion
with the author, "Judge Mukasey is 'Kormanizing' the insurance class action litigation." Off-
the-Record Telephone Interview with an attorney involved in the lawsuits (Nov. 1999).
The most likely possibility of settlement is through the non-adversarial process
created by some of the insurers participating in the International Commission on Holocaust
Era Insurance Claims. See infra Part IV.C. To have this occur, however, additional insurance
defendants need to join the International Commission.
433. Complaint, Winters v. Assiocurazioni Generali, S.p.A., No. 98 Civ. 9186 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Winters Complaint].
434. The Winters lawsuit names 28 European insurance companies as defendants. See
Winters Complaint, supra note 433, IS 15-43.
435. See id. T 1. The complaint asserts:
This is a civil action on behalf of those victims of the Holocaust and their heirs
and beneficiaries... whose assets in insurance and/or contractual rights under
insurance and insurance-like policies covering, inter alia, life, property,
casualty, dowry, disability, liability, accident, health, annuities, and/or pension
funds... were sold, confiscated, converted, and/or otherwise unjustly retained
by Defendants in the years leading up to, during, and following the Second
World War.
Id.
436. See id. 7-14.
437. Id. The complaint asserts that the statute of limitations are tolled and defendants
are estopped from "interposing any time bar type of defense to these claims." Id. 124. First,
there is tolling pursuant to the London Debt Agreement of 1953:
Plaintiffs' legal right to seek compensation for the unjust seizure by German
Defendants of their insurance proceeds during the Second World War was
deferred by the London Debt Agreement of 1953, until the German courts ruled,
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defendant insurance companies are accused of not having made any
reasonable attempt to pay or compensate the plaintiffs.43 According
to the complaint:
[A]fter the Second World War, Defendants intentionally (i) conspired
with one another to foil Plaintiffs' and members of the Plaintiff Class'
attempts to recover their insurance assets after the Second World War;
(ii) misrepresented the extent of war damage to their records and their
ability to determine their liability to members of the Plaintiff Class;
(iii) distorted the circumstances of their wartime activities through
dissemination of false and fraudulent information; and (iv) refused to
disclose documents evidencing Defendants' liability to members of the
Plaintiff Class."'
The complaint describes the defendants' wrongdoing as follows:
(1) the defendants colluded with the Nazi Regime to benefit
economically at plaintiffs' expense;44 (2) the defendants plundered
the victims by profiteering through "Aryanization""' and retaining
on November 7, 1997, that the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Germany
had lifted the moratorium on individual claims for compensation against
German entities. Accordingly, statutes of limitation claims of compensation for
losses accrued in connection with the Second World War were tolled through at
least November 7, 1997.
Id. T 121. Second, there is equitable tollingbecause "[dlefendants have concealed information
from Plaintiffs and the Class by, inter alia, (i) concealing their course of conduct as described
herein; (ii) failing to search for or disgorge assets belonging to the Class; and (iii) refusing to
disclose information to the Class regarding the nature of assets improperly appropriated by
Defendants." Id. 1 122. In addition,
Recently, archived records concerning the actions of Germany, Austria, Italy
and insurers of the Nazi regime during the Second World War were opened to
the public. These records allowed an examination of various insurers' roles in
the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Second
World War and perpetuated into the present by their inaction, deceit and
concealment.
Id. 1 123.
438. See id. 15. The complaint states:
At no time since the end of the Second World War has any Defendant made any
reasonable attempt to compensate members of the Class for the assets
Defendants wrongfully appropriated during the war, despite their knowledge
that their wrongful behavior violated the laws of their respective countries, the
practices of the insurance industry, and international law.
Id.
439. Id.
440. See id. T 48-56.
441. See id. 61. "Aryanization' was the transfer of allJewish-owned propertyin Germany
and in territories under German wartime control to 'Aryan' owners." Id.
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the victims' assets;" 2 and (3) the defendants participated in postwar
activities to foil survivors attempts at restitution." 3
The Winters lawsuit is broader than the Cornell action. The
complaint alleges ten causes of action: (1) violations of international
law; (2) conversion; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) breach of insurance
policies; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; (6) breach of special duty; (7)
breach of duty to disclose; (8) bad faith; (9) conspiracy; and (10)
accounting.'
Unlike the Cornell complaint, the Winters complaint does not
specify any amount of compensatory damages." 5 Like in Cornell, the
Winters plaintiffs are also seeking punitive damages.4 6
Since its filing in December 1998, no action has been taken on the
Winters lawsuit, other than seeking to coordinate it with the Cornell
action."
In August 1999, some of the defendant insurers filed a motion to
dismiss. The motion tracked the arguments made by the same
defendants in the Cornell motion.4"
As of January 2000, Judge Mukasey, also presiding over the
Winters class action, had not ruled on the dismissal motion. Most
likely, as in Cornell, he will not rule on the motion anytime soon,
but will also allow the Winters plaintiffs, like the Cornell plaintiffs,
to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
442. See id. 57-106.
443. See id. 107-110.
444. See id. 125-157 (citing counts I-X).
445. See id. at Prayer for Judgment % A.
446. See id. at Prayer for Judgment % B.
447. See Letter from Morris Ratner, Counsel for Plaintiffs in Winters, to Judges Barbara
S. Jones and Michael B. Mukasey (Apr. 15, 1999) (on file with author) (suggesting that "the
interests ofjustice and efficiency would best be served if activity in the two cases [Cornell and
Winters] were coordinated" and that, to date, "no dispositive issues have been adjudicated in
either case by any court"). Both lawsuits were filed in the Southern District of New York.
448. See Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Winters v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.-, No. 98
Civ. 9186 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 30, 1999) [hereinafter Winters Joint Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction];
Joint Memorandum of Law in Support ofDefendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the
Ground of Forum Non Conveniens, Winters v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 98 Civ. 9186
(S.D.N.Y. filed July 30, 1999) [hereinafter Winters Joint Memorandum of Law in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the Ground of Forum Non Conveniens].
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iii. Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG "
The first Holocaust-era insurance case to reach the hearing stage
did not go well for the plaintiffs. The case, an individual action, was
dismissed and is now on appeal.
Plaintiffs Sophie Stahl, Gabrielle Stahl Lansing, and Werner
Stahl are the daughter, granddaughter, and grandson, respectively,
of Heinrich Stahl, a prominent German Jew who died in the
Holocaust.45 °
449. Complaint, Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No. BC 188677 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr.
2, 1998) [hereinafter Stahl I Complaint]. For the ease of the reader, all future citations to
documents for the state court case will be prefaced with Stahl L This case was removed by
the defendant to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. See
Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No. 98 CV 3490 (C.D. Cal. 1998). For the ease of the reader,
all future citations to documents for the removal of Stahl I to federal court will be prefaced
with Stahl IL The plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaint to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No.
Civ. 99-55012 (9th Cir. filed Mar. 13, 1999). For the ease of the reader, all future citations
to documents for the appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit will
be prefaced with Stahl III.
450. See Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, TT 4-6, 13. The fates of Stahl v. Victoria
HoldingAG and the other individual Holocaust-era insurance cases are good illustrations of
the irrationality of the removal system when applied to similar cases.
The Stahl complaint originally was filed in Los Angeles Superior Court together with
eight other individual Holocaust-era insurance complaints (one of which was voluntarily
dismissed by plaintiffs). See StahlI Complaint, supra note 449, 1. All of the California cases
were individual actions, unlike the federal class actions filed in New York. See supra Part
IV.A.2.b. The same team of attorneys, Shernoff, Bidart, Darras & Arkin of Claremont,
California, and Lisa Stern of Los Angeles, California, represented all the plaintiffs in these
California state cases. Attorney Lisa Stern is the wife of Alan Stern, the grandson of Mor
Stern and one of the plaintiffs in Stern v. Assicuriazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Feb. 5, 1998). See supra Part IV.A.2.b.(ii). (discussing other California cases
being litigated).
Defendants in these California cases, except Stern, removed the cases to federal court.
Curiously, Generali did not seek removal of Stern to federal court, but sought removal of the
other three cases against it. Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG (Stahl I) was assigned to one
federal judge. The three cases against Generali were assigned to another federal judge. See
Friedman v. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A., No. 98 CV 5780 (C.D. Cal. filed July 17, 1998);
Babos v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 98 CV 5368 (C.D. Cal. filed July 2, 1998); Sladek
v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 98 CV 5369 (C.D. Cal. filed July 2, 1998). The case
against Riunone Adriatica, Klein v. RiunoneAdriatica di Sicurta S.p.A, No. BC 201983 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 8, 1998), was assigned to another federal judge.
Babos, Sladek, Friedman, andKlein were remanded back to state court by the federal
judges. Babos, Sladek, and Friedman were then assigned to the same state judge who was
presiding over Stern. See Civil Minutes-General, Babos v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No.
98 CV 5368; Friedman v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 98 CV 5780; Sladek v.
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. 98 CV 5369; (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14,1998) (opining on Plaintiffs
Babos's and Sladek's Amended Motions and PlaintiffFriedman's Motion to Remand); see also
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Prior to the war, Heinrich was the president of the Jewish
community in Berlin.4 1' Heinrich was one of the founders of Victoria
Amanda Levin, Holocaust Suits Remanded to California Court, NAr'L UNDERWRITER LIFE &
HEALTH-FIN. SERVICES ED., Dec. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 27193004.
Klein was combined with another subsequently filed case against Adriatica, and
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint consolidating all three cases into one action against
Adriatica, with Klein becoming the lead case. See Klein v. Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta
S.p.A., No. BC 201983 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 8, 1998). In August 1999, plaintiff Eugene
Klein died and his daughter is continuing the action. See Telephone Interview with Lisa
Stern, Plaintiffs' Attorney (Feb. 16, 2000); discussion and notes infra Part IV.A-2.b.(ii).
Stahl v. Victoria HoldingAG (Stahl II) remained in federal court and is now the only
individual action Holocaust-era insurance case in the federal court system.
An examination of the jurisdictional facts for the California cases shows that, for
federal versus state jurisdictional purposes, the cases are the same. No reason exists why one
should be in federal court while the others are in state court.
451. See Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, 13.
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Insurance Company ("Victoria") of Berlin, Germany.452 Heinrich's
452. See id. 7,8, 13. Since the end of the war, Victoria Insurance Company of Berlin,
as it was originally known, has gone through a number of mergers and name changes.
At some point after the war, Victoria Insurance Company ofBerlin became known as
Victoria Holding AG. Since all parties and the trial court referred to defendants collectively
as "Victoria," this will be the designation used herein. At another point, a company named
Victoria LebensversichrungAG became the "successor to [the] insurance business of Victoria
Holding AG." Stahl II Declaration of Gert Schlosser in Support of Defendant's Notice of
Motion and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, for
Insufficiency of Process, and, in the Alternative, forForum Non Conveniens 1, at 26, Stahl
v. Victoria Holding AG, No. 98 CV 3490 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 1998) [hereinafter Stahl II
Declaration of Gert Schlosser]; see also Stahl I Defendant's Amended Notice of Filing of
Notice of Removal of Action to United States District Court for Central District of California
at 1, Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No. BC 188677 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 8, 1998)
[hereinafter Stahl I Defendant's Amended Notice of Filing of Removal of Action to United
States District Court for Central District of California] (Victoria LebensversichrungAGis the
successor-in-interest to Victoria Holding AG).
In January 1998, Victoria (and presumably Victoria Lebensversichrung AG) ceased
to exist as independent companies after merging with Hamburg Mannheimer AG, another
German company. See Stahl III Preface to Appellees' Brief 11, Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG,
No. Civ. 99-55012 (9th Cir. filed May 10, 1999) [hereinafter Stahl III Preface to Appellees'
Brief].
In October 1997, Hamburg Mannheimer AG changed its name to Ergo
Versicherungsgruppe AG, which appears to be the current name of the company. This is the
successor to the Victoria-Hamburg Mannheimer merger. See id. It appears, however, that
Victoria Lebensversichrung AG still operates under its own name. See supra.
Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG, in turn, is owned by Miinchener Riickversicherungs-
Gessellschaft ("Munich Re"), the world's largest reinsurance company. See Henry Weinstein,
German Insurer Targeted over Holocaust Claims, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at A3.
Munich Re owns "approximately sixty-three percent (63%) of the outstanding stock
of appellee Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG.... The remaining outstanding stock of said
appellee is publicly traded on stock exchanges located in Frankfurt and Diisseldorf, Federal
Republic of Germany." Stahl III Preface to Appellees' Brief, supra, 1 2.
Plaintiffs point out that Munich Re owns an American insurance company, American
Reinsurance ("American Re"), which has two regional offices in California "and derives 17%
of its business from [California]." Stahl III Appellants' Opening Brief at 18, Stahl v. Victoria
HoldingAG, No. Civ. 99-55012 (9th Cir. filed Mar. 10,1999) [hereinafter Stahl IlAppellants'
Opening Brief].
Plaintiffs assert that Munich Re, "a multinational conglomerate[,] operates [these]
various subsidiaries on a consolidated, integrated basis." Id. According to plaintiffs, "Munich
Re operates as a single unitary enterprise in which American Re and VICTORIA/ERGO are
merely conduits or instrumentalities for the operation of Munich Re's business." Id at 40.
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son, Bruno, was the Victoria agent in Brussels from 1931 to 1941. 453
Heinrich and his wife, Jenny, were deported by the Nazis to the
Theresienstadt Concentration Camp, where, in 1942, Heinrich was
killed.454 Jenny survived the war and emigrated to the United States
where she died in 1959."' Their daughter, Sophie, was ninety-eight
years old at the time of filing the lawsuit in 1998 and resided in
California.456 Granddaughter Gabrielle is also a resident of Califor-
nia, and grandson Werner resides in New York.457
Plaintiffs allege that, prior to the war, Heinrich and Bruno
purchased various life and annuity policies from Victoria and that
such policies provided "that when Heinrich and Bruno died[,]
defendant VICTORIA would pay life insurance and annuity
proceeds to their surviving heirs, which include Plaintiffs."45 8
Plaintiffs, however, do not have any of the alleged policies.
Plaintiffs allege that, in or about 1993, Victoria invited the family
to celebrate its centennial anniversary, and "[i]t was at that time
that VICTORIA declared that the Policies459 only had 'sentimental
value' and confiscated them for their archives. Regretably [sic], the
family now does not have possession of even a copy of the
Policies."46 °
453. See Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, 13. Bruno Stahl survived the war and died
in 1958. See id. 15.
454. See id. 13.
455. See id. 15.
456. See id. 1, 16. In August 1999, she died. Interview with Lisa Stern, Plaintiffs'
Attorney (Feb. 16, 2000).
457. See Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, T$ 2-3.
458. Id. T 11. Plaintiffs also alleged that, after the war, the Stahl family "requested on
multiple occasions that VICTORIA pay benefits under the huge stock options, life insurance
and annuity policies that the family owned [and that] VICTORIA has refused to honor its
insurance obligations to the family." Id. 18.
459. It remains unclear how many policies, which they allegedly turned over to Victoria
at this anniversary celebration, plaintiffs retained after the war. Compare preceding
statement and Stahl III Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 452, at 11 (both referring to
multiple "policies"), with id at 48 (stating that, at the anniversary celebration, plaintiffs
requested "payment of the proceeds under one of the policies issued to Heinrich Stahl which
appellants still had possession of.... [Victoria] confiscated the policy.") (emphasis added).
460. Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, T 19. Plaintiffs also alleged that "Heinrich was
presented with a certificate from VICTORIA for his 20 faithful years of service prior to his
deportation [to a Nazi concentration camp]." Id. 17. Plaintiffs attached a copy of the
certificate as Exhibit A to the complaint.
In its motion to dismiss, Victoria denied plaintiffs' allegations. See Stahl II
Declaration of Gert Schlosser, supra note 452, 6; see also Stahl III Appellees' Brief at 51-52,
Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No. Civ. 99-55012 (9th Cir. filed May 10, 1999) [hereinafter
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The complaint sets out four causes of action: (1) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) breach of
contract; (3) damages and injunctive relief under California
Business & Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500; and (4)
intentional spoliation of evidence.46'
Following service, defendant removed the lawsuit from California
state court to federal court, specifically to the Central District of
California. There, Victoria moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction and, in the alternative, on grounds of forum
462non conveniens.
The federal trial court granted Victoria's motion to dismiss, citing
lack of personal jurisdiction.463 The court found that it does not
possess either general or specific personal jurisdiction over
Victoria.464
Stahl III Appellees' Brief] (discussing Schlosser declaration).
Victoria did acknowledge the existence of one policy to the Stahl family: a policy
issued in 1933 to Bruno Stahl, the now-deceased son, in Brussels, Belgium. See Stahl H
Declaration of Gert Schlosser, supra note 452,916. "Other than this one life insurance policy,
the investigation revealed no other insurance policy or other insurance contract issued to
plaintiffs, Bruno Stahl, Heinrich Stahl, or plaintiffs' relatives, predecessors, or antecedents."
Id. But see Stahl IlAppellees' Brief, supra, at 6 (stating that Victoria also found "a reference
to a second life insurance policy issued to Heinrich Stahl, another relative, in Germany in
1926").
In its pleadings, Victoria does not explain why it never paid on these two life
insurance policies. Apparently, Victoria would suggest that plaintiffs must bring an action
against Victoria either in Belgium or Germany to recover under the policies. See Stahl 11
Declaration of Gert Schlosser, supra note 452, 19 (stating that Bruno Stahl's policy contains
a choice-of-forum clause specifying the courts of Belgium as the forum for resolution of
disputes); Stahl II Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for Personal
Jurisdiction over Defendant, for Insufficiency of Process, and, in the Alternative, for Forum
Non Conveniens, 1 1, at 25, Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No. 98 CV 3490 (C.D. Cal. filed
June 22, 1999) [hereinafter Stahl II Victoria's Motion to Dismiss] ("The European
jurisdictions whose laws govern this case have modern, full, and hospitable judicial systems
with adequate civil procedures and due process which can efficiently and completely
adjudicate plaintiffs' claims far better than can a California-based court.").
461. See Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, IT 20-45 (citing counts I-IV).
462. See Stahl II Victoria's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 460, 911.
463. See Stahl II Civil Minutes-General, Stahl v. Victoria AG, No. 98 CV 3490 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 15,1998) [hereinafter StahlII Opinion]. The Civil Minutes document is actually an eight-
page, single-spaced opinion, discussing the reasons for dismissal and authored by the
Honorable William D. Keller, the federal trial judge presiding over the case. See id.
464. See id. at 2, 4, 7. For discussion of general and specific personal jurisdiction over
foreign defendants in international disputes, see BORN, supra note 12, at 67-197.
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The trial court first focused on whether it has general
jurisdiction.465 Since Victoria is a German corporation not domiciled
in California, to establish general jurisdiction the court had to find
that Victoria's activities in California were "substantial" or
"continuous and systematic."466
The court cited a variety of factors why the activities of Victoria
in California were not substantial or continuous and systematic.
Specifically, Victoria did not:
(1) transact[ ] any business within California; (2) ha[ve] any agents or
representatives in California to conduct business; (3) solicit[ ] any
business within California; (4) ha[ve) an office within California; (5)
conduct[ ] any advertising, solicitation or other activity directed to any
person or entity within California; (6) attempt[ ] to develop a national
market through any participation in any entity or association;[ I or (7)
have any accounts, assets, funds, monies, or property [in] California.6
To counter these factors, plaintiffs argued that Victoria, neverthe-
less, had substantial California contacts. Plaintiffs' assertion was
based upon evidence obtained by an investigator "that [Victoria]
invested large sums of money in the American market."46 The court
rejected this evidence. The court held that this assertion of Victo-
ria's U.S.-based activities "is found in a declaration by an attorney
citing the findings of a private investigator, [amounting to] a classic
out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
465. After removal to federal court, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding as an
additional defendant Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG ("Ergo"), a German company that
plaintiffs alleged is the surviving or resulting corporation of a merger between Victoria
Insurance and Hamburg-Mannheimer AG and is the successor-in-interest to the rights,
duties, and obligations of Victoria. See Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, 9.
In its analysis, the court examined whether personal jurisdiction exists over either
Victoria or Ergo. See Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 3-6. Since the court's analysis for
both Ergo and Victoria is the same, the discussion herein will refer to both entities collectively
as "Victoria." See supra note 452.
466. Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 2. The judge noted that "[gleneral jurisdiction
exists when a defendant is domiciled in the forum state or when its activities there are
'substantial' or 'continuous and systematic."' Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)). The Court inHelicopteros actually used the terms
'continuous and systematic general business contacts" and "sufficient contacts."Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 414-16.
467. Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 3. Compare these factors, favoring a finding of
lack ofjurisdiction over the German insurer Victoria, with the factors cited by the California
state court in Stern v. Generali, favoring a finding of jurisdiction over the Italian insurer
Generali. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.A.2.b.(i).
468. Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 40.
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asserted."469 Such evidence alone, the court found, was not enough
to sustain plaintiffs' "burden of offering prima facie proof of jurisdic-
tion."47 °
Plaintiffs argued that, if the court finds that plaintiffs did not
meet their burden of offering prima facie proof of jurisdiction, they
should be given an opportunity to conduct discovery to obtain
additional evidence to support jurisdiction over Victoria.47' Federal
courts, especially the Ninth Circuit, have been liberal in allowing
defendants to conduct jurisdictional discovery. This is especially
true in cases involving international disputes, where information
about U.S.-based activities of foreign defendants is more difficult
and more time-consuming to obtain. 2
The district court, however, rejected this request outright, on the
ground that "further efforts to find evidence to support jurisdiction
would likely prove futile."73
It appears that the court was unduly harsh in its assessment of
plaintiffs' future ability to prove jurisdiction based upon Victoria's
California-based activities. As the court noted, plaintiffs had already
scheduled a deposition of an executive of St. Paul's Fire & Marine,
an American insurer that is "a partner of [Victoria]"474 and "ha[s]
contacts with California." 475
Plaintiffs contended "that this deposition will show, through the
existence of a partnership agreement [between Victoria and St.
Paul's Fire & Marine], that [Victoria] ha[s] contact with
California."476
The court should have allowed plaintiffs to engage in jurisdic-
tional discovery-at the least, to take the already-scheduled
deposition-rather than dismissing the case outright, especially since
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. See id. at 7. Plaintiffs also sought to amend their complaint to add additional
defendants. See id.
472. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 713 (9th Cir.
1992); Santos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890,892 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991); Filus
v. LOT Polish Airlines, 907 F.2d 1328, 1332 (2d Cir. 1990). In Siderman, the Ninth Circuit
cited its earlier opinion inAmerica West Airlines, Inc. v. GPA Group, Ltd., 877 F.2d 793 (9th
Cir. 1989), holding that "where pertinent facts bearing on the question ofjurisdiction are in
dispute, discovery should be allowed." Siderman, 965 F.2d at 801.
473. Stahl 11 Opinion, supra note 463, at 8.
474. Id. at 7.
475. Id. at 8.
476. Id. at 7-8.
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the lead plaintiff is a ninety-eight-year-old Holocaust survivor who
had waited for over a half-century for her day in court.477
Plaintiff presented another ground for establishing general
jurisdiction. Victoria is a subsidiary of another German insurance
company, Munich Reinsurance ("Munich Re"),478 which, plaintiffs
alleged, has "substantial contacts with this forum."479
Even though Munich Re, Victoria's parent, has such substantial
contacts with California, the court held that general jurisdiction
over Victoria still is not established. According to the court, Munich
Re's contacts with California can be asserted against Victoria to
establish jurisdiction only if there is an alter ego relationship
477. Apparently, the court had previously denied Victoria's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that plaintiffs would present additional jurisdictional facts, and plaintiffs had failed
to do so. See id. at 8 ("Finally, the Plaintiffs have failed to improve their evidentiary position
since the Defendants' last motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."). This appears
to be a factor in the court denying plaintiffs' request to postpone its ruling and the court
issuing a decision based on admissible evidence presently before the court.
478. In German, the company's name is Mfinchener Rfickversichergungs-Gesellschaft.
According to a report of the Washington State Insurance Commissioner:
Reinsurance is one ofthe most important-but least understood-aspects
of the insurance business. Reinsurance is a form of insurance that direct
insurance companies (those writing policies directly for insured parties) buy for
their own protection.
Simply stated, the direct insurer gives or "cedes" a portion of its liability
to the reinsurer. The reinsurer agrees to accept some of the risks from
the direct insurer, commonly in exchange for a share of premium income
collected ....
In Europe, the modem reinsurance industry was pioneered by the
Munich Reinsurance Company (Miinchener Riickversicherung) in the early
years of the 20th Century.
Two major firms, Munich Reinsurance and Swiss Reinsurance
dominated the pre-WW II European reinsurance industry ....
Before the war, Axis firms derived substantial income from European
countries through their dominance of the reinsurance business.... As the Axis
powers spread, Munich Reinsurance gained preeminent status in European
reinsurance, a position it continues to enjoy today.
Senn, supra note 372, app. B. at 32. Munich Re is now the world's largest reinsurance
company. See Weinstein, supra note 452, at A3.
In June 1999, the California Department of Insurance initiated an administrative
hearing against the California-licensed subsidiaries of Munich Re for failing to pay Holocaust-
era claims. See id. According to the California Insurance Commissioner, "Department
research indicates that this group of insurance companies has significant exposure and has
failed to pay Holocaust victims' claims." Cal. Dep't of Ins., Press Release #114, June 22, 1999,
at 1. The California Insurance Commissioner lists four subsidiaries of Munich Re as doing
business in California. See id. at 2. Victoria is not among them. See id.
479. Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 3.
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between Munich Re and Victoria; otherwise, corporate formalities
must be observed." °
As the court explained:
This Court finds that the cases that the Plaintiffs cite do not stand for
the proposition that a forum may assert personal jurisdiction over a
corporate subsidiarywhere it may assertjurisdiction over the corporate
parent. The cases cited instead show that a court may not assert
jurisdiction over a corporate parent or officer without its own contacts
with the forum, except under circumstances characterized by fraud or
an agency or alter ego relationship. These conditions do not exist here.
The Plaintiffs have made no showing that the subsidiaries have acted
in any fashion through the parent, Munich Re, or that the parent has
acted as an alter ego for the subsidiary. The very nature of the typical
parent/subsidiary relationship assumes that the parent controls or acts
through the subsidiary, not the other way around. Consequently,
jurisdiction is not proper on this ground.4 8'
The court's analysis makes the situation more clear-cut than it
actually is. In fact, as will be discussed below, the law concerning
personal jurisdiction over foreign-based entities is complicated.
Furthermore, the specific facts concerning Victoria's relationships
to its parent, its parent's subsidiaries, its parent's American
partner, and Victoria's subsidiary or successor-in-interest are
convoluted and require further examination.
First, contrary to the impression created by the district court, the
law concerning obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign entities
doing business in the United States, either directly or through
subsidiaries or independent distributors, is uncertain. 4"
Moreover, the court was presented with an unusual situation,
which it failed, at least explicitly, to acknowledge.
In all other cases dealing with the question of personal jurisdic-
tion based on corporate affiliations-including the cases cited by the
court-the issue was whether a court can assert jurisdiction over a
foreign parent as a result of the activities in the forum of the foreign
parent's wholly-owned subsidiary. In those instances, the parent has
480. See id. at 3-4.
481. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
482. See BORN, supra note 12, at 151-70 (discussing and reviewing cases dealing with
jurisdiction based on corporate affiliations or agency relationships of foreign-based companies
and their subsidiaries doing business in the United States).
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little or no direct contact with the forum, while the subsidiary has
substantial forum-based contacts.
The situation here is reversed. Plaintiffs are asserting that the
court possesses jurisdiction over the foreign-based subsidiary,
Victoria, because Victoria's foreign-based parent, Munich Re, has
substantial contacts in California.
Not recognizing this novel scenario, the court applied the
traditional test, first enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1925, in
Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co."3 Under
Cudahy, corporate formalities between a parent and subsidiary
should be respected in determining personal jurisdiction over a
parent for the subsidiary's forum-based activities, in the absence of
evidence showing that the parent and the subsidiary were alter
egos.48
4
Since plaintiffs "have made no showing that the subsidiar[y
Victoria] here ha[s] acted in any fashion through the parent, Munich
Re, or that the parent has acted as an alter ego for the subsid-
iary,"485 the court dismissed the case simply by applying the
traditional Cannon analysis for determining jurisdiction over a
parent company.486
Even if the court was correct-that the test to be applied for
finding jurisdiction over a subsidiary is the same as that for finding
jurisdiction over a parent company-the court failed to recognize that
the seventy-year-old test in Cannon has been relaxed in recent
years, due to the emerging phenomenon of multinational corpora-
tions and the manner they do business.48 7
483. 267 U.S. 333 (1925). In Cannon, a North Carolina corporation brought a breach of
contract lawsuit in North Carolina against a Maine corporation. See id. at 334. The defendant
Maine corporation had an Alabama subsidiary that had an agent for service of process in
North Carolina. See id. Plaintiff served the defendant Maine corporation by serving the
North Carolina agent. See id. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the
ground that the two corporations were legally distinct and could not be treated as one. See
id. at 335. The Court found that the two companies kept separate books, and conducted
transactions between them "in the same way as if the two were wholly independent
corporations."Id. Accordingto the Court, "[t]he corporate separation, though perhaps merely
formal, was real. It was not pure fiction." Id. at 337.
484. See id.
485. Stahl H Opinion, supra note 463, at 4.
486. Id.
487. See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
The opinion states:
[Aifter World War II... the phenomenon of the multinational enterprise, as we
now know it, became a major factor in the world scene. Since then tens of
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Rather than looking strictly at alter ego, "[m]any courts... apply
less stringent tests for alter ego status [by] inquir[ing] into the
parent corporation's control over its subsidiary's operations, rather
than merely examining 'corporate formalities."4 " A few courts "have
departed [even] further from the Cannon analysis, instead consider-
ing whether a parent and its subsidiary are 'economically inte-
grated.'" 9
Besides unsettled law, the relationships, if any, of Victoria (1) to
Munich Re, (2) to American Reinsurance Company ("American Re")
and other Munich Re insurance subsidiaries490 that sell insurance
in California, (3) to St. Paul Fire & Casualty, Victoria's American
partner, and (4) to Victoria Lebensversicherung AG, a Victoria
subsidiary or its successor-in-interest, that appears to be doing
business in the United States, are complex and confusing.
491
thousands of subsidiaries have been created or acquired by parent enterprises
located in other countries.... After the Second World War investment in the
United States by foreign parent companies ... expanded tremendously....
These trends have accelerated. The vehicle of this modern international
economic growth were and are the multinational enterprises. Their size is often
awesome: the annual sales of General Motors exceeded the gross national
products of Switzerland, Pakistan, or South Africa.
Id. Since these words were written, almost two decades ago, the globalization trend and
growth of multinational corporations has become even more rapid. See generally THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE LExUs AND THE OLiVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (1999).
488. BORN, supra note 12, at 160 (discussing Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir. 1983)).
489. Id. at 154-56, 161. Plaintiffs specifically assert this economic integration by arguing
that:
[G]iven the incorporation and consolidation of VICTORIA/ERGO into the
operations of the Munich Re Group, the jurisdiction conferred on Munich Re
justifiably extends to VICTORIA/ERGO as well.
Nor is this linking of relationships to reach VICTORIA/ERGO in any
way unreasonable. It is clear from the documentation that the entire Munich
Re Group does, in fact, operate as a consolidated, integrated unit-a word
actually used by Munich Re to describe its Group. Thus, exercising jurisdiction
over VICTORIA/ERGO is no different than exercising jurisdiction over Munich
Re or even American Re itself: They are all part of one whole.
Stahl III Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 452, at 19.
Defendants present two counter arguments: the "documentation" relied on by
plaintiffs is inadmissible hearsay that the district court properly disregarded, and the
economic integration argument is not the law as it ignores the requirement of recognizing the
corporate formalities of each of Munich Re's subsidiaries that, according to defendants, are
separate and distinct corporations. See Stahl III Appellees' Brief, supra note 460, at 21-24,
31-45.
490. For a discussion on Munich Re's four licensed subsidiaries in California, see text and
notes supra Part IV.A.3.
491. As the courts opinion itself shows, the various relationships between Victoria, Ergo,
Victoria LebensversicherungAG, American Re, Munich Re, and St. Paul Fire & Casualty are
complicated, perhaps even convoluted. See Stahl 11 Opinion, supra note 463, at 2-3. The
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At the least, the court should have allowed plaintiffs to conduct
further discovery to sort out these confusing relationships, and to
examine whether any of them are sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction.492
complexity is exacerbated by the fact that all these insurers, except for St. Paul Fire &
Casualty, are German companies incorporated under a foreign legal system, and doing
business world-wide. See id. Furthermore, it appears that since the policies were written in
the 1920s and 1930s, Victoria has undergone a name change, and various mergers and
acquisitions. See id. After filing of the complaint, plaintiffs discovered that Victoria is now
part of Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG, a German corporation that arose out of a merger
between Victoria and Hamburg-Mannheimer AG, another German concern. See id. Ergo and
Victoria are, in turn, subsidiaries of Munich Re, another German corporation. See id.
Defendants further confused the issue by asserting that Victoria Lebensversicherung
AG is the "successor in interest" to defendant Victoria Holding AG, formerly known as
Victoria Insurance Company of Berlin. See Stahl I Defendant's Amended Notice of Filing of
Removal of Action to United States District Court for the Central District of California, supra
note 452, at 1. The declaration of an officer of Victoria confirms this fact. See Stahl II
Declaration of Gert Schlosser, supra note 452, at 26 (stating that Victoria Lebensversichrung
AG became the 'successor to [the] insurance business of Victoria Holding AG").
Defendants argue that the nexus to California by Munich Re or any other company
affiliated with Victoria or Munich Re is irrelevant by stating that: "Personaljurisdiction over
Victoria cannot constitutionally be based upon the California contacts of Victoria's parent or
any other entity affiliated with Victoria." Stahl III Appellees' Brief supra note 460, at 11.
Defendants, therefore, would prevent examination of the relationships between the various
Munich Re companies and Victoria. See id. Of course, the defendants go too far. As shown
above, in some instances, the relationship between various subsidiaries of a multinational
corporation and the multinational parent and its subsidiaries can be sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction in the United States. See BORN, supra note 12, at 151-70.
Finally, plaintiffs assert that Victoria itself, without any connection to Munich Re or
any of its subsidiaries, does business in the United States and within California through
Victoria's participation with American insurance companies in an international network of
insurance that sells insurance in California, and through Victoria's "50% or greater"
investment in a New York-based real estate development partnership that owns properties
in California. See Stahl III Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 452, at 21. The district
court disregarded any evidence of Victoria's contacts in the United States and, specifically,
California, as inadmissible hearsay. See Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 4 ("The Court
finds that this is a classic out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.").
492. It may well be that upon further discovery, plaintiffs would need to amend their
complaint once again to sue the appropriate successors to the no-longer-existing Victoria
Insurance Company of Berlin. Plaintiffs specifically made this request, but it was denied by
the court as "futile." See Stahl H Opinion, supra note 463, at 8 (stating that "[flinally, the
plaintiffs suggest that if given leave to amend, the plaintiffs will be able to add other Munich
Re corporate subsidiaries to allow this Court to assert jurisdiction over the case").
Allowing plaintiffs to conduct jurisdictional discovery, rather than dismissing the case
outright, comports with the newly-enacted California Holocaust Victim Insurance Act. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.5 (West 1999) (expressing the California legislature's interest in
having Holocaust-era insurance claims by its residents decided in California courts and
subject to California law). For discussion of section 354.5, see infra note 533 and
accompanying text. While the trial court in Stern v. Generali found section 354.5 to be critical,
see infra Part IV.A.2.b.(i)., the trial court here completely ignored the statute.
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The district court also found that it has no specific personal
jurisdiction over Victoria. In examining personal jurisdiction, the
court conducted a separate analysis of plaintiffs' contract and tort
claims against Victoria.493
For the contract claims, the court found that Victoria did not
purposefully avail itself of the privilege of doing business in
California by putting insurance policies, which have found their way
to California, in the stream of commerce.494 Citing Ninth Circuit
authority that interpreted California law, the court found that mere
presence of an insurance contract in a forum is not sufficient for the
forum to assert jurisdiction over the defendant insurer."' Critical to
the court's analysis was the fact that Victoria "ha[s] not advertised
or attempted to sell insurance to residents of California."496
Plaintiffs also alleged an intentional tort claim against Victoria:
namely, that Victoria wrote a letter to the plaintiffs in California
inducing them to come to Germany for Victoria's millennium
celebration in order to obtain an insurance policy from plaintiffs so
that it could be destroyed.497 Plaintiffs alleged that this amounted
to the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence, recognized under
California law.49
While the court found that such acts of Victoria, if proved to be
true, satisfy the tests of (1) purposeful availment and (2) "arising
out of' defendants' forum-related activities, necessary for a finding
of specific jurisdiction,4 9 the court still dismissed this claim on the
ground that forcing Victoria to litigate this intentional tort in
California would be unreasonable. °0 According to the court, "There
is no question that it would be burdensome for [Victoria] to defend
in California and that alternate forums, namely Germany and
Belgium, exist."50 1
493. Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 5-6.
494. See id. at 5.
495. See id. at 5-6.
496. Id. at 6.
497. See id. The district court referred to multiple "policies" that the plaintiffs turned over
to Victoria. See id. Apparently, however, there was only one such policy, which plaintiffs still
had in their possession after the war. See Stahl IllAppellants' Opening Brief, supra note 452,
at 48.
498. See Stahl H Opinion, supra note 463, at 6. But see Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior
Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. 1998) (abolishing tort of intentional spoliation of evidence).
499. See Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 6-7.
500. See id. at 7.
501. Id.
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The court also found Victoria's purposeful interjection into
California to be "somewhat limited," stating: "[A]lthough the alleged
solicitation of the Plaintiffs to come to Europe occurred in Califor-
nia, the remaining elements of the alleged plan occurred in Europe,
where the evidence was fraudulently obtained and allegedly
destroyed."" 2
Therefore, the court acknowledged that while California "has an
interest in protecting its citizens against the intentional spoliation
of evidence,""' a factor that favors trying this case before this court,
the location of evidence-the other factor in determining reasonable-
ness of assertion of jurisdiction by the forum-"does not mitigate in
favor of either forum, [since e]vidence related to the tort ... exists
in both California and Europe."5 °4 The court, nevertheless, found it
unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over the intentional tort claims
since to do so would not "comport with 'fair play and substantial jus-
tice."505
The court's rationale for dismissal of the intentional spoliation of
evidence on the ground of unreasonableness likewise cannot be
supported. To maintain that trying this case in California would be
burdensome for Victoria, as compared to the burden that would be
imposed upon plaintiffs in trying this case in Germany, is pure
fiction.
This is not a case where a small foreign entity that engages only
in local business is dragged into a California court. Victoria is a
large multinational corporation, and part of Munich Re, an even
larger multinational, which has extensive business dealings in
California." 6 The lead plaintiff, in contrast, is a ninety-eight-year-
old California resident.0 7
Forcing Victoria to defend itself in California presents a small
burden,58 especially in comparison to the burden that will be
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 7 n.2.
505. Id. at 6 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985)).
506. See Stahl I Complaint, supra note 449, 7.
507. See id. 16. After filing the suit, the lead plaintiff died. See supra note 456.
508. See Boyd, supra note 191, at 70. The article states:
Litigants in international cases have access to overnight delivery of documents,
facsimiles, and Internet electronic mail; witnesses can be flown all over the
world. Compulsory process of non-party witnesses by the U.S. forum may also
be less of a concern given the use of customary letters rogatory and the Hague
Evidence Convention, which provide for compelling testimony of foreign non-
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imposed upon the elderly California plaintiff if she is forced to go to
Germany or Belgium to prosecute her action.0 9
The case is presently on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.51 ° The
Ninth Circuit should remand the case to allow plaintiffs to conduct
jurisdictional discovery, and, at the conclusion of such discovery, to
amend their complaints, if necessary, to add or delete parties in the
action.
b. State Court Litigation
i. Stern v. Generali ...




509. The court also provides another reason to denyjurisdiction in California, which forces
plaintiffs to try their case in Belgium or Germany. See Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at
7. "Perhaps more importantly, a Belgian or German court would be more likely to be able to
provide relief to the Plaintiffs, if their claim were found to be meritorious, given that the
Defendants have no assets in the United States." Id.
This is a strange reason to deny jurisdiction. If, in fact, there are no assets in the
United States for plaintiffs to attach if they prevail in their lawsuit, then this action is
senseless. It should be for the plaintiffs, not the court, to make this decision. If plaintiffs
chose to prosecute their action in the United States, they must have believed that the
defendants are not judgment-proof in the United States. It is not the court's role to second-
guess this decision. Moreover, if Victoria is judgment-proof, why is it even defending this
action? Apparently, Victoria has exposure in the United States, and the court's reasoning,
which it considers important, is faulty.
510. See StahlINotice ofAppeal, Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No. 98 CV 3490, (C.D. Cal.
filed Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Stahl I Notice of Appeal].
511. Complaint, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter Stern Complaint].
512. For stories discussing the Stern case, see, for example, Alan Abrahamson, Heirs of
Holocaust Victims Sue Insurer, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1998, at B [hereinafter Abrahamson,
Heirs ofHolocaust Victims SueInsurer; AlanAbrahamson, Searching For Justice, L.A. TIMES
MAG., June 20, 1999, at 20, available in 1999 WL 2170080 [hereinafter Abrahamson,
SearchingforJustice]; Linda Gerstel & RichardP. Lewis, Holocaust Survivors OvercomeFirst
Hurdles ofPersonal Jurisdiction andForum Non Conveniens, CORP. LEGALTIMES, Apr. 1999,
at 72; David Lyons, Holocaust Claims Get a New Boost, NAT'L L. J., May 18, 1998, at A6;
Aurora Mackey, Settling Old Scores: Victims of the Third Reich Mount a New Legal
Challenge, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1999, at 17; YetAnotherHolocaust Theft, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9,1998,
at BS.
The case originally was set for trial on February 9,2000, and was going to be the first
Holocaust-era insurance case to reach trial. See Henry Weinstein, Judge Sets First Trial of
Holocaust Claims against Insurance Firms, LA TMIES, May 29, 1999, at B8. The case,
however, was subsequently transferred to another judge, who set aside the February 2000
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The Stern lawsuit stems from the activities of Moshe "Mor" Stern,
a wealthy Jewish merchant who died in the Holocaust.513 Before the
war, Mor had a successful wine and spirits production business in
Uzghorod, Hungary.514 Mor and his wife Regina had six sons and
one daughter.515
In 1944, the entire Stern family, except for one son, was trans-
ported to Auschwitz.516 Mor, Regina, and three sons perished
there." 7
Before the war, Mor took out substantial life insurance and
annuity policies and a dowry policy on his daughter, through the
Prague office of Generali.15 Mor purchased the policies between
1929 and 1939, and prepaid premiums on the policies through
1944.5'9
trial date. See Denise Levin, Judge Questions Constitutionality ofHolocaustLaw, L.A. DAILY
J., Sept. 8, 1999, at 1.
513. See First Amended Complaint 1 24-25, 29, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p-,
No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 5, 1998) [hereinafter Stern First Amended
Complaint].
514. See id. 1 24.
515. See id. 23.
516. See id. 9 29.
517. See id. PlaintiffAdolf Stern's wife and child were also murdered by the Nazis. See id.
518. See id. 9 25.
519. See Stern First Amended Complaint, supra note 513, T 18. Of the various policies
purchased by Mor Stern, written proof exists for one policy: a Generali annuity policy number
115285, issued to Mor Stern on April 23, 1929, and payable upon Mor's death, or in 1949, if
he was still living. See id.
Policy 115285 also provided "that when Mor died, defendant GENERALI would pay
life insurance proceeds to his surviving heirs, which include Plaintiffs." Id. The initial
premium paid on the policy had a "payout value of at least 400,000 [Czech] Krona, equivalent
at the time to nearly fifteen thousand dollars," and was paid up until 1939. Id. 9126. Later on
Mor Stern's instructions, Adolf Stern prepaid to Generali an additional five years worth of
premiums, through 1944. See id. 1 27. During the war, the Stern children lost all
documentation for the policies purchased by Mor. See id. Exhibit B 1 7 (affidavit of Adolf
Stern).
In a letter dated August 31, 1972, to Edith Stern, Mor Sten's daughter, Generali
stated that it found no documentation of any life insurance policy on Mor Stern. See id. 38.
"Referring to your letter of the 19th of August 1972, we wish to inform you that in the local
records of our former Czechoslovakian stock we have not traced any assurance offered on the
life of a Mr. Mor Stern." Id.
In a letter dated October 11, 1996, to Martin Stern, one of the Stern grandchildren,
Generali again denied that it had any records of any policies issued to Mor Stern. See id. 9
43. The letter informed the Stern family of the following:
Assicurazioni Generali has no direct knowledge of the incidents describedin the
letter of Mr. Stern (to which the new items relate). Assicurazioni Generali made
efforts to find records relating to the insurance policy of the late Mr. Morris
Stern, allegedly issued in Prague in 1929/30. Unfortunately, no such records
were found, as the documents and details relating to specific policies were
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In June 1945, soon after the war ended, Adolf Stern, Mor's oldest
son who survived the Buchenwald Concentration Camp, made his
way to Generali's offices in Prague seeking payment on the family's
insurance policies.52 ° Adolfwas twenty-eight years old at the time. 2'
At his deposition, Adolf, now eighty-two years old and residing in
Florida, testified that the Generali officials demanded that he
produce a death certificate for Mor.522 WhenAdolf explained that the
Nazis did not issue death certificates, he was mocked and forcibly
removed from Generali's offices.52
normally kept in the Prague Branch Office.
Id. 43.
Surprisingly, a summary of one policy, policy number 115285, was found. "On
December 10, 1996, contrary to GENERALrS prior assertions on August 31, 1972 and
October 11, 1996, that no documents existed evidencing that a policy was even issued
covering the life of Mor Stem, a GENERALI clerk faxed MARTIN [STERN) a copy of one of
the annuity policies!" Id 49. A copy of this summary policy is attached as Exhibit A to the
complaint. See id. Exhibit A.
Generali concedes the existence of this document. "Attached to the Complaint as
Exhibit A is a German-language summary of the Policy that Generali found in its files and
transmitted to the Sterns in 1996." Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities
Supporting Motion by Specially Appearing Defendants to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss
or Stay at 3 n.4, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p., No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super Ct. filed
Aug. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Stern Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities
Supporting Motion by Specially Appearing Defendants to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss
or Stay]. According to Generali, the original policy was written in Hungarian, and Exhibit
A is a "German-language abstract reflecting certain terms and conditions" of the policy. Id.
at 3-4.
In response to the filing of the suit, in 1999, Generali performed a search for any
policies belonging to Mor Stem. Declaration of Federico Baroglio in Support of Motion to
Quash T 33, Stem v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super Ct. filed Aug.
7, 1998 [hereinafter Stern Declaration of Federico Baroglio]. In addition to finding evidence
of policy number 115285, Generali found another policy issued to Mor Stem. Policy number
115438 was issued on May 10, 1929, and Generali believes that it is a replacement policy for
policy number 115285. See id. 136 n.6.
520. See Stern First Amended Complaint, supra note 513, T 30.
521. See id. 9123.
522. See id. 7.
523. See Deposition ofAdolf Stem at 26-27, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC
185376 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Stern Deposition of Adolf Stem]; see also
Stern First Amended Complaint, supra note 513, 11 7, 31. Stern states:
The Assicurazioni Generali officials were less than kind. They mocked me. They
were arrogant. They stated that I would have to produce a death certificate and
copies of the relevant insurance policies before they would process the claims.
I explained that Hitler did not pass out death certificates and that all family
insurance documentation was confiscated by the Third Reich. They declined my
request to retrieve from Generali's own files the insurance and annuity policies
that they sold to my family. The officials said that Generali could not help me
and they had me forcibly removed from the premises by a security guard. I was
humiliated.
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For the next fifty, years, Adolf and his other siblings-and subse-
quently their children (Mor's and Regina's grand-
children)-repeatedly petitioned Generali to make payment on the
policies purchased by Mor.524 They were rebuffed each time.525
In February 1998, the children and grandchildren of Mor Stern
filed a $135-million lawsuit against Generali in Los Angeles
Superior Court.526 The suit sought $10 million in compensatory
damages and $125 million in punitive damages.52 The lawsuit, filed
in Los Angeles Superior Court, listed Adolf as the lead plaintiff.528
The complaint set out four causes of action: (1) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) breach of
contract; (3) damages and injunctive relief under California
Business & Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500; and (4)
intentional spoliation of evidence.529
In response, Generali filed a motion to dismiss. 3 ' In its motion,
Generali argued that California courts lack personal jurisdiction
over Generali, that the action should be dismissed because the
Generali policies sold to Mor Stern contained a forum-selection
Id.
524. See Stern First Amended Complaint, supra note 513, 32-35, 37-38, 41-60.
525. See Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Quash and/or Stay or Dismiss Action at 2,
Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A., No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 30, 1998)
[hereinafter Stern Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion to Quash and/or Stay or Dismiss Action].
The Memorandum states:
After Mr. Stern perished in a Nazi death camp, his children repeatedly tried to
obtain the proceeds of the policies issued by [General].... GENERALI rejected
those claims under a litany of specious grounds. First, GENERALI refused to
pay the claims without a death certificate and without the original policies;
then it refused on the grounds that its records indicated that no policy ever
existed; later, it asserted that because its property in Eastern Europe had been
nationalized, it was no longer obligated to pay the claims.
Id.
526. Of the nine Stern family plaintiffs, two reside in California: Anne Stern, wife of one
son who died in 1996, and Alan Stern, grandson of Mor. See Stern First Amended Complaint,
supra note 513, 4, 7,10, 11.
527. It should be noted that the case will be tried in the same court, the Central District
of Los Angeles Superior Court (downtown Los Angeles), where a jury in July 1999 issued a
record verdict of $4.9 billion, the largest verdict ever in a personal injury case. See Ann W.
O'Neill, Henry Weinstein & Eric Malnic, GM Ordered to Pay $4.9 Billion in Crash Verdict,
L.A. TIMEs, July 10, 1999, at Al (awarding punitive damages of $4.8 billion).
528. See Stern First Amended Complaint, supra note 513, T 1.
529. See id.
530. See Stern Defendants' Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities Supporting Motion by




clause mandating that all disputes be settled in Prague, and the
case should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens.53'
In filing its motion to dismiss, Generali faced a major obstacle. In
May 1998, after this lawsuit was filed, California enacted the
Holocaust Victims Insurance Act ("HVIA"). 532 The HVIA specifically
vests California with jurisdiction over Holocaust-era insurance
cases; nullifies any forum-selection clause in a Holocaust-era policy;
and tolls the statute of limitations for Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims until 2010.
533
531. See id. at 13. California law specifically recognizes the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. A defendant is allowed to seek "Etlo stay or dismiss the action on the ground of
inconvenient forum." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 418.10(a)(2) (West 1999).
532. See Stern Defendants' Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities Supporting Motion by
Specially Appearing Defendants to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss or Stay, supra note 519,
at 17, 23-24 (referring to the HVIA as "AB1334," its original bill number when it was
introduced in the California Assembly by Assemblyman Wally Knox).
Both chambers of the California legislature, controlled by the Democratic Party,
unanimously passed the HVIA and designated it as urgency legislation. California Governor
Pete Wilson, a Republican, immediately signed the bill into law. The enacting legislation to
the HVIA explains why the California legislature promulgated the HVIA
(a) The Legislature recognizes that thousands of Holocaust survivors and the
heirs of Holocaust victims are residents or citizens of the State of California.
... California has an overwhelming public policy interest in assuring that its
residents and citizens who are claiming entitlement to proceeds under policies
issued to Holocaust victims are treated reasonably and fairly and that those
contractual obligations are honored.
(b) It is the specific intent of the Legislature to assure Holocaust victims be
permitted to have an expeditious, inexpensive, and fair forum in which to
resolve their claims for benefits under these policies by allowing actions to be
brought in California courts and subject to California law, irrespective of any
contrary forum selection provision containedinthe policies themselves. Itis the
finding of the Legislature that enforcement offorum selection provision in those
policies would work an undue, unreasonable, and unjust hardship on Holocaust
victims who are residents of California and that those provisions are
unenforceable with respect to the policies as to which this act applies.
1998 Cal. Stat. ch. 43, § 1.
533. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.5 (West 1999). Subsection (a)(1) defines a "Holocaust
victim" to be "any person who was persecuted during the period of 1930 to 1945, inclusive, by
Nazi Germany or its allies." Id. § 354.5(a)(1). The victim need not be Jewish.
Subsection (a)(3) defines an "insurer" to be "an insurance provider doing business in
[California], or whose contacts in [California] satisfy the constitutional requirements for
jurisdiction, that sold life, annuities, dowry, educational, or casualty insurance covering
person or property to persons in Europe at any time between 1920 and 1945, directly or
through a related company." Id. § 354.5(a)(3).
Subsection (a)(2), in turn, defines a "related company" to be "any parent, subsidiary,
reinsurer, successor in interest, managing general agent, or affiliate company of the insurer."
Id. § 354.5(a)(2). This subsection is meant to cover the myriad ways that European insurance
companies headquartered in Western Europe, and still existing today or being a successor
company, sold insurance in prewar Eastern Europe. See id.
Sections (b) and (c) contain the operative provisions of the HVEA. Section (b) states:
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Confronted with the HVIA, Generali argued that the Act was
unconstitutional on three grounds:5 34
First, the [HVIA] violently interferes with the legitimate
expectations of the parties to the [insurance] Policy, in violation of the
Due Process clause. Moreover, its purported extraterritorial reach
violates Due Process as well as the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses.
Finally, its enactment exceeded the Legislature's power under the
separation of powers set forth in the California Constitution, which
does not grant to the Legislature the constitutional power to place its
thumb on a judicial scale to pre-ordain the outcome of judicial
decisionmaking."5'
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Holocaust victim, or heir or
beneficiary of a Holocaust victim, who resides in this state and has a claim
arising out of an insurance policy or policies purchased in Europe between 1920
and 1945 from an insurer described in paragraph 3 of subdivision (a) of this
section, may bring a legal action to recover on that claim in any superior court
of the state for the county in which the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs resides,
which court shall be vested with jurisdiction over that action until its
completion or resolution.
Id. § 354.5(b).
Section (c) deals with the issue of statute of limitations for Holocaust-era insurance
claims. See id. § 354.5(c). Even though Holocaust survivors or their heirs may argue equitable
tolling or make some other counter-argument to the defense of statute of limitations, in an
action seeking proceeds of a Holocaust-era insurance policy, subsection (c) removes the need
to make such argument by stating that any such action "shall not be dismissed for failure to
comply with the applicable statute of limitation, provided the action is commenced on or
before December 31, 2010." Id.
534. See Stern Defendants' Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities Supporting Motion by
Specially Appearing Defendants to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss or Stay, supra note 519,
at 17-24.
535. Id. at 17-18. With regard to its last assertion, Generali argued that the California
Legislature passed the HVIA with the Stern lawsuit in mind, and used its legislative power
to meddle with this ongoing litigation. As Generali asserted:
Assemblyman Knox, the Act's sponsor, has publicly acknowledged that
the Act was rushed into law to ensure that Generali "do[es] not prevail" on the
present motion.
"We are not talking about a hypothetical problem. At this very moment,
insurance industry lawyers are poised to file motions in California Court to
dismiss the first major lawsuit brought against them for a claim on a Holocaust
policy. The legislature must act quickly to see that they do not prevail."
Id. at 23-24 (quoting the statement of Assemblyman Wally Knox in support of AB 1334).
Generali explained that, "[H]ere, the [HVIA] unconstitutionally intrudes upon the function
of the judicial branch by purporting to dictate a specific result preferred by the
Legislature-namely, the denial of the present motion." Id. at 23. According to Generali, the
California Legislature cannot do this because it violates the separation of powers between the
legislative andjudicial branches mandated by the California Constitution. See id. at 22 (citing
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3, stating that "[tihe powers of State government are legislative,
executive andjudicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either
of the others except as permitted by this Constitution").
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The trial court denied Generali's motion." 6 In so doing, the trial
judge appeared to be sidestepping the question of the constitutional-
ity of the HVIA, by holding that, even without the statute, the court
possessed jurisdiction over the case and need not dismiss the case
on forum non conveniens grounds." 7
On the question of jurisdiction, the court found that "[a] number
of factors support the conclusion that Generali has consented to the
jurisdiction of the California Courts."53 While any one of the factors,
"standing alone might be insufficient to confer jurisdiction, when
considered together, they constitute both express and implied
consent on the part of defendant to the jurisdiction of [Califor-
nia]. 539
The court found the following factors, in the aggregate, conferred
jurisdiction. First, Generali has been admitted to transact insurance
business in California since 1958 and has been selling insurance
policies in California since that time.54 ° Second, Generali has
acquired a certificate of authority from the California Department
of Insurance.54 Third, Generali has designated an agent for the
service of process in California and, in the form designating such an
agent, has stated that service on such an agent "shall give jurisdic-
tion over the person of such insurer."542 Fourth, Generali has
brought suit in California courts to assert or protect its interest.5
43
536. See Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376, 1999 WL 167546, at *1
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 15,1999). It shouldbe noted that the California Insurance Commissioner
filed an amicus brief in opposition to Generali's motion. See Memorandum of Points And
Authorities of Amicus Curiae Charles Quackenbush, California Insurance Commissioner, in
Opposition to Motion to Quash and/or Stay or Dismiss Action, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali
S.p., No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan 6, 1999). The amicus brief followed and
reaffirmed the arguments made by plaintiffs in their opposition papers and also added its own
arguments. See id.
In its ruling, the court did not indicate whether the Insurance Commissioner's
appearance as amicus on the side of the plaintiffs played a role in the court's decision to deny
defendant Generali's dismissal motion. See Stern, 1999 WL 167546, at *1. However, much
of the discussion in the court's ruling appears in the amicus brief. See id.
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And finally, Generali has in the past had an office and owned a
subsidiary in California.5"
The court noted that even though Generali's sales of insurance in
California "represent[ed] only 1% of its world-wide business, it has
sold insurance resulting in millions of dollars in premiums paid by
California residents-$27 million in [premiums from California] in
1997 alone."545 Based upon the totality of these factors, the court
concluded that "Generali has continuing and substantial contacts
with California, sufficient to satisfy due process."546
Examining the forum-selection clause in the Generali policies, the
court "refuse[d] to recognize the forum-selection clause."54 As the
court explained, "[wihen such clauses are part of a preprinted form,
designed by the insurer and imposed on the insured, they are not
binding."548
544. See id. In its brief, Generali pointed out that, at present, it "has no offices or
employees in California." Stern Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities
Supporting Motion by Specially Appearing Defendants to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss
orStay, supra note 519, at3. In a footnote, Generali acknowledged that it "briefly maintained
a small, three-person support office in conjunction with Deans & Homer[, its non-exclusive
independent agent] from 1990-93." Id. n.3.
A short article analyzing the trial court's ruling found the court's reference to a no-
longer-existing office as a significant factor influencing jurisdiction. The article states:
In listing the jurisdictional factors it found relevant-including the fact
that Generali had been doing business in California for nearly 30 years-the
court answered a much-debated question in both jurisdictional and forum non
conveniens battles: what period of time is relevant in determining whether a
company engages in continuous and systematic business so as to subject itself
to personal jurisdiction. Often, defendants whose business in a particular
jurisdiction has progressively decreased argue that the relevant time period is
one month or, at most, one year prior to the filing of the complaint. Most of the
case law on this issue, however, analyzes contacts throughout a more expansive
period. Depending on the circumstances, some cases hold that consideration of
jurisdictional contacts over a six- or even ten-year period may be appropriate
for resolving personal jurisdiction. The Stern case reveals that in certain cases,
particularly where there are strong public policies implicated in retaining
jurisdiction and providing an adequate forum, the relevant period of time for
examining a company's jurisdictional contacts can be quite expansive.
Gerstel & Lewis, supra note 512, at 72.
545. Stern, 1999 WL 167546, at *1.
546. Id. In contrast, the court in Stahl v. Victoria could not make this ruling. See
discussion and notes supra Part IV.A.2.a.(iii). Unlike Generali, Victoria was not licensed to
do business in California and did not directly sell insurance policies in the state. See id.
547. Stern, 1999 WL 167546, at *2.
548. Id. The trial judge did not provide authority for this proposition. See id. In their
brief, plaintiffs cited one case for the proposition that "under California law, a forum selection
clause, especially one contained in a standard-form contract, cannot be enforced unless it is
demonstrated that the insured had notice of the provision." Stern Plaintiffs' Opposition to
Motion to Quash and/or Stay or Dismiss Action, supra note 525, at 18 (citing Carnival Cruise
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Finally, examining Generali's argument that the common-law
doctrine of forum non conveniens mandates dismissal of the suit, the
court found that it
has discretion to determine whether one forum is more convenient
than another, and may choose not to exercise jurisdiction. It does not
appear to the court that plaintiffs have unfairly or unreasonably
chosen to litigate this matter in California, or that proceeding with
litigation here is prejudicial to the defendant. 9
What remains unclear from the trial court's ruling is the extent
to which the court relied upon the HVIA to rule against Generali.
Put another way, would Generali's motion to dismiss have been
denied in the absence of the HVIA? Possibly, but less likely.
On the one hand, the court used common law principles, rooted in
California case law, to reject all three arguments for dismissal
raised by Generali. First, the court found that it had jurisdiction
over Generali based upon Generali's business activities in Califor-
nia."' Second, the court held that it would not enforce the choice-of-
forum clause in Generali's insurance policies because it was an
adhesion contract.55' Third, the court properly noted that it had
discretion whether to dismiss the case on forum non conveniens
grounds because one forum was more convenient than another; in
this case, the court chose the California forum over the Czech
Republic.Y5 2
On the other hand, the court's ruling made frequent reference to
the HVIA and its relevance to Generali's motion to dismiss. For
instance, the court began its ruling with the following paragraph:
"At the heart of this motion is Code of Civil Procedure section 354.5,
the Holocaust Victims Insurance Act. That Act, unquestionably
Lines v. Superior Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1026 (1991)). Plaintiffs argued, "[niothing
presented by GENERALI supports the conclusion that Mr. [Mor] Stern had notice of the
[mandatory choice-of-forum] provision." Id. According to plaintiffs, "[thus, it is obvious that
Mr. Stern did not voluntarily' negotiate away his right-or the right of his heirs-to bring an
action wherever they resided at the time the right of action existed." Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has specifically held, albeit outside the insurance
context, that the existence of a preprinted form containing a forum-selection clause that
benefits only the defendant does not necessarily make the clause invalid. See Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991).
549. Stern, 1999 WL 167546, at *2.
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relevant to these proceedings, if constitutional when applied to this
defendant, controls the issues before the court."
553
While the court never specifically held in its written ruling that
the HVIA is constitutional, at oral argument the court represented
as much. 5
4
In its choice-of-forum analysis, the court specifically held that it
"need not rely on the terms of this new statute in order to refuse to
recognize the forum-selection clause."555 The court, however, in
addition to voiding the clause because it was not freely agreed upon,
also stated that "[in the face of the strong public policy in favor of
California's jurisdiction, this Court will not honor the selection of
Czechoslovakia as a proper forum for the resolution of this
dispute."556
Where does the court find this strong public policy? Of course, in
the language of HVIA and in its legislative history, both of which
the court freely quotes. It appears, therefore, that the HVIA
ultimately played a critical role in the court's denial of Generali's
motion to dismiss.
553. Id.
554. Judge Cooper stated:
I have an obligation both to uphold the law as the legislature gives it to me and
to uphold the Constitution; and if the statute strikes me as blatantly
unconstitutional, I will say so .... I'm satisfied that the act certainly does
represent a very strong, very clear public policy message from the legislature
and is sufficiently constitutional on its face for me not to invalidate it.
Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings at 30-31, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC
185376 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 25, 1999).
555. Stern, 1999 WL 167546, at *2.
556. Id.
557. See id. Section Two of the court's ruling is entitled "The Legislative Expression Of
Public Policy" and contains the following two paragraphs:
The statute in question, CCP § 354.5, unanimously adopted by the
California Legislature, reflects a clear directive to the courts to assume and
exercise jurisdiction over lawsuits such as the instant case, where suit is
brought to enforce the terms of a life insurance policy sold to an insured who
became a victim of the Holocaust. The statute directs the Courts to exercise
jurisdiction "notwithstanding any other provision of law."
It also provides that "it is the specific intent of the legislature to assure
that Holocaust victims be permitted to have an expeditious, inexpensive, and
fair forum in which to resolve their claims ... irrespective of any contrary
forum selection provision contained in the policies themselves."
Id. at *1-2 (quoting 1998 Cal. Stat. ch. 43, §§ 1, 3). These paragraphs are followed by the
court's rulings that it will not honor the choice-of-forum clause and will not dismiss the case
in favor of a more convenient forum. See id. at *2.
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Following the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiffs
filed a motion for sanctions against Generali. The motion was based
on a declaration, filed by an executive of Generali in support of the
earlier motion to dismiss, stating that "Generali cannot locate any
records of ever having filed a lawsuit in the California state
courts."55 In fact, Generali had brought "at least 24 lawsuits... in
California state courts in recent years."559 The court found that the
declaration, "if not dishonest, was at least disingenuous and clearly
designed to mislead the court on the critical issue of whether
defendant had substantial contacts with California and had
subjected itself to the jurisdiction of California courts."56 ° The court
fined Generali $14,126.06, the costs plaintiffs alleged to have
expended "in order to disprove the misleading statement in defen-
dant's declaration."56'
Generali's interlocutory appeals to the appellate courts of
California, attempting to reverse the trial court's ruling on the
motion to dismiss, failed.562
Upon remand to the trial court, the case originally was set for
trial on February 9,2000, and was to become the first Holocaust-era
case to reach trial.563 However, in July 1999, Generali was success-
558. Id.
559. Id. According to the court, "[alt oral argument, counsel for Generali admitted that he
has located even more lawsuits filed in California by Generali than the 24 found by plaintiffs."
Id. at *3. Generali also appeared as the defendant in approximately 80 lawsuits in California
without ever raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. See id.
Moreover, Generali, in response to the sanctions motions, admitted two additional
incorrect statements in its original movingpapers: contrary to its original representation that
Generali does not have a telephone listing in California, Generali acknowledged that there
is a telephone listing in California for"Generali Insurance Company of Trieste &Venice"; and
contrary to its original representation that Generali never advertised in California, Generali
ran an advertisement in California in a publication entitled "Business Insurance" in
conjunction with Aetna Insurance. See id. at *2-3.
560. Id. at *2.
561. Id. at *3; see also Denise Levin, Judge Sanctions Italian Insurance Firm, L.A. DAILY
J., Mar. 24, 1992, at 2.
562. See Assicurazioni Generali v. Los Angeles County Sup. Ct., No. 5078215 (Cal. June
16,1999) (denyingpetitionforreview); Assicurazioni Generaliv. LosAngeles County Sup. Ct.,
No. 5079615 (Cal. June 16, 1999) (denying application for stay and petition for writ of
mandate); Assicurazioni Generaliv. Los Angeles County Sup. Ct., No. B 129736 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 6, 1999) (denying petition for writ of mandate-prohibition).
563. See Weinstein, supra note 512, at B8.
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ful in transferring the case to another judge, who set aside the trial
date.564
In November 1999, the Stern case settled. 65 While the terms of
the settlement were supposed to remain confidential, one source
reported the settlement amount as $1.25 million,166 substantially
less than the $10 million in insurance claims and $125 million in
punitive damages sought by the plaintiff.56
7
Stern v. Generali became the first Holocaust insurance case to
reach settlement in the modern era of Holocaust litigation. It is also
the first case since Buxbaum v. Generali,5 6' resolved fifty-six years
earlier, in which Holocaust survivors successfully sued for payment
of a pre-World War II insurance policy.
ii. Other California Insurance Cases
Four other individual (nonclass) action cases remained in
California state court against Generali.5 69 The same team of lawyers
who filed Stern (and Stahl v. Victoria) also filed these four cases.
Like in Stern, plaintiffs in these other actions are heirs of alleged
Generali policyholders who perished in the Holocaust.7 1 Plaintiffs
564. See Levin, supra note 512, at 1. Judge S. James Otero, the new presiding judge,
agreed to review the constitutionality of HVIA, and scheduled hearings on the matter. See id.
at 1.
565. See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali, S.p.A., No.
BC 185376 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Stern Reporter's Transcript of
Proceedings]; see also HenryWeinstein, Holocaust Victim's Heirs Settle Suit, L.A.TIES, Nov.
25, 1999, at 1; Holocaust Insurance Settlement Reported, N.Y. TImES, Nov. 25, 1999, at A4.
566. See Holocaust Insurance Settlement Reported, supra note 565, atA4 (reporting $1.25
million, "according to people knowledgeable about the deal").
567. See Weinstein, supra note 565, at 1.
568. For a discussion of Buxbaum, see discussion and notes supra Part II.A
569. See Complaint, Feldman v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A-, No. BC 21491 (Cal. Super.
Ct. filed July 27,1999); Complaint, Friedmanv. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 193182
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 2,1998); Complaint, Babos v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC
188680 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed April 2, 1998); Complaint, Sladek v. Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A., No. BC 188679 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed April 2, 1998). For relationship ofthese four cases
to the other California Holocaust-era insurance cases, see Levin, supra note 512, at 1.
570. See discussion and notes supra Part IV.A.2.a.(iii)., b.(i). (discussing the Stahl and
Stern cases, respectively). The California attorneys, in contrast to the New York attorneys,
have preferred to file individual actions in state court, rather than class actions in federal
court.




seek payment on the policies and punitive damages.572 The causes
of action are the same as those stated in Stern.573
In May 1999, the same judge who denied Generali's motion to
dismiss in Stern likewise denied similar dismissal motions in three
of the other cases.5 "4




574. See Tentative Rulings, Friedman v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 193182
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 28, 1999). Judge Cooper's ruling stated:
The Court has read and considered the moving, opposition, and reply
documents filed by the plaintiffs, defendants, and amicus curiae. The Court has
also reviewed its ruling in Stern v. Assicurazioni [Generali] in which many of
the same issues were raised and resolved. Although some factual distinctions
exist between and among Stern and the moving plaintiffs, they are not legally
significant, and the Court has found no reason to depart from its earlier
conclusion that it has, and should exercise, jurisdiction over this defendant in
these cases.
Id. at 2. As in Stern, at the hearing on the motion, the court announced that it would follow
its tentative ruling and make that decision the court's final ruling. Also, as in Stern, the
California Insurance Commissioner filed an amicus brief in opposition to Generali's motions.
Like in Stern, plaintiffs suffered a setback in July 1999, when the cases were
transferred to another judge, who is again considering Generali's motions to dismiss. See
Stern Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 565, at 2, 16 (confirming settlement
of Stern, and setting a mandatory settlement conference for Feldman, Friedman, Babos, and
Sladek, in which the president of Generali, located in Italy, was ordered to come to California
to attend the settlement conference). Rejecting Generali's plea that it was not necessary for
the head of Generali to come to California, Judge Otero commented:
If there's a case that ever cries out for the head of a company to come down to
participate in a settlement, it is this case. There is no other case that's ever
crossed my desk where I would consider ordering a C.E.O. in because generally
it's not necessary. This case is probably the most significant case that's ever been
given to me for resolution.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
575. The Feldman, Friedman, and Babos cases settled. Sladek v. Generali continues.
Interview with Peter Simshauser, attorney for Generali (Feb. 23, 2000).
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Additionally, there is one recently-filed California state court case
against Riunione Adriatica," 6 an Italian insurance company whose
current majority owner is Allianz of Germany.
All these cases are presently proceeding through the pretrial
process.
B. Defenses Presented by the European Insurers
The European insurance companies raised both substantive and
procedural defenses to the lawsuits filed against them. Many of the
defenses were either identical, or substantially similar, to the
defenses made by the Swiss banks in the earlier litigation against
them.5
77
For the substantive defenses, the European insurers argued that
they were not under any legal obligation to pay claims issued by
them or their subsidiaries before or after World War 11.578 They
maintained this legal argument even after agreeing to make
payment.5 7 9 According to the European insurers, even if they made
576. See First Amended Complaint, Klein v. Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta S.pA., No. BC
201983 (Cal. Super. Ct. served July 6, 1999) [hereinafter Klein First Amended Complaint].
This action combines claims of three Jewish families whose relatives, before perishing in the
Holocaust, purchased insurance policies from Riunione Adriatica. See id. The Klein, Turner
and Kaufman families seek payment on the policies. See id. 17-30 (referring to the Klein,
Turner and Kaufman policies, respectively).
With regard to personal jurisdiction over Italy's Riunione Adriatica, plaintiffs allege
in the complaint that Riunione Adriatica appeared as a party in California courts in at least
twelve lawsuits. See id. T 14. The complaint also attached documentation showing that in
February 1998, Riunione Adriatica withdrew from the California insurance market. See id.
Exhibit A.
The lawsuit pleads three causes of action under California law: (1) breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) breach of contract; and (3) violation of the
California Business and Professions Code sections 17200 and 17500. These are the same
claims made against Italy's Generali in Stern and in the consolidated
Babos/Sladek/Friedman lawsuits. See discussion and notes supra Part IV.A.2.b. (discussing
state court insurance litigation).
577. See Life Insurance and the Holocaust, supra note 375, at 94-100 (discussing
statements of representatives of Germany's Allianz and Italy's Generali,. and letters of
Switzerland's Baloise Life and Winterthur Life written to NAIC, explaining reasons for denial
of payment). On February 12, 1998, the Committee on Banking of the U.S. House of
Representatives, chaired by Congressman James Leach, held hearings on the Holocaust-era
insurance issues. See Hearing before the House of Representatives' Comm. on Banking, 105th
Cong. 1 (1998). At the hearing, representatives ofsome of the European insurance companies
testified as to why they are not legally obligated to pay on the insurance claims made from
the Holocaust era. See id.




payments, it would be due to their goodwill and not because of any
legal obligation owed to the Holocaust insurance claimants or their
successors.
580
For the procedural arguments, the insurers raised the same
jurisdictional defenses as those presented by the Swiss banks.
1. Substantive Defenses
a. Nationalization of Local Offices
The insurance firms vigorously argued that because the postwar
Communist governments of Eastern Europe nationalized their
branch offices in the countries where the policies were issued, their
obligations on the policies had been taken over by the nationalized
insurance companies. 58 '
In response, the insurance claimants pointed out that the
insurance policies on which the claims were being made were never
confiscated by any postwar Communist regime. Rather, prior to the
Communist nationalizations, the Nazi government during World
War II had already confiscated the assets of the Eastern European
Jews, including the victims' insurance policies. In many instances,
the Nazis forced the European insurers to pay on the policies to the
German treasury.8 2
580. See id. at 97-98.
581. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 390, at 11. According to Henry:
In the postwar nationalizations, Generali [Insurance of Italy] lost all its East
European businesses, 14 other companies it controlled, and 184 buildings....
"In expropriating and nationalizing the company's assets, the communist states
of Eastern Europe assumed all Generali's liabilities in these countries," the
company said in a statement. "This is not a Holocaust issue; it is a communist
nationalization issue .... We are not sitting on the money like the Swiss banks.
We lost everything."
Id. (quoting a company statement). Generali has claimed that after the war it paid on policies
that originated in Western Europe, where its offices were not nationalized. See Marilyn
Henry, $65M. Generali Settlement Expected, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 18, 1998, at 1, available
in 1998 WL 6533999.
582. Due to these payments, the European insurers made an additional argument that the
claims on some of the policies had already been paid to the Nazis as policyholders. See
California Department of Insurance, Helping Holocaust Survivors and Heirs Reclaim What
Is Rightfully Theirs, at 1 (Apr. 1999) (unpublished report on file with author) [hereinafter Cal.
Dep't Ins. Rep.]. The claimants argued, however, that such payments "certainly [were] not
the contractual relationship to which the policyholders had agreed and did not relieve
insurers of their contractual obligations [to pay on the policies]." Id.
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For the policies not confiscated by the Nazis, the claimants argued
that the insuring event-the death of the insured-occurred during
the war before any Communist takeover.1 3 Therefore, the subse-
quent takeover of the local offices had no legal consequence,
"particularly since the worldwide assets of these companies are
available to pay the claims."58 4
Therefore, the claimants argued, the nationalization argument is
specious and should be rejected in any Holocaust insurance
lawsuit.585
The new, postcommunist Eastern European governments
supported this position.8 6 The new governments also maintained
that they are not responsible to the claimants because postwar
Germany never returned the policies to the nationalized successor
firms and never compensated the firms nor the claimants for the
Nazi confiscation.8 7 Moreover, some Communist governments had
583. See id. at 2.
584. Id. The report of the Insurance Commissioner of Washington State, directly
addressing the issue of nationalization, concludes:
Holocaust-era insurance obligations are not only unaffected by the
passage of time, they are also unaffected by post-war World War II Communist
regime confiscations in Central and Eastern Europe because the 'insurance
events' triggering claims-the deaths and/or property losses of the
policyholders-preceded such actions.
Because such claims remain unpaid, and because there is legal basis to
enforce payment through the U.S. legal system, a process still can be
implemented to resolve them today, despite the passage of more than a half
century.
Senn, supra note 372, at 29.
585. See Cal. Dep't Ins. Rep., supra note 582, at 2. According to the California Department
of Insurance, which has taken the lead in arguing on behalf of the Holocaust insurance
claimants, "The insurance companies insistence that claimants submit their claims to state-
run agencies in eastern Europe [for payment] is both shocking and wrong." Id.
586. See Jiri Sitler, The Forgotten Victims, TRANSITIONS, Nov. 1998, at 32-33.
587. See id. As explained by Jiri Sitler, an historian with the Foreign Ministry of the
Czech Republic and consultant to the President of the Czech Republic:
The insurance firms argue that, because their branch offices in the
region were nationalized after the war by the countries' communist
governments, the firms were freed of any commitments. But these insurance
policies were not confiscated by any post-war regime; the German government
had already claimed them during World War II....
All [Holocaust victims] had their property confiscated-expressly
including insurance policies, and regardless of whether Nazis confiscated a
specific insurance policy. [The Nazis]... simply cashed in the policies ....
Neither the Third Reich nor the post-war German government returned these
assets to the legal Czechoslovak government.
Id. at 33. The Eastern European governments are claiming, therefore, that present-day
Germany, as the successor to the Nazi regime, might be liable for the claims. See Henry,
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already paid lump sum compensation to companies and individuals
under earlier agreements negotiated with Western countries."'
In May 1999, it was reported that five of the European insurers
being sued agreed to drop the argument that nationalization of their
local offices had cleared them of any liability to pay on the policies
issued by the local offices. 58 9 The concession was made at a negotia-
tion session of the International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims held in London.590 It appears, however, that the
concession was made only outside the litigation process, and the
insurers could still make the argument in the suits filed against
them. Moreover, only five of the more than one dozen insurers
agreed to the stipulation.
supra note 581, at 1.
The claimants' response to these arguments is simple: the European insurers should
pay them; if the insurers' have a colorable claim against the current governments of Europe,
the insurers should then seek reimbursement from these governments. See id.
588. See Sitler, supra note 586, at 33. "The nationalization argument also is just another
discriminatory measure against victims from Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, the
Czechoslovak communist government entered into global agreements with Western countries,
providinglump sums as compensation for companies and individuals in those countries whose
Czech properties had been nationalized." Id.
Moreover, with regard to Generali, it may have been partially compensated by the
Italian government for the nationalization of its offices behind the Iron Curtain. See John M.
Goshko, Italian InsurerAccused of Hiding Compensation; Israel Lawmaker Levels Charge in
Dispute with Holocaust Survivors, Heirs, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1999, at A22. In 1968,
all Italian assets, liabilities and interests that have been nationalized [in
postwar Czechoslovakia] were compensated by total amount of 2.6 billion [lira]
paid to the Italian government [by Czechoslovakia] to be further administered
under its exclusive responsibility. Furthermore... as part of the Agreement
[between Italy and Czechoslovakia], 8102 shares of 'Assicurazioni Generali'
were-among others-transferred to the disposition of the Italian government.
Declaration of Sharon J. Arkin in Opposition to Motion to Quash and/or to Stay or Dismiss
Action, Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super Ct. filed Nov. 30,
1998) (quoting a letter dated June 7, 1997 from Jiri Schneider, Ambassador of the Czech
Republic to Israel, to Martin Stern).
589. See Henry Weinstein, Insurers Ease Stand onHolocaust Claims Coverage, L.A. TIES,
May 8, 1999, at A12. As reported by the Los Angeles Times:
The [insurance] companies also agreed to back off from their insistence that
they are not responsible for paying off policies that were issued in Eastern
European countries, where insurance firms were nationalized by Communist
regimes after World War II. The bulk of European Jews killed in the Holocaust
lived in such countries.
Id.; see also Alan Cowell, InsurersAgree to Pay on Victims'Pre-Holocaust Policies, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1999, at A3 (stating that'"the companies agreed to assume responsibility for policies
predating the postwar nationalization of insurance subsidiaries"') (quoting Elan Steinberg,
Executive Director, World Jewish Congress, an organization that participated in the
negotiations).
590. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.C. (discussing the power of sanctions and the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Claims).
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The nationalization argument, therefore, remains a potent
weapon to be used by the European insurance companies to deny
payments on the policies issued by them.59'
b. Failure to Pay Premiums
The European insurers relied on standard principles of insurance
to argue that their obligations to pay on the policies ceased when,
during the war, policyholders stopped making premium payments
on the policies. An insurance policy is a contract,592 and one of the
terms of the contract is regular and timely payments of the premi-
ums.
5 93
The claimants argued that they should be excused from this
requirement because their deceased relatives were unable to make
premium payments, having either been murdered or interned in
concentration camps with all their assets taken away.5 94
c. Policies Became Worthless
The European insurers argued that even if they are obligated to
pay on the policies, the amount of payments should be minimal,
since the policies were designated to be paid in currencies that
either were greatly devalued or became worthless after World WarII.595
The claimants argued, in response, that payments on the policies
should include inflation and interest for over one-half century, and
591. For an excellent discussion of the nationalization issue, and a cogent analysis of why
the seizure of insurance assets by post-World War II communist governments of Eastern
Europe does not relieve the European insurers of legal liability, see Senn, supra note 372, at
21.
592. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1993) (stating that "insurance is a contract"); id.
§ 380 (stating that "the written instrument in which a contract of insurance is set forth, is the
policy").
593. See, e.g., id. § 480 (stating that "an insurer is entitled to payment of the premium");
id. § 484 (stating that "a policy may be canceled.., for nonpayment of all or any portion of
the premium").
594. See Raine, supra note 398, atB1. "Ernest Smetana, 82, said the Italian firm Generali,
which has a U.S. branch, told him his father's policy was canceled for nonpayments of
premiums. But my father could not pay premiums from Dachau,' where he was sent to die
in 1938, Smetana said." Id.
595. See Insurers Meet in Israel for Holocaust Talks, WALL ST. J.-EUR., June 24, 1999, at
25, available in 1999 WL 18407430.
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even punitive damages for the insurers' intransigence in refusing to
honor the policies.596 Such amounts, the claimants asserted, more
than exceed the loss of value through any currency devaluations.
In May 1999, at a negotiation session in London, five of the
insurers participating in the International Commission on Holo-
caust Era Insurance Claims agreed to value the claims under a
formula that would reflect present-day values, or "real values" of the
policies.
According to the New York Times, "The agreement with the
insurers [that was reached in London] is significantly different from
other settlements of Holocaust claims because it takes into account
a half-century of inflation, interest payments and currency deprecia-
tion, which could drastically magnify the size of payments."597
While the exact formula for determining present-value was not
finalized in London,59 estimates place the total payout that could be
made by the five insurers on the Holocaust-era policies to range
from $1 billion to $4 billion.599 For the first time, the European
insurers, like the Swiss bankers almost a year earlier, agreed to
begin uttering the dreaded "b" word: billion.6 °0
The mathematical implications for this agreement to pay present-
value are enormous: for instance, a World War II-era insurance
policy with a face value of $3,000 could now be worth between
$100,000 to $300,000.601
596. See id.
597. Cowell, supra note 589, at A3.
598. According to the LosAngeles Times: "ChristopherWorthley, a spokesman for Munich-
based Allianz AG, one of the five insurance companies participating in the talks, cautioned
that there is still 'a considerable amount of work [left] to define what 'real value' truly
means.'" Weinstein, supra note 589, at A12.
599. See Cowell, supra note 589, at A3.
600. See Marks & Egan, supra note 400. According to published reports, the five insurers
participating in the negotiations in London declined to be interviewed or issue a statement
after the London round was concluded. Therefore, they could not be questioned about details
of the agreement or the amount of monies they were now willing to pay. See Cowell, supra
note 589, at A3. However, according to one participant (representing the claimants), the
insurers only agreed to recognize the present-value of the policies after Lawrence
Eagleburger, head of the International Commission, threatened to "disclose their attitude to
the press." Id.
601. See Avi Macblis & JohnAuthers, Holocaust Compensation: Talks 'Heading for Crisis',
FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 23, 1999 at 14. The article discusses valuations as follows:
Insurance groups sayvaluations shouldbe based on a policy's original currency.
Jewish groups want to convert policies into a stable currency and apply a
compound rate of interest. A dormant policy valued by insurance companies at
hundreds of current dollars, for example, could be worth nearly Dollars 100,000
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d. Sufficient Proof Lacking to Make Payment
The European insurers made arguments remarkably similar to
those made by the Swiss banks as a basis to deny payment. Like the
Swiss banks, the insurers demanded that the claimants claiming to
be beneficiaries under the policies provide them with death
certificates as proof that the insured had died.6" 2 The insurers
pointed to clauses in the policies requiring this document. °3
Additionally, the insurers demanded that claimants provide the
policies themselves.60 4
according to the latter method.
Id.
In June 1999, Generali offered to pay only three times the face value of the policy. See
ElliWohlgelernter,Eagleburger Commission Sets New July Deadline, JERUSALEM POST, June
25, 1999, at 3A, available in 1999 WL 9004896 (stating that "[Generali]... propos[ed] to
reevaluate policies by a factor of $3 for every $1").
Compare Alex Brummer & Jill Treanor, Holocaust Victims Win Breakthrough Deal
Worth Billions, GUARDIAN (London), May 7,1999, available in 1999WL 16878887 (noting that
"a policy with a face value of Dollars 3,000 could now be worth Dollars 10,000"), with Amanda
Levin, State Dept. against Sanctioning Insurers Over Holocaust Claims, NAT'LUNDERWRITER
LIFE & HEALTH-FIN. SERVICES ED., June 7, 1999, available in 1999 WL 1847248 (noting that
'a policy that was worth $3,000 in the 1930s could be worth $300,000 at present day value").
602. See Shelley Emling, Florida Holocaust Victims Pursue Insurance Claims, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 23, 1997, at B3. That article states:
Erika Brodsky, a resident of Coconut Creek, Fla., whose parents both died in
Auschwitz... visited the offices of Generali [Insurance] in Vienna, Austria in
1960, the insurance company where her father worked as an agent, in the hopes
of getting information on any policies he might have purchased. But she was
met with a cold reception. "They wanted all kinds of documents, which was
absurd," she said, then added. "They didn't hand out death certificates in
Auschwitz."
Id.
Adolph Stern, whose father also purchased an insurance policy from Generali and
later perished in Auschwitz, received a similar reception. See Abrahamson, Searching for
Justice, supra note 512, at 20. "A destitute survivor of the concentration camps, he walked
into a Generali office in Prague in 1945 and tried to collect [on his father's policy]. He says
a Generali agent told him to produce a death certificate. He couldn't, of course, and was
unceremoniously ushered into the street." Id.
603. See Insurers Meet in Israel for Holocaust Talks, supra note 595, at 25. Apparently,
five European insurers that are part of the International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims will no longer insist on this requirement if a claim for payment is made
through the International Commission. See id.; see also discussion and notes infi'a Part IV.C.
(discusising sanctions imposed on insurance companies).
604. See Al Podgorski, Holocaust Survivors Push Claims, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 11, 1997,
at 8. Survivors and their heirs claim that such proof requirements should be suspended. As
explained by one Holocaust survivor: "'Don't forget, when we were liberated from the camps,
we were naked and half dead and we didn't have paperwork like insurance policies.'" Id.




In May 1999, Generali agreed to hand over a CD-ROM containing
100,000 names of prewar policyholders. °5 At the outset of the
litigation, Generali denied that it had records dating to prewar
years, but in 1998 revealed that it had discovered an archive in its
headquarters at Trieste, Italy, containing copies of policies. 606
Generali then computerized the newly-discovered policies and
turned over the computerized files in the CD-ROM format to the
Yad Vashem Holocaust Research Institute in Israel, which con-
tained the most extensive records of Holocaust victims and survivors
in the world. Yad Vashem agreed to match its list with the Generali
list to determine "how many of the [prewar] policyholders were
indeed unpaid Holocaust victims."
607
The other insurers, however, refused to open up their files.608
Winterthur and Basler Lieben, two Swiss insurance companies,
claimed that opening its books to inspection by U.S. regulators
would be regarded as a violation of Swiss law.60 9
Experience shows that publication of lists of policyholders is
critical to discovering unpaid policies, and should be done by the
insurance companies forthwith. For instance, in mid-1999,
Avotaynu, Inc., a publisher of information on Jewish genealogy,
released a list of 29,000 names that included Austrian Jews who
were forced to declare their assets in 1938 upon the unification of
Austria with Nazi Germany. 6 0 The publication of the list led to an
According to another survivor: "'[The insurance companies) asked for documents, but
my family wasn't even allowed to take their driver's licenses with them, so the request is
ludicrous. No one has the right to benefit from the misery of others, and that is just what
these insurance companies are being allowed to do." Emling, supra note 602, at B3 (quoting
James May, 76-year-old Holocaust survivor now residing in Florida).
605. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Key Issues in Resolving Holocaust Claims Linger, WALL ST.
J.-EuR., May 6, 1999, at 23, available in 1999 WL 5514064.
606. See id. at 23.
607. Id. Unfortunately Generali, while agreeing to share the list with YadVashem, did not
agree to make the list public. It agreed only to help those that bring claims. See Henry, supra
note 390, at 1L Therefore, a son or daughter of a Holocaust survivor who suspects that they
may be a beneficiary of an unpaid Generali wartime policy is unable to verify this
information.
608. See NAIC Wants to See the Books of European Insurers, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Feb. 17,
1998, available in 1998 WL 6566337.
609. See id.
610. See Michael Tobias, Database of Unclaimed Swiss Bank Accounts and Other
Holocaust-era Assets (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http'//www.avotaynu.com/HolocaustListt>.
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immediate match between a Holocaust-era policy and an heir to that
policy living in Washington State.61'
e. Claimants Already Received Payment
West Germany paid certain Holocaust victims compensation after
the war.612 The insurance companies maintain such compensation
covered all losses incurred by the victims during the Nazi era,
including loss of insurance benefits.613 Survivors who received
payment from the German state, the insurers argue, have had their




a. Lack of Jurisdiction
In both the federal class action litigation and in the California
state actions, the European insurers have asserted that courts in
the United States lack jurisdiction over them.61 5 The arguments are
identical to those made earlier by the Swiss banks in their
611. See Washington State Insurance CommissionerFindsPolicy throughInternet, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Aug. 14,1999, available in 1999 WL 2654417. The heir in question was only a boy
when his father purchased an insurance policy. See id. The heir "could only remember that
the family had insurance," but did not know the name of the insurance company issuing the
policy. Id. "Washington state insurance commissioner Deborah Senn said the [Avotaynul
database allowed her staff to find the cash value of the insurance policy ... ." Id.
According to Senn, "[u]sing the Internet in this way is a tremendous resource for
families who know that the insurance coverage existed but whose documentation and other
evidence were lost or stripped from them in the Holocaust." Publisher Releases List of
Insurance Policyholders from Holocaust Era, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Aug. 16, 1999, available in
1999 WL 21818286; see also LivingHeirs (visited Nov. 7,1999) <http'//www.LivingHeirs.com>
(providing a link to Avotaynu list and other Holocaust-era property records).
Publication of lists can also lead to unexpected discoveries. For example, after the
Swiss banks published their list of dormant account holders in 1997, U.S. Ambassador to
Switzerland Madeline Kunin, who was born in Switzerland, was surprised to discover her
mother's name on the list of account holders. See Olson, supra note 397, at 7.
612. See Raine, supra note 398, at B1.
613. See id.
614. See id.; Marilyn Henry, International Effort to Tackle Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 16, 2000, at 1.
615. See Stern Defendants' Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities Supporting Motion by




Holocaust-era lawsuits, and revolve around the factual question of
the extent of minimum contacts with the forum possessed by the
defendant.616 In some cases the insurers have prevailed with the
argument of lack ofjurisdiction, while in others they have failed.61
The critical question is how much business has the defendant
insurer conducted in the jurisdiction where it is being sued.1 8
616. See id. Generali argued that:
Generali had no contacts at all with California until nearly 30 years after it
issued the Policy [to its insured Mor Stern in 1929], and even today Generali
has no office or employees in California, it keeps no records here, and it has no
listings in any California telephone directories. Any exercise ofjurisdiction over
Generali based on claims related to an insurance policy issued in Prague to a
Czech national, involving Czech currency, and reserved for with Czech assets,
would violate Generali's rights under the Due Process clause of the 14th
Amendment.
Id. at 1 (footnote omitted).
617. Compare Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 8 (holding by federal court in California
dismissing action against Germany's Victoria Insurance Company due to lack of minimum
contacts with California), with Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376, 1999
WL 167546, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1999) (holding by a California state court denying
the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction by Italy's Generali Insurance Company due to
finding of sufficient contacts with California).
618. In the case against Germany's Victoria Insurance, the federal trial court found a lack
of jurisdiction since Victoria has not:
(1) transacted any business within California; (2) had any agents or
representatives in California to conduct business; (3) solicited any business
within California; (4) had an office within California; (5) conducted any
advertising, solicitation or other activity directed to any person or entity within
California; (6) attempted to develop a national market through any
participation in any entity or association; nor (7) had any accounts, assets,
funds, monies, or property [in] California.
Stahl II Opinion, supra note 463, at 3. Moreover, even though Victoria's parent, Munich Re,
has substantial holdings in the United States, this Court may not properly
assert jurisdiction over a corporate subsidiary on the basis of a corporate
parent's contacts with California in the absence of an alter ego relationship.
... The Plaintiffs have made no showing that the subsidiaries here have acted
in any fashion through the parent, Munich Re, or that the parent has acted as
an alter ego for the subsidiary.
Id. at 3-4. In the case against Italy's Generali, the California state court found that it has
jurisdiction since
Generalihas been admitted to transact insurance business in California
since 1958.... [It] has designated an agent for service of process.... It is also
authorized to do business [in California] as an alien insurer under [California]
Ins[urance] Code § 1580.
... Execution ofthese documents by defendant reflects express consent
to jurisdiction.
Additionally, Generali has brought suit in California courts to assert or
protect its interests. ... Although insurance sold in California represents only
1% of its world-wide business, it has sold insurance resulting in millions of
dollars in premiums paid by California residents-$27 million in 1997 alone.
Stern, 1999 WL 167546, at *1. For additional discussion of both the questions of personal
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens in the Holocaust-era insurance cases, see Gerstel &
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b. Forum Non Conveniens
Like every defendant in Holocaust-era litigation, the European
insurers have argued that even ifjurisdiction exists, the complaints
should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.619 The
difference between the forum non conveniens arguments made by
the Swiss bank defendants and the German and Austrian compa-
nies, on one hand, and the European insurers, on the other, is that
the insurers, in almost all of these cases, are opting to have the
Lewis, supra note 512, at 72.
619. See, e.g., Stern Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting
Motion by Specially Appearing Defendants to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss or Stay, supra
note 519, at 2. The defendants argue:
This case belongs in European courts, not in a California court. All of the
relevant documents are located in Europe, all of the potential witnesses reside
in Europe, all of the substantive issues are governed by European law, most if
not all of the evidence-both documentary and testimonial-will be in languages
other than English, and the potential third-party defendants, whose presence
is required for complete relief, are governmental entities that are immune from
suit here but not in Europe.... Accordingly, to permit this case to proceed in
California would be both inconvenient and prejudicial.
Id.
Part of the forum non conveniens argument is the assertion made by defendants in
all of the Holocaust-litigation cases that if the matter is brought to trial, the court will be
forced to adjudicate difficult issues of foreign law and international law, and also deal with
facts over a half-century old. See, e.g., Stahl 1 Victoria's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 460,
at 17, 20. Attempting to dismiss the case at the pleading stage, the defendants have focused
on this burden, hoping that the court will be unwilling to undertake it. For a typical example
of such an argument, see id. Victoria argues that:
Because the claims in this action will be decided under the substantive
laws of either Germany or Belgium, without dismissal this Court would have
the burden of alternatively serving as a German or as a Belgian judge. The
Court would also have the burden of determining how the laws [of] these
countries changed during the 67-year period from 1931 through 1998, which
will require an understanding of each country's contract and insurance laws,
as well as laws on the nationalization of insurance companies, restitution for
confiscated insurance policies, and corresponding release of issuing insurance
companies. History records changes in governments in Germany from the
Weimar Republic when the one known policy was issued, through the era of the
Third Reich... through occupied post-World War II Germany, until the present
Federal Republic of Germany. Belgium underwent similar but less drastic
changes in governments and legal systems during this 67-year period.
[Applying foreign law here] would create a monumental burden for both
the Court and the parties that could easily be avoided by litigating plaintiffs'
claims in the European forums familiar with the languages and controlling
substantive laws. The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, other circuits, and
this Court have held that "the need to apply foreign law favors dismissal."
Id. (citations omitted).
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claims decided in the new and fragile legal systems of the post-
Communist nations of Eastern Europe.62 ° The defendants in the
other Holocaust-era lawsuits are seeking, or sought, alternative
adjudication in the developed legal systems of Western Europe.
Faced with a decision about whether to dismiss the lawsuit in the
United States in favor of litigation in Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic... or even Yugoslavia, a court in the United States is
unlikely to accept the forum non conveniens argument, especially
when the claimants are elderly Holocaust survivors residing in the
United States.622
620. But see Stahl II Victoria's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 460 at 1, 25. That motion
states:
[Tihe action should be dismissed on the separate and independent ground of
forum non conveniens, because either Belgium (where one insurance policy was
issued) or Germany (where defendant [Victoria] conducted business) is clearly
a more convenient forum to adjudicate all of plaintiffs' claims.
• [T]hese two countries, whichever one plaintiffs choose, have full,
efficient, speedy, meaningful, and impartial legal systems, procedures, and
remedies. In other words, dismissing this case will not deprive plaintiffs of a
legal tribunal for their claims.... The European jurisdictions whose laws
govern this case have modern, full, and hospitable judicial systems with
adequate civil procedures and due process which can efficiently and completely
adjudicate plaintiffs' claims far better than can a California-based court.
Id. at 1, 25.
621. See Declaration of Jaroslav Sodomka 1 4-6, 26, at 2, 7, Stern v. Assicurazioni
Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Stern
Declaration of Jaroslav Sodomka] (defendants' expert on Czech law). Sodomka asserts the
following-
The Czech Republic is committed to the rule of law by its Constitution.
The civil judicial system in the Czech Republic is typical of other
countries in Europe, providing appropriate procedures and protections to
plaintiffs in civil matters. In the Czech Republic, an aggrieved party with a
claim against an insurance company may seek relief through the courts....
Insurance cases normally take approximately one or two years to litigate in the
Czech courts.
. . . The Czech judiciary operates independently of political and
commercial influence.
Based upon my review of the Complaint, it is my opinion that Czech
courts would recognize the subject matter of the plaintiffs' claims.
Id.
622. The European insurers have argued that if the courts of the Eastern European
countries are not acceptable fora for adjudication of these suits then, at the least, the courts
of the countries where these insurers are headquartered are acceptable alternative fora. See,
e.g., Stern Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities Supporting Motion by
Specially Appearing Defendants to Quash Summons and/or Dismiss or Stay, supra note 519,
at 12-13 (arguing that "courts in either the Czech Republic or Italy are well equipped to
resolve disputes of the kind alleged in the Complaint") (emphasis added). Basically, the
strategy of the defendants is to have the case tried anywhere in the world except the United
States, for fear of U.S.-style litigation. For discussion of preference by plaintiffs and dislike
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c. Choice-of-Forum Clause
Some of the prewar insurance policies being litigated contain a
choice-of-forum clause, stating that the forum for resolving any
dispute between the parties would be in the European country
where the policy was issued.623 Generally, modern law holds that in
the absence of grave injustice, international forum-selection
agreements should be upheld.62 4 At least one court, however, has
held that the forum-selection clauses found in prewar policies
written in Eastern Europe are not enforceable.62
by defendants of litigation in the United States, see discussion and notes supra Part III.A.2.
623. See Stern Declaration of Jaroslav Sodomka, supra note 621, 1 35, at 10. For instance,
in Stern v. Generali, the Generali policies issued in prewar Czechoslovakia contained a clause
that tracked a provision of the then-applicable Czech Insurance Code, specifying Czech courts
as the exclusive forum for actions against Generali. See id. In the Stern case, the applicable
forum-selection clause in the insurance policy purchased by Mor Stern from Generali in April
1929 read: "Any lawsuit under the insurance contract brought against the Company shall be
settled before the competent Court in Prague." Id.
In addition, the applicable provision of the Czech law stated: "The court having
jurisdiction of legal actions against an insurer which are based on an insurance relationship
is the court in whose district the branch of the insurance company which concluded the
contract is located.'" Id. 34, at 10 (quoting Art. 12 of Czechoslovakian Insurance Contract
Law No. 501 (Dec. 23, 1917), and Art. 12 of Law No. 145 (July 3, 1934)).
In Stahl v. Victoria, the Victoria policy issued in Belgium in 1933 read: "The company
and the policyholder each chose Belgium as their domicile. Accordingly, for any disputes that
may arise from this contract, the courts of Belgium shall have sole competence." Stahl II
Declaration of Gert Schlosser, supra note 452, 8, at 28 (quoting the Victoria policy issued
to Stahl).
624. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972). For discussion of
contemporary approaches to the enforceability of international forum-selection clauses, see
BORN, supra note 12, at 378-94.
625. See Tentative Rulings, Babos v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. at 2-3, No. BC 188680
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 28, 1999). The ruling, which became the court's trial ruling, states:
Here, the public policy of the State of California with respect to the precise type
of litigation under scrutiny could not have been more explicitly stated [referring
to California's Holocaust Victims Insurance Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
354.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1999)].... To compel California residents to attempt
to litigate these cases in foreign tribunals, (where there is no assurance they
could proceed because of statute-of-limitations bars) would utterly defeat that
public policy interest.
Id. It is unclear whether forum-selection clauses will be enforced in fora other than
California, since California's HVIA specifically holds that a forum-selection clause in these
policies does not control. See Cal. CIv. PROC. CODE § 354.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1999).
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C. The Power of Sanctions: The International Commission on
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
The European insurance companies, in response to the lawsuits,
began to follow the game plan invented by the Swiss banks during
their struggle with the Holocaust-era claims.
The insurance companies realized that a useful weapon utilized
by the Swiss in the litigation filed against them was the creation of
a commission headed by a prominent American politician or
diplomat (preferably Jewish) who could propose a settlement less
costly than compromises or judgments reached in U.S. courts and
make arguments either to delay the court process or plead for
dismissal of the lawsuits altogether.626
626. See Abrahamson, Searching For Justice, supra note 512, at 35. Another useful Swiss
invention, copied by many companies being sued by Holocaust survivors, is to hire Jewish
lawyers from some of the most prominent law firms in the United States to defend them-
preferably counsel with important connections to the organized Jewish community. See id.
For instance, in the Stern v. Generali litigation in California, Italy's Generali
dismissed its original counsel, Coudert Brothers, after losing the motion to dismiss and
hired a new lawyer-Kenneth J. Bialkin, a partner at the powerhouse New York
firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. During his lengthy career,
Bialkin has also led several prominent Jewish institutions, among them the
Anti-Defamation League. "In part," Bialkin says, 'Tminitto see ifwe can bring
it to closure, and everybody gets out of it in a dignified way."
Id. Countered William Shernoff, a lead plaintiffs' counsel in the Stern case,
I just think there's something wrong here, that these pillars of the Jewish
community-type ofpeople, well-connected, well-respected, are takingmoney [in
legal fees] from this insurance company to try to beat down and destroy the
claims of these survivors. What the hell am I missing here?
Id. (alteration in original). The Jerusalem Post quotes an unnamed member of the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, obviously representing the
Holocaust claimants and referring to Bialkin, as follows:
"I feel he's using years of service to the Jewish community to now
perform a great disservice to Holocaust survivors. A Jewish lawyer can be a
Jewish lawyer for anyone, but someone who calls himself a Jewish leader...
has no business trying to defend the position of those who did not pay Holocaust
victims. Period."
Elli Wohigelernter, Lawyers and the Holocaust, JERUSALEM POST, July 2, 1999, at 4B,
available in 1999 WL 9005172 (quoting a member of the International Commission on
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims). Counters Bialkin:
Tm doing what I think is right, I'm going to try to perform it honorably, I think
in the end it will be viewed as a service to the Jewish people, but I recognize
that it can blow up in my face.... I'm a big boy, I did what I thought was
appropriate... and I'm prepared to be judged by my peers."
Id. (quoting Bialkin). For an excellent discussion of the ethical and moral concerns faced by
law firms and individual lawyers in representing companies who have been sued by Holocaust
survivors, see David Segal, Past vs. Future:Nazi-Related Suits Put Law Firms on Defensive,
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For example, the Swiss created and funded the so-called Interna-
tional Committee of Eminent Persons ("ICEP"), headed by Paul
Volcker, the distinguished former head of the Federal Reserve
Board.
The European insurance companies' version of the Volcker-style
ICEP is the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims, led by a sufficiently-heady American, former Secretary of
State and long-time diplomat Lawrence Eagleburger.627
Moreover, like in the Swiss banks scenario, state officials had a
powerful tool they could use to pressure the insurance companies to
come to the bargaining table. Insurance is regulated state-by-state,
and the individual state insurance commissioners could threaten the
European insurance companies with expulsion from their states if
the companies refused to negotiate a settlement.628 It is no surprise,
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1999, at El, available in 1999 WL 2204215.
627. See John Authers & William Hall, Committee on Holocaust Claims Convenes to
Appoint a Chairman, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20854326.
One of the insurance companies that agreed to participate in the International Commission,
Zurich Insurance Group of Switzerland, went one step further by virtually copying the Swiss
banks' ICEP concept. In advertisements placed in major newspapers throughout the United
States, entitled "A Message from Zurich Insurance to Holocaust Survivors and Heirs," Zurich
explained:
Zurich Insurance Group remains committed to thoroughly investigate and
evaluate all inquiries on life insurance policies from the World War II era and
to honor all justified claims. Zurich believes that it has in place a just,
compassionate and equitable process for addressing claims of Holocaust
survivors and heirs of Holocaust victims.
To further underline its commitment, Zurich has also formed an
independent four-person International Commission of Eminent Persons. Its
members are: John C. Whitehead, former Deputy Secretary of State during the
Reagan Administration and currently Chairman of the Board of the
International Rescue Committee; Rabbi Arthur Schneier, President of the
Appeal of Conscience Foundation and Senior Rabbi of New York City's Park
East Synagogue; Margrith Bigler-Eggenberger, former Justice of the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court, and Gyorgy Suranyi, President of the National Bank
of Hungary. The Commission has been set up to review and help resolve
Holocaust-related life insurance cases submitted to the company.
A Message from Zurich Insurance to Holocaust Survivors and Heirs, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1998
(advertisement). The Commission's Web site is <http://www.ICHEIC.org>.
628. See Probe into Insurance Pay-Outs, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 1997, at 5.
"Insurance is regulated on a state by state basis in the U.S., and European insurers need a
license from the commissioner before they can trade in a state. [Florida Insurance
Commissioner Bill Nelson] said: 'Many of these European companies now have operations in
the United States. That's our hook.'" Id.
An interesting question-beyond the purview of this article-is whether the expulsion
of a foreign insurance carrier from a state for failure to honor Holocaust-era claims is
constitutional. For a related discussion on this point, see text and notes supra Part HI.C.3.,
discussing the constitutionality of the use of economic sanctions by state and local
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therefore, that the six insurance companies that agreed to partici-
pate in the International Commission process all sold insurance in
the United States, and that one of the six companies, Switzerland's
Basler Leben, brazenly withdrew from the Commission process soon
after it stopped selling insurance and closed shop in the United
States.629
The International Commission is composed of thirteen members:
six representing the insurers and European insurance regulators,63 °
six representing various Jewish groups631 and the State of Israel, 632
and a chairperson. 3 Originally, six insurance companies, represent
governments for political purposes, and the First Circuit decision in National Foreign Trade
Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d. 38,77(1st Cir. 1999) cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (Nov. 29,1999)
(declaring the Massachusetts Burma Law, imposing restrictions by Massachusetts on doing
business in Burma, unconstitutional).
629. See Letter from Bruno Dallo, General Counsel of Basler-Lebens-Versicherungs-
Gesellschaft, to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Chairman, The International Commission on
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (Jan. 11, 1999) (on file with author). That letter provides:
No longer with U.S. affiliates, and no longer subject to regulatory
sanctions-that is, absent the duress that forced Basler Leben to sign the MoU
in the first place-[Basler Leben] cannot put itself at the risk "consensus"
achieved by others, including carriers who still functionwithin the Commission,
in fear of regulatory sanctions, public reprisals and onerous legislative
requirements.
Id. (emphasis added).
630. See European InsurersAgree to HolocaustSettlement, BEST'SINs.NEWS, May 7,1999,
available in 1999 WL 5826620. The five insurance companies originally agreeing to
participate in the Commission were: France's AXA; Germany's Alianz; Switzerland's
Winterthur Leben (Life) (owned by Credit Suisse Bank), Zurich, and Basler Leben (also
known as Baloise Life).
Italy's Generali joined the Commission after its $100 million settlement unraveled,
see infra notes 638-39 and accompanying text, and Basler Leben withdrew from the
Commission after it stopped selling insurance in the United States. See supra note 629 and
accompanying text. "The insurers that have agreed to take part in the commission all conduct
business in the United States." Levin, supra note 512, at 1.
631. See European Insurers Agree to Holocaust Settlement, supra note 630.
632. See Insurers Meet in Israel for Holocaust Talks, supra note 595, at 25. The Jewish
representatives are composed of representatives of the Israeli government, the World Jewish
Restitution Organization, and the Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany
("Claims Conference"). See id.
633. A potential problem with the International Commission is that the attorneys
representing both the individual and class action plaintiffs have been left out of the
Commission process. See, e.g., Battle Brews on Insurance Pact, FORWARD, Aug. 28, 1998, at
3, available in 1998 WL 11416497. According to plaintiffs' attorney Edward Fagan:
'The [National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC")] is putting
politics ahead of claimants' rights .... The memorandum of understanding does
not allow for survivor claimants to have parity or a voice in the process. The
document... doesn't promise money, it doesn't promise time frames, it doesn't
give survivors a say. But it does make a lot of insurance commissioners big-
time political stars."
Id. (quoting Edward Fagan). Another plaintiffs' lawyer, Linda Gerstel, "called the insurance
20001
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ing twenty-five to thirty percent of the prewar European insurance
market, agreed to participate in the International Commission.63 4
Basler Leben's withdrawal in January 1999 from the Interna-
tional Commission63 left only five companies participating. To date,
the five insurance carriers have been unsuccessful in convincing the
other European companies sued to join the nonadversarial Interna-
tional Commission process.
636
The International Commission process began in August 1998
when the selected insurance companies signed a so-called Memoran-
commissioners' process 'a bureaucratic-laden process that repeats a lot of the mistakes of the
Volcker Commission.'" Id. Added Gerstel: "'Ve don't withdraw the lawsuits.'" European
Insurance Firms Make Deal, Holocaust Survivors Won't Drop Suits, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Aug.
26,1998, available in 1998 WL 16585768. Countered Elan Steinberg, of the World Jewish
Congress:
"Maybe the lawyers are upset because we have said that we will tell the court
that we think this money should not go to lawyers. Whether it's insurance
claims or bank accounts, most of these assets are without identifiable heirs.
That belongs to the Jewish people and Holocaust survivors. We do not want
one group of Holocaust survivors to have a superior claim over others."
Battle Brews on Insurance Pact, supra, at 3 (quoting Elan Steinberg).
Time will tell whether keeping the lawyers out was a wise move.
Legally, the International Commission has no effect on the ongoing lawsuits against
the European insurance companies. Practically, however, the work of the International
Commission invariably will have a significant impact upon the fate of the lawsuits. To date,
Lawrence Eagleburger, unlike Paul Volcker in the Swiss bank litigation, has not intervened
in any of the insurance litigation. If and when he does, undoubtedly the judges presiding over
various insurance suits will carefully listen to his views.
634. See Carole Landry, 44 Countries Pledge To Return Holocaust-eraAssets, AGENCEFR.-
PRESSE, Dec. 3,1998, available in 1998 WL 16652355. But see Norman Kempster, 44 Nations
Set Guidelines for Retrieving Nazi Loot, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1998, at A8 (stating that 25% of
the prewar European insurance market will participate); Immunity Sought for WWII
Insurers, AP ONLrNE, May 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17805700 (stating that 30% of the
prewar insurance market will participate, citing Stuart Eizenstat, the Clinton
Administration's "point man" on Holocaust reparation issues); Insurers Meet in Israel for
Holocaust Talks, supra note 595, at 25 (stating that 35-40% of prewar insurance market will
participate).
635. Basler Leben withdrew because, subsequent to its entry, it left the U.S. insurance
market. No longer having any affiliates in the United States, it was no longer subject to
pressure by the state insurance regulators. Without this leverage, the NAIC could no longer
convince Basler Leben to negotiate with them. See Letter from Bruno Dallo, General Counsel
of Basler Leben, to International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (Jan. 14,
1999) (on file with author) (withdrawing from the International Commission and canceling
its agreement to the Memorandum of Understanding). Surprisingly, even though it withdrew
from the International Commission process, Basler Leben still stood by its previous
commitment to pay $5 million to a fund set up by the International Commission and
contribute an additional $600,000 to the Commission's operating budget. See id. at 1.
636. At a December 1998 Holocaust conference in Washington, D.C., for 44 nations,
"Hungary and the Czech Republic said companies in their countries will also participate [in




dum of Understanding ('"MOU") with the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC). 637
That same month, and exactly one week after the Swiss bank
settlement, Generali announced that it had settled with plaintiffs'
lawyers the claims against it for $100 million.638 However, the
settlement rapidly unraveled, since Generali wanted the $100
million to be its maximum payout, while the claimants' representa-
637. The NAIC is an organization composed of the primary insurance regulator of every
state and territory of the United States. The NAIC formally became involved with Holocaust
Era Insurance Claims in September 1997, six months after the first insurance lawsuit was
filed in the United States, when it created the NAIC Working Group on Holocaust and
Insurance Issues. The 21-state Working Group was headed by Deborah Senn, Washington
State Insurance Commissioner. See The Pursuit of Justice, WASH. STATE INS. COMM. REP.,
Feb. 11, 1998, at 1-2 (on file with author).
From September 1997 to February 1998, the Working Group held six public hearings
throughout the United States. See Life Insurance and the Holocaust, supra note 375, at 81-82.
The Insurance Forum published this report as a "Special Holocaust Issue"; it contains an
excellent discussion of the issues, including statements from both claimants and
representatives of the some of the insurance companies involved. See id.
In April 1998, the NAIC established a nine-member Holocaust Task Force, chaired
by Glenn Pomeroy, Insurance Commissioner of North Dakota and NAIC's president. See id.
at 83 (subsuming the Working Group).
That same month, the insurance commissioners from New York and California (Neil
Levin and Chuck Quackenbush, respectively), and later joined by the insurance commissioner
from Florida (William Nelson), the states with the largest Jewish populations, directly
approached four European insurance companies (Allianz of Germany, AXA/UAP of France,
Generali of Italy, and Zurich of Switzerland) and signed a nonbinding Memorandum of Intent
("MOI) to resolve the insurance issues. See Memorandum of Intent (Apr. 4,1998) (on file with
author); see also Henry Weinstein, Creation of Holocaust Insurance Panel OKd, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1998, at A3. Two Jewish organizations, the World Jewish Congress and the Claims
Conference, also signed the MOI. See id. One of the goals of the MOI was the creation of an
international commission to settle the Holocaust-era insurance claims through a
nonadversarial process, an idea credited to former Senator Alfonse D'Amato. See id. The
preliminary MOI led to the signing of a more formal Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU") in August 1998, and the creation of the International Commission. See
Memorandum of Understanding (Aug. 24, 1998) (on file with author).
In October 1998, Lawrence Eagleburger was chosen to head the International
Commission. See John M. Goshko, Holocaust Panel Tries to Enlist Eagleburger as Chairman,
WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1998, at A33. The three commissioners from New York, California, and
Florida have taken the lead in representing the NAIC at the International Commission
negotiation sessions. See id.
638. See Goshko, supra note 393, at A3. The settlement was coordinated by former
SenatorAlfonse D'Amato. See id. Originally, itwas reported that the settlement wouldbe $65
million. See Henry, supra note 581, at 1.
Apparently, the $100 million figure was agreed on because that was "the amount
[Generali] received in settlement from the communists for seizing Generali assets." Gersten,
supra note 372, at 7.
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tives viewed this amount as a "floor," with additional payments to
be made by Generali in the future.63 9
With settlement abandoned, Generali, originally not one of the
parties signing the MOU, signed the document and joined the
International Commission.640
In November 1998, the European insurers who were original
members of the International Commission made their initial
contribution: $90 million to a humanitarian fund for Holocaust
victims and an additional $5 million "preliminary start-up fund [for
the Commission] to hire staff and open offices in London and
Washington."64'
639. See John Authers & Avi Machlis, Generali's $100M Offer Unlikely to be Enough, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 21, 1998, at 4, available in 1998 WL 12260412. For instance, Deborah
Senn, Washington State Insurance Commissioner, asserted that "claims on Generali's
insurance policies belonging to Holocaust survivors and heirs could 'easily be within the
billion dollar range or more." Id.
640. See European Insurance Firms Make Deal, Holocaust Survivors Won't Drop Suits,
supra note 633.
641. Amanda Levin, Holocaust Insurance Gains Momentum, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE &
HEALTH FIN. SERVICES ED., Dec. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20199645.
Curiously, Baslen Leben, which withdrew from the International Commission in
January 1999, nevertheless still agreed to contribute $5 million towards the $90 million fird
and to pay $600,000 of the Commission's first annual administrative budget. See Letter from
Bruno Dallo, General Counsel ofBasler-Leben-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, to Signers of the
MOU and to the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Members, Alternatives and Observers of the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (Jan. 14, 1999) (on file with
author) (announcing Basler Lieben's resignation from the Commission). Basler Leben balked
at contributing $15 million, or one-sixth of the total amount that Lawrence Eagleburger
suggested should be paid by each of the six insurers. See id.
Stuart Eizenstat, the Clinton Administration's "point-man" on Holocaust restitution
issues, praised the establishment of the fund and stated that under the Commission plan, all
of the $90 million or more would go to needy victims. "If the cases are adjudicated in the
courts, he said, the cost for lawyers, auditors and others would far exceed $90 million."
Kempster, supra note 634, at 48.
To date, it is still open to debate whether Eizenstat's assessment is correct. The
commission route has not shown, to date, to be more successful than the litigation process.
In fact, litigation, so far, has yielded much greater and more expeditious results than the
commission process. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A.2.b. (discussing the California lawsuits against
Generali and their successful settlements). Looking at the Volcker Commission precedent,
the Volcker Commission, for instance, has taken too long and has failed even to meet its own
deadline. The costs of the Volcker Commission have also been high. It might be questioned,
therefore, whether Eagleburger, the former top diplomat, can do better than Volcker, the
former top banker. Already, one can ask why the International Commission requires an
initial operating budget of $5 million. The amount appears unnecessarily large. See Rebecca
Spence, Holocaust Insurance Team Racking up Millions in Expenses as Survivors Wait,
FORWARD, July 30,1999, reprinted in <http://www.forward.com/BACK/1999/99.07.30/news>.
By the time the Commission finishes its work, its expenditures are expected to be much
higher than $5 million.
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Monthly meetings of the International Commission were held in
1999, in Washington, D.C., London, and Jerusalem.642 At these
meetings, Chairman Eagleburger was successful in moving forward
the negotiations between the five insurers on the one side, and the
consortium of state insurance commissioners, Jewish organizations,
and Israel on the other.
At the May meeting in London, the Commission achieved a
significant breakthrough 3 when the insurers agreed to abandon
642. See id.
643. According to published reports, prior to the May 1999 meeting in London, the
International Commission's work was stalled. See Avi Machlis & John Authers, Jewish
Groups Warn of Holocaust Dead Crisis, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 23, 1999, at 3. The article
states: "The commission is in deadlock after four months of talks. Little progress has been
made on issues including the valuation of policies, the allowance to be made for inflation and
the problem of dealing with claims against companies nationalized by east European
communist governments after the war." Id. Elan Steinberg, representing the World Jewish
Congress at the Commission, commented: "'he meeting on May 6 [in London] is a critical
moment. At that point we will be able to see whether this experiment will work or not. Flesh
and blood claimants will have to know that there's an independent process by which their
claims can be fairly determined.'" Id.
On April 30, 1999, on the eve of the London meeting, an important and widely-
publicized press conference was held at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. See,
e.g., Jean-Loup Sense, California Targets Insurers Not Settling with Holocaust Victims,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2593992; Henry Weinstein, Davis
Presses Insurers on Holocaust, L-A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1999, at A3; Wohlgelernter & Tugend,
supra note 373.
At the conference, a bipartisan group of California officials that included California
Governor Gray Davis and California Insurance Commissioner Chuck Quackenbush, issued
a stern warning to the European insurers. See Sense, supra. Governor Davis announced: "We
come to send a message [to the insurance companies]. You can pay now or we guarantee you
will pay more later.'" Sense, supra. Commissioner Quackenbush stated: "There is a limit to
our patience. When they feel the heat, they will see the light.'" Wohlgelernter & Tugend,
supra note 373. Concurrently, the California Department of Insurance began running full-
page ads, including ads in the London newspapers where the Commission meeting was to be
held, chastising the insurance companies.
Under a bold headline of 'Time Is Running Out" the ad began as follows:
For sixty years, insurance companies have profited by not paying on insurance
policies issued to Jews and others who were murdered by the Nazis during the
Holocaust. The average age of survivor is 80 years old. Meanwhile, the
average Californian only lives to age 74. Every year, thousands of survivors
pass away. If these people are to achieve any measure of justice from the
companies that took advantage of them, it must occur now.
Cal. Dep't Ins., Time is Running Out, May 1999 (advertisement run by the California
Department of Insurance). A second ad was even harsher. It began:
THE INS URANCE COMPANIES.After the Holocaust, they broke their promise.
[Here a large graphic of the word "promises" broken in half]. They lied. They
said, "Give us a little money each week and if something bad happens to you
we'll take care of your family." Well something bad happened. Something really
bad, and the insurance companies didn't live up to their end of the bargain. And
they still haven't.
Cal. Dep't Ins., The Insurance Companies, May 1999 (second advertisement run by the
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their two most potent arguments: (1) that they need not pay because
their offices were nationalized by the postwar Communist govern-
ments, and (2) that the values of their unpaid prewar-issued policies
were now negligible.6  Rather, the companies agreed to a "formula
that reflects present-day values... [which] could result in billions
of dollars in payments."645
In the wake of progress made in London, then-Undersecretary of
State Stuart Eizenstat (now Deputy Secretary of the Treasury)
urged insurance commissioners to place a moratorium on sanctions
or threat of sanctions against the five insurers that are part of the
International Commission.646
California Department of Insurance). Both ads then provide information about the efforts of
the California Department of Insurance in obtaining payment on Holocaust-era insurance
policies. Both ads conclude with the following statements: "It's about restitution, it's about
justice and its about time. Haven't they been waiting long enough?" Time is Running Out,
supra; The Insurance Companies, supra.
The strategy worked and the London meeting provided a breakthrough in
negotiations.
644. See Weinstein, supra note 589, at A12; see also Cowell, supra note 589, at A3.
645. Cowell, supra note 589, atA3; see also Brummer &Treanor, supra note 601. Applying
"present day" or "real" value, "a policy that was worth $3,000 in the 1930s could be worth
$300,000 at present day value." Levin, supra note 512. A spokesperson for Allianz, however,
stated that "there remains 'a considerable amount of work to define what 'real value' truly
means.'" Ron Lent, Real Value to be Paid on Nazi Era Claims, J. OF COM., May 11, 1999, at
12A, available in 1999 WL 6377295.
The Israeli delegate to the talks assessed the May London meeting as follows: "We
have made a step forwards but we have not reached our destination yet." John Mason & John
Authers, Holocaust Era Insurance Deal Reached, FIN. TIMES (London), May 7, 1999, at 3.
646. See Levin, supra note 512. According to Eizenstat, the Clinton Administration's top
official on Holocaust reparation issues:
"In light of the commission's recent breakthroughs, sanctions against
companies participating in the commission would gravely undermine the
commission's work .... We appeal very strongly to the insurance commissioners
of all 50 states to recognize the importance of a safe harbor for all those
insurers who are actively working within the commission .... [Slanctions would
be counterproductive and not justified, given the progress that the
International Commission has now made.... [I]mposing sanctions would be
detrimental to keeping those already in the commission working in a
cooperative way."
Id. (quoting Stuart Eizenstat).
Eizenstat did acknowledge that "'[t]here's more to be done.'" Id. He also expressed
a preference for the commission process over litigation in the United States: "'Litigation
would take years, if not decades to be completed." Id. He added, "'We believe the commission
is the best vehicle for resolving Holocaust Era Insurance Claims because it brings together
many of the interested parties in a cooperative, nonconfrontational process." Immunity
Sought for WWII Insurers, supra note 634.
It is noteworthy that, in the Swiss bank litigation, Eizenstat also urged state (and
local) officials not to impose sanctions. See discussion and notes supra Part lII.C.3.
(discussing sanctions in the Swiss bank litigation). His advice was not followed, and the
Swiss banks, rather than withdrawing from the talks in response to threats of sanctions (as
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Unfortunately, no final agreements were reached at the June 1999
meeting in Jerusalem, even though Eagleburger had earlier prom-
ised that payments to survivors would begin soon after the Commis-
Eizenstat feared), capitulated, and more than doubled their settlement offer. See id.
In a letter to Eizenstat, California state Senator Tom Hayden specifically referred to
these events, pointing to them as a guide on how to best deal with the European insurers:
As a concrete example, last year in a phone conference with approximately 17
Jewish leaders over the Swiss bank settlement, you counseled a settlement
which was significantly lower than the final one. I was very aware of this
consultation because, at the time, I had introduced legislation calling for a one-
year moratorium on California pension investments in Swiss firms. In the end,
as a result of the legislative pressure and that of survivor representatives, the
final settlement was significantly greater than what you had proposed
originally. I
Letter from California state Senator Toni Hayden to Stuart Eizenstat, Undersecretary of
State (June 3, 1999) (on file with author).
Of the New York-California-Florida troika of insurance commissioners at the talks,
the New York and California insurance commissioners, the two most powerful with the
largest constituency of Holocaust survivors, declined to comment on Eizenstat's suggestion.
Florida Insurance Commissioner Bill Nelson publicly signaled his agreement with Eizenstat:
"[N]ow would not be a good time to impose sanctions. The International Commission made
a lot of progress over this past year and it had a major breakthrough [at the May London
meeting]. Commissioner Nelson is prepared to take strong actions if he feels the process is
no longer moving forward." Id. (statement of Dan McLaughlin, Nelson's press secretary).
Two California legislators, both authors of important California legislation dealing
with Holocaust Era Insurance Claims, spoke out against Eizenstat's suggestion of "going
easy" on those insurers who are participating in the commission process. California state
Senator Tom Hayden stated:
U.S. Undersecretary of State Stuart Eizenstat recently opposed state action on
behalf of Holocaust survivors .... That strategy has failed to produce results for
survivors for 50 years. There has been more progress than ever before in the
past three years since states like California embarked on a strategy of
legislation, regulation and litigation. Only when these [insurance] firms see
that their niche in the California market is threatened will they settle these
historic claims.
Hayden Criticizes U.S. State Department for Attempted Weakening of California Holocaust
Legislation, Press Release (June 3,1999) (on file with author). California Assemblyman Wally
Knox specifically criticized the International Commission procedure:
After months of deliberations, the commission's proceedings have not resulted
in a payment ofa single claim. The industry's involvement with the commission
is entirely voluntary, and there is no mechanism to enforce its decisions....
The insurers' game plan is obvious-delay until the claimants, many of whom
are elderly, die or give up. In the meantime, make a pretense of cooperating
with the commission, without making real concessions. The antipode to this
strategy is to exert the unparalleled economic leverage of California state
government over the recalcitrant insurers desiring to do business in our
lucrative market. It is the right thing to do and could be the catalyst for more
meaningful progress at the international commission.
Wally Knox, Insurers Should Disclose Holocaust Policyholders, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1999, at
B17.
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sion's May 1999 meeting.647 Eagleburger then set his own deadline:
At the time of the next meeting of the Commission, on July 21-22,
1999, in Washington, D.C., all outstanding issues would be
settled.6 41
The July 1999 meeting ended without an agreement.649 As a
result, in August 1999, Eagleburger, announced his first directive:
The European insurers would have to pay approximately ten times
the face-value of the policies they issued.65 °
As of January 2000 it remains unclear whether the European
insurers, forced to abide by Eagleburger's directives, will continue
to work with the Commission. It is also possible that Eagleburger
might resign from the Commission if his directives are not followed.
647. See Machlis & Authers, supra note 601. "I hope we can start the payment of claims
shortly after the May meeting.'" Id. at 3 (quoting Eagleberger's statement regarding
payments).
648. See Wohlgelernter, supra note 601, at 3A. "Eagleburger said he will personally resolve
any disputes among the commission members that are outstanding by that date. 'You can
throw me out if you don't agree,' one source quoted him as saying." Id. By June 1999,
Generali Insurance still had not agreed to release to the public the list of 100,000 names of
outstanding policies.
Michael Kleiner, an Israeli parliamentarian who headed an Israeli government
committee on Holocaust-era insurance, urged Eagleburger to immediately release, and post
on the Internet, the names of the 100,000 unpaid Generali policyholders from the prewar era.
He stated:
"I told him if he really wants to have a breakthrough in Jerusalem, he must
force an immediate release on the Internet of the list of 100,000 names
presented by Generali in May [1999]. People are not coming forward because
they don't have evidence; they don't know if they have a policy. They are
neither approaching the Israeli committee nor the American committee."
Wohlgelernter, supra note 395, at 5 (quoting Michael Kleiner).
Eagleburger did not follow this suggestion. Rather, at the June 1999 meeting in
Jerusalem, the Commission was only authorized to provide funding to the Yad Vashem
Holocaust Center in Israel to match its list of Holocaust victims with the 100,000 names on
the CD-ROM given by Generali to Yad Vashem in May 1999.
649. See Amanda Levin, Panel Head Ends Negotiations, NAT'L UNDERWRITER LIFE &
HEALTH FIN. SERVS. ED., Aug. 9, 1999.
650. This multiplier is a rough approximation, and does not include a discount for World
War II currency devaluations and other adjustments. The actual payout may be substantially
less than the 10X multiplier. See Robert S. Greenberger, Holocaust Settlement May Be Near,
WALL ST. J.-EuR., Aug. 4, 1999, at 13, available in 1999 WL 18410725; Barry Schweid,
Eagleburger Panel Reaches Formula forInsurance Payback, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 10, 1999,
at 4, available in 1999 WL 9006899.
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If Eagleburger resigns, the entire Commission process might be
abandoned.651
In February 2000, the Commission, after numerous delays,
announced that it would finally begin a claims program 2 akin to
the programs set up in the Swiss banks and Austrian banks
settlements. However, even while announcing the start of the
Commission's claims process, "Eagleburger said he didn't know how
many people have such claims or how much they're owed .... 65 3
651. See Vanessa Furhmans,Delays Snag Claims Process on Holocaust, WALLST. J.-EUR.,
Sept. 23,1999, at3, available in 1999 WL-WSJE 27639662; Amanda Levin, HolocaustRuling
Draws Fire, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BEN. MGM'T., Aug. 16, 1999, at
1, available in 1999 WL 8859976.
652. See Pauline Jelinek, Insurance Claims BeingAccepted from Holocaust Survivors, AP
ONIUNE, Feb. 15, 2000, available in 2000 WL Associated Press Newswires Database.
653. Id. To determine the number of claimants, the International Commission began
placing ads in newspapers that same month soliciting claimants to submit their names to the
Commission. The initial ad, which appeared on February 20, 2000, was well done. It
contained the headline Suppose Your Family Had a Holocaust Bra Insurance Policy and You
Just Didn't Know aboutlt? Appearingbelow the headline banner was a prewar-framed-family
photo of parents and an infant child. The text below the aged photograph read:
If you are a Holocaust survivor, you may have a legitimate unpaid Holocaust
era life, education or dowry insurance claim and the opportunity exists for you
to receive payment. You can file claims through a new Claims Resolution
Process set up by the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims.
The Commission consists of representatives of United States insurance
regulators, five European insurance companies and their subsidiaries, the State
of Israel, worldwide Jewish and Holocaust survivor organizations andEuropean
regulators as observers.
The unique Claims Resolution process provides individuals with a
central source for information on, investigation into, and payment of those
outstanding policies, without any charge to the claimant.
Suppose YourFamily Had a HolocaustEra Insurance Policy and You JustDidn'tKnowAbout
It?, L.A. TImES, Feb. 20, 2000, atA34 (advertisement). The ad then provides the International
Commission Web site and telephone number, and a simple form to be mailed in to obtain
further information. See id.

V. STOLEN ART CLAIMS
The Nazis stole an estimated 220,000 pieces of art from both
museums and private collections throughout Europe.654 It took
29,984 railroad cars, according to records from the Nuremberg
trials, to transport all the Nazi-stolen art back to Germany.655
The value of this plundered art exceeded the total value of all
artwork in the United States in 1945.656 The value of the art stolen
by the Nazis is astounding: $2.5 billion in 1945 prices, or $20.5
billion today.657
Museums suspected of currently possessing Nazi-stolen art
include the Louvre in Paris and the Hermitage in St. Petersburg,
654. See Norman Kempster, Tracking the Nazi Plunder, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1998, at Fl.
The most publicized book on the subject of Nazi-stolen art is HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST
MUSEUM: THE NAzi CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD's GREATEST WORKS OF ART (1997).
Feliciano, a Paris-based journalist, first published his book in France, where it caused a
sensation and led to the first identification of Nazi-stolen art found in French museums and
private collections. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, At Lunch with Hector Feliciano-A Bulldog on
the Heels of Lost Nazi Loot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1997, at El.
Two years later, Feliciano was sued in France in a $1 million defamation lawsuit by
the children ofGeorges Wildenstein, a famous World War H art dealer whom Feliciano, in his
book, accused of collaborating with the Nazis. See Author Accused of Libeling Art Seller to
Testify Today: Writer Said to Have Hinted Dealer Had Ties to Nazis, BALT. SUN, May 12,
1999, at 18A, available in 1999 WL 5185254. The suit claimed that Feliciano's book "scared
away major Jewish-American clients and caused 'considerable commercial damage.'" Id.
(quoting the lawsuit). In June 1999, the French court dismissed the lawsuit, and the
defendants vowed to appeal. SeeFrench CourtRules against Wildenstein, Jewish Nazi-Linked
Art Dealer, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, June 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2626943.
655. See Eric Gibson, de gustibus: The Delicate Art of Deciding Whose Art It Is, WALL ST.
J., July 16,1999, at Wll. As explained by one heir ofa victim of the Holocaust whose art was
stolen: "You ask did they kill, yes they killed. They killed for art, when it suited them. So
killing Jews and confiscating art somehow went together." Gaby Wood, Profits and Loss,
GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 14,1998, at 6 (quoting Henry Bondi, 76-year-old heir to the Bondi
art collection).
656. See John Authers et al., Unsettled Business, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1998, at
14, available in 1998 WL 3078752 (citing Edgar Bronfinan, president of the World Jewish
Congress); List Reveals Names of Nazi-era Art Looters, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1998, at C3
(citing Francis Taylor, director of the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1945).
657. See List Reveals Names of Nazi-era Looters, supra note 656, at C3 (providing an
estimate by Francis Taylor, director of the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art). In
November 1998, the World Jewish Congress announced that it found a list of 2,000 people
involved in the Nazi looting of art in the U.S. National Archives. See id. The list includes
nationals of "Germany, Austria, France, Switzerland, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Sweden and Luxembourg, and some of the most prominent art dealers in Europe."
Id. The list, running 11 pages and cross-referencing various individuals and companies in ten
nations, can be found on the Web site of the Art Newspaper, an art trade journal. See Art
Newspaper.Com (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http:J/www.theartnewspaper.com>.
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Russia.65 Museums in the United States also have been discovered
holding art stolen during World War II. Since 1997, a number of
prominent American museums have been embarrassed to find that
their collections include Nazi-stolen art that made its way to the
United States after the war.659
It appears that no museum in the world is immune. In July 1999,
an impressionist masterpiece looted by the Nazis appeared in the
Israel Museum in Jerusalem.66 °
658. See Vereria Dobnik, Art Looted by Nazis May Be in Louvre, INDEPENDENT (London),
Nov. 11, 1998, at 13, available in 1998 WL 21743330.
659. See Lee Rosenbaum, NaziLoot Claims:Art with a History, WALL ST. J.-EUR., Jan. 14,
1999, at 14 [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims]. The World Jewish Congress, among
others, has labeled Nazi-stolen art that has not been returned to their owners as World War
Irs "last prisoners of war." Id.
For an excellent discussion of the problem of Nazi-stolen art found in the United
States and possible solutions, see Lee Rosenbaum, Will Museums in U.S. Purge Nazi-Tainted
Art?, ART IN AMERICA, Nov. 1, 1998, at 37, available in 1998 WL 13812646 [hereinafter
Rosenbaum, Will Museums in U.S. Purge Nazi-TaintedArt?]. Morley Safer, a correspondent
for CBS News, puts the blame squarely on the art world.
[Ilt was somewhat of a shock when, in the ongoing debate over returning art
stolen by the Nazis to the rightful owners, curators and museum directors,
those guardians of the spiritual heritage, became stony-faced warders of loot.
That is, when they weren't running for cover.
It is something less than charming that these men and women, trained
so meticulously to make judgments for our culture in a free society, have
become the mirror image of their old Soviet counter- parts: Don't ask questions.
Don't answer questions. Deny. Accuse the victim.
What I find most interesting.., is that it comes so late, with almost
everyone safely dead-when a generation of owners, dealers, and curators can
safely plead ignorance, when the evidence has become murky with age.
"What will happen if the courts allow wholesale restitution to heirs?"
they ask. "Think of the upheaval.... Everything once belonged to someone.
None of us will be safe."
Complicated stuff, of course. But suppose we deal only with the "Art of
the Possible," with events and objects and families who survive, at least in
memory. If the art world were to vigorously pursue the truth about plundered
art-if they were to offer this small token-it would make the great collections
and the great institutions in question spiritually richer. Where their treasures
once hung, they could display their virtue with pride. They could publicly right
their wrong.
Morley Safer, Disguising Plunder withArtifice, BOSTONGLOBE, Dec. 8,1998, at D1, available
in 1998 WL 22238381.
660. See Fiachra Gibbons, Looted Masterpiece in Israel, GuARDIAN (London), July 23,1999,
available in 1999 WL 22081488. The painting, Camille Pissarro's Boulevard Montmartre,
Printemps, [Spring] 1897, came from a large prewar collection of Max Silberberg, a German-
Jewish businessman from Breslau who died in the concentration camps. See id. "The Pissarro
is thought to be worth in excess of pounds 5 m[illion." Id. Mr. Silberberg's only surviving heir
is Gerta Silberberg, his daughter-in-law, who fled Germany with her husband Alfred, Max's
son, in 1939. See id.
After the war, the Pissarro ended up in the hands of a private European collector, and
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According to experts, the disposition of art found to be looted
during World War II is even more complex than the issue of Nazi-
stolen gold and other Holocaust-era claims.66' First, so much art is
then passed through a series of owners before turning up in the Israel Museum in 1997. See
id. The museum received the painting as a donation from the New York-based Loeb family
who bought the painting in 1960. The London-based European Commission on Looted Art,
see discussion infra note 661, traced the painting to Jerusalem. See id.
Mrs. Silberberg, 85 years old, has lived modestly in the same house in Leicester,
England for the last 40 years. See id. Only a month earlier, in June 1999, the German
government returned to her a Van Gogh drawing "worth pounds 3.3 m[illion]," id., and a work
byVanMarees. See Douglas Davis &Alastair Grant, Van Gogh'sRightfulReturn, JERUSALEM
POST, Sept. 24, 1999, at 6B, available in 1999 WL 9008507; Giles Whittell, Looted Matisse
Returns to Heirs, TIMES (London), June 15, 1999, at 5, available in 1999 WL 8001183. Both
were held by the National Gallery in the former East Berlin. See Davis & Grant, supra, at 6B;
Whittell, supra, at 5.
661. For an excellent country-by-country analysis of the problem of Nazi-stolen art, and
the various efforts to deal with it, see Marilyn Henry & Hubertus Czernin, Owning Up,
ARTNEWS, May 1999, at 68, available in 1999 WL 9955656.
In late 1998, 44 nations held a conference in Washington, D.C., to address the
problem of how to deal with Nazi-stolen assets, including art found throughout the world. See
Kempster, supra note 654, at Fl. At the conclusion of the conference, the delegates agreed
on "comprehensive guidelines intended to identify artworks looted by Nazis during World War
II, locate the prewar owners and settle conflicting claims to property worth billions of dollars
on today's market." Kempster, supra note 634, atA8. Unfortunately, the guidelines proposed
by the U.S. delegation could not be made legally binding. See id. As a result, they have made
little impact in the art world, and are rarely discussed today.
For a discussion of legal problems concerning stolen art and possible solutions, see
Patty Gerstenblith, Cultural Property and World War 1I: Some Implications for American
Museums-ALegal Background, SC 40 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 17 (1998) (Conference on Legal Problems
of Museum Administration held Mar. 26, 1998); Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two
Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance between the Rights of Former Owners and Good
Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAMi L. REv. 49 (1995); Lynn Nicholas, The Rape of
European Art, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 237 (1998); Victoria A. Birov, Note, Prize Or Plunder?:
The Pillage of Works of Art and the International Law of War, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
201 (Fall-Winter 1997-98); see also Daniel J. Bender, An Alternative Approach to Settling
Disputes over StolenArt, 220 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1998) (discussing proposals made by Nazi-stolen art
expert Hector Feliciano and art law attorney Owen Pell).
Due to the complexity of the problem, at least four organizations are working on the
issue. In the United States, the World Jewish Congress has formed the Commission for Art
Recovery ("CAR"), whose mission is to "[ildentify and locate art stolen by the Nazis and their
collaborators, and register claims for the victims of Nazi art theft." Commission for Art
Recovery of the World Jewish Congress (visited June 25, 1999) <http-//www.wjc-
artrecovery.org>. CAR is located in New York and can be reached at (212) 521-0102. See id.
Its Web site contains a claim form to notify CAR of a lost Nazi-stolen artwork. See id. CAR
will enter the information on the artwork "into a computer database and compare[ ] [it] with
provenance data, insurance company and museum records, Nazi confiscation lists, and other
resources in an effort to locate stolen art and aid in its recovery." Id. CAR is chaired by
Ronald S. Lauder, art collector, philanthropist, heir to the Lauder cosmetics fortune, former
U.S. Ambassador to Austria, and chairman of New York's Museum of Modern Art ("MOMA").
See id. By holding two positions-chairman of MOMA and head of CAR-Lauder was being
pulled in opposite directions in the Schiele case. See discussion and notes supra Part V.C.
(discussing the MOMA/Schiele litigation). While CAR is concerned about restoring Nazi-
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at stake that a large-scale return of such World War II-looted art
"could disrupt the art market, especially for French Impressionist
paintings, which were a favorite target of Nazi looters."662 Second,
unlike the claims of Nazi-stolen gold, dormant Swiss accounts, or
use of slave labor, where the perpetrators knew-or at least, should
have been substantially on guard-that they were engaging in
wrongful activities, many (though not all) present owners of Nazi-
looted art bought the artworks in good faith, without any knowledge
stolen art to its former owners, MOMA sought to return the Schiele paintings back to Austria.
See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Man in the Middle of the Schiele Case, N.Y. TvMES, Jan. 29, 1998,
at El.
A second organization involved with the issue in the United States is the Holocaust
Art Restitution Project ("HARP'), located in Washington, D.C., and affiliated with the B'nai
B'rith Klutznick National Jewish Museum. See HolocaustArtRestitutionProject (visited Nov.
7, 1999) <http://www.lost.art.org>. HARP can be reach at (202) 857-6500. See id. HARP was
involved in the research conducted by the Seattle Art Museum that led to the return of a
Nazi-stolen Matisse to the heirs of its pre-World War II owner. See Holocaust Art Restitution
Project Announces Its Involvement in the Restitution of Four Works Plundered by Nazis, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, June 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 4637007.
In Europe, the European Commission on Looted Art ("ECLA"), founded in London in
March 1999 by the European Council of Jewish Communities, seeks to trace Nazi-stolen art.
See New Group to Speed up Rescue of Nazi Looted Art, JERUSALEM REP., Mar. 29, 1999, at 4,
available in 1999 WL 9687654 (describing work ofECLA); Eliahu Salpeter, Homeward Bound,
HA'ARETZ (Israel), June 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17468764 (describing work of ECLA);
Anne Simpson, Face to Face with Anne Webber: Every Picture Tells a Tragic Story, HERALD
(London), June 28, 1999, at 26, available in 1999 WL 21173499.
The Holocaust Educational Trust ("HET") has been actively involved in tracing Nazi-
stolen art, both in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. See, e.g., Francis Elliot, Scots Galleries
in Row over Nazis'LootedArt, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, July 4, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL
5909820 (discussing HET and discovery of possible Nazi-looted art in the National Galleries
of Scotland); Andrew Gilligan, Hunt for Nazi Looted Art in British Messes, SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 15, 1999, at 18, available in 1999 WL 19847298 (discussing HET
report on Nazi-stolen art found in the United Kingdom).
Finally, an art trade journal, ART NEWSPAPER, published on its Web site in January
1999, a list issued in 1946 by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services of individuals involved in
art trade with the Nazis. See The Art Trade Under the Nazis: The Not So Secret List (visited
Jan. 20, 2000) <http'//www.theartnewspaper.com>. The preface to the list, which contains
over 200 names, sets out the widespread scope of trade and looting in art during World War
II. It states:
When Jacqueline Kennedy employed Stephan Boudin to redecorate the
White House, did she know that, as head of [the] famous firm ofJansen, he also
redecorated the Reichsbank in Berlin under the Nazis? This is one of the
piquant facts which emerges from the 1946 U.S. Office of Strategic Services list
published here in its entirety. This list has to be used with care because, by its
own admission, many allegations against individuals are "reported".
Nonetheless, it gives an extraordinary panorama, especially for Paris, of the art
trade in war time. Much of this trade was not illegal, even if it was
collaborationist.
Id. at 1.
662. Kempster, supra note 654, at Fl.
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or suspicion of their controversial heritage.663 Finally, these good
faith purchasers are often pitted against claimants who may not
even be the original owners from whom the artwork was stolen, but
surviving-sometimes distant-relatives of the victims.664
While the task of restoring Nazi-stolen art to its rightful owners
is difficult, it must be done. As eloquently explained by one commen-
tator:
[W]hy bother with recovering it at all? Plundering is, after all, the
handmaiden of war. And the world's museums are filled with objects
lifted during conflicts from the Romans on.
But this is no Elgin Marbles controversy. The Nazis weren't simply
out to enrich themselves. Their looting was part of the Final Solution.
They wanted to eradicate a race by extinguishing its culture as well as
its people. This gives these works of art a unique resonance, the more
so since some of them were used as barter for safe passage out of
Germany or Austria for family members. The objects are symbols of a
terrible crime; recovering them is an equally symbolic form ofjustice.665
To date, unlike in the other Holocaust-era claims litigation, less
than a handful of lawsuits have been filed in the United States
involving World War II-looted art.666 Since each lawsuit involves a
663. See id. The article notes:
RabbiMarvin Hier, Dean ofthe Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies
in Los Angeles ... expresse[s] sympathy for owners who innocently bought
paintings without knowing they had been stolen. "In no way should these
people be faulted," Hier said. "They were misled themselves. It is not the same
as the Swiss bankers who knew in advance that it was Nazi gold" they were
acquiring.
Id.
Being a good-faith purchaser of a stolen artwork, however, is not a defense, at least
in the United States. "According to Stanford University Prof. John Henry Merryman, an
authority on art law: The law is clear that the [original] owner is entitled to recover the work
from a good-faith purchaser' ... . Collectors can wake up one morning to the threat of
forfeiting objects they acquired in good faith." Gibson, supra note 655 at W11.
664. See Rosenbaum, Will Museums in U.S. Purge Nazi-Tainted Art?, supra note 659, at
37. For instance, in the claim of Dead City III, the Nazi-looted painting by Egon Schiele, held
by an Austrian museum and detained in the United States in 1998 while on loan to MOMA
in New York, the claimants to the painting were the "widows of the sons of the victim's
cousin," not even the blood relatives of the victim from whom the Nazis stole the painting and
who perished in the Holocaust. Id.
In the case of art stolen by the Nazis from German collector Max Silberberg, the only
surviving heir is his daughter-in-law, who, at age 85 and living modestly all her life, has now
obtained possession of artwork worth millions. See supra note 660.
665. Gibson, supra note 655, at Wil.
666. For a general discussion of the law in the United States dealing with stolen art, see
RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAw: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, INVESTORS,
DEALERSANDARTISTS 201-58, 550-63, 1431-34 (2d ed. 1998) (providing a two-volume leading
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specific artwork, all were individual lawsuits, rather than class
action litigation. Each lawsuit will be discussed separately below.
A. Goodman v. Searle 667
In August 1998, the, first case scheduled to reach trial for Nazi-
stolen art, Goodman v. Searle, settled.66
The case involved the artwork Landscape with Smokestacks, an
1890 work by Edward Degas (the "Degas") that made its way to the
United States from Europe.669
treatise on the subject). For other treatises, see generally JESSICAL. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT
& ARCHITECTURE LAW (1995); LEONARD D. DUBOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (1977);
FRANKLIN FELDMAN ETAL., ART LAW (1986); ARMEN R. VARTIAN, LEGAL GUIDE TO BUYINGAND
SELLING ART (1997). Law review articles on the subject include Hawkins et al., supra note
661, at 49, and Birov, supra note 661, at 201.
A conference held in March 1998 at the Smithsonian Institution, entitled Cultural
Property and World War II: Implications for American Museums, dealt specifically with the
subject. For selected transcripts of the proceedings, see Elaine L. Johnston, Cultural Property
and World War II: Implications for American Museums-Practical Considerations for the
Museum Administrator, SC 40 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 29 (1998). A conference held at Whittier Law
School in March 1998, entitled Nazi Gold and Other Assets of the Holocaust: A Search for
Justice, featured a panel on Nazi-stolen art. For selected transcripts of the proceedings, see
20 WHITTIER L. REV. 67 (1998) (including addresses by Hector Feliciano, author of a leading
treatise on the subject; Owen Pell, legal expert on stolen art; and Nick Goodman, plaintiff in
Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill. settled Aug. 7, 1998)). A mid-1998 conference at
American University Law School, entitled Neutrality, Morality, and the Holocaust, featured
two stolen art experts. For selected proceedings, see Thomas Kline, The Recovery of Stolen
Art Sold in the United States from a "Neutral Country," 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 243 (1998)
(including addresses by Lynn Nicholas, author of a leading treatise on the subject, and
Thomas Kline, attorney for plaintiffs in Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill. settled
Aug. 7, 1998)).
667. Complaint, Goodman v. Searle, No. 96 Civ. 5316 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 17, 1996)
[hereinafter Goodman Complaint]. The case was originally filed in the Southern District of
New York on July 17, 1996 and was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois on
September 24, 1996.
668. August 1998 proved to be a critical month for Holocaust-era litigation in the United
States. Three important settlements took place that month: (1) the $1.25 billion settlement
with the Swiss banks, see discussion supra Part III.D.; (2) the $100 million settlement with
Generali Insurance, which later fell apart; and (3) the instant settlement, the first Nazi-stolen
art case in the United States to be settled. See discussion and notes supra Part II.A.
(discussing earlier Generali Insurance litigation); Part lV.A.2.a.(i). (discussing current federal
litigation against Generali); infra Part V.A. (discussing the Goodman v. Searle litigation).
669. At least two television programs prominently featured the saga of the Degas. See
Tamar Milstein, PBS Airing Documentary about Stolen Art, JEWISH ADvoC., Aug. 13, 1998,
at 5, available in 1998 WL 11388490 (discussing PBS documentary on the Gutmann family,
entitled Making a Killing: A Legacy Stolen by the Nazis); 60 Minutes: The Search (CBS
television broadcast, July 26, 1998) (discussing claims on Nazi-stolen art).
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Prior to the war, the painting belonged to Friedrich and Louise
Gutmann, a prominent Dutch couple of Jewish descent who had
converted to Christianity. Friedrich Gutmann purchased the Degas
in 1932. °
InApril 1939, Friedrich Gutmann, anticipating the oncomingwar,
sent the Degas to an art dealer in Paris for safekeeping.71 The
dealer placed the work, along with other artworks belonging to the
Gutmann family, in storage in Paris to protect them from seizure by
the Germans during World War 11.672 The Degas then disappeared.
In 1944, Friedrich and Louise Gutmann perished in Nazi death
camps.
673
After the war, the Gutmann children, Lili and Bernard, attempted
to locate their parents' possessions,7 including the artworks sent
to Paris.
In 1994, Simon Goodman, one of Bernard's sons, discovered the
Degas in the United States. 5 It was owned by Daniel Searle, a
Chicago pharmaceutical tycoon.676 Searle purchased the painting in
670. See Terri Sforza, Search for Justice, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 24, 1998, at A10,
available in 1998 WL 2619641. Friedrich Gutmann was raised in a prestigious banking
family, and founded his own bank in Holland after World War I. See id. Gutmann assembled
an impressive art collection over the years, including works by Botticelli, Gainsborough,
Holbein and three modern art pieces, which included the Degas pastel. See id.
671. See id.
672. See id.
673. See id. In 1943, the Gutmanns attempted to escape from Nazi-occupied Holland to
Italy, where their daughter Lili was living. See id. They were captured by the Nazis and sent
off to concentration camps. See id.
674. See id. Prior to their deaths, Friedrich and Louise relinquished many of their valuable
possessions to the Nazis under a "forced sale." See Peter Huck, Possession: The Hunt for
Looted Art, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Nov. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 20236328.
675. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum ofLawin Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 16-17, Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 27, 1998)
[hereinafter Goodman Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment]. In 1994, the Degas was displayed at New York's Metropolitan
Museum of Art (on loan from Searle), as a result of which Simon Goodman discovered its
existence in the United States. See id. Prior to that time, plaintiffs believed that the Degas
had been in Russia, shipped there by the victorious Soviet forces. See id. at 17-18. In 1961,
the West German government, in restitution proceedings brought by Bernard and Lili,
informed them that its own efforts to find the Degas and other Gutmann art had proved
fruitless and that "further investigations hold no prospect of success." Id. at 17. The West
German government then paid 50% of the value of the Degas to the Gutmann estate, not
being able to determine whether the painting had been removed from Paris to East or West
Germany. See id. at 10.
676. See Telephone Interview with Nick Goodman (Jan. 15,1999). After the collapseofthe
Soviet Union in 1991, the Goodman brothers began to look for the Degas again, hoping to find
a record of it in the newly-opened Soviet archives. See id. As part of this search, one day
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1987 for $850,000.67? The Gutmann heirs demanded the return of
the work. When Searle refused, the heirs filed a lawsuit in New
York, which was transferred to federal court in Chicago.6 79
Plaintiffs were Lili Gutmann, now in her mid-70s, and her two
nephews, Nick and Simon Goodman, sons of Bernard, who died in
1994.680
Searle claimed that the Degas was not stolen, but rather sold by
Friedrich Gutmann when he began experiencing financial difficul-
ties during World War II.6"1 Plaintiffs countered that no bill of sale
or other proof of the painting being sold existed, even though "sales
of other Gutmann paintings during the war are well-documented." 2
Moreover, according to plaintiffs, Searle either was, or should
have been, aware of the Degas's checkered pedigree, or provenance,
since
[aiccording to the "Provenance" that Searle obtained when he purchased the
[Degas] from Emile Wolf in 1987, the [Degas] had passed through the hands
of Hans Wendland-a card-carrying Nazi who the U.S. government
interrogated and concluded was instrumental in the trade of art looted by
the Nazis in France-and Wendland's brother-in-law, Hans Fankhauser.'
Simon Goodman was leafing through art books at the U.C.L.A. Art library, where, to his
amazement, he discovered a photo of the Degas and confirmed its presence in the United
States in the private collection of Daniel Searle. See id.
677. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Statute of Limitations Defense at 1, Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D.
Ill. filed Oct. 22, 1997) [hereinafter Goodman Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitations Defense].
678. See id. at 2. Plaintiffs made a written demand on December 5,1995 to have the Degas
returned, and Searle refused the demand in writing on December 15, 1995. See id.
679. See id. at 1 (citing Consent Order, Goodman v. Searle, No. 96 Civ. 5316 (S.D.N.Y.
entered Sept. 24, 1996)). Both parties agreed to the transfer. See id.
680. The Gutmann children changed their last name to Goodman after the war.
681. See Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts T 11, at 3, Goodman v.
Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Goodman Defendants'
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts]. Apparently, Friedrich had sold some works of art
during the war. See id.
682. Goodman Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 675, at 3.
683. Id. Defendant Searle relied on the expertise of the curators from the Art Institute of
Chicago. See Walter V. Robinson, Holocaust Victims' Heirs Given Share of a Degas, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 9148291. "But according to pre-trial
depositions.., two museum curators missed evidence pointing to flaws in the [painting's]
ownership records, including the fact that it was once owned by Hans Wendland, perhaps the
most successful wartime fence for art looted by the Nazis." Id.
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Searle also argued that plaintiffs' claims were barred by either
statute of limitations or laches6 4 since, according to the defendant,
plaintiffs "reasonably should have known of the location of the
landscape long before Searle bought it."
68 5
684. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
at 10-15, Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill. filed Jan. 13, 1998) [hereinafter
Goodman Defendants Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment];
Defendan's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Statute of
Limitations Defense at 3-10, Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill. filed Dec. 8, 1997)
[hereinafter Goodman Defendants Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Statute of Limitations Defense]. The federal court hearing the case was sitting
in Illinois and the defendant, Searle, wanted the court to apply Illinois law. See id. Plaintiffs
wanted New York law to apply. See Goodman Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitations Defense, supra note 677,
at 4-12. New York law appeared to be more favorable to plaintiffs, since an action for return
of stolen art against a good faith purchaser of the art (an action for replevin) is timely in New
York if brought within three years after the purchaser refuses the true owner's demand that
the property be returned, otherwise known as the "demand and refusal rule." See Solomon
R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. 1991) (adopting "demand and
refusal" rule for determining statute of limitations); see also Hawkins et al., supra note 661,
at 52,55-69 (criticizing New York's"demand and refusal" rule since, according to the authors,
"former owners will be able to prevail over innocent purchasers even after decades of inaction
[by former owners] in attempting to locate the missing work").
Under Illinois law, in contrast, the statute of limitations in a stolen art context is
more strict, determined by the so-called traditional"discovery rule," which requires plaintiffs,
former owners, or heirs to prove that they conducted a reasonably diligent search for the art.
See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d
278, 288 (7th Cir. 1990). New York has specifically rejected the discovery rule on the ground
that it would "place the burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner and [would]
foreclose the rights of that owner to recover its property if the burden is not met [and, as
such, would] encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art [in New York]." Solomon R.
Guggenheim Found., 569 N.E.2d at 431 (N.Y. 1991).
Plaintiffs claimed that New York law applied in this diversity action-even though the
Degas was located in Chicago when the suit was filed, defendant Searle resided there, and
plaintiffs are not residents of New York-because the action involved the ownership of a stolen
artwork purchased by defendant on the New York art market, and the Degas was in New
York when plaintiffs demanded its return. See Goodman Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitations Defense, supra
note 677, at3 (discussing Searle's contacts with New York). Plaintiffs argued that their action
met the New York statute of limitations since they brought their lawsuit within three years
of Searle's refusal to return the Degas to them. See id. at 2.
685. Goodman Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, supra note 684, at 11. As support, Searle argued that the Goodmans should have
been aware of the Degas' presence in the United States as a result of the following: (1)
publication of two books, in 1968 and 1974, which included information about the Degas and
its location; and(2) exhibits at three college museums in the United States (the FoggMuseum
at Harvard, the Rhode Island School ofDesigu, and the Finch College Museum) in 1965,1968,
and 1974, respectively, featuring the Degas. See id. at 6-7.
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Plaintiffs countered that they diligently pursued a search of the
painting for over fifty years,686 and could not locate it until its
exhibition in New York.687
These competing contentions were never fully settled, as the
parties reached a compromise and ended their dispute on the eve of
trial.68
8
Under the settlement, Searle and the plaintiffs agreed to share
ownership of the Degas. Searle donated his one-half interest to the
Art Institute of Chicago, where Searle is a trustee, and the museum
agreed to purchase the plaintiffs' one-half interest. The Degas will
hang in the museum, with the designation: "Purchase from the
collection of Friedrich and Louise Gutmann and a gift of Daniel C.
Searle."68 9
686. See Goodman Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, supra note 675, at 3-4 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs claimed that
they
reported their losses immediately after the war to the Allied Forces and to
government officials in France, Germany and Holland.... [as well as] to the
international police organization known as Interpol at Scotland Yard. They
consulted art experts; presented photographs of the paintings on television
. . . and listed the [Degas] in a stolen art registry maintained by the
International Foundation for Art Research ("IFAR") as soon as they learned of
IFAR's existence.
Id.
687. See id. at 16-17.
688. See Marilyn Henry, Holocaust Victims' Heirs Reach Compromise on Stolen Art,
JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 16, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL 6533973; Robinson, supra note
683, at Al (stating that the trial was scheduled for September 9, 1998, and the parties settled
on August 7, 1998).
689. Teri Sforza, Rival Claims on Nazi-Looted Art Resolved, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Aug.
14, 1998, at 1. The deal almost unraveled, as the parties could not agree on the present value
of the painting. See Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims, supra note 659, at 14. Searle bought the
Degas in 1987 for $850,000, at the top of the art market. See id. The Art Institute of Chicago
agreed to use its acquisition funds to pay the Gutmann heirs for their one-half interest in the
Degas, with the price to be determined by averaging two independent appraisals. See id. This
value came to $437,000, based on a $300,000 appraisal by Christie's auction house and
$575,000 by a New York art dealer. See id. According to Nick Goodman, "'We are hoping to
talk to Christie's to see if they will reconsider .... If the appraisals stand, he said, 'we will
be out-of-pocket ... by about $100,000," as a result of pursuing the litigation. Id. (quoting
plaintiff Nick Goodman).
In late fall 1999, almost one year after the compromise was announced, the settlement
was finalized. See id. Christie's slightly raised its appraisal so that the plaintiffs, according
to Nick Goodman, were "at least able to break even." Telephone Interview with Nick
Goodman, supra note 676. "Overall, I'm pleased with the result," Nick Goodman stated. Id.
"The painting was brought back to the family, it is now hanging in a beautiful museum, and,
most importantly, we significantly raised public awareness of this issue." Id. In June 1999,
the Art Institute began publicly displaying the Degas, and Nick Goodman flew to Chicago
personally to view it. See id.
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B. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum69 °
In June 1999, the second Nazi-stolen art case to reach litigation
(and the first against an American museum), Rosenberg v. Seattle
Art Museum ("SAM"), also settled.6 9' The case involved the artwork
Odalisque, a 1928 painting by Henri Matisse,692 which belonged to
Paul Rosenberg, one of the most prominent and wealthy art dealers
in prewar France.693
Because Rosenberg was Jewish, he fled France for the United
States in 1941, after the Nazi occupation of France a year earlier.694
The Nazis then seized more than 400 of his paintings, including
some of the greatest works of modern art in prewar Europe.695
Rosenberg returned to Paris after the war and, by the time he
died in the late 1950s, managed to recover most of the stolen
works.696 The Odalisque, however, remained missing. In August
1997, the Rosenberg family found it hanging in the Seattle Art
Museum.697
690. Complaint, Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, No. C98-1073 D (W.D. Wash. filed July
31, 1998) [hereinafter Rosenberg Complaint].
691. See JoAnn Lewis, Museum to Return Looted Artworks: Matisse Taken by Nazis Will
Go to Owner's Heirs, WASH. POST, June 17, 1999, at C1.
692. SeeRosenberg Complaint, supra note 690,919. The paintingis also known as Oriental
Woman Sitting on Floor. See id.
693. See id. 10; see also FELICIANO, supra note 654, at 52-74 (describing Paul Rosenberg's
background); Kenneth Jost, A Family Fights for a Stolen MatisseCQ RESEARCHER, Mar. 26,
1999, at 265 (describing Paul Rosenberg's background). Paul Rosenberg acquired the
Odalisque in 1929, one year after it was painted by Matisse, and the painting was part of
Rosenberg's personal art collection. See Rosenberg Complaint, supra note 690, $ 9-11.
694. See id. 1 17.
695. See id. 14.
696. See id. 17-19.
697. See id. 28. According to the complaint and a 1999 study conducted by the Holocaust
Art Restitution Project ("HARP"), see supra note 661, the Odalisque found its way from Paris,
France, to Seattle, Washington, in the course of 50 years as follows:
In early 1940, Paul Rosenberg placed the painting for safekeeping in a bank vault
outside Paris, in anticipation of the Nazi offensive against France. See Rosenberg Complaint,
supra note 690, T 13. In 1941, the "Einsatzstab der Dienstellen des Reichleiters Rosenberg"
(the "ERR"), a Nazi-party group that conducted looting activities on behalf of Hermann
Goering and other Nazis, seized the painting from the bank vault. See id. 9 14. The ERR
shipped the painting back to Paris, and in 1942, traded it, and another painting (by Gauguin)
it considered "degenerate art," for a painting from the Renaissance period. See id. 1 15.
Nazi records show the trade was made with a shady German art dealer who,
interrogated by the Allies after the war, claimed that he shipped the painting along with
others to a warehouse in Germany, but that the shipment never arrived. See Robin Updike,
'Odalisque'Project Was Lengthy, Thorough, SEATTLE TIES, June 16, 1999, at E6, available
in 1999 WL 6277916 [hereinafter Updike, 'Odalisque' Project Was Lengthy, Thorough]. 'So
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Plaintiffs Elaine Rosenberg and Micheline Nanette Sinclair, the
daughter-in-law and daughter, respectively, of Paul Rosenberg,
brought suit in July 1998 to recover the painting.698 Plaintiffs'
complaint contained two causes of action: a request for a declaratory
judgment that plaintiffs are the current owners of the Odalisque;699
and an action for replevin, seeking the return of the painting.7"'
we suppose he was lying,' said [the HARP researcher commissioned by the Seattle Art
Museum ("SAM") to trace the provenance of the painting]. 'It's obvious that he lied about
many things; this would make sense.'" Id. (quoting the HARP researcher).
In early 1954, the painting turned up in Paris, at Galerie Drouant-David, a now-
defunct art gallery. See id. Soon after, the Odalisque crossed the Atlantic Ocean, when the
Paris gallery sold the painting to Knoedler & Co., a renowned art dealer in New York. See id.
How the Paris art gallery obtained the Odalisque is unknown, and the 1999 HARP
report "was unable to verify the whereabouts of the painting between 1941 and 1954, when
the painting was acquired by Galerie Drouant-David, of Paris." Robin Updike, SAM to Return
Matisse Stolen during WWII, SEATrLE TIMES, June 15, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL
6277818 [hereinafter Updike, SAM to Return Matisse Stolen during WWII].
In November 1954, Knoedler & Co. sold the painting to the Bloedel family of
Washington State. See Rosenberg Complaint, supra note 690, 23. The Bloedels kept the
painting in their private collection until 1991. See id. 24. That year, the painting was
donated, in part, to the Seattle Art Museum and, in whole, in 1996, upon the death of Mr.
Bloedel. See id. 25.
The painting is valued today at approximately $2 million. See Tunku Varadarajan,
Gallery Is Sued over "Looted'Art, TIMES (London), Aug. 5, 1998, at 11, available in 1998 WL
4852772. In 1954, the Bloedels paid $18,000 to Knoedler for the painting, and "hung it in the
living room of their country estate on Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound[, Washington]."
Patrick McMahon, Matisse Stolen by Nazis to Be Returned, USA TODAY, June 15, 1999, at
10A, available in 1999 WL 6845470.
The Times of London describes the unusual means of how the Rosenberg family
discovered the whereabouts of the painting:
In [1996], Prentice Bloedel, a Canadian timber magnate, gave the painting to
the Seattle Art Museum. Shortly afterwards[,] a book called The Lost Museum:
The Nazi Conspiracy to Steal the World's Greatest Works ofArt was published,
in which the author, Hector Feliciano, cites the painting as one of many
plundered by the Nazis. He stated that it was stolen from Rosenberg.
A grandchild of Bloedel, who is now dead, recognised the illustration in
the book as matching the painting that had been given to the museum. The
Bloedel family then contacted the Rosenbergs.
Varadarajan, supra, at 11.
According to another account: "At a party in 1997, the grandson of the Bloedel's [sic]
was flipping through the book [Feliciano's The Lost Museum], when he spotted the picture
and recognized it as the one hanging in his grandparents' home. He began the search for its
original owners." Karen Lowe, Matisse Painting Stolen by Nazis to Be Returned, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, June 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2623461.
698. See Rosenberg Complaint, supra note 690, 7. Plaintiffs are the sole surviving heirs,
since Paul Rosenberg and his wife and their other child, a son, are now deceased. See id.
7. The daughter, Micheline Sinclair, resides in Paris, France, and the daughter-in-law, Elaine
Rosenberg, resides in New York City, New York. See id. T 5-6.
699. See id. 33-40.
700. See id. T 41-46. According to the complaint, on October 17, 1997, two months after
learning of the location of the Odalisque, plaintiffs demanded the painting's return. See id.
28-30. On June 12, 1998, after failing to reach a resolution of the matter with the
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In August 1998, SAM, in turn, sued Knoedler & Co., claiming that
the gallery committed fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
breach of warranty of title when, in 1954, it sold the painting to the
Bloedels.7 °' SAM, which received the painting as a gift, nevertheless
sought $2 million in compensation, the fair market value of the
Odalisque. °2
In March 1999, Knoedler filed a motion to dismiss SAM's third
party complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that it did not do
plaintiffs, SAM formally refused to return the painting. See id. IT 31-32.
According to the Times of London:
Although the museum initially said that it would have preferred a settlement
reached by mediation, it later expressed a preference for the dispute to go to
court as a test case. In court, the museum's lawyers hope to resolve the role
played in the painting's history by Knoedler & Company, the renowned
Manhattan art dealer which bought Odalisque in 1954 from a gallery in Paris.
Varadarajan, supra note 697, at 11.
701. See Answer and Third-Party Complaint for Damages for Breach ofWarranties, Fraud
andNegligent Misrepresentation IT 3.1-5.0, Rosenbergv. Seattle Art Museum, No. C99-5462
(W.D. Wash. filed Aug. 24,1998) [hereinafter Rosenberg Answer and Third-Party Complaint
for Damages for Breach of Warranties, Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation]; Amended
Third-Party Complaint for Damages for Breach of Warranties, Fraud, Negligent
Misrepresentation and Implied Equitable Indemnity I9 3.1-6.5, Rosenberg v. Seattle Art
Museum, No. C99-5462 (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 15, 1998) [hereinafter Rosenberg Amended
Third-Party Complaint for Damages for Breach of Warranties, Fraud, Negligent
Misrepresentation and Implied Equitable Indemnity].
702. See Lewis, supra note 691, at C1. The Paris gallery that sold the Odalisque to
Knoedler & Co., Galerie Drouant-David, is no longer in business, and, therefore, Knoedler
remains the only other viable private defendant. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, No Easy Route
to Rediscovering Nazi Plunder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,1998, at 6, available in 1998 WL 5425847
[hereinafter Dobrzynski, No Easy Route to Rediscovering Nazi Plunder]. A lawsuit against
Germany would fail on the ground of sovereign immunity. See discussion ofPrincz v. Republic
of Germany, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995), supra Part II.D. (discussing Holocaust claims litigated
before 1996). The problem of finding responsible parties, a half-century later, remains acute:
In one way, at least, the Seattle museum is fortunate: It has a gallery
to sue. Knoedler celebrated its 150th anniversary in 1996, although it is no
longer a family business. (Armand Hammer, the late financier, bought the
company in 1971, and it is now controlled by his foundation). [sic]
"Not a heck of a lot of galleries are left that did business" shortly after
the war, particularly in European art, said Richard Gray, the president of the
Art Dealers Association of America.
Judith H. Dobrzynski, Loot-Holders Learn That Honesty Can Be Tricky, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 13,1998, at G3, available in 1998 WL 6154929 [hereinafter Dobrzynski,
Loot-Holders Learn That Honesty Can Be Tricky].
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business in Washington State."°3 The district court denied
Knoedler's motion.
0 4
In June 1999, SAM finally agreed to return the painting to the
Rosenberg family0 . after obtaining the findings of a research study
from the Holocaust Art Restitution Project ("HARP"), confirming
that the Odalisque in their possession, indeed, had been stolen by
the Nazis from Paul Rosenberg. 70 6
703. See Rosenbergv. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (W.D. Wash. 1999);
see also Dobrzynski, Loot-Holders Learn That Honesty Can Be Tricky, supra note 702, at G3.
The article explains:
Knoedler... said through its lawyer that it had nothing to do with the museum
dispute because its dealings were all with the Bloedels, not the museum. "I
don't know of any case where a museum has gone to someone who never dealt
with them and tried to extract money from them," said Lewis B. Clayton of
Paul, Weiss, Rilkind, Wharton & Garrison in Manhattan. "The only people who
could press a claim are the Bloedels." The museum[, said its lawyer, John A.
Reed of David Wright & Tremaine in Seattle, has standing in the suit as the
Bloedels' successor.
Id.
704. See Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1037-38. The district court found that it lacked
jurisdiction over SAM's claims for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, but
that it had jurisdiction over SAM's claims against Knoedler for fraud. See id. Under principles
of pendent jurisdiction, the court continued to exercise jurisdiction over all of SAM's claims
against Knoedler. See id.
705. See Joanna Massey, Heirs Reclaim Plundered Monet, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 1999,
at B4. Earlier, in April 1999, the Rosenberg heirs received another piece of good news when
a French museum agreed, without litigation, to return to them a Monet masterpiece,
Nymphdas, 1904, one of 48 waterlily paintings by Monet. Id. The painting is estimated to be
worth approximately $7.5 million. See Vanessa Thorpe, Jewish Family Demand Return of
Pounds 5m Monet Stolen by Nazis, Independent (London), Dec. 6,1998, at 3, available in 1998
WL 21749172.
The painting, taken from Paul Rosenberg's chateau in 1940 and kept by Nazi Foreign
Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop during the war, turned up on loan at a Monet exhibition
in November 1998 at Boston's Museum of Fine Arts ("MFA"). See Walter V. Robinson, MFA
Exhibition Acknowledges Background, Theft of Monet Work, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1998, at
Bi. The Rosenbergs first spotted the painting at the MFA exhibition. See Thorpe, supra, at
3; Massey, supra, at B4. The painting was returned to France after leaving Boston amidst
controversy during the exhibition. See Robinson, supra, at B1. Unlike in the Schiele case, the
Rosenberg family did not attempt to hold the painting in the United States. See discussion
and notes infra Part V.C. (discussing the MOMA/Schiele litigation).
706. See Lewis, supra note 691, at Cl. SAM, apparently, paid HARP $10,000 to determine
the provenance of the Odalisque. See id.
The HARP report, according to Mimi Gates, director of SAM:
answers several crucial questions about the history of the painting.... [It]
prove[s] the painting is the one taken by the Nazis from the vault where
Rosenberg hid his collection. The report also makes clear that Rosenberg, who
died in 1959 after moving his art business to New York, never again saw the
painting or had the chance to bring it back into his collection. This is a pivotal
point, since it apparently proves Rosenberg never sold the painting to anyone.
Updike, SAM to Return Matisse Stolen during WWII, supra note 697, at Al.
Moreover, according to another SAM director, "it took time to determine the
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SAM's litigation against Knoedler, however, continues.° 7 The
trial court dismissed the cross-action in October 1999, but SAM is
appealing.
708
In an interesting footnote to the dispute, the painting now hangs
at the Bellagio Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, having been sold by
the Rosenbergs to casino mogul Steve Wynn shortly after it was
returned to them. 9
ownership of this particular 'Odalisque' because Matisse made several paintings named
'Odalisque.'" Lowe, supra note 697.
After obtaining the HARP study, SAM's board of directors unanimously approved the
return of the painting to the Rosenberg family. See McMahon, supra note 697, at 10A.'Now
that we've had thorough research, and now that the HARP report is completed, this is the
right thing to do,'" stated Mimi Gates, SAM's director. Updike, SAMto Return Matisse Stolen
during WWII, supra note 697, at Al.
For a discussion of the HARP study, see Robin Updike, 'Odalisque' Project Was
Lengthy, Thorough, supra note 697, at E6. Two HARP researchers "spent more than a year
sifting through old exhibition catalogs and documents before piecing together a partial history
of'Odalisque.' The research was old-fashioned: Tracing looted art is not the sort of thing you
can do on the Internet.... The report was several months late."Id.
Ronald S. Lauder, director of New York's Museum of Modern Art and head of CAR,
"praised the museum's actions: 'This is the first time an American museum has returned art
work like this. This is very important.'" McMahon, supra note 697, at 10A (quoting Ronald
Lauder).
707. ARTnews, an art trade publication, has summarized the factual dispute between
Knoedler and SAM as follows:
According to the museum, when Knoedler sold the Odalisque to the
Bloedels, the gallery documented the painting's exhibition history. But the
gallery omitted the fact that the catalogues for two exhibitions cited, at the
Petit Palais in Paris in 1937 and at the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh in
1938, state that the Odalisque was on loan from Paul Rosenberg. Responding
to Mrs. Bloedel's later questions aboutthe painting's provenance, Knoedler sent
her a letter explaining that the painting had actually been loaned to both
exhibitions by Matisse himself, and "was without doubt in his possession
through 1938." The museum's current lawsuit against Knoedler was filed to
determine who actually had title to the painting: either the gallery
misrepresented the painting's provenance, the museum charges, or the
Rosenbergs' claim of rightful ownership may not be valid.
Patricia Failing, Suit to Fit, ARTNEws, Oct. 11, 1998, at 56, available in 1998 WL 19732869.
Apparently, the HARP study proved the Rosenbergs' ownership claim to be valid, and the
representation made to the Bloedels by Knoedler to be incorrect.
708. See SAM to Appeal Decision on Painting, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at B2,
available in 1999 WL 6295896.
709. See Christine Clarridge, MatisseReturned by SAMNow inLas Vegas Casino, SEArLE
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1999, at B2, available in 1999 WL 6291451. Undoubtedly, it is now getting
a larger audience than while it was hanging at the SAM.
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C. The Museum of Modern Art ("MOMA") ISchiele Litigation
The New York MOMA held an exhibition of work by the Austrian
painter Egon Schiele from October 1997 to January 1998.710
As part of this exhibition, the Austrian government, through the
government-financed Leopold Foundation,71' loaned MOMA two
Schiele paintings: Dead City III and Portrait of Wally.712
While the paintings were on exhibit, the heirs of two individuals
who perished in the Holocaust contacted MOMA claiming that the
paintings were Nazi-stolen artworks.713 The heirs requested that the
paintings remain in New York pending determination of their
ownership."'
MOMA denied this request, informing the heirs that the paintings
would be shipped back to Europe." 5
710. See Brief of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Art
Law, as Amicus Curiae, In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (No. 28012-98).
711. See Wood, supra note 655, at 6. Dr. Rudolph Leopold, a retired Austrian
opthamalogist, acquired the largest collection of Schiele art in the world. In 1994, Leopold,
in order to pay his back taxes, sold the collection to the Austrian government, which
established a foundation and museum in his name and appointed him as a director of the
museum for life. See id.
712. See id. "Schiele was an expressionist painter who died in 1918. The paintings in
question date from around 1910." U.S. News Story Page, Judge Says Disputed Printings Can
Return to Austria (visited Jan. 19, 2000) <http'//www.cnn.comUS/9805/13/Schiele.
paintings/>. Today, the paintings are worth approximately $2 million each. See Barbara Ross,
MOMA Loses Round in Art Case, Mar. 17, 1999, at 56, available in 1999 WL 3428201.
713. See Wood, supra note 655, at 6.
714. See Judith H. Dobrzynski, Modern Is Urged to Play Solomon in Paintings Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at El. Portrait of Wally is alleged to have been stolen from Lea
Bondi Jaray, and Dead City III is alleged to have been stolen from Fritz Grunbaum. See id.
Henry Bondi, Lea's nephew, is claimingPortrait of Wally on behalf of the Bondi heirs.
See Affirmation and Exhibits in Opposition to the Museum of Modern Art's Application to
Quash the Grand Jury Subpoena Ex. 1, In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998)
(No. 28012-98) [hereinafter MOMA AIfration and Exhibits in Opposition to the Museum
of Modern Art's Application to Quash the Grand Jury Subpoena] (attaching a Letter from
Henry S. Bondi to Glenn D. Lowry, Director of MOMA (Dec. 30, 1997)).
Kathleen and Rita Reif, of New York, and the wives of the nephews of Fritz
Grunbaum, are claiming Dead City INI on behalf of the Grunbaum heirs. See id. Exhibit 2
(attaching a Letter from Kathleen E. Reif and Rita Reifto Glenn D. Lowry, Director of MOMA
(Dec. 31, 1997)).
715. See Marilyn Henry, MOMA to Send Disputed Paintings to Barcelona, JERUSALEM
PoST, Jan. 6, 1998, at 7 ("The museum said late Sunday that it would ship the exhibit to its
next stop, Barcelona, this week. Although it had expressed sympathy for the claims, MOMA
said it was bound by a contract to return the pictures.").
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Hours before the paintings were to be returned to the Austrian
government, Robert Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney,
was able to stop their departure from New York.v16 Morgenthau did
so by empaneling a grand jury to conduct a criminal investigation
of the ownership of the paintings.717 The grand jury then issued a
subpoena duces tecum ordering MOMA to appear as a witness
before it, and to produce the two paintings, thereby preventing their
departure."' 8
MOMA filed legal proceedings in New York state court to quash
the subpoena.719 The parties agreed that the paintings would remain
in the United States, in the custody of MOMA, pending the resolu-
tion of this dispute.72 °
In its application, MOMA argued that the subpoena was issued in
violation of section 12.03 of the New York State Arts and Cultural
716. See Robert Hughes, Hold Those Paintings!, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998, at 70; Walter V.
Robinson, New York DA Bars Return of Austrian Art, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1998, at Al.
717. See id. The Bondi and Grunbaum heirs could not have prevented the departure of the
paintings from New York by filing a civil lawsuit to determine the paintings' ownership and
then seeking a prejudgment attachment because such a move would have been barred by
section 12.03 of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law. See N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.
LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999); see also infra note 721 and accompanying text.
The heirs, therefore, tried another legal maneuver. Instead of a civil lawsuit, they
filed a criminal complaint with the Manhattan District Attorney, who then began a criminal
investigation regarding the ownership dispute. See Hughes, supra note 716.
718. See Hughes, supra note 716, at 70; Robinson, supra note 683, at Al. The Schiele
exhibit at MOMA closed on January 4, 1998. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the
Museum of Modern Artfs Motion to Quash the Grand Jury Subpoena at 2, In re Application
to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 677
N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (No. 28012-98) [hereinafter MOMA Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to the Museum of Modern Art's Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena]. On
January 7, 1998, Morgenthau opened a grand jury investigation into this matter. See id. at
3. The grand jury issued a subpoena to MOMA ordering the production of both paintings the
next day, January 8th, at 3:00 p.m. See id. The date of production, at MOMA's request, was
continued to January 23rd. See id. On January 22nd, MOMA filed a notice ofmotion to quash
the subpoena before the Supreme Court of New York, which began the instant proceedings.
See id. For recitation of procedural facts of this litigation, see Memorandum of Law in
Support of the Museum of Modern Arts Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, In re
Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern
Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (No. 28012-98) [hereinafter MOMA Memorandum
of Law in Support of the Museum of Modern Art's Application to Quash Grand Jury
Subpoena]; MOMA Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Museum of Modern Art's
Motion to Quash the Grand Jury Subpoena, supra, at 1-3.
719. See Notice ofMotion, In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Served on the Museum of Modern Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (No. 28012-98)
[hereinafter MOMA Notice of Motion].
720. See MOMA Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Museum of Modern Art's
Motion to Quash the Grand Jury Subpoena, supra note 718, at 3. For discussion of the
Schiele case, see Hughes, supra note 716, at 70, and Robinson, supra note 683, at Al.
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Affairs Law ("ACAL"). 721' According to MOMA, ACAL section 12.03
prevented the issuance of a grand jury subpoena upon MOMA
ordering the production of the paintings.722
In May 1998, a New York Supreme Court judge ruled in favor of
MOMA, holding that the Manhattan District Attorney should not
have ordered the seizure of the paintings while their disputed
ownership was being investigated.7 23
In March 1999, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
reversed.724
Contrary to the ruling of the trial judge, the appellate court held
that ACAL section 12.03 is not intended to affect criminal proceed-
ings, such as the one being conducted by Morgenthau.125 Specifically,
the appellate court held that a subpoena to appear before a grand
jury and produce evidence "does not authorize or call for a seizure
in any meaning of the word." 26 Not constituting "seizure," the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum upon MOMA was not violative
of section 12.03 prohibiting "any seizure.., upon any work of fine
art."
72 7
In September 1999, the New York Court of Appeals, in a six to one
decision, reversed.7 28 The Court of Appeals held that ACAL section
12.03, through its use of "unconditional language'--"no process" and
721. See N.Y.ARTS & CuLT.AFF. LAW § 12.03 (McKinney 1999). ACAL section 12.03 states:
No process of attachment, execution, sequestration, replevin, distress or
any kind of seizure shall be served or levied upon any work of fine art while the
same is enroute to or from, or while on exhibition or deposited by a nonresident
exhibitor at any exhibition held under the auspices or supervision of any
museum, college, university or other nonprofit art gallery, institution or
organization within any city or county of this state for any cultural, educational,
charitable or other purpose not conducted for profit to the exhibitor, nor shall
such work of fine art be subject to attachment, seizure, levy or sale, for any
cause whatever in the hands of the authorities of such exhibition or otherwise.
Id.
722. See MOMA Memorandum of Law in Support of the Museum of Modern Art's
Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena, supra note 718, at 7-9.
723. See In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the
Museum of Modern Art, 677 N.Y.S.2d 872, 881 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
724. See In re Application to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the
Museum of Modern Art, 688 N.Y.S.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
725. See id.
726. Id. at 6.
727. Id. at 5.
728. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Served on the Museum of Modern Art,
697 N.Y.S.2d 538, 550 (1999).
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"or any kind of seizure"-prohibits the carrying out of an exception
for criminal proceedings.729
The court held that the legislative history of section 12.03
supported this view.3 ° Conceding that the statute originally was
enacted in reaction to a civil seizure of an artwork, 31 the court
nevertheless held that "a comprehensive reading of the history
reveals a consistent, unyielding legislative intent to promote artistic
and cultural exchanges by creating a climate in New York [State]
free from the threat of seizure by judicial process and by encourag-
ing nonresidents to share their works of art with the public." '32 The
court concluded: "The statute's 'no loopholes' approach compels our
holding that Arts and Cultural Affairs Law § 12.03 is not limited to
civil process." 33 The Court of Appeals also disagreed with the lower
appellate court's holding that a grand jury subpoena does not
amount to a "seizure" within the meaning of section 12.03.
Relying on "the United States Supreme Court's definition of
'seizure' as 'some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in... property," 735 the court held that "in the
context of this case the subpoena rises to the level of 'meaningful
interference with [the lender's] possessory interest' for purposes of
section 12.03. "736
729. Id. at 541. According to the court: "Indeed, there is no limiting language in section
12.03; the words are unqualified. Hence, on facial reading of the statute, we are confident that
the words-unrestricted as they are-are not limited to civil process." Id.
730. See id.
731. See id. ("[Tihe impetus for this statute was a civil lawsuit involving the civil seizure
of artwork on display at a Buffalo museum ...
732. Id.
733. Id. at 542.
734. See id. at 543.
735. Id. (quotingUnited States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109,113 (1983)). The court also relied
on the dictionary definition of seizure to support its conclusion. The opinion states:
"Seizure," as used in everyday parlance, is understood to mean "the action or an
act of seizing, or the fact of being seized; confiscation or forcible taking
possession." "Seize" in turn is defined as "to put in possession" or "to take
possession of (goods) in pursuance of a judicial order."
Id. (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)).
736. Id. (alteration in original). The court of appeals acknowledged that "a subpoena of
this kind generally does not authorize the seizure, impoundment or other disruption in
possession of property, and is not intended to deprive its custodian of control." Id. However,
the court found it critical that
[t]he paintings, which were scheduled to leave New York well over a year and
a half ago, are still present in this State and an indictment has not been
forthcoming. As a practical consequence of the subpoena, the Museum has been
and would continue to be precluded indefinitely from returning the paintings
to the Leopold Foundation. We conclude that the subpoena here has interfered
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The court of appeals's decision, based upon both the language and
legislative history of section 12.03, cannot be faulted as unreason-
able. As the lower appellate court and the sole dissenting judge in
this court pointed out, however, an emphasis on other language of
the statute and other parts of legislative history of section 12.03
yields a contrary conclusion. 73
7
The New York Court of Appeals's decision, however, did not end
the Schiele saga. Despite being freed from the restraints of the
grand jury subpoena, one of the paintings still could not be returned
to Austria. 8
On the very day that the court of appeals issued its decision, Mary
Jo White, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
stepped into the picture. In conjunction with the U.S. Customs
Service, she filed a federal civil action seeking the forfeiture of
Portrait of Wally, one of the two Schiele paintings.739 That evening,
significantly with the Leopold Foundation's possessory interests in the
paintings by compelling their indefinite detention in New York, and thus
effectuating a seizure.
Id.
737. See id. at 547 (Smith, J., dissenting). As the dissenting judge aptly explained:
Significantly, at one point in the statute, the term "seizure" is sandwiched
between the words "attachment" and "levy," words which have no application
in criminal law. The Legislature would not have placed a term with dual
application in criminal and civil law between two exclusively civil terms if it
intended its meaning to be both criminal and civil.... [T]he conclusion is
inescapable; without any other criminally relevant terms in the statute, the
term "seizure," which follows a listing of civil remedies, connotes civil seizures.
Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). As the dissenting judge pointed out, and the majority conceded,
the impetus underlying the enactment of section 12.03 was a civil lawsuit, [filed
in 1968, against] a well-known, out-of-State artist [whose loaned artwork to a
Buffalo museum was seized through a prejudgment attachment]. Alarmed at
the circumstances under which the art was seized, the [New York] Legislature
responded by mending a gap in the then-existing law that allowed local
creditors to seize fine art exhibits under a host of provisional remedies.
Id. at 548 (Smith, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the dissent concludes: "The legislative history
simply does not illustrate that either the sponsors or proponents of the bill ever contemplated
criminal processes." Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
738. See Jesse J. Holland, Warrant Issue in Art Dispute, AP ONLINE, Sept. 23, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 28120576.
739. See Complaint, United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Sept. 21, 1999) [hereinafter Portrait of Wally Complaint]. According to the complaint, the
painting is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 545 and 19 U.S.C. § 159a(c) (1994)
because there is probable cause to believe that the painting is stolen property under Austrian
law that was imported into the United States in violation of law. See Amended Verified
Complaint 8-11, United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept.
27, 1999) [hereinafter Portrait of Wally Amended Complaint].
The U.S. Attorney did not make a forfeiture claim against Dead City III, the other
Schiele painting, since the evidence that this painting was stolen art is not as strong.
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the U.S. Attorney obtained a federal seizure warrant preventing the
painting from leaving the United States.740 The warrant was
obtained based upon a finding of "probable cause to believe that the
Defendant in rem's stolen property [was] imported and introduced
into the United States contrary to law."41 A few days later, with the
painting still in New York, the Bondi heirs filed a federal lawsuit
seeking a declaratory judgment that Portrait of Wally belonged to
them.
742
The Schiele saga continues.
D. Warin v. Wildenstein743
In July 1999, a new Nazi-stolen artwork case was fied in the
United States.7' The case involves rare manuscripts, and the
parties are well-known personalities in the art world.74
The case involves eight rare Christian prayer books, valued at
approximately $15 million, which allegedly belonged to Alphonse
Kann, a renowned Jewish art collector in France.746 The prayer
books, known as Book of Hours, dating from the fifteenth through
seventeenth centuries, are now in the possession of Wildenstein &
Co., an international art gallery, which "has long been a legend in
740. See Seizure Warrant No. 99 MAG 1668, United States v.Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ.
9940 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 21, 1999) ("The move came hours after a state court said the
painting could go back."); see also Holland, supra note 738.
The painting was never actually seized by the federal government. Instead, MOMA
was allowed to retain custody of the painting, "keeping the same in its secure custody and
control until further order of the court." Order for Substitute Custodian, United States v.
Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 21, 1999).
741. Portrait of Wally Complaint, supra note 739, 21.
742. See Bondi v. A Painting by Egon Schiele Known as "Bildnis Vally [Or 'Wally'] Aus
Krumau" ("Portrait ofVally [Or Wally'] from Krumau), No. 99 Civ. 9986 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept.
24, 1999).
743. Complaint, Warin v. Wildenstein, No. 115413-99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 27, 1999)
[hereinafter Warin Complaint].
744. See id. 4.
745. For selective stories on this lawsuit, see Salvatore Arena, Wildensteins in $15M
Stolen-book Suit, N.Y DAILY NEWS, July 28, 1999, at 8, available in 1999 WL 17239347;
Godfrey Barker, Body Blow to the Pride of Wildenstein, EVENING STANDARD (London), Aug.
2, 1999, at 50, available in 1999 WL 19548800; and Ken Bensinger, Collectors' Heirs Sue
Wildenstein in Theft Claim, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1999, at B2.
746. See Warin Complaint, supra note 743, 29. The prayer books are written in
parchment, are hand-lettered, and contain elaborately-designed color illustrations ofreligious
figures. See id. They were commissioned by wealthy European families during the Middle
Ages. See id. 5 43; see also Arena, supra note 745, at 8.
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the art world for holding in stock greater masterpieces than any
other gallery."7
47
The lawsuit, filed in New York state court, alleges that the
manuscripts were part of Kann's collection of 1200 artworks, stolen
by the Nazis from his villa on the outskirts of Paris in 1940 after
Kann fled from France to England.74
Plaintiffs are Kann's heirs: Francis Warin, the surviving son of
Kann's nephew, and En Memoire D'Alphonse Kann, a French
association comprised of Kann's other heirs, beneficiaries, and
descendants.749
The complaint alleges that the manuscripts reappeared at
Wildenstein & Co. in 1996 (bearing a Nazi inventory marking "ka"
and a number), indicating that they were from the Kann
collection.75 °
The defendants, 81-year-old Daniel Wildenstein and his two sons,
Alec and Guy, maintain that the manuscripts did not belong to
Kann. Rather, the Wildensteins claim that the prayer books were
part of the personal collection of Georges Wildenstein, their family
patriarch, also Jewish, whose Paris art gallery likewise was looted
by the Nazis.751 The defendants asserted a claim that the Kann
claim to the manuscripts is based upon a mixup committed by the
Nazis after both families' collections were looted.752 According to the
747. Barker, supra note 745, at 50. The Wildensteins' collection of art holdings is estimated
to be worth $5 billion. See Arena, supra note 745, at 8.
748. See Warin Complaint, supra note 743, 32. After the war, Kann remained in London,
and died in 1948. See id. 7.
749. See id. 9 11-14.
750. See id. 13 5. The designation "ka" stands for "Kann, Alphonse." One of the eight
manuscripts has since been sold by Wildenstein & Co., with the other seven still in the
gallery's collection. See id. 38-39; Bensinger, supra note 745, at B2.
According to the New York Times, the Kann heirs were able to make their claims
against Wildenstein & Co. for the manuscripts as a result of the work of Hector Feliciano,
after publication of his book The Lost Museum. See FELICIANO, supra note 654; see also Alan
Riding, Stalking a Claim to Art the Nazis Looted, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 3, 1997, at C12.
Interestingly, in 1999, shortly before filing this action, the Wildensteins filed suit in France
against Feliciano for defamation, claiming that in his book, Feliciano wrongfully accused the
Wildenstein family of dealing in Nazi-stolen artwork during the war. The French trial court
dismissed the lawsuit, and the Wildensteins are appealing that ruling. See Bensinger, supra
note 745, at B2; see also U.S. Writer Wins Case of Slander, DAILY NEWS, June 24, 1999, at
10A, available in 1999 WL 19853039.
751. See Bensinger, supra note 645, at B2. While Alphonse Kann fled from France to
England, George Wilderstein fled, in 1940, from France to the United States. See Arena,
supra note 645, at 8.
752. See Arena, supra note 745, at 8.
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Wildensteins, the Nazis housed their family's collection in the same
building as the looted Kann collection, and marked the manuscripts
that came from the Wildenstein collection with "ka" in error.753
The case is presently proceeding through the pretrial process in
New York state court.
E. The Failure of Litigation
The experience of taking the above-described stolen art cases to
court shows that their litigation is prohibitively expensive. For this
reason, two of the cases involving Nazi-stolen art have settled.754
The MOMA case is still ongoing, undoubtedly because it was first
brought by the New York District Attorney, with far greater
resources than the private plaintiffs in Goodman and Rosenberg,
and is now being carried on by the U.S. Attorney. Therefore, the
adversarial litigation system may not be the best method for
resolving the claims involving Nazi-stolen art, unlike the situation
for the other Holocaust-era claims.755
753. See id. That article states:
'Mhe claims of the Alphonse Kann heirs are groundless. The manuscripts in
question were lawfully in the possession of the Wildenstein family at the time
they were looted from the Wildensteins by the Nazis." The attribution of
ownership to Kann, he added, "was a mistake originally made by the Nazis and
subsequently compounded by Allied authorities."
Id. (quoting Guy Wilderstein).
754. See Henry, supra note 688, at 3. According to Thomas Kline, attorney for the plaintiffs
in Goodman v. Searle, "I am almost at the point where I would say that if the art is worth
less than $3 million, give up." Id. (quoting Thomas Kline). In the Goodman litigation, "[tihe
costs of the case were prohibitive, and the [plaintiffs] once resorted to placing an ad in the
Anglo-Jewish press asking for donations for alegal defense fund."Id.; see also Marilyn Henry,
Recovering LootedArt:ARich Man's Game, JERUSALEMPOST, Apr. 3,1998, at 17 (discussing
costs of litigating the Goodman case); Varadarajan, supra note 697, at 11. In the Rosenberg
case, plaintiffs were also unhappy to have beenforced to litigate the matter. "[Plaintiff] Elaine
Rosenberg... said: 'here is no justification for the Seattle Art Museum forcing the
Rosenberg family to incur the expense and delay of bringing a lawsuit.'" Id.
755. See Dobrzynski, supra note 661, at El. According to Ronald S. Lauder, chairman of
the Museum of Modern Art and head of World Jewish Congress's Commission for Art
Recovery: "If we treat each case-and therell be hundreds-as front page news, with lawyers
and seizures, we'll never succeed in getting this moving in the right direction." See id. at E6
(quoting Ronald Lauder).
In February 2000, a dispute involving the painting Madonna and Child in a
Landscape, painted by the sixteenth-century German Renaissance master Lucas Cranach
the Elder, settled without litigation. See James Rosen & Tom Hamburger, Sisters Lay Claim
to N.C. Museum as Nazi Loot, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 7, 1999, at Al,
available in 1999 WL 2776644. The painting, valued at as much as $750,000, is one of the
most prized works in the North Carolina Museum of Art, located in Raleigh, North Carolina.
See id. In November 1999, the painting was claimed by two elderly sisters from Austria. See
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Since the issue arose, various proposals have been made on how
to best handle these claims outside the litigation process.
According to both parties in the Goodman v. Searle litigation:
[T]he best approach to these complex issues would be a formal
mechanism for mediation or arbitration, balancing the interests of
legitimate claimants, innocent owners, and the public that most
benefits if those works now in museums can remain there. Ideally,
negotiators could draw on a stash of public and private money to
compensate legitimate claimants.
71 6
This solution, however, may not be practicable. "The idea of a
'universal solution' involving a pool of money that would be used to
pay claimants, like the one that Swiss banks recently agreed to
establish, seems attractive theoretically. But it runs into problems
because there is no comparable single source of money for an art
fund. 757
To date, the community of museums, galleries, and art dealers
seems unwilling to create such a fund. Instead, the professional art
world leaves each defendant who unluckily ends up with a Nazi-
stolen artwork to fend for itself. This practice continues despite the
lack of communal responsibility within the art world after World
War II by turning a blind eye towards art that suddenly appeared
in the marketplace with a suspicious provenance.758
id. The painting was stolen from the sisters' great-uncle in Austria by the Gestapo, and then
wound its way from European art dealers to dealers in New York, New York, then to a
wealthy California couple and, eventually, to the North Carolina museum, which acquired
the painting in 1984. See id. After investigating the provenance of the painting, the museum
decided that it rightfully belonged to the sisters. See Emily Yellin, North Carolina Art
Museum Says It Will Return Painting Tied to Nazi Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2000, at 22.
756. Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims, supra note 659, at 14 (discussing a proposal made by
Ralph Lerner, one of defendant Searle's attorneys and "seconded by his adversary, Mr.
[Simon] Goodman"). "Winner-take-all litigation, only cost-effective for the most expensive art,
is 'a terrible waste of money, no matter how it comes out,' observed Mr. Goodman." Id.; see
also Dobrzynski, Loot-Holders Learn that Honesty Can be Tricky, supra note 702, at G3 -It
might be in the interest of the art community-auction houses, dealers, museums-to
contribute to the solution.' They could justify 'communal reasons' for their participation, he
argues, perhaps the way industry groups sometimes pay into a fund to settle class-action
claims." Id. (quoting Ori Soltes, former director of the Kutznick Jewish National Museum in
Washington, D.C., which originated the HARP project).
757. Dobrzynksi, No Easy Route to Discovering Nazi Plunder, supra note 702, at 6.
758. See Dobrzynski, Loot-Holders Learn that Honesty can be Tricky, supra note 702, at
G3. 'When the idea of levying a tax on dealers and auction houses, or their transactions, has
come up at symposiums and conferences, it has not won resounding support from the art
trade, with few people in the business feeling a responsibility for what happened in the war."
Id.
[Vol. 34:1
2000] STOLEN ART CLAIMS
Another proposal, issued by the Task Force on the Spoliation of
Art During the Nazi/World War II Era,759 created by the Association
of Art Museum Directors ("AAMD"), has been to issue guidelines to
museums to expedite both discovery and handling of Nazi-stolen
art. 6 ° However, the AAMD guidelines have been criticized as
vague, 6' and so far have been unsuccessful in either uncovering any
artwork or returning disputed works to their owners. 62
759. See Association of Art Museum Directors, Press Release, Feb. 3, 1999 (announcing
creation of Task Force) (on file with author). The press release, in part, reads:
The Association of Art Museum Directors recognizes and deplores the
systematic unlawful confiscation of art that was one of the many horrors of the
Holocaust and World War 11. The Association is committed to implementing a
mechanism for coordinating full access to the newly available documentation
on this wide-scale confiscation of art. In keeping the AAMD's Code of Ethics, the
Association reaffirms the commitment of its members to weigh, promptly and
thoroughly, claims of title to specific works.
... In order to achieve timely resolution of ownership claims relating
to art alleged to have been stolen immediately before, during and immediately
after World War II, the Association strongly recommends the creation of a
mechanism for the resolution of these claims, such as mediation, arbitration or
other forms of alternate dispute resolution.
Id. (emphasis added).
760. See Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims, supra note 659, at 14; see also Patricia Failing,
Suit to Fit, ARTNEws, Oct. 11, 1998, at 56, available in 1998 WL 19742869.
The guidelines, contained in a June 1998 report of the Task Force, mandate that
museums respond to "legitimate" claims relatingto illegal confiscation by"offer[ing] to resolve
the matter in an equitable, appropriate and mutually agreeable manner." The Spoliation of
Art During the NazilWorld War I1 Era (1933-1945), Part II, Guidelines D.2 & E.2, June 4,
1998, reprinted in AAMD TASK FORCE REPORT (visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http-//www.aamd.
orgJguideln.shtm> [hereinafter AAMD TASK FORCE REPORT].
761. See Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims, supra note 659, at 14. For instance, for guidelines
D2 and E2, no guidance is given as to what constitutes a"legitimate" claim. See AAMD TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 760, Part I, Guidelines D.2 & E.2. The suggestion to museums
to "offer to resolve" the legitimate claim in"an equitable, appropriate, and mutually agreeable
manner" is meaningless, and provides no specifics as to what a museum should do when faced
with a claim that it possesses art stolen during World War H. See id.
These guidelines, and the creation of a Museum Task Force, appear to be more a
public relations exercise, rather than a real attempt to deal with the problem. Manhattan
District Attorney Robert Morgenthau appears to agree that the Task Force will have a
minimal impact. See Walter V. Robinson, Judge Rejects Seizure of Disputed Paintings from
a N.Y. Museum, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 1998, at A4. Referring to his case against MOMA,
Morgenthau stated: "I am pleased to learn that 53 years after the end of World War 11,
museum directors have established a task force to address the question of looted art. Would
they have done so if it had not been for our investigation?" Id.; see also Walter V. Robinson,
Judge Rejects Seizure ofDisputed Paintings from a N.Y. Museum; DA Rebuffed on Art Nazis
May Have Looted, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 1998, at A4.
For additional discussion and critique of the AAMD guidelines, see Rosenbaum, Will
Museums in U.S. Purge Nazi-Tainted Art?, supra note 659, at 37.
762. See Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims, supra note 659, at 14. The AAMD claims credit,
however, for the return of Matisse's Odalisque to its rightful owners. See Lowe, supra note
697 ("'The Seattle Art Museum did the right thing. They followed the guidelines set out for
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In late 1998, in reaction to the Schiele case, a proposal began
circulating in New York that would change existing New York law
to limit the time during which art theft victims could recover stolen
objects.763 Presently, under New York's "demand and refusal rule,"
an art theft victim does not have to take action until the victim
locates the stolen art object. 6 ' A three-year statute of limitations
begins to run when the victim's demand to return the stolen object
is refused. 65 Under the proposal, a victim of an artwork theft would
have, in all instances, six years to file suit in New York to recover
the theft. 66 The victim must also register the theft with the Art Loss
Register ("ALR"), a privately-owned, for-profit directory database of
50,000 stolen and missing artworks. 6 ' Failure by a victim to
register the stolen artwork with ALR could immunize a good faith
purchaser from suit.76 Purchasers would also be required to check
with ALR before their purchase to show their "due diligence" as a
good faith buyer.769 Holocaust victims would be allowed more
time-ten years, according to some-to make claims, or be forever cut
off from claiming looted art."7
handling these cases,' said a spokesperson for AAMD.").
Similar criticisms can be made for the so-called Washington Principles, an 11-point
plan created at the December 1998 Conference on Holocaust Era Assets held in Washington
D.C. and attended by delegates from 44 countries. See Kempster, supra note 654, at Fl.
The 11 guidelines are extremely vague, "call[ing] for such steps as opening museum
archives to facilitate provenance research, publicly announcing unrestituted art, and devising
a 'just and fair solution' for looted works whose owners cannot be identified." Henry &
Czernin, supra note 661, at 68. Moreover, the Washington Principles are nonbinding. "'They
are moral commitments .... How they are applied is up to governments, individual auction
houses, galleries, and museums.'" Id. (quoting J.D. Bindernagel, State Department senior
coordinator of the Washington Conference).
763. See Sylvia Hochfield, Statute with Limitations?, ARTNEWs, Nov. 1, 1998, at 57,
available in 1998 WL 19732936.
764. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 1999) (discussing the statute of limitations).
765. See discussion and notes supra Part V.A. (discussing New York's "demand and
refusal" rule).
766. See Hochfield, supra note 763, at 57.
767. See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 666, at 203.
ALR, an international for-profit clearinghouse that began operations in 1991,
represents a complex alliance of London insurance brokerages, such as Lloyd's
of London; major auction houses, including Sotheby's, Christie's and Phillips;
and IFAR [the International Foundation of Art Research, established by a
group of attorneys, art historians, and scientists to study and combat
fraudulent art practices] .... Dealers, collectors, museums, and other interested
parties can register items with ALR in either New York or London or can
search the register for a small fee. The service is free to all police authorities.
Id.
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The proposal, remarkably similar to one made in a 1995 law
review article written in the aftermath of Solomon R. Guggenheim
Foundation v. Lubell,771 was opposed by the various groups dealing
with Nazi-stolen art, including HARP and CAR.772 A major practical
problem was
how the register will make itself known.... [Tiheft victims' "could
protect their rights in New York State only by knowing about this law
and knowing about this registry. But there's nothing in the proposal
about how the registry is going to inform someone who lives in Kiev or
Ankara or Beijing or New Delhi that if they don't register their stolen
object, and it turns up in New York, they have no chance of reclaiming
it."
7 73
Finally, the private market may also offer a partial solution. In
August 1998, the Financial Times reported that museums and
galleries may soon be able to purchase insurance to cover losses due
771. See 569 N.E.2d 426,429 (N.Y. 1991) (adopting a"demand and refusal" rule for statute
of limitations); see also Hawkins, supra note 661, at 89-94. For an additional discussion of
that article, see infra note 777.
772. See Hochfield, supra note 763, at 57. The proposal was backed by Ashton Hawkins,
general counsel to the Metropolitan Museum ofArt, and Ronald S. Tauber, chairman ofALR.
See id.
773. Hochfield, supra note 763, at 57 (quoting Constance Lowenthal, director of CAR).
Another objection was "to the idea that a single database is adequate for research into
Holocaust claims, which are usually vague. There are hundreds of thousands of missing
artworks of all sorts.... The great majority of them will never be recovered and claimed
because they can't be identified.'" Id. (quoting Willi Korte, vice-chairman of HARP).
A partial solution, at least to the problem of informing buyers and sellers of art
worldwide, is the creation of a database accessible to anyone in the world on the Internet.
Already, such an online registry is being created in Germany. German museums would post
descriptions of artworks with a suspected provenance at this online registry, and would list
their entire collection of prewar artworks and cultural objects acquired after 1933. See Carol
J. Williams, Web Site to List Artworks Lost to the Nazis, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 16, 2000, at A28.
The Web site for the registry is <http:www.beutekunst.de>. The registry has a launch date
of March 2000 and will make it possible for Holocaust survivors or their heirs to learn
whether works stolen from their families may have found their way to museums in Germany.
See id.
The Czech government is now also turning to the Internet as a solution to its
problems in locating Nazi-stolen art. See Government Draws List of Former Jewish Property,
CZECH NEWS AGENCY, Jan 12, 2000, available in 2000 WL 6919746. The article states:
Some 2,500 items of art from the state collections originate from the
property confiscated by Nazis during World War II from the Czech Jewish
community, according to a report by the government commission of victims of
the Holocaust given to the cabinet today.
Commission head Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky said that the
commission intended to publish the pictures of the items on the Internet. "If
descendants of some of those families are found by chance.., it is our will to
return the property to its original owners," Rychetsky said.
Id. The article does not list a Web site.
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to disputes over the rightful ownership of art.77 An insurance policy,
to be offered by J&H Marsh & McLennan and underwritten by
Lloyd's of London,775 "will cover legal costs of defending lawsuits
over so-called 'defective title' as well as losses if a judgment goes
against the museum leading to the return of artwork. Cover[age] is
available with limits up to $50 m[illion]." v76
While existing law in the United States may be favorable to the
heirs of past owners of Nazi-stolen art777 by never giving good title
to the present owners, even if they are entirely innocent (in contrast
to some European systems),77 plaintiffs filing lawsuits in the United
States find such suits to be expensive, slow, and often ineffective. 79
Because these are all individual suits, the cost spreading benefits
of class action litigation are not available for these cases. Each
774. See Jim Kelly, Insurer to Cover Art Ownership Disputes, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.
17, 1998, at 6, available in 1998 WL 23266787. "Janice Lopatkin, of the [London-based]
Holocaust Education Trust, said: 'My initial reaction to the new insurance policy is that it
would lead to more openness-which is to be encouraged.' Observers believe museums would
be more likely to discuss disputed works with the assurance of a policy." Id.
775. See Jill Treanor, Insurers and Galleries Under Scrutiny: Hunt for Nazi Loot Moves
On, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 14, 1998, at 21, available in 1998 WL 3114448.
776. Kelly, supra note 774, at 6.
777. See Hawkins et al., supra note 661, at 89-94. That article, written in reaction to the
New York Court of Appeals Lubell case, see supra note 771, proposes to make it more difficult
for former owners or heirs of stolen art to recover against good faith possessors of such art.
See id. The authors seek to strike a balance between the two innocent parties by proposing
a statute, to be enacted at either the federal or state level, creating a confidential,
computerized international art theft registry, to which both former owners and purchasers
would turn to when dealing with stolen art. See id. Former owners would register their stolen
art, and purchasers would turn to the registry to check the provenance of art they are
considering to purchase. See id. This proposal, so far, has proven to be a nonstarter. With
more sophisticated use of computer technology, and especially the Internet, the proposal may
become more attractive over time.
As the authors of this article recognize, however, "[i]t must be understood that no
solution, legislative or otherwise, will be perfect. Under any legislation, some innocent party -
whether the former owner or the purchaser-will be saddled unfairly with the loss." Id. at 54.
778. See id. at 69-76. As the authors of this article explain: "Indeed, the tort of conversion
is unique in that it permits a plaintiff [former owner] to recover property or money damages
from a defendant [present good faith possessor] who is by definition innocent of any
wrongdoing or of inflicting harm to the plaintiff." Id. at 50. The principle under English
common law is based upon the adage in Latin: "Nemo dat quod non habet" (No one can give
what he does not have), so that a thief cannot transfer good title, since the thief never had
good title in the first place. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1037 (6th ed. 1990).
779. See Henry, supra note 688, at 17; LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 666, at 550. As
explained in a leading treatise on the subject: "Legal remedies available in the United States
to foreign nations and citizens of foreign nations from which cultural property has been stolen
or smuggled have proved to be cumbersome and inadequate." Id. The same can be said for
former heirs or heirs who are United States nationals, and are seeking the return of stolen
art.
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claimant must bear the total amount of expenses and, unless the
work of art is highly-prized, an attorney is unlikely to handle the
case on a contingency basis."' °
An alternative dispute resolution mechanism would be the best
method of resolving future disputes of such claims. 8 ' Also, some-
thing else is required. As put by one commentator: "The key to
resolving all such disputes is goodwill. As Evan Maurer, director of
the Minneapolis Institute, recently told the local press, 'There is no
statute of limitations on doing the right thing."'7 2
780. See Smadar Shefi, The Treasures WereReturned to Their Owners-And Sold, HA'ARETZ
(Israel), June 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17469079. The heirs of the past owners of the
art are unlikely to be wealthy, and, therefore, unable to hire an attorney on a fee basis. As
explained by a commentator:
It is reasonable to assume that many of the stolen works would be put up for
sale if they were returned to their legal owners' descendants. The families of
the collectors who were robbed have lost the source of wealth that made this
kind of collecting possible. This, by the way, is one reason for the paucity of
claims filed by heirs-it is extremely costly to undertake legal proceedings
against collectors, museums and government institutions that, unwittingly, are
in possession of stolen property.
Id.
781. See Alan G. Artner, Ethics and Art Museums Struggle for Correct Response to Stolen
Art Claims, C-. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1998, at 6, available in 1998 WL 2886288. Both CAR and the
AAMD "are in favor ofmediation between claimants and museums once a legitimate instance
arises." Id. According to Constance Lowenthal of CAR:
[O]ne of the reasons we would like mediation to be considered is that then the
people who are guidingthe negotiations are really familiar with the constraints,
the needs, the ethics, and the ways of the art world-which most judges are not.
It is very specialized. And while many judges would love to have such a case,
it's almost always their first.
Id. James Wood, Director of the Art Institute of Chicago, agrees:
These cases are tremendously emotional. They often get tried in the press.
When that happens, it introduces other aspects and positions harden. If either
party really feels he could win [a lawsuit], mediation will not help. But most
cases are pretty gray. And those are the kind of situations that can be resolved
through mediation, skillfully applied. With a jury trial, who knows?
Id.
782. Rosenbaum, Nazi Loot Claims, supra note 659, at 14 (quoting Evan Maurer).

VI. SLAVE LABOR CLAIMS
A. Background
Between eight and ten million people. 3 were forced to work as
slave laborers.. in factories in Germany and throughout occupied
783. See John Authers et al., Unsettled Business, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1998, at
14 (claiming eight million); German Ex-slave Workers Plan Action, AP ONLINE, Nov. 6, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 22415808 (claiming nine million); Ian Traynor, Schroder Tries to
Hammer out Settlement for Slave Labourers, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 23, 1998, at 19
(claiming ten million).
According to the Nuremberg judgment, "[t]he German occupation authorities did
succeed in forcing many of the inhabitants... to work for the German war effort, and in
deporting at least 5,000,000 persons to Germany to serve German industry and agriculture."
The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 123 (1946). The Tribunal quotes Himmler as stating, "[W]e
have 6-7 million foreigners in Germany." Id. at 124.
N.B. "Nirnberg"is the German spelling for the city. See RANDOMHOUSEUNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 1331 (2d ed. 1993). The F.R.D. is one of the only English-language texts where
the German spelling of the city name is used. It is more commonly known as "Nuremberg,"
which is the English spelling and the one used throughout this article, except when citing to
the F.R.D.
784. The term "slave" is a misnomer. As explained by Benjamin Ferencz, one of the
American prosecutors at Nuremberg, in his incisive treatise:
The Jewish concentration camp workers were less than slaves. Slavemasters
care for their human property and try to preserve it; it was the Nazi plan and
intention that the Jews would be used up and then burned. The term "slave" is
used in this [book] only because our vocabulary has no precise word to describe
the lowly status of unpaid workers who are earmarked for destruction.
BENJAMIN B. FERENCz, LESS THAN SLAVES: JEWISH FORCED LABOR AND THE QUEST FOR
COMPENSATION at xvii (1979). For a more recent treatment of the subject, see generally
ULRICH HERBERT, HITLER'S FOREIGN WORKERS: ENFORCED FOREIGN LABOR IN GERMANY
UNDER THE THIRD REICH (William Templer trans., 1995).
The Germans used the term "Zwangsarbeiter" (forced laborer) to describe their slave
laborers. See Authers, supra note 783, at 14.
According to plaintiffs' attorney Deborah Sturman,
the term "Zwangsarbeit" is a sanitized German term for forced labor. There were
always clear distinctions in the manner the various slaves were treated.
(Himmler issued clear orders detailing such minutiae as how many calories,
blankets and hours of free time each class of "sub-humans" was to receive. So, for
example, Ukranians and Poles were to receive fewer calories and blankets than
Czechs.) The most severe treatment was reserved for those to be annihilated
through labor (Vernichtung durch Arbeit). Less severe treatment was afforded
those who were to be treated as capital assets. But, there too distinctions were
made. Distinguishing the groups of laborers.., is necessary to... takef into
account the degree of the victims' suffering. In fact, more discreet distinctions
could be made, for example, between those slaves (i) which were household maids
and butlers (good treatment); (ii) who worked on farms (generally satisfactory
treatment); (iii) who worked in industry (bad treatment); and (iv) those who were
earmarked for extermination (deathly treatment)."
Letter from Deborah Sturman to Professor Michael Bazyler, supra note 359, at 3-4.
In the recent lawsuits against German companies, plaintiffs' lawyers have begun to
distinguish between "slave laborers" and "forced laborers," defining the former as
"concentration camp inmates earmarked for extermination" and the latter as "conquered
191
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Europe785 during World War II. Historians estimate that approxi-
mately 700,000 of these are still alive today, with some estimates
placing the number as high as 2.3 million slave labor survivors.786
An historical study in August 1999 based upon Nazi records
discovered in newly-opened Soviet archives787 revealed the vast
array of German companies that "profited from what has been
civilian population and prisoners of war." See, e.g., Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand
122, Rosenberg v. Continental AG, No. 99 CV 01892 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 1999); Class Action
Complaint and Jury Demand 1 13, Nittenberg v. BMW AG, No. 99 CV 0756 (D.N.J. Feb. 19,
1999). However, such a distinction was never adopted by the Nuremberg Tribunal. See The
Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 123-26 (discussing slave labor policies of the Nazis). The Ferencz
treatise likewise uses the terms "slave labor" and "forced labor" interchangeably. In the Swiss
bank litigation, the same attorneys also did not make a distinction between the two terms.
See discussion and notes infra Part III.A. (discussing federal class action lawsuits against the
Swiss). The two recent court decisions in the Iwanowa and Degussal/Siemens lawsuits also
used the terms interchangeably. See discussion and notes infra Part VI.C. & D. (discussing
lawsuits filed and dismissed to date).
For these reasons, this article will not distinguish between the two terms. Rather,
the term "slave labor," adopted at Nuremberg, is used herein to describe the work of all
those forced to toil for the Nazis. But see Letter from Deborah Sturman to Professor
Michael Bazyler, supra note 359, at 3-4.
785. As explained by Miles Lerman, chairman of the Washington D.C. Memorial Council
and a Holocaust survivor himself:
It was not coincidental that IG Farben or any other industrial complex in
Germany settled themselves around Auschwitz-Birkenau. They were getting
labour for 10 cents a day. We are interested not in the dollars and cents but the
fact that it was by design. They were trying to utilise and benefit from every
aspect of the prisoners. First, their labour, then they were gassed for their hair,
their gold teeth and even their bones were crushed and used as fertiliser.
Richard Wolffe, Putting a Price on the Holocaust, IRISH TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1999, at 15, available
in 1999 WL 14002124 (quoting Miles Lerman).
786. See Authers, supra note 783, at 14 (estimating 700,000 living); Roger Cohen, German
Companies Set up Fund for Slave Laborers under Nazis, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al
(citing the figure of 1.6 million surviving slave laborers, with over 500,000 living in Poland
alone, according to Michael Witti, German lawyer representing slave laborers); Fifth ofNazi-
forced Laborers Still Alive, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Aug. 21, 1999, at A7 (discussing
report issued by Nathan Associates, a Virginia-based economic consulting firm hired by
plaintiffs' attorneys, estimating that about 2.3 million people who survived enslavement by
the Nazis are still alive). But see id. (estimating that 100,000 to 200,000 slave laborers and
about 600,000 ex-forced laborers are alive today and would qualify for any compensation).
In November 1998, the American television program Dateline NBC profiled the slave
labor issue. For a transcript of the program, featuring interviews with former slave laborers
living in the United States see Dateline: Just Rewards? German Companies that Used Jewish
Slave Labor Being Sued Now for Damages (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 10, 1998),
available in 1998 WL 22610135.
787. Since the Soviet Red Army liberated Auschwitz and many other German
concentration camps, the Nazi records languished in Soviet archives until the breakup of the
Soviet Union in 1991 and are only now becoming available to historians. See Douglas Davis,
Documents Reveal Ford Was Part of the Auschwitz Industrial Complex (visited Aug. 22,1999)
<http://www.jta.org/aug99/22-ford.htm>. The new study was conducted by historians at the
Auschwitz Museum in Poland, who pored over the Soviet archives for several years before
revealing their findings. See id.
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dubbed the 'Holocaust bonanza.'"78 ' Over 400 German companies
exploited the large pool of slave labor the Nazis made available to
German private industry."9 Of the 400 companies, 92 companies
used slave labor from Buchenwald, 57 from Mauthausen, 52 from
Dachau, and 51 from Auschwitz.79 °
While postwar West Germany paid reparations to some Jewish
victims of Nazi persecution,7 91 slave laborers were specifically
excluded from receiving payment. Former German slave laborers
found themselves in a "Catch-22" type of situation: the German
government claimed that it was not obligated to make payments to
them, since the laborers worked during the war for private German
industry; German industry, on the other hand, argued that any
payments should come from government coffers, since the postwar
German regime was the legal successor to the Third Reich. The
788. Adam LeBor, SlaveLabouratAuschwitz Used byFord, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug.
20,1999, at 8, available in 1999 WL 21262339. Apparently, "the information recently released
from Moscow didn't significantly expand preexisting knowledge. In fact the International
Tracing Service published a book in the early 1960s listing over 1,500 companies which used
slave and forced labor." Letter from Deborah Sturman to Professor Michael Bazyler, supra
note 359, at 4.
789. See LeBor, supra note 788, at 8. According to plaintiffs' attorney Deborah Sturman,
The number of companies which used slave labor exceeded 20,000. According to
Ulrich Herbert, the foremost expert on the subject, there wasn't a company in
Germany with more than 10 employees which didn't use slave or forced labor.
There were also many with fewer than 10 employees which did. There were even
numerous households with slave laborers as maids and butlers.
Letter from Deborah Sturman to Professor Michael Bazyler, supra note 359, at 4.
790. See id.; see also Davis, supra note 787. One of the companies discovered to have
recruited slave laborers from Auschwitz was Ford Werke A.G., Ford Motor Company's
German subsidiary. For allegations andlitigation against Ford, see discussion and notes infra
Part VI.C., D. (discussing the lawsuits filed and their dismissals, respectively).
791. See Traynor, supra note 783, at 19. Since the 1950s, Germanyhas paid approximately
$70 billion in reparations. See id. But see Cohen, supra note 786, at Al (citing figure of $80
billion); Roger Cohen, Talks on Holocaust Reparations Held, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1999, at A9
(citing figure of $60 billion). In addition, Germany "more recently... has paid DM1.5 bn into
trust funds set up in eastern Europe, in Moscow, Minsk, Kiev and Warsaw for Nazi victims,
including those forced to work for German industry." Authers, supra note 783, at 14. For a
discussion of German reparation payments, see generally CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYINGFORTHE
PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER REPARATIONS FOR SURVIVING VIcTIMS OF THE NAZi TERROR
(Belinda Cooper trans., 1998).
No German industrialist was brought to trial at Nuremberg for use of slave labor. See
Mathew Lippman, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists: The 'Other Schindlers," 9
TEMPLE INT'L & COMP. L.J. 173, 266 (1995) (footnote omitted). After Nuremberg, the United
States initiated prosecutions of representatives of three German firms: Flick, Farben, and
Krupp. See id. Found guilty, the corporate defendants, however, served short prison terms.
See id. By the early 1950s, they were released and allowed to return to lead their firms in
postwar West Germany. See id. As summarized by one recent study: "The [German]
industrialists left prison and almost immediately regained their place at the pinnacle of
power." Id.
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German firms maintained that the Nazi regime forced them to use
slave laborers to support the German wartime economy during
World War II.792
B. The German Fund Proposal and Fear of American Litigation
In October 1998, the new center-left Chancellor of Germany,
Gerhard Schroeder, reversed his predecessor, Helmut Kohl,7 and
announced the creation of a fund to compensate former slave
laborers and others not covered under existing German reparation
law.794 By that time, however, plaintiffs' lawyers in the Swiss bank
litigation, buoyed by the success of their $1.25 billion settlement,
had already begun filing suits in American courts against various
German-and even American-companies seeking damages for their
use of slave labor during World War II."' Even announcements by
792. See Germany to Compensate Nazi Slave Laborers, 'Forgotten Victims, L.A_ TIMES, Oct.
21,1998, at A8. "Since World War II, Germany has paid billions in compensation to Holocaust
victims: Yet it rejected claims of back wages for slave laborers, saying the companies involved
were responsible .... Most German firms, though, argued that the government, as legal
successor to the Nazi regime, should be accountable." Id.
According to Bernard Graef, head of Volkswagen archives, "From a legal position the
crimes of the Nazis were a state crime, and the issue of slave labour compensation must be
addressed to the [German] government." Adam Lebor, Holocaust Slaves Set to Gain
Compensation, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 22, 1998, at 15.
793. See Jerry H. Meldon, Dirty Secrets as Germans Go to the Polls, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
26, 1998, at A19; Kohl:No More State Money for Holocaust Victims, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12179218.
794. See Traynor, supra note 783, at 19. The new chancellor appointed his chief-of-staff,
Bodo Hombach, to head a joint German government-industry group to work out the
mechanics of such a fund. See id. In July 1999, Hombach was replaced by Otto Graf
Lambsdorff, a highly-respected member of the opposition, former economics minister and a
count. See Andrew McCathie Berlin, Nazi Ghost Still Not Banished, AUsTL. FIN. REV., July
30, 1999, at 37, available in 1999 WL 19335541.
In November 1998, some former slave laborers living in the United States announced
that they would fight plans to set up the compensation group, desiring instead to "settle their
claims individually or on a class-action basis" in U.S. courts. German Ex-slave Workers Plan
Action, supra note 783.
795. According to Michael Hausfeld, a lead attorney in the Holocaust litigation cases,
"The Swiss banks settlement dramatically changed the landscape of restitution
on behalf of victims from all other sources". . . . Among other companies
"responsible for wrongly appropriating, inverting or outright stealing assets from
the victims of the Holocaust," Mr. Hausfeld said, there is a sense that "if the
Swiss banks were beaten, there really is no hope for them."
Battle Brews on Insurance Pact, FORWARD, Aug. 28, 1998, at 3, available in 1998 WL
11416497; see also Authers, supra note 783, at 14; Mitchell Danow, Swiss Settlement Adds
Momentum to Holocaust-era Claims in Europe, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIcAGENCY, Aug. 18,1998,
at 3, available in 1998 WL 11404011. According to the London-based Financial Times,
Anyone who thought that [the Swiss bank settlement] marked the end of
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some German companies in late 1998 that they would set up
commissions to investigate their role during the Nazi era796 and
voluntarily make payments to their former slave laborers still
alive,797 did not dissuade "slave labor" plaintiffs and their lawyers
from continuing their lawsuits.798
the campaign by Jewish organizations for restitution has had a rude awakening.
Far from dying down, the number of European banks, insurance companies and
industrial companies that are under pressure to make similar settlements is
snowballing.
According to Edward Fagan, [another lead attorney in Holocaust
litigation]: "We all did a disservice to survivors when we allowed the public
perception to be focused towards just looking at the Swiss banks as the Nazi
banks. They weren't the only ones, and the origin was back in Germany" ....
According to Mr. Fagan, many of his clients want 'another Nuremberg,"
preferably with a German bank or industrial company.
Authers, supra note 783, at 14.
796. See Barry Meier, Chronicles of Collaboration: Historians Are in Demand to Study
Corporate Ties to Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at Cl. A favorite method taken up by
German and American companies to counter the class action litigation and shore up their
public image, in the wake of accusations of Nazi-era dealings, has been to "try to come clean"
by hiring prominent academics to research the companies' role during the Hitler era and issue
a report of their findings. See id. As reported by the New York Times, "the lawsuits have also
created a mini-boom for... [World War fl-era] historians and research [scholars]."Id.
The Swiss andAmerican companies are emulatinga strategyinventedin Switzerland.
In 1996, the Swiss government, to counter the widespread bashing of the Swiss (and, to its
credit, to face up to its history), set up "the Independent Commission of Experts, an
independent group of internationally recognized historians chaired by Professor Francois
Bergier ... to examine Switzerland's relationship with Nazi Germany." Settlement
Agreement supra note 265, at 1. The Bergier Commission then began issuing highly
respected-and critical-reports of the Swiss role during World War H. See Marilyn Henry,
Swiss Helped Nazis by Shutting Borders to Fleeing Jews, JERUSALEMPOST, Dec. 12,1999, at
1. This method countered criticisms that the Swiss are trying to hide their dealings with the
Nazis. See id.
797. See Advertisement: Volkswagen AG Humanitarian Fund for GrantingAid to Former
Forced Laborers, L.A TIMES, Dec. 4,1998, at All (publicizing the fund in a full-page VW ad);
Carol J. Williams, VWSetting up Fund to Pay Nazi-era Slave Laborers, L.A.- TIMES, Sept. 12,
1998, at A6 (announcing a $12 million private relief fund for their former slave laborers by
Volkswagen); IG Farben to Set up Holocaust Fund, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1999, at A10
(announcing a $1.6 millionfund to compensate wartime slave laborers by a notorious German
chemicals concern that worked thousands to death in Nazi camps and manufactured death
gas). A spokesperson for the IG Farben survivors group called the amount "laughably small"
and demanded that the company, ordered by the Allies to be liquidated after the war,
complete its liquidation and distribute to survivors $11 million in assets that it still holds. See
Survivors Want Gas Co. Liquidated, AP ONLINE, Aug. 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL
22034473.
798. As explained incisively in the Los Angeles Times:
But as young Germans seek to move out of the war's shadows and establish a
"post-postwar" society governed from Berlin, a rash of lawsuits demanding
compensation for tens of thousands of wartime slave laborers is undermining the
argument that Germans have earned the right to move on. The captains of the
industry have not even paid their financial debt to wartime victims, argue
advocates for the claimants, much less reached the end of moral atonement.
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As reported by the Economist:
Now that Switzerland's two largest banks have settled... the finger
is pointing at German and Austrian firms that benefitted from slave
labor during the second world war. Since the $1.25 billion Swiss
settlement earlier this year, the number of lawsuits against such
companies has snowballed .... The list of firms now accused reads like
a who's who of corporate Germany: it includes Siemens, BMW,
Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz, MAN and Phillip Holzmann, as well as two
Austrian groups, Voest and Steyr-Daimler-Puch. The number of
targeted firms may soon reach 100."'
Hoping to stop the litigation in its tracks, the German government
and industry announced in February 1999 the establishment of a
$1.7 billion fund to compensate slave laborers."' 0 German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder made it obvious that the fund was being created
as a means to shortcut lawsuits filed against German industry in
the United States."' Such admission is astounding because it
Carol J. Williams, Exhibit No. 1: Delayed Holocaust Memorial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1999, at
A4. According to the London-based Economist, the fear of American-style litigation is, in part,
a reason why German government and industry is finally paying attention to the claims of
slave laborers. See Germany: Can It Be Normal? The More the Germans Try to Look to the
Future, The More Their Past Seems to Return to Haunt Them, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998, at
51, available in 1998 WL 11700921. "Why now? Partly because of the claims now being made
against German firms by lawyers, particularly in America, acting on behalf of former slave
labourers under the Nazis." Id.
799. Companies and the Holocaust: Industrial Actions, EcoNOMisT, Nov. 14, 1998, at 75,
available in 1998 WL 11700614. The Germans apparently
want to manage their public relations better than the ham-fisted Swiss, and to
avoid the threat of sanctions against their American subsidiaries .... "Things are
moving quickly," Mr. [Edward] Fagan [representing the plaintiffs in the U.S.
litigation] says. "But if they slow, we'll cause those firms so much pain that the
Swiss fuss will seem like a catwalk in comparison."
Id.
800. See Cohen, supra note 786, at Al. The so-called "Remembrance, Responsibility and
the Future Fund" is being set up "to answer the 'moral responsibility of German firms with
regard to such issues as forced laborers, Aryanization and other injustice during the Nazi
regime.'"Id. (quoting German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder). In February 1999, at the
time of the announcement, Schroeder predicted that payments to slave laborers would begin
by September 1, 1999, exactly sixty years after Germany attacked Poland, marking the start
of World War II. See id. The September 1 deadline was not met. See infra notes 811-12 and
accompanying text.
Moreover, according to a German lawyer representing the slave laborers, the
estimated 1.6 million slave labor survivors of World War II (with more than 500,000 living
in Poland) would receive only $1000 each if payments were divided equally. See Cohen, supra
note 786, atAl (quoting attorney Michael Witti). Ironically, the longer the issue of slave labor
compensation is perpetuated, the fewer survivors will be left, with more monies going to each
still-living survivor. See id.
801. See Cohen, supra note 786, at Al. In the February 1999 announcement, Chancellor
Schroeder explicity stated that the fund was being established "to counter lawsuits,
particularly class action suits, and to remove the basis of the campaign being led against
SLAVE LABOR CLAIMS
explicitly demonstrates the strength of the American system of
justice.
Fear of American litigation led the Germans to capitulate and
agree to pay the slave laborers. 0 2 Until the lawsuits were filed in
the United States, both German industry and the German govern-
ment were able to avoid dealing with the issue.
Under the plan announced by Chancellor Schroeder in February
1999, the slave labor fund would have been financed entirely by
German industry, with twelve prominent German companies
originally agreeing to participate.0 3 The German government would
not be making any contribution to the fund, but was expected to
establish a state "German Federal Fund" in the future.80 4
German government and industry then began negotiations with
various Jewish organizations and plaintiffs' attorneys in the United
States on the details of the fund. The first meeting was held at the
State Department, and chaired by then-Undersecretary of State
Stuart Eiszenstat, the Clinton Administration's "point man" on
Holocaust issues.0 5 The major obstacle, like in the negotiations with
German industry and our country." Id. (emphasis added). According to the New York Times,
the announcement of the fund "was clearly aimed at stopping a wave of lawsuits in American
courts against German companies that used slave labor and forced labor during World War
II." Id.; see also Michael Hirsch, A Nazi-era Bill Finally Comes Due, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22,
1999, at 40 ('German companies are ready to compensate,' Schroeder told reporters last
week. But he wants a 'high degree of legal certainty.' Translation: we'll pay, but no more
lawsuits.").
802. See Cohen, supra note 786, at Al. As explained by Michael Witti, a German lawyer
representing many of the slave laborers: "This is an inadequate and embarrassing statement'
.... It is not a question of campaigns by anybody. It is a question of Holocaust victims' rights
that have been denied by these corporations for decades." Id. According to Eugene Dubow, the
head of the American Jewish Committee in Germany, "If Mr. Schroeder thinks there is a
campaign against Germany, perhaps he does not totally understand the issue of people
waiting 50 years for justice." Id.
803. See id. The 12 original companies are: three German automotive giants,
DaimlerChrysler, Volkswagen and BMW; two German banks, Deutsche Bank and Dresdner
Bank; two German chemical and pharmaceutical concerns, Bayer and Degussa; one German
insurance company, Allianz; and three other blue chip German industrial companies, Krupp,
BASF and Hoechst. The 12 participants invited other German companies tojoin the fund and
make a contribution. See id.
Later, four additional German companies agreed to join the fund: Siemens,
Commerzbank, Veba, and RAG, making a total of 16 German companies participating. See
Roger Cohen, Germans Lag in Reaching Slave Labor Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1999,
at All.
804. See Cohen, supra note 803, at All; see also Holocaust Fund May Be Matched, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1999, at A4 (discussing proposal by German companies to have German
government match amount of the industry fund).
805. See Cohen, supra note 803, at All.
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the Swiss banks, was money. Both plaintiffs' attorneys, representing
the uncompensated slave laborers, and American Jewish leaders
unanimously felt that the $1.7 billion offered by the Germans was
woefully inadequate." 6
In June 1999, as the German companies scheduled a news
conference in Berlin on the eve of the second negotiating session to
be held in Germany and to announce some specifics about the fund
that they named "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,"
negotiations almost broke down.8 °7 While this announcement was
positively described by some as "the first comprehensive proposal
raised on slave labor issues by German firms since lawsuits on these
matters were first filed,"8"' the claimants' representatives and
Jewish leaders severely criticized this unilateral move by the
Germans."0 9 In fact, this unilateral announcement made in the
806. See id. "The sticking point really is the numbers .... Although the talks have been
going on since February [1999], the sides are some way apart.'" Id. (quoting Alissa Kaplan,
Jewish Claims Conference spokeswoman).
807. See Henry Weinstein, Firms Offer Fund for WWII Slave Labor, L.A. TIMES, June 11,
1999, at Al. Claimants and their representatives also criticized the unilateral nature of this
public announcement by the German firms. See id. According to Michael Hausfeld, one of the
claimants' attorneys:
We were led to believe.., that we were engaging in a process where there would
be working groups and a confidential exchange of information and ideas, leading
each side to assess the viability of a workable resolution .... Instead they
unilaterally... announce a program that is totally unacceptable in tone and
terms.
Id. at A35. Hausfeld's co-counsel, Melvyn Weiss, stated that "plaintiffs' lawyers would
continue to press the lawsuits." Id. Weiss stated that he "would participate in no further
meetings until the German companies agreed to engage in what he called meaningful
negotiations." Id.
American Jewish leaders also "expressed dismay about the German plan." Id. Stuart
Eizenstat "told representatives of the German companies ... that their move had not been
helpful to the process and that aspects of the [fund] proposal were unacceptable." Id.
808. Id. at A35.
809. See id. Four major criticisms were leveled at the German companies' June 1999
proposal. First, former slave laborers, their representatives, and Jewish leaders all agreed
that $1.7 billion, which appeared to be the amount the German consortium was offering, did
not even come close to being considered adequate compensation. See id. As eloquently put by
Professor Burt Neuborne, one of plaintiffs' counsel, "'[t]he human heart simply isn't big
enough to provide enough money for what happened to these people.'" Id. (quoting Burt
Neuborne). Melvyn Weiss, another lead counsel for the plaintiffs, stated, "'[w]e're not going
to buy into a prepackaged plan that's going to be shoved down the victims' throats. Who are
they kidding-$1.7 billion?'" German Companies Withold Payments, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), June 11, 1999, at D3, available in 1999 WL 20264497 (quoting Melvyn Weiss).
Second, the claimants also found it ironic that the German companies were calling
their establishment of the fund a voluntary "humanitarian" act while insisting, at the same
time, that "no payments would be made until they got assurances that the lawsuits [in the
United States] would be dismissed." Weinstein, supra note 807, atA35. According to Professor
Neuborne, '[c]alling this charity' is absurd." Id. (quoting Burt Neuborne). Elan Steinberg, of
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midst of intense negotiations very much resembled the tactic of the
Swiss banks. In July 1998, in the midst of their negotiations with
the same representatives of the Holocaust victims, the banks
publicly announced their "final offer" of $600 million that they later
abandoned.10
By September 1, 1999, the talks were at an impasse. While the
German government and German industry had hoped to begin
making payments to former slave laborers by that date, which
marked the sixtieth anniversary of the start of World War II,
negotiations adjourned in late August 1999 without a settlement."11
Failing to meet the September 1 deadline, Germany then set for
itself a "millennium deadline," hoping to reach a comprehensive
settlement and start making payments to the elderly survivors in
the twentieth century.1 2
the World Jewish Congress, stated: "This is not a charitable contribution. It is an obligation.
This is compensation for material wrongs inflicted.'" Id. (quoting Elan Steinberg).
Third, the German proposal called for the size of the payment to each claimant to be
"pegged to pension levels in the countries where a survivor lives-meaning that individuals
in the United States and Canada would get considerably more than people in Eastern Europe
and Russia." Id. According to Rabbi Marvin Hier, head of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los
Angeles, "'[t]he question is how much did people suffer,' not whether they live in the United
States or Russia." Id. (quoting Rabbi Marvin Hier).
Fourth, to qualify for the fund, "an individual would have [to have worked as] a forced
laborer [for] at least six months." Id. The World Jewish Congress's Elan Steinberg called this
requirement "macabre," "inequitable," and "clearly unacceptable." Id.
For further discussion of the German companies' June 1999 proposal and reaction by
claimants and their representatives, see Vanessa Fuhrmans, Survivors Blast German
Proposal on Compensation, WALL ST. J.-EuR., June 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 18406315;
see also Letter from Michael Hausfeld, Martin Mendelsohn, Melvyn Weiss, Elizabeth
Cabraser & Irwin Levin, Plaintiffs' Attorneys, to Stuart Eizenstat, United States
Undersecretary of State, and Gerd Westdickenberg, German Legal Advisor of the German
Foreign Ministry (June 10, 1999), available in Cohen, Milstein, Hausfield & Toll, E-Journal
(visited Jan. 30, 2000) <http://www.cmht.com/cwgermletter.htm>.
810. See discussion and notes supra Part III. (discussing litigation against the Swiss
banks).
811. See Edmund L. Andrews, Germany: Slave Talks Adjourn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,1999,
at A6; see also Cohen, supra note 803, at All. The article states:
Negotiations over compensating slave laborers from the Nazi era were adjourned
in Bonn with lawyers representing survivors and German industrial companies
still far apart. American class-action lawyers are demanding up to $20 billion,
more than 10 times what the companies have proposed. The [German]
[G]overnment had hoped to reach a full agreement by Sept. 1, but many
participants said a deal is still months away.
Id.
812. But see Roger Cohen, Germany: Schroder on Slave Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1999,
at All. That article states:
After a meetingwith leading German industrialists, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder
said financial claims from American and German lawyers representing forced
laborers exploited by the Nazis were "completely unrealistic." His remarks
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While no payments were made to Holocaust survivors in 1999, the
parties were able to reach a "pre-end of millenium" agreement of
some sort: On December 17, 1999, Germany and some participating
German corporations agreed to settle the slave labor claims for 10
billion German marks, or approximately $5.2 billion.813
suggested that a settlement under which German companies and the Government
would compensate victims of slave labor and forced labor is not imminent. The
companies made an initial offer of about $1.7 billion, which has been met by
claims for over $20 billion.
Id.
813. See Norman Kempster, Agreement Reached on Nazi Slave Reparations, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1999, at Al; Carol J. Williams, Germany Pledges $5.2 Billion for Slave Laborers, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at Al. The settlement was for 10 billion German (Deutsche) marks [DM
10 billion], but the U.S. dollar figure will fluctuate depending on the relative values of the two
currencies.
The settlement was a classic compromise, akin to the result achieved in the Swiss
banks settlement negotiations. See discussion and notes supra Part III.C.,D. (discussing the
Swiss banks settlement). Initially, the German government and participating industry
doubled their offer from the original $1.7 billion (to be funded exclusively by German
industry) to $3.3 billion. The figure was then raised to $4.2 billion, with German industry
pledging $2.6 billion and the German government offering to contribute $1.6 billion. See
Kempster, supra, at Al. The German government then began soliciting other German
corporations to join the effort and pledge to make contributions. When it became clear that
additional contributions from German industry were not forthcoming, the German
government "sweetened their offer by $1 billion" for a total matching contribution of $2.6
billion. Kempster, supra, at A13. The claimants' representatives, including the class action
attorneys, then lowered their demands and accepted the offer. See id. As the agreement now
stands, the German government and participating German corporations will each contribute
five billion German marks, or $2.6 billion to the settlement. See Williams, supra, at A5.
For a statement by President Clinton praising the settlement, see William J. Clinton,
Remarks on Action by Germany to Compensate Nazi Regime Victims of Forced Labor and an
Exchange with Reporters, 35 WKLY. COMP. PREs. Docs., Dec. 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL
12655371. The $5.2 billion settlement "satisfies the requirements of those representing the
victims. We close the 20th century with an extraordinary achievement that will bring an
added measure of material and moral justice to the victims of this century's most terrible
crime. It will help us start a new millennium on higher ground." Id.
For a criticism of the settlement, see Tom Hayden, Ex-slave Laborers Deserve Far
Better; Holocaust: Rich Firms Get Good Press with Token Payments, but What about the
Victims?, L.A. TnIES, Dec. 30, 1999, at Bl. The article states:
Survivors of slave labor under the Nazis will be awarded only $790 each for back
pay and a lump sum of $7,894 each in recognition of the 55-year delay. Those who
were exploited as "forced labor," such as Nazi prisoners working in agriculture,
will get a mere $5,000 each. Why is this agreement being hailed by the Clinton
administration as a historic milestone when, in any other context, it would be
dismissed as a slap on the wrist of the bully?
Id. (providing an editorial by California state Senator Tom Hayden, author of slave labor
compensation law in California).
It appears, however, that the $5.2 billion settlement is the best that could be
accomplished at this time. The stark reality is that Holocaust survivors are dying at the rate
of 10% a year, and so further delays would only reduce the number of survivors who could
obtain some measure of justice during their lifetime. See id. As explained in an editorial:
Critics of the deal scoff with reason at this attempt to put a price tag on
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As of March 1, 2000, however, the parties were still negotiating
the details of the $5.2 billion settlement, including the critical issue
of distribution.814 Moreover, while the moneys have been pledged,
"moral restitution" for Nazi crimes. Nobody can pretend that the paltry sum of
$7,500 per slave laborer, or any dollar amount for that matter, could ever right
the heinous historical crimes involved. But, however unsatisfactory, monetary
damages are accorded an important role, sometimes a symbolic one, in our
jurisprudence as a means of assigning, and accepting responsibility.
For those aged... surviving slave laborers, the amount of the checks will
surely not be as significant as their symbolic meaning, as a statement from the
world and from the German people that what was done to these workers was
wrong and has not been forgotten.
Laborers Lost Money Can't Buy Justice for Nazi-Camp Survivors, PITTSBURGPoST-GAzETrE,
Dec. 17, 1999, at A30, available in 1999 WL 25715856.
Otto Graf Lambsdorff, the German government representative to the slave labor
negotiations, testifying before the U.S. Congress on the settlement, was straightforward. He
stated: 'Believe me, I wish I had greater funds available for distribution. But 10 million
marks is what we got and what was agreed upon by all the participating parties after long
and arduous negotiations." Hearing of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of
the U.S. House of Representatives, 106th Cong. 6 (2000) (statement of Dr. Otto Graf
Lambsdorff, Special Representative of the German Chancellor for the Foundation
"Remembrance, Responsibility, and the Future") [hereinafter Statement of Dr. Otto Graf
Lambsdorffl.
814. See Marilyn Henry, Disputes Mark Second Day of Nazi Slave Labor Compensation
Talks, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 2,2000, at 4, available in 2000 WL 8252906 [hereinafter Henry,
Disputes Mark Second Day of Nazi Slave Labor Compensation Talks]; Marilyn Henry,
Germany Said Ignoring Terms of Slave-Labor Deal, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 3,
available in 2000 WL 8251915 [hereinafter Henry, Germany Said Ignoring Terms of Slave-
Labor Deal].
On February 9, 2000, Lambsdorff stressed that the settlement terms still need to be
completed. He stated: "Now, details need to be worked out, compromises have to be found,
comprehensive legislation needs to be finalized and passed by the German Bundestag
[Parliament], since half of the funds are being made available by the German Government
with taxpayers' money." Statement of Dr. Otto Graf Lamsdorff, supra note 813, at 4.
Deputy Treasury Secretary Eizenstat, testifying the same day, agreed. He stated:
I want to emphasize that despite the critical importance of what was
agreed in Berlin on December 17, [1999,] final settlement requires subsequent
agreements on a number of issues, most importantly on an equitable allocation
of the DM 10 billion among various groups and classes of claimants, and on the
substance of the legislation that will define the administrative structure and
operation of the German Foundation.
Hearing of the Committee on Banking and Financial Services of the U.S. House of
Representatives, 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E.
Eizenstat) [hereinafter Statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat].
Focusing on the all-important detail of the amount of payment to each victim, Lambsdorff,
in his testimony, stated that:
the largest part of the 10 billion mark endowment is intended for direct payment
to victims, especially to former slave and forced laborers, most of whom live in
Central and Eastern Europe.... Former slave laborers who were interned in
concentration camps shall receive up to 15,000 German marks [approximately
$7,800]; former forced laborers up to 5,000 German marks [approximately
$2,600].
Statement of Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, supra note 813, at 3 (emphasis added).
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they have yet to be received. The German government must enact
legislation to fund its one-half share of the $5.2 billion,8 5 and
German industry must make an actual payment into the program. 16
As a result, the various lawsuits against the German companies are
still pending. 7
Eizenstat, in his congressional testimony, did not mention a specific payment amount
to be allocated to each victim, but stated that the proposed settlement "will be the mechanism
through which those who worked as forced and slave laborers and those who suffered at the
hands of German companies during the Nazi era can receive dignified payments." Statement
of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra, at I (emphasis added). Of course,
Holocaust victims might vehemently disagree with both Eizenstat and Lambsdorff that the
above-quoted sums amount to "dignified payments."
With regard to expenses, Lambsdorff explained that "300 million marks
[approximately $156 million] are earmarked for administration costs, including lawyers' fees."
Statement of Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, supra note 813, at 4. Eizenstat explained that these
"[aldministrative expenses shall be paid from interest on deposited funds," and will not be
taken from the 10 billion marks corpus. Statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E.
Eizenstat, supra, at 4.
815. See Henry, Germany Said Ignoring Terms of Slave-Labor Deal, supra note 814, at 3.
816. See id. The article states that: "More than 110 German companies have agreed to
participate in the fund, although they have not yet collected half the industrial pledge of DM
5 billion. On Friday, Preussag, an electricity and tourism concern with annual sales DM 32
[billion], became the 111th to join, according to news accounts." Id.
817. See German Economy Foundation Initiative Steering Group, Preamble (visited Feb.
22,2000) <http.//www.stiftungsinitiative.de/eindex.html>. Having the lawsuits dismissed and,
thereby, buying legal peace for the German companies from further litigation in the United
States is an indispensable part of the settlement. As explained:
For the Foundation to be established and for the funds to be made
available, it is an indispensable prerequisite that the enterprises have full and
lasting legal certainty, in other words, that they are safe from legal action in the
future. Even in connection with this legal closure desirable legal peace is to be
achieved.
Id.
The legal mechanism for giving Germany and its industry legal peace in the United
States is the filing by the U.S. government, upon resolution of the outstanding issues in the
settlement, of a "Statement of Interest" in (1) all presently outstanding lawsuits against
German firms, recommending to the courts that the suits be dismissed; and (2) a promise,
through some form of an executive agreement between President Clinton and German
Chancellor Schroeder, that the U.S. government would file such additional statements in the
event that any other slave labor claimant brings a lawsuit against a German firm in the
United States. See Statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note
814, at 5; Statement of Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, supra note 813, at 5-6.
Deputy Treasury Secretary Eizenstat describes the global scope of the settlement as
follows: "We are working to ensure that the Foundation's coverage is so broad that the United
States will be able to file a Statement of Interest in U.S. courts in all cases brought against
German companies arising out of the Nazi era." Statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary
Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 814, at 5. German industry, therefore, will be obtaining the
same protection from lawsuits as obtained by Swiss industry in the August 1998 settlement
with the Swiss banks. See discussion and notes supra Part III.D. (discussing Swiss bank
litigation).
Consequently, the December 17, 1999 announcement of the preliminary settlement
brought a halt to the filing of additional suits against German firms in American courts.
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If the settlement is completed, the first payments are expected to
reach recipients "within the course of this year."18
C. Suits Filed to Date
To the distress of the German government and industry, the
announcement of a proposed slave labor fund and subsequent
negotiations did nothing to stop the lawsuits. In fact, on the very
day that the fund was being announced in Germany, a new federal
class action lawsuit was filed in the United States against Bayer,
one of the fund companies. The suit alleged that Bayer participated
in cruel medical experiments at Auschwitz conducted by the
infamous Dr. Josef Mengele. 19
1. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. 8
20
Surprisingly, the first slave labor action filed in the United States
was not against a German company, but against the American
automotive giant Ford.
In a federal class action suit filed in March 1998 in Newark, New
Jersey, while the action against the Swiss banks was still ongoing,
Ford Motor Company was accused of "knowingly accepting substan-
tial economic benefits" 21 from the use of forced labor in Nazi
Germany during World War II through its German subsidiary, Ford
Werke A.G. Also a defendant, Ford Werke A.G. was alleged to have
While the U.S. government cannot sop a former slave laborer from filing a lawsuit in the
future against a German firm in our courts, the contemplated intervention of the U.S.
government on behalf of any defendant German firm that is sued makes it practically
impossible for any such suits to succeed. For an example of the U.S. government successfully
intervening through a "Suggestion of Interest" to have a lawsuit dismissed, see Jackson v.
Peoples'Republic of China, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984).
818. Statement ofDr. Otto GrafLambsdorff, supra note 813, at 2. For updated information
on the settlement, posted by the German parties to the agreement, including a list of German
companies participating, see German Economy Foundation Initiative Steering Group,
Preamble (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http'/www.stiftungsinitiative.de/eindex.html>.
819. See Henry Weinstein, SuitAlleged BayerRole in Holocaust Experiments, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 18, 1999, atA22. For a discussion of the lawsuit against Bayer, see discussion and notes
infra Part VII.B. (discussing litigation against German pharmaceutical firms).
820. 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
821. Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand 1 2, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (Civil Action No. 98-959) [hereinafter Iwanowa Complaint].
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"knowingly earned enormous profits from the aggressive use of
forced labor under inhuman conditions." 22
According to the complaint, Ford Werke A.G., which has been
doing business in Germany since 1925 and is headquartered in
Cologne, was an aggressive bidder for forced laborers dragooned into
Germany from occupied Europe by the Nazi war machine.8 23 "By
1942, 25% of the work force utilized by Ford Werke A.G. were
unpaid, forced laborers. By 1943, the percentage of unpaid, forced
laborers at Ford Werke A.G. had grown to 50%, where it remained
for the remainder of the war years."8 24
The complaint alleged that "[t]he use of unpaid, forced laborers by
Ford Werke A.G. was immensely profitable [to the extent that] Ford
Werke A.G.'s annual profits doubled by 1943. "825
Following the war,
Ford Werke A.G. continued to produce trucks at substantial profit at a
time when much of Europe was devastated, benefiting from economic
reserves and production capacity that had, in large part, been derived
from the work of unpaid, forced laborers. By 1948, Henry Ford II was
able to arrive in Cologne to celebrate the 10,000th truck to roll off the
post-war Ford (Cologne) assembly line.826
The suit claimed that Ford Werke A.G., unlike subsidiaries of
other American-owned companies, was never nationalized or
confiscated by the Nazis, and that the parent Ford maintained a
controlling 52% interest in the German subsidiary during the war
years.827
The plaintiff, Elsa Iwanowa, a citizen and resident of Belgium, is
alleged to have performed, from 1942 to 1945, unpaid "forced labor
under inhuman conditions for Ford Werke A.G." at its Cologne
plant.128 In October 1942, Iwanowa, then age sixteen and residing
in Russia, is alleged to have been "abducted by Nazi troops and
transported to Germany with approximately 2,000 other children
822. Id.
823. See id. 6.
824. Id. 10.
825. Id. I 12.
826. Id. I 14.
827. See id. 15.
828. Id. 1-2, 24-28.
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[and purchased] along with 38 other[s]... by a representative of
Ford Werke A.G." to work at the Cologne plant
29
Plaintiff's class action was "on behalf of herself and all members
of the Class, that is, all persons who were compelled to perform
forced labor for Ford Werke A.G. between 1941 and 1945. """° The
suit sought disgorgement of "all profits and economic benefits"8 '
earned from forced labor by Ford and its German subsidiary, as well
as punitive damages "arising out of defendants' knowing use of
forced labor under inhuman conditions."832
In a public response to the lawsuit, Ford countered that "the plant
was under Nazi control during the war and that, although 'divi-
dends were accumulated from German operations' on the parent
company's behalf, Ford never received them."33 A company
spokesperson added: "It must be said that by anyone's measure this
was one of the darkest periods of history mankind has known.'8 34
Ford, in response to the complaint, filed two motions to dismiss.
The motions were consolidated, but not heard until March 8, 1999,
almost exactly one year after filing of the lawsuit. 5
The district court took the extraordinary step of holding a full-day
hearing on the motions, and requested further documentation and
briefing from the parties.836
When the district court scheduled an additional hearing in early
August 1999, Ford brought in the "big guns." Warren Christopher,




832. Id. at Prayer for Judgment 4.
833. Thomas S. Mulligan, LawsuitAlleges Ford Profited from Forced Labor in WWII, L.A.
TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1998, at D1 (quoting a statement made by Ford responding to the lawsuit).
834. Id. at D7 (quoting a statement made by Ford regarding the war). Ironically,
"Holocaust historians said that since the war Ford has compiled a distinguished record in its
relations with the American Jewish community and Israel, and in memorializing the
Holocaust. Ford took the extraordinary step [in 1997] of sponsoringthe film,'Schindler's List',
which was broadcast on NBC without commercials." Blaine Harden, Suit Alleges Ford Unit
Used Forced Labor in WWII, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at A4.
835. See Ford Motor Company's Motion to Dismiss, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (Civil Action No. 98-959) [hereinafter Iwanowa Ford Motor
Company's Motion to Dismiss]; see also Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,437-
69 (D.N.J. 1999).
836. See Telephone Interview with Burt Neuborne, Plaintiffs Attorney (Mar. 19, 1999).
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hearing as counsel for Ford.137 Moreover, "Christopher was not the
only high-powered lawyer for Ford .... Walter Dellinger, who was
acting U.S. Solicitor General in 1996 and 1997, also appeared in
court."838
Not long after the hearing, and while the court was still consider-
ing Ford's motion, new historical evidence appeared that came back
to haunt Ford. 39 Newly-released documents from the Nazi archives
revealed that Ford Werke A.G. was one of fifty-one German
companies to use Nazi victims from Auschwitz as slave laborers.84 °
The documents, discovered in Russia by historians with the
Auschwitz Museum in Poland, show that the Ford operation in
Cologne was among the enterprises in Germany that exploited the
vast pool of slave labor that the Nazis made available to German
private industry during the war.84'
In response, Ford again contended that the American parent did
not control Ford Werke A.G.'s operations in Nazi-occupied Europe. 42
837. See Marilyn Henry, Ford Slave-Labor Case May Stall Reparations, JERUSALEMPOST,
Aug. 8. 1999, at 3, available in 1999 WL 9006809; David Voreacos, Ford Fights Lawsuit by
Holocaust Survivors, RECORD (N.J.), Aug. 6, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 7109695.
Christopher was brought in to argue that the claims of the former slave laborers at Ford
should be dismissed because payment to them would amount to war reparations, which can
be negotiated only between governments. See Voreacos, supra, at Al. "'Reparations have
been, and must be, handled by the political branches of government,' Christopher told Judge
Joseph A. Greenaway Jr. in arguing that the lawsuit should be dismissed." Id. (quoting
Warren Christopher).
838. Voreacos, supra note 837, at Al.
839. This new accusation against Ford, discovered through historical research and
connecting Ford to Auschwitz, is akin to the earlier historical discoveries made against
Deutsche Bank, alleging that it financed the construction of Auschwitz, see discussion and
notes infra Part VI.C., and Allianz Insurance, that it insured Auschwitz, see discussion and
notes infra Part IV. As explained in a recent article:
While Auschwitz was the site of the deaths of over a million inmates, the camp
complex, of three separate sites, was also a thriving industrial and business
complex that proved highly profitable for the barons of Germany's war industry
as well as the Nazi leadership itself. Auschwitz, like many camps, had a sub-
camp-Auschwitz-III, also known as Monowitz, where I.G. Farben manufactured
3ynthetic oil and rubber. According to a list compiled by the London-based
Holocaust Education Trust (HET), a total of 51 companies used slave labour at
Auschwitz.
LeBor, supra note 788, at 8.
840. See id.; Davis, supra note 787.
841. See Davis, supra note 787; LeBor, supra note 788, at 8.
842. See Davis, supra note 787.
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2. Other Slave Labor Actions
While the slave labor actions were not the first Holocaust-era
lawsuits to be filed in the United States, clearly, they constitute the
largest category of Holocaust-era cases proceeding in American
courts today. Following the Iwanowa lawsuit, more than three-
dozen additional lawsuits were filed against more than twenty
different German and Austrian firms84 for their use of slave labor
during World War II. The lawsuits were filed in California, 45
Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin.846
843. As of January 2000, the German and Austrian firms sued for their use of slave
laborers during World War I are: Agfa-Gevaert, Alcatel SEL, Albert Ackermann,
Aktiengesellschaft, Audi, BASF, Beiersdorf, BMW, Bosch, Continental (Tire), Daimler-Benz,
Diehl Stiftung & Co., Dunlop, Durkopp Adler, Franz Haniel & Cie, Dyekerhoff Heinkel,
Heidelberger Zement, Hochtief, Hoechst, Phillip Holzman, Hugo Boss, Leica Camera,
Leonhard-Moll Krupp, Lufthansa, MAN, Mannesmann, Messerchmitt-Boelkow-Blohm, Miele
& Co., Pfaff Akteingesellschaft, Rheinmetall, Rodenstock, Siemens, Steyr-Daimler-Puch,
Thyssen, VARTA, Voest, Volkswagen, Wurttembergische Metallwarenfabrik, and Zeppelin.
See infra Appendix A. Additionally, the American automotive giants Ford and General Motors
and their German subsidiaries, Ford Werke A-G. and Opel, respectively, were also sued for
profiting from slave labor. See discussion and notes supra Part VI.C.
The German firm Degussa was sued for supplying Zyklon B gas used in the gas
chambers and for use of the gold taken from victims of the Nazi regime. See discussion and
notes infra Part VI.D.2.
German pharmaceutical giants Bayer, Hoecht, and Schering were sued for being
involved in cruel medical experiments performed upon Holocaust victims. See discussion and
notes infra Part VII.B.
The German banks sued were Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Hypo
Bank, and VIAG. Austrian banks sued were Bank Austria, Creditanstalt (currently owned
by Bank Austria), and RZB. See discussion and notes infra Part VII.A.1.
844. This number does not include additional suits filed against: German pharmaceutical
firms for their alleged involvement in cruel medical experiments during the war; German
insurance companies for failing to pay on Holocaust-era insurance policies; German banks for
stealing the accounts and other assets of its Jewish depositors; and other German companies'
alleged war-time acts including neglecting infants who were taken away from slave laborers,
and producing gas used in the gas chambers. From March 1998 to June 1999, German firms
were hit with over 30 lawsuits in the United States for their nefarious activities during World
War Il. Almost all of these lawsuits were filed after the August 1998 settlement with the
Swiss banks. See infra Appendix A for a listing ofcases filed to date. The list is not exclusive.
Truly, the floodgates of litigation have opened against German industry in the courts of the
United States.
845. In 1999, California enacted California Civil Procedure Code section 354.6, specifically
recognizing lawsuits in California courts for slave and forced labor, and extending the statute
of limitations to 2010. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (Deering 1999); see also infra
Appendix B (providing California legislation). Since California is the only state with such a
law, and is the state with the second-largest population of Holocaust survivors, it is likely
that the next wave of World War II-era slave labor lawsuits will appear in California.
846. See infra Appendix A.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Like the Swiss banks, who faced similar Holocaust survivor
litigants and heirs, the German companies countered the lawsuits
with a variety of substantive and procedural defenses.847 For their
substantive arguments, the German companies claimed that they
were compelled by the Nazis to use slave labor."4 '
The response to the suits by the German industrial concern
Siemens is typical and echoed by the other companies using slave
labor during World War II. "According to Siemens, 'During the
course of World War II, German industry had no choice but to
participate in the Nazi regime's "wartime economic production
program.""' 9 The absence of sufficient labor meant that "'companies
were compelled to turn to laborers provided by the government.
Operating in a totalitarian wartime economy, Siemens was also
mandated to accept these conditions.'85 0
As procedural defenses, the German defendants listed the usual
reasons cited by foreign defendants when they are sued in American
courts. In fact, every procedural argument made by the German
companies in their motions to dismiss was one made by the Swiss
banks' earlier dismissal motions.8 "
The German companies argued that the lawsuits against them
cannot be maintained in the United States because of: (1) existence
of alternative resolution mechanisms for resolving the suits; (2)
847. See discussion and notes supra Part III.A.2.
848. See supra note 792 and accompanying text.
849. Gerald M. Steinberg, The Holocaust DidNot 'Just Happen', JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 23,
1998, at 9, available in 1998 WL 6536807 (quoting a company statement about participation
in slave labor). The phrase "wartime economic production program" is the euphemism used
by German companies when referring to their use of slave labor. See id.
850. Id. (quoting a company statement about participation in slave labor).
851. See discussion and notes supra Part III.B.
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nonjusticiability;85 2 (3) lack ofjurisdiction, both personal and subject
matter; (4) forum non conveniens; and (5) statute of limitations.853
D. The Dismissal of the Iwanowa and Degussa/Siemens Lawsuits
September 13, 1999 was not a good day for Holocaust-era
litigation. Two federal judges, both sitting in New Jersey, issued
separate opinions dismissing five slave labor lawsuits filed in the
United States on that day.
Judge Joseph Greenaway, Jr. dismissed the lawsuit against Ford
and its German subsidiary Ford Werke A.G. 1 4 Judge Dickinson R.
Debevoise dismissed four separate lawsuits filed against German
companies Degussa and Siemens."5
1. The Dismissal of the Iwanowa Action
As already discussed, in response to the lawsuit against it, Ford
filed motions to dismiss. Ford's motions, like the earlier Swiss
banks' motions, set out numerous reasons why the lawsuits against
Ford, the American company, and Ford Werke A.G., its German
subsidiary, could not proceed. 6
Judge Greenaway issued a 120-page opinion, in which he
methodically dealt with each of Ford's arguments.857
852. See discussion and notes infra Part VI.D.I.d. (discussing nonjusticiability). The
German companies referred to various treaties entered into between defeated Germany and
the victorious allies that they claim do not allow litigation against them in the United States
for their wartime wrongs. See id. Similarly, the Swiss banks referred to the postwar
agreements entered into between Switzerland and the allies for disgorging Nazi-stolen gold
and other loot that entered Switzerland during the war. See discussion and notes supra Part
mI.A.2.b. (discussing the Swiss banks' substantive grounds for dismissal). Switzerland
claimed that such agreements settled all Swiss obligations for their dealings with the Nazis.
See id.
853. These arguments were never tested in the Swiss bank cases, since the cases settled
before the federal district court ruled on the Swiss banks' dismissal motions. See discussion
and notes supra Part III.A.2. (discussing Swiss banks' defenses used during litigation).
854. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424,491 (D.N.J. 1999).
855. See Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 285 (D.N.J. 1999).
856. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion to
Dismiss, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (Civil Action No. 98-
959).
857. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
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The opinion examined Ford's arguments as they applied to
Iwanowa's claims under: (1) customary international law;85 (2) U.S.
law;859 and (3) German law. 6' In the last section, the opinion
examined the claims in toto, to determine whether they were
justiciable. 61
a. Iwanowa's Claims under International Law
Ford asserted that Iwanowa's claims under customary interna-
tional law 62 should be dismissed for: (1) lack of subject matter
jurisdiction; (2) failure to state a claim; and (3) expiration of the
statute of limitations. 63 Judge Greenaway rejected Ford's jurisdic-
tional challenge, but dismissed the claims on the other two
grounds. 64
i. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA")
Because Iwanowa is a Belgian citizen and therefore is an alien,
she meets the initial prerequisite to assert subject matter jurisdic-
tion over her international law claims under the ATCA. 65 Examin-
ing the other requirements of the ATCA, the court found that
Iwanowa could fit her claims of slave labor against Ford under the
subject matter jurisdiction mandate of the ATCA. 66
858. Judge Greenaway labeled Iwanowa's customary international law claims as claims
under "the law of nations," but recognized that the two terms are "interchangeable." Id. at 438
n.14. According to the opinion, Iwanowa is not asserting claims under any treaty or express
international law. See id. at 439.
859. See id. at 469-76.
860. See id. at 476-82.
861. See id. at 482-91.
862. Iwanowa alleges that Ford breached international law "[b]y knowingly utilizing
unpaid, forced labor under inhuman conditions." Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (citations
omitted). As evidenced by Ford's motion to dismiss, Ford did not dispute this assertion. See
id.
863. See id. at 434.
864. See id. at 491.
865. The Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") was first raised in Holocaust litigation in the
Swiss bank cases. For discussion of the ATCA, in general, and as it applies to those cases, see
discussion and notes supra Part III.A.2.a.(iii). (discussing the lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in the Swiss bank cases).
866. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 438-46.
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First, the court held that Ford's "use of unpaid, forced labor
during World War II violated clearly established norms of custom-
ary international law."867 According to the court, Iwanowa's
allegation that "'she was literally purchased, along with 38 other
children... by a representative of [Ford Werke A.G.]'... [suffices]
to support an allegation that [Ford and Ford Werke A.G.] partici-
pated in slave trading."6 ' The court held that Ford's slave trading
during World War II unequivocably violated customary interna-
tional law, or "the law of nations."69
Second, the court found that the ATCA, in addition to establishing
subject matter jurisdiction, also creates a private right of action for
violations of customary international law torts.87 °
Finally, the court found that customary international law, despite
being sometimes labeled as "the law of nations," does apply to
private actors such as Ford.' While the court recognized that
certain customary international law norms may arguably only be
binding upon state actors, 72 slave trading definitely "is included in
that "handful of crimes" to which the law of nations attributes
individual responsibility.'" 7 The court also found that Ford cannot
utilize the nonstate actor argument since, by acting with Nazi
government officials to obtain slave laborers, it "acted as an agent
of, or in concert with, the German Reich." 74
While the human rights bar, and especially attorneys litigating
Holocaust claims against German entities, maybe unhappy with the
remainder of Judge Greenaway's opinion, they would have no
quarrel with the court's analysis of the ATCA.
Judge Greenaway, in the strongest terms, reaffirmed the viability
of the ATCA as providing both a grant of subject matter jurisdiction
867. Id. at 440.
868. Id.
869. See id. at 439-41.
870. See id. at 441-43 (following earlier authorities discussing the issue).
871. See id. at 443-45.
872. Seeid. at444-45. The court appeared to reject those cases which denied responsibility
to private actors for violations of customary international law norms, characterizing them as
applying "international law as it stood over fifteen years ago," and not today. Id. at 444.
873. Id. at 445 (citing National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal Corp., 176 F.R.D. 329,348 (C.D.
Cal. 1997)).
874. Id. at 446.
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and a private cause of action, as well as its applicability to private,
nonstate, actors.875
ii. Treaties with Postwar Germany and Private Rights of Action
In Part II.B. of the opinion, the court spends close to thirty pages
analyzing various multilateral treaties enacted after the defeat of
Germany.16 The analysis is done for two reasons: to determine if
such treaties bar litigation against private actors, such as Ford and
Ford Werke A.G. for international law wrongs; and to determine the
proper statute of limitations for such international law claims.8 77
Contrary to popular belief, Germany and the Allied nations did
not settle their postwar claims-or even enter into a peace
treaty-upon Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945, or
soon thereafter. Rather, the process took forty-five years, ending in
1990. Postwar Germany and the Allies entered into four different
treaties dealing with postwar compensation.7 8
In January 1946, the United States and seventeen other nations
met in Paris and enacted the so-called "Paris Reparations Treaty,"
obligating Germany to pay reparations. 79
The atonement contemplated by the Paris Reparations Treaty,
however, was never fully executed. Rather, the Cold War led to the
division of Germany into two states, the Federal Republic of
Germany (the "F.R.G." or 'Vest Germany"), formed out of the
portions of Germany controlled by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France; and the German Democratic Republic (the
"G.D.R." or "East Germany"), formed out of the portions of Germany
controlled by the U.S.S.R.8 °
In the continuing conflict between West and East, both the
Western powers and the Soviet Union halted the reparations
875. See id. at 437-46. This portion of the opinion, therefore, can serve as important
precedent for the use of the ACTA in international human rights litigation.
876. See id. at 446-69.
877. See id.
878. See id. at 448-55.
879. Agreement on Reparations from Germany, on the Establishment of an Inter-Allied
Reparation Agency and on Restitution of Monetary Gold, Jan. 14, 1946,61 Stat. 3157, T.I.A.S.
No. 1655.
880. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 448-52.
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program, preferring instead to rebuild those parts of Germany that
they controlled. 8 '
In 1952, the F.R.G. entered into a treaty with the Western
powers, the so-called "Transition Agreement,"8 2 that postponed
West Germany's payment of reparations until a later date.883
A year later, in 1953, the Western powers and seventeen other
nations entered into another treaty with the, F.R.G., the so-called
"London Debt Agreement,"8 4 that deferred the collection of
reparations set out in the Paris Reparations Treaty until the F.R.G.
rebuilt its economy.8 5 As explained by the court, "[i]n effect, the
London Debt Agreement established the equivalent of a bankruptcy
workout plan designed to defer consideration of certain private
liabilities until the bankrupt entity [the F.R.G.] regained its
financial health."8
In 1990, the F.R.G. and the G.D.R. on one side, and the U.S., the
U.K., France and the U.S.S.R., on the other, entered into the so-
called "Two-Plus-Four Treaty."8 7 The Two-Plus-Four Treaty: (1)
reunified East and West Germany; (2) finally promulgated a peace
treaty (envisioned by the Transition Agreement) between a unified
Germany and its former adversaries; and (3) by implication,
conclusively settled the problem of reparations by stating that the
881. See id. at 451-52; 468-69 (discussing West Germany's deferral of reparations to the
Western allies and East Germany's extinguishment of reparations obligations to the Soviet
Union).
882. Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
France, the United States ofnAmerica and the Federal Republic of Germany on the Settlement
of Matters Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331
U.N.T.S. 219 (as amended by Protocol on Termination of the Occupation Regime in the
Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117, 331 U.N.T.S. 219).
883. See id. ch. 6, art. 1. "The problem of reparation shall be settled by the peace treaty
between Germany and its former enemies or by earlier agreements concerning this matter.
The Three Powers undertake that they will at no time assert any claim for reparation against
the current production of the Federal Republic [of Germany]." Id.
Thus, the Western powers agreed to postpone reparations until a peace treaty was
signed with a unified Germany sometime in the future and not to seek reparations from the
F.R.G., the temporary state entity they created, until unification was achieved. See id.
884. Agreement on German External Debts, Feb. 27, 1953,4 U.S.T. 443, 333 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Agreement on German External Debts].
885. See id.
886. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
887. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, 29 I.L.M.
1186.
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Allied nations can no longer demand further reparations from a
unified Germany.88
While the court in its analysis discussed at length each of the four
treaties, its decision essentially relies on article 5(2) of the London
Debt Agreement.889
Article 5(2) provides:
Consideration of claims arising out of the Second World War by countries
which were at war with or were occupied by Germany during that war,
and by nationals of such countries, against the Reich, or agencies of the
Reich ... shall be deferred until the final settlement of the problem of
reparations."
Since Iwanowa was a national of the U.S.S.R. during World War
II, a country at war with and occupied by Nazi Germany, her claims,
as the court acknowledged, are covered by article 5(2)."9l Moreover,
the court recognized that the Two-Plus-Four Treaty lifts the
moratorium for filing claims by individuals, since it is the "final
settlement of the problem of reparations" contemplated by article
5(2) of the London Debt'Agreement.8 92 However, while the court
recognized that (1) article 5(2) of the London Debt Agreement
contemplates that individuals such as Iwanowa would be able to
make claims arising out of World War II, and (2) the Two-Plus-Four
Treaty now allows Iwanowa to make such a claim, it nevertheless
found that such individual claims can only be pursued by way of
government-to-government negotiations and not through private
litigation. 93
888. See id.
889. Agreement on German External Debts, supra note 884, art. 5(2).
890. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 453 (quoting the London Debt Agreement). Private
German corporations are not "the Reich or agencies of the Reich," and, therefore, may appear
not to be covered by the deferral provision of article 5(2). Id. at 454. However, in 1963, and
again in 1973, the German Supreme Court held that private corporations utilizing unpaid
slave labor were entitled to the same London DebtAgreement deferral defense as the German
government. See id. at 452-54 (discussing the 1963 and 1973 decisions of the
Bundesgerichtshof, which is the German Federal Supreme Court ("BGH")).
891. See id. at 453 n.36. Later in the opinion, the court contradicts itself by referring to
article 5(3), which covers deferral of claims of neutral countries and its nationals. See id. at
459-61. This is obviously a mistake, since, as the court states, '[alrticle 5(2) is the only
provision pertinent to Iwanowa's claims." Id. at 453 n.36.
892. Id. at 465.
893. See id. at 460.
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The court's conclusion is wrong. The plain language of article 5(2)
contemplates the ability of individuals to make claims arising out of
unlawful actions committed during World War IU.94 The London
Debt Agreement defers such claims to a later date.89 Nothing in the
Agreement makes such claims available only through government-
to-government diplomacy. The court's analysis, in effect, interprets
article 5(2) as not only deferring such claims, but forever extinguish-
ing them.896
Moreover, the court's conclusion is contrary to the decisions
reached by the German courts. Three German court decisions-in
1997,97 in 1998,898 and in 1999899-have allowed private claims for
slave labor to go forward in German courts.
In so doing, the German courts' decisions acknowledged that such
private claims are now ripe for litigation, since the signing of the
Two-Plus-Four Treaty lifted the forty-five-year moratorium on such
claims. Unlike this court, the German courts interpreting the same
treaties did not find that the private lawsuits were barred by the
treaties.
Finally, the court confuses its analysis even more by incorrectly
referring to and analyzing article 5(3) of the London Debt Agree-
ment, dealing with claims of neutral nations and their nationals. 00
Article 5(3) has no application to the case, since Iwanowa's claims,
894. See Agreement on German External Debts, supra note 884, art. 5(2).
895. See id.
896. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 460.
897. See id. at 456 (citing Krakauer v. Federal Republic of Germany, LG [District Court]
Bonn, 10 134/92 (1997)); see also Mary W. Walsh, German Judge Awards Back Pay to WWII
Slave Laborer, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at Al (discussing the Krakauer I decision).
898. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
at 18 n.5, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (Civil No. 98-959)
(discussing decision of LG [District Court] Landericht Bremen, 1-0 2889/90 (1998) (F.R.G.)).
899. See Uta Harnischfeger, German Court to Hear Nazi Slave Labor Case, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 11, 1999, available in 1999 WL 21147091 (stating that a court in Hanover
agreed to hear claims of three Holocaust survivors, now Israeli nationals, who were slave
laborers for the German tire-maker Continental).
900. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 459-61. The court also incorrectly asserted that
"Iwanowa may be entitled to compensation from [Russia, since in 1993 unified Germany
agreed to contribute DM [Deutsche marks] 1 billion in funds to former Soviet states... to
compensate victims of Nazi persecution." Id. at 460 n.42. However, Iwanowa, while born in
Russia and abducted from there by the Nazis, is today a Belgian national. See id. at 468 n.51.
Consequently, Iwanowa cannot make a claim for such funds, or even have the Russian
government assert her claims against Germany. See id. Under international law, Belgium
likewise cannot assert Iwanowa's claim, since the wrongs did not occur while she was a
Belgian national. See id. Government-to-government diplomacy, the solution proposed by the
court, therefore, is unavailable to her.
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as the court itself acknowledged, fall exclusively under article
5(2).901
iii. Postwar Treaties and Statute of Limitations
Since "[tihe ATCA does not contain a statute of limitations,"9 °2
Judge Greenaway, following the authority of other courts, applied
the statute of limitations of the closest analogous federal statute to
the ATCA,9 °3 the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 ("TVPA7).9 °4
The TVPA contains a ten-year-limitations period.9" 5 Since
Iwanowa filed her suit more than fifty years after the events in
question transpired, defendants asserted that her ATCA claims
were time barred.9"6
Plaintiff argued, however, that the statute of limitations was
tolled.90 7 According to plaintiff, the various treaties discussed above
and the doctrine of equitable tolling extend the statute of limitations
to November 1997,908 making Iwanowa's claims timely.90 9 In its
statute of limitations analysis, the court examined three possible
tolling periods created by the treaties-extending from 1945 to
1997-to determine whether the treaties, in fact, tolled the statute
of limitations.9 0
The limitations period for Iwanowa's claims against Ford began
to run in 1945, when she was freed from her slave labor.91' The court
found that the Paris Reparations Treaty of 1946 initially tolled the
limitations period until 1953.912 The Paris Reparations Treaty
901. See id. at 453-54 n.38.
902. Id. at 462.
903. See id. at 462-63.
904. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended in 20 U.S.C. § 1350
(1994)).
905. See id.
906. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 462-63.
907. See id. at 463.
908. Every slave labor lawsuit filed against private German companies alleges the same
tolling period. See, e.g., Complaint % 35, Gross v. Volkswagen KG., Civil Action No. 98-4104
(D.N.J. Aug. 31, 1998); Complaint 63, Nittenberg v. BMW AG, Civil Action No. 99-0756
(D.N.J. Feb. 19, 1999).
909. Ford argued that the limitations period was only tolled until 1949, the year when the
F.R.G. was established. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 465-66.
910. See id. at 463-66.
911. See id. at 463.
912. See id.
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barred individuals from making reparation claims because it
subsumed these claims into the governmental claims of the
signatories to the Treaty.91
In 1953, the London Debt Agreement superceded the Paris
Reparations Treaty.914 The Agreement both resurrected individual
claims arising out of World War II, and at the same time deferred
such claims until the final settlement of the issue of reparations.9 5
Therefore, Iwanowa's claims again were tolled.9"6 This second tolling
period ended on March 15, 1991, when the Two-Plus-Four Treaty
came into effect, terminating the London Debt Agreement's
moratorium on claims.91 7 Consequently, since Iwanowa filed her
lawsuit in March 1998, her ATCA claims, coming within the ten-
year statute of limitations period, were timely.918 According to the
court, "the statute of limitations on Iwanowa's claims under inter-
national law would expire on March 15, 2001.""' 9
The court held, however, that the tolling provisions applied only
to Ford Werke A.G., the German corporation, and not to Ford, its
American parent.92 0 According to the court, since the London Debt
Agreement covered only deferral of claims against German corpora-
tions for their Nazi-related activities, 92' Iwanowa could have sued
913. See id.
914. See id. at 464.
915. See id. at 464-65.
916. See id. As explained by Judge Greenaway: "[T]his court finds that the London Debt
Agreement deferred all claims by non-German nationals, arising out ofWorldWar II, against
German corporations acting under color of Nazi law, regardless of whether the claims
asserted violations of international law or German law." Id. at 464 (citing to Agreement on
German External Debts, supra note 884, art. 5(2)).
917. Plaintiff argued that the tolling period created by the London Debt Agreement
extended until November 1997, when a German court announced for the first time that the
Two-Plus-Four Treaty lifted the London Treaty's moratorium on individual claims. See id. at
465-66. The court rejected that argument. See id.
918. See id.
919. Id. at 466. If the court is correct in its analysis, then the statute of limitations for all
suits against German corporations being sued in the United States under the ATCA expire
on March 15,2001. Attorneys who are contemplating filing suits on behalf of other claimants
for slave labor and other World War II wrongs against German entities are now put on notice,
through this decision, of the deadline for filing their suits.
920. See id.
921. See Agreement on German External Debts, supra note 884, art. 5(2) (deferring
consideration of claims "against the Reich and agencies of the Reich"). As the court explains:
"Although German courts have held that German corporations utilizing forced labor were
acting as agents of the Reich, no court has ever held, and the complaint does not allege, that
U.S. corporations (such as Ford) were agents of the German government." Iwanowa, 67 F.
Supp. 2d at 466-67.
It appears that the court was unwilling to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint to
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Ford under the ATCA in the last half-century.922 Having failed to do
so, her claim against Ford, the court held, is time barred. 23
The court also refused to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to
the claims against Ford.924 As the court recognized, for the plaintiff
to avoid dismissal, "a complaint asserting equitable tolling must
contain particularized allegations that the defendant 'actively
misled' plaintiff."925 While the court recognized that plaintiff raised
such allegations, they were not contained in the complaint, but in
counsel's brief and accompanying declarations. 26 The court refused
to recognize such allegations and declined to give plaintiff an
opportunity to amend her complaint to add such allegations.927
However, the court's lengthy discussion of the limitations period
for Iwanowa's ATCA claims has no practical significance, since the
court already held that the London Debt Agreement bars individuals
from seeking damages through litigation for slave labor from private
928German companies. Therefore, Iwanowa's timely claim against
Ford Werke A.G. under the ATCA was dismissed anyway.929
b. Iwanowa's Claims under U.S. Law
Iwanowa's claims against Ford are based upon common-law
principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.93 During
wartime, Iwanowa performed services for Ford for which she was
never compensated.9 3' Basic quasi-contract principles require Ford
to pay Iwanowa the reasonable value of her services. 2
make such an allegation against Ford. See id. at 466. Pretrial discovery and further historical
research could have revealed that Ford and Ford Werke A.G. had such sufficient financial
links during wartime, and that if Ford Werke A.G. was an agent of the Reich, Ford likewise
could be held to have had such an agency relationship.
922. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
923. See id. at 467-68.
924. See id.
925. Id. at 467 (citing 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs. v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F.3d
320, 325 (3d Cir. 1996)).
926. See id. at 468.
927. See id.
928. See id. at 460-61.
929. See id. at 466.
930. See id. at 470.




As the court recognized, the substantive law of all three possible
jurisdictions-New Jersey (where the court sits), Michigan (where
Ford has its headquarters), and Delaware (where Ford is incorpo-
rated)-recognize these basic equitable principles.933 The court,
however, ruled that the quasi-contract claims were time-barred. 93 4
Applying the statute of limitations of any of the three possible
jurisdictions to such claims, the court found that "It]he longest
applicable limitations period for quantum meruit or restitution/
unjust enrichment claims under New Jersey, Michigan, or Delaware
law is six years."935 Even if the London Debt Agreement tolled the
statute of limitations until March 15, 1991, the effective date of the
Two-Plus-Four Treaty, Iwanowa did not file the instant action until
March 4, 1998, almost seven years later.936 Therefore, having filed
her claims one year too late, "[Iwanowa's] claims under U.S. law are
time-barred."937
c. Iwanowa's Claims under German Law
German law also recognizes the doctrines of restitution and
quantum meruit, requiring defendants who are unjustly enriched to
disgorge amounts wrongfully received or held by them.931 German
courts, however, like courts in the United States, will dismiss a
claim if it is not timely fied, regardless of its merits. 93 9
Judge Greenaway examined the various possible limitation
periods which could apply to Iwanowa's claims under German
law.940 The court held that a two-year statute of limitations applied
933. See id. at 470 n.59.
934. See id. at 475.
935. Id. at 475-76.
936. See id. at 475.
937. Id. at 93. The Iwanowa action is the first slave labor lawsuit filed in the United
States. See infra Appendix AV. (listing pending and dismissed slave labor claims). If the
court's statute of limitations analysis is correct, then all claims under U.S. law in the
subsequently-filed slave labor lawsuits are also time-barred. The only possible exception
would be slave labor lawsuits fied in California. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (Deering
1999) (extending statute of limitations for forced and slave labor claims until 2010).
938. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 478 n.77 (citing § 812 BGB [German Civil Code]).
939. See id. at 477-82. Under New Jersey's choice of law analysis, the German statute of
limitations is applied to Iwanowa's claims under German law. See id. at 476-77.
940. See id. at 477-82. The term used in Germany, as in many other countries, for statute
of limitations is "prescription." See id. at 477 n.71 (translating German Civil Code); see also
FED. R. CIV. P. 44(1) (discussing application and examination of foreign law in U.S. federal
courts).
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to Iwanowa's claim for lost wages94' and a three-year limitations
period applied to Iwanowa's tort claims against Ford and Ford
Werke A.G. 942 The court rejected plaintiff's arguments, supported by
an expert on German law,943 that other sections of the German Civil
Code provide either a thirty-year limitations period,9" or no
limitations period at all for her claims against Ford.945 In particular,
the court relied on a 1967 decision of the German Supreme Court,
Bartl v. Ernst Heinkel A. G.,946 that dismissed a German national's
slave labor lawsuit, filed in 1959 (fourteen years after the end of the
941. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 477 n.71. Section 196 of the German Civil Code
provides: "(1) The following claims prescribe in two years: * * * 9. Claims of workmen-
journeymen, assistants, apprentices, factory workers-day laborers and manual laborers, for
the wages and other allowances agreed upon in lieu of or as part of the wages, including
disbursements ..... Id. (quoting § 196 BGB).
942. See id. at 477. Section 852(1) of the German Civil Code provides: "The claim for
compensation for any damage arising from a delict [tort] is barred by prescription in three
years from the time at which the injured party obtained knowledge of the injury and of the
identity of the person liable to make compensation .... " Id. at 477 n.75. (quoting § 852(1)
BGB).
943. See Declaration of Hans Reis 7-14, Iwanowav. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424
(D.N.J. filed Apr. 2, 1999) (Civ. No. 98-959). Plaintiffs conceded in their briefs that "[t]he
parties disagree vigorously concerning the applicable limitations period governing claims
under German law." Declaration of Burt Neuborne at 8, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424. (D.N.J. 1999) (Civ. No. 98-959) [hereinafter Iwanowa Declaration of Burt
Neuborne].
944. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 477 n.72 (discussing German Civil Code § 195, which
provides a thirty-year prescription for unjust enrichment claims).
945. See id. at 477. Plaintiff relied on §§ 819(1) and 852(3) of the German Civil Code.
Section 819(1) provides:
If the recipient knows of the absence of a legal ground at the time of the receipt, or if
he subsequently learns of it, he is bound to return from the time of receipt or of
acquisition of the knowledge as ifan action on the claim for return were pending at the
time.
Id. at 477 n.73. (citing § 819(1) BGB). Plaintiff argued that pursuant to German Civil Code
§ 819(1), no limitations period exists for unjust enrichment claims arising out of particularly
egregious behavior. See id. at 477.
Section 852(3) provides that ifa "person liable has acquired anything by the delict at
the expense of the injured party, he is, even after the running of the period of prescription,
bound to return it under the provisions relating to unust enrichment." Id. at 477 n.75 (quoting
§ 852(3) BGB). Plaintiff argued that "because defendants have wrongfully obtained her
property (her labor), and because she is requesting the return of that property, German law
imposes no limitations period [on this action]." Id. at 477.
946. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (citing Bartl v. Ernst Heinkel A.G., BGHZ
[Supreme Court] 48,125 (125) (1967) (F.R.G.)). PlaintiffBartl, a German lawyer, was arrested
by the Nazis and forced to work for an aircraft factory owned by the defendant German
corporation Ernst Heinkel A.G. See id. In 1959, Bartl sued defendant for unpaid wages. See
id. His suit in the German courts was not barred by the London Debt Agreement since he was
a German national. See id. Nevertheless, the German Supreme Court dismissed his suit as




war), as time-barred.94 That decision held that, regardless of the
gravity of the defendant's conduct, at most, a three-year statute of
limitations applies." According to the court, "[s]ince Bartl is good
law, and is factually similar to the instant case, this Court shall
follow Bartl and its reasoning.
94s
In this case, according to the court, Iwanowa could file her claims
under German law after March 15, 1991, the effective date of the
Two-Plus-Four Treaty. Since "[t]he statute of limitation on [her]
claims under German law expired, at the latest, three years later,"
then "Iwanowa's claims under German law [are] time-barred."950
At the end of this lengthy discussion on the German law of
limitations, the court, in a footnote, added that it would have
dismissed Iwanowa's German law claims even if they were timely
filed.95' According to the court, two recent German court decisions
have denied slave labor claimants the right to sue their private
corporate captors in German courts.952 Based upon these decisions,
according to the court, plaintiff has no right to sue Ford and Ford
Werke A.G. under German law.
953
947. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 477-81.
948. See Bartl, BGHZ 48 (127). According to the court in Iwanowa, the German Supreme
Court rejected his assertion that there is no limitations period for forcedlabor claims and held
that "the circumstances under which the prohibited act was committed do not ordinarily
counter the defense of the statute of limitations having run: Even the most horrible criminal
is :. . not prevented under applicable law from countering the victim with the three-year
statute of limitations." Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 481-82 (quotingBartl, BGHZ 48 (133-34)).
949. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 480 n.80. Plaintiff attempted to distinguish the Bartl
decision by arguing that the plaintiff there was suing only for lost wages, and thereby
triggered the shorter limitations period, while Iwanowa sought "not merely wages, but the
equitable disgorgement of all unjust profits flowing to defendants from the enslavement of
plaintiff, as well as compensation for the pain and suffering inflicted upon plaintiffs by
defendants' brutal conduct." Iwanowa Declaration of Burt Neuborne, supra note 943, at 10.
The court, however, rejected this distinction. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
950. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 482.
951. See id. at 482-83 n.83.
952. See id.
953. See id. However, Judge Greenaway failed to note that, in the last three years, other
German court decisions in Bonn, Bremen, and Hanover recognized such suits. See discussion
and notes supra Part VI.C.1. (discussing the claim against Ford Motor Co.).
It appears that the situation in Germany regarding slave labor litigation remains
uncertain. Judge Deveboise, in the Burger-Fischer decision, examining the same cases
referred to by Judge Greenaway, at least acknowledged this uncertainty: "It is evident that
there are numerous unresolved issues of German law relating to claims of war time forced
laborers both as against the German government and as against private German
corporations." Burger-Fischerv. DegussaAG, 65 F. Supp. 2d248, 280-81 (D.N.J. 1999). Judge
Greenaway, therefore, in holding that the case law in Germany mandates dismissal of such
suits, mischaracterized German law.
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d. Nonjusticiability
In addition to the reasons discussed above, the court found an
additional ground upon which to dismiss the lawsuit: nonjusticiabili-
ty.954 The court used the term as synonymous for dismissal under
the political question doctrine. 55
The political question doctrine holds that a federal court having
jurisdiction over a dispute should still decline to adjudicate such a
dispute if it would force the court to resolve issues that should be
addressed by the political branches of the government (the Execu-
tive Branch and Congress). 956
As the court recognized, while cases concerning foreign relations
are most likely to comprise political questions, "not every case
involving foreign affairs or foreign relations raises a [non-justiciable]
political question."97
In Baker v. Carr,58 the Supreme Court set out a six-prong test for
determining whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political
question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a
lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without [the court first making]
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
954. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 483-89. In addition to nonjusticiability, the court also
set out a final reason for dismissing the case: lack of international comity. See id. at 489-91.
However, the court's rationale for the need for international comity is the same as that for
existence of nonjusticiability. See id.
955. Part V.A. of the court's opinion is labeled "Political Question." See id. at 483-89.
However, Part Vcontains no other subsections, and the court's only discussion ofjusticiability
is of the political question doctrine. See id. The court, therefore, must equate justiciability
with political question.
956. See id. at 483 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962)).
957. Id. at 485 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211); see also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990) (stating that "[clourts in the
United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases and controversies
properly presented to them"); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,
230 (1968) (stating that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance").
958. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.959
Judge Greenaway found "at least four of the Baker factors are
inextricable from Iwanowa's claims and, therefore, [the] forced labor
claims raise nonjusticiable political questions. 6 °
Judge Greenaway found the first Baker factor present: existence
of a constitutional commitment that the issue of "war reparations
fall within the domain of the political branches and are not subject
to judicial review."96' However, the court was incorrect that this
factor applied. First, plaintiff was seeking payment for unpaid
services, compensation for brutal treatment, and restitution for
unjust enrichment earned by a private company, Ford, not war
reparations from Germany. 1
2
Second, the mere fact that a suit seeks compensation for damages
caused during wartime does not necessarily mean that adjudication
of such a suit is impermissible because such wartime damages are
nonjusticiable. For instance, in the Paquette Habana,963 the classic
case found in every international law casebook, the Supreme Court
awarded damages to Spanish owners whose vessels were seized by
the United States in contravention of customary international law
during the Spanish-American War.9' The political question doctrine
was not even considered by the Court in deciding the case.965
Contrary to the district court's reasoning, the mere invocation of the
term "war reparations" does not make the case nonjusticiable.
The court found the second factor of the Baker test present: lack
ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards.166 As support,
the court relied on Kelberine v. Societe Internationale,967 a thirty-
year-old decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit that dismissed World War II-era claims on the
959. Id. at 217.
960. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
961. Id. (citations omitted).
962. See id. at 432.
963. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
964. See id. at 678-79, 714.
965. See id. at 683-84.
966. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 488-89.
967. 363 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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ground that deciding them posed "an insoluble problem if under-
taken by the courts without legislative or executive guidance."968
However, the current situation, in both the state of international
human rights adjudication and in Holocaust-era litigation, is
completely different than thirty years ago. While this court was
complaining that it could not handle "It]he specter of adjudicating
thousands of claims arising out of a war that took place more than
fifty years ago," two other federal courts in the Swiss banks and
Austrian banks litigation were doing exactly that.969
The court also found the fourth factor of the Baker test present:
lack of respect to the coordinate branches of the government,
specifically, the Executive Branch" According to the court, "the
executive branch, the department responsible for negotiating
international agreements, considers claims arising out of World War
II as falling within the ambit of government-to-government negotia-
tions."97'
However, other than citing to some general pronouncements from
the State Department and the President regarding compensation
from Germany, no evidence exists that deciding this case would
show any lack of respect to the Executive Branch.972
Critical to this determination is that the Executive Branch is
intimately aware of this litigation. Deputy Treasury Secretary
Stuart Eizenstat, the number two official at the Treasury Depart-
ment, is leading the negotiations with the German companies and
the German government for a global "rough justice" fund for slave
laborers973 and yet the Executive Branch has not intervened. When
the Executive Branch sees a threat to its interests by a court
decision involving foreign affairs, it is not reluctant to make its
968. Id. at 995.
969. Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 489. For a discussion of Swiss bank litigation, see
discussion and notes supra Part III. For a discussion on Austrian bank litigation, see
discussion and notes infra Part VII.A.1.
970. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87.
971. Id. at 486.
972. See id. at 486-87.
973. For recent congressional testimony by Deputy Treasury Secretary Eizenstat on the
fate of the negotiations, see Statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat,
supra note 814, at 1. For a profile of Eizenstat, see Bob Dart, From Atlanta to Washington




views known, either by filing an amicus brief or a suggestion of
interest.974 Here it has done neither.
As pointedly put by the plaintiffs in the Swiss bank litigation, in
response to the same alleged danger raised there by the Swiss
defendants: "If the United States government wishes to inform the
Court that maintenance of this action is detrimental to our national
interest, it knows the Court's address."975
At the least, if the district court was concerned about showing a
lack of respect for the Executive Branch in deciding this case on its
merits, it could have solicited the views of the Executive Branch on
this issue. The district court chose not to do so.
976
Finally, the court found the sixth factor of the Baker test present:
potential of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments.977 According to the court, "the executive
branch has rejected the notion that [Nazi-era slave labor] claims are
justiciable."978 For this reason, "adjudication of Nazi era forced labor
claims... would embarrass the executive branch in the eyes of the
international community."979 It seems strange, however, that the
Executive Branch, fearing such embarrassment in the eyes of the
974. See, e.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick& Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,410-
11, n.63 (1990) (submitting by the United States of an amicus brief in the Supreme Court and
a letter from the State Department Legal Adviser in the district court, to make the United
States' views known in this private litigation that involved international issues); Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1992) (filing by the United
States of a Suggestion of Interest, asking the court to vacate default judgment against
Argentina and to consider the issue of foreign sovereign immunity); Republic of the
Philippines v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (reversing an earlier panel
decision after the United States made its views known in a case involving suit against former
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) (vacating its original decision involving an international
business dispute after the United States made its views known); Jackson v. People's Republic
of China, 596 F. Supp. 386 (1984) (vacating a judgment against PRC after receiving
suggestion of interest from the United States explaining how that decision adversely impacted
U.S. foreign relations).
975. Neuburne Memorandum at 71, supra note 138.
976. See, e.g., National Coalition Gov't v. Unocal Corp., 176 F.R.D. 329, 361 (C.D. Cal.
1997). The United States submitted a Statement of Interest in response to an invitation by
the district court "to express its views concerning the ramifications this litigation may have
on the foreign policy of the United States as established by Congress and the Executive." Id.
at 361.
977. See Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88.
978. Id. at 488. Again, however, the court failed to point to any pronouncement by the
Executive Branch stating this view. See id.
979. Id.
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international community, would remain silent. The sixth factor of
the Baker test is not present in this litigation.
2. The Dismissal of the Degussa ISiemens Actions
Judge Debevoise, in his opinion, dismissed four slave labor
cases,98° two against Degussa and two against Siemens.98'
Judge Debevoise's seventy-eight page opinion is less lengthy than
Judge Greenaway's opinion.98 2 Moreover, the tone and methodology
of the opinion are completely different.
Judge Debevoise, unlike Judge Greenaway, did not attempt to
deal with every ground raised by defendants Degussa and Siemens
in their motions to dismiss. Rather, the court ordered the parties to
focus on only two questions: justiciability and statute of
limitations.9 3 Ultimately, his decision for dismissal was based on
980. Like Judge Greenaway, Judge Debevoise used the terms "slave labor" and "forced
labor" interchangeably. In his opinion, he states:
The shortage of manpower in Germany became acute and in order to fill the
needs of German industry there was developed a system of involuntary forced
laborers. These slave laborers were drawn from the conquered nations, Russian
prisoners of war and the concentration camps.
Organized by the Nazi government, the slave labor program enabled
private industry to draw upon a huge pool ofpotential workers, who were not paid
and who lived and worked in abominable conditions. Particularly appalling were
the conditions to which the Jewish workers were subjected.
Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252-53 (D.N.J. 1999) (emphasis added).
981. The opinion dismissed the following actions: Vogel v. Degussa AG, Civil Action No.
98-5019 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 6, 1998); Klein v. Siemens AG, Civil Action No. 98-4468 (D.N.J.
filed Sept. 24, 1998); Lichtman v. Siemens AG, Civil Action No. 98-4252 (D.N.J. fied Sept. 9,
1998); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, Civil Action No. 98-3958 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 21, 1998).
All four cases were brought by elderly Holocaust survivors who were forced to work
as slave laborers for the defendant German companies. All four lawsuits were filed as class
actions. See Degussa/Siemens, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
Degussa, in addition to having used slave labor, was "charged with having refined the
gold seized from inmates of the Nazi concentration camps with knowledge of its source ...
and with having manufactured [the] Zyklon B [gas] used in the notorious gas chambers of
Auschwitz and other concentration camps." Id. at 249.
Siemens "is alleged [to have] requisitioned for employment in its many plants nearly
100,000 foreign workers, prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates; exploiting them
ruthlessly, subjecting them to abuses and ill treatment and profiting greatly from this source
of unpaid labor." Id. at 254.
982. See Degussa/Siemens, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
983. See id. at 250.
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only one ground: nonjusticiability.984 The limitations issue was not
decided.985
The scope and breadth of analysis, therefore, of the Degusssa/
Siemens opinion is much narrower than the Iwanowa decision.986
However, unlike the Iwanowa opinion, which takes no stand on
these issues, the Degussa/Siemens opinion is rife with factual and
legal findings in favor of the plaintiffs. According to the court:
Plaintiffs' factual allegations ... are totally consistent with the history
of the Nazi era and with the record developed during the post-war trials
in Nuremberg. In brief[,] Degussa's and Siemens's executives were fully
aware of the widespread use of slave labor and of the inhumane
conditions in which the victims lived and worked. The two corporations
were aware that this program was utilized not only to advance the
German war effort, but also as part of the Nazi goal of exterminating the
entire Jewish community in Germany, in the territories of its allies and
in the conquered lands. Degussa was aware of the uses to which the
Zyklon B it manufactured would be used in the concentration camps and
was aware that the gold it refined was seized from the Jewish people at
their places of residence, when they arrived at the concentration camps
and from their bodies before and after they had been killed. Knowing
this[,] Degussa and Siemens voluntarily participated and profited from
the use of slave labor and[,] in the case of Degussa, in the manufacture
and sale of Zyklon B and the refining of the stolen gold."8
Furthermore, according to the court, "[t]here can be little doubt
that the acts in which the defendant corporations are alleged to
have engaged were and are proscribed by customary international
984. See id. at 272-81.
985. See id. at 255 n.2 ("For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that plaintiffs'
claims are not barred by any applicable statute of limitations.").
986. However, in other respects, the Degussa/Siemens opinion is broader than the
Iwanowa opinion. Judge Debevoise devotes an entire section of his opinion to describing the
history of World War IT, its aftermath, and the Nazis' genocidal policies against the Jews. See
id. at 262. No such historical mini-lesson is found in the Iwanowa opinion.
987. Id. at 255 (emphasis added). In the conclusion ofthe opinion, the court reaffirms these
findings: "The plaintiffs' accounts of the wrongs they suffered at the hands of the Nazi
government and the defendants are deemed to be completely accurate. The historical events
recited herein are established either by undisputed submissions in the record or are of
common knowledge." Id. at 285.
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law... [and] defendants' alleged conduct violated German civil law
in effect at the time they engaged in that conduct."98 8
Like Judge Greenaway, Judge Debevoise devotes a substantial
portion of his opinion reviewing the various postwar treaties entered
into between defeated Germany and the allied powers.8 9
Following such review, the court focused on the justiciability of
plaintiffs' claims.990 According to the court,
The critical issue, the resolution of which is dispositive of these cases, is
whether in light of post World War II diplomatic history[,] the plaintiff
victims, and representatives of victims of the Nazi regime[,] can bring an
action in this Court against private German corporations which
participated in and profited from the atrocities committed against
plaintiffs and those they seek to represent. 99'
The Degussa/Siemens court answered this question in the nega-
tive. According to the court:
To state the ultimate conclusion, the questions whether the reparation
agreements made adequate provision for the victims of Nazi oppression
and whether Germany has adequately implemented the reparation
agreements are political questions which a court must decline to
determine. Accepting that the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this case and assuming that it has jurisdiction over the parties
it must nevertheless refrain from adjudicating this dispute. 92
While Judge Debevoise expressed his personal desire to help
plaintiffs (and others like them),993 he found that "[t]o a greater or
988. Id. at 255. In response to the popular misconception that the German corporations
were complying with German law (albeit enacted by the Nazis) at the time they used slave
labor, plaintiffs' German law expert pointed out that "slavery and involuntary servitude have
been prohibited in Germany since 1871 and that [section] 234 of the German Criminal Code
prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude under penalty of imprisonment." Id. at 257.
989. Compare id. at 265-72 (discussing Agreements Concerning Reparations), with
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 447-55 (D.N.J. 1999) (discussing postwar
Germany and the London Debt Agreement's contemplation of individual claims).
990. See Degussa/Siemens, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (discussingthejusticiability ofplaintiffs'
claims). The heart of the decision is found in Part V.E. See id. at 281 (concluding the opinion).
Therefore, while the opinion is 78 pages, only eight pages contain analysis, with the rest
primarily being devoted to a recitation of the facts and the parties' arguments.
991. Id. at 254-55.
992. Id. at 282.
993. See id. at 285. The judge stated:
Every human instinct yearns to remediate in some way the immeasurable wrongs
inflicted upon so many millions of people by Nazi Germany so many years ago,
wrongs in which corporate Germany unquestionably participated. For the reasons
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lesser extent all of the [six political question factors enunciated in
Baker v. Carr]994 are present in the instant case."995 His analysis,
however, did not discuss the factors in a coherent, orderly fashion.
Rather, the opinion haphazardly referred to the various factors,
sometimes expressly and sometimes implicitly.
First, like Judge Greenaway, Judge Debevoise laments that
"[w]ere the court to undertake to fashion appropriate reparations for
the plaintiffs in the present case, it would lack any standards to
apply."99
6
Judge Debevoise mischaracterized, however, the task required of
him (and a jury at trial) to decide this litigation. The judge and jury
are not being asked to undertake at trial the Herculean job of
fashioning (or refashioning) damages for all European victims of
World War IV Rather, his task (and that of the jury) is straight-
forward: to determine whether these private plaintiffs, and their
class action counterparts are entitled to compensation from these
set forth above, however, this court does not have the power to engage in such
remediation.
Id.
994. See discussion and notes supra Part VI.D.I.d. (discussing the six factors of the
political question doctrine).
995. DegussalSiemens, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83.
996. Id. at 284. The court continued:
Wrongs were suffered not only by the classes of persons represented in these
proceedings, however, but also by many other classes of persons in many lands.
They, too, had claims against German assets.... By what practical means could
a single court acquire the information needed to fashion such a standard? This
was a task which the nations involved sought to perform as they negotiated the
Potsdam Agreement, the Paris Agreement, the Transition Agreement and the 2+4
Treaty. It would be presumptuous for this court to attempt to do a better job.
Id.
At another point in the opinion, the court states: "Determining adequacy in relation
to the capacity of the Federal Republic [of Germany] to pay confronts the same lack of
standards as establishment of a reparation program in the first instance." Id.
However, these cases do not seek payment from Germany. Germany's ability to pay
is not at issue. Rather, the suits seek compensation from private corporate defendants. The
issue of ability to pay-and extent of payment-in suits involving corporate defendants is
confronted regularly, for instance, by bankruptcy courts and ordinary civil courts deciding the
extent of punitive damages (based on net worth) to be assessed against a corporate
wrongdoer.
While never specifically stated by the court, this discussion appears to refer to the
second factor of the Baker test: "a lack ofjudicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving [the dispute.]" Id. at 282 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217(1962)). It may
also be referring to the third factor of the Baker test: "the impossibility of deciding without
[the court first making] an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion." Id. Or it maybe referring to the fifth factor of the Baker test: "an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made." Id.
997. See DegussalSiemens, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
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two private defendants for specific wrongs committed during a
twelve-year period (from 1933 to 1945).998
Courts in the United States repeatedly undertake similar tasks,
ranging from complex multidistrict litigation cases involving airline
crashes or securities fraud, to wide-ranging products liability class
action lawsuits involving tobacco, drugs, or other consumer
products. As discussed above, two other federal courts-in the Swiss
bank and Austrian bank litigation-are already determining a fair
allocation of damages to Holocaust survivors and their heirs located
throughout the world.999
It appears that Judge Debevoise also relies on factors four, five,
and six of the Baker v. Carr test as grounds for dismissal:
Major policy determinations are implicated in the determination of the
size and in the allocation of reparations. They are not the subject of
judicial discretion. For a court now, in the light of the diplomatic history
of the last fifty-five years, to structure a reparations scheme would be to
express the ultimate lack of respect'000 for the executive branch which
conducted negotiations on behalf of the United States and for the Senate
which ratified the various treaties which emanated from these
negotiations.'00' These are decisions which were made in the face of
serious foreign policy concerns. An attempt by a court to undo them
would create the "embarrassment for multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question."'002 One need only consider the
damage which would be created if foreign nations negotiating with the
United States were confronted with a situation in which a solemn pact
reached with the Executive Department and ratified by the Senate could
be undone by a court. 10 3
However, this "parade of horribles" recited by the court is
nonexistent. By misconstruing this private litigation against two
German corporate defendants into a lawsuit for reparations against
998. See id. at 282-83.
999. For a discussion of the Swiss and Austrian bank litigation, see discussion and notes
supra Part III. and infra VII.A.1.
1000. This refers to the fourth factor of the Baker test: "the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of government." Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
1001. This appears to refer to the fifth factor of the Baker test: "an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made." Id.
1002. Here, the court quotes the sixth factor of the Baker test.
1003. Degussa/Siemens, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 284-85 (citations omitted).
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the nation of Germany, the court set out nonexistent concerns. °0 4 As
already pointed out, if these lawsuits against Degussa and Siemens
had such significant consequences to American foreign policy, the
Executive Branch, which is well-aware of this litigation, would have
made its concern known to the court.
100 5
Judge Debevoise, it appears, committed the same error as Judge
Greenaway. In the absence of specific danger to U.S. foreign policy,
these cases, involving private litigation between nongovernmental
parties, should not have been dismissed on political question
grounds.
In Kadic v. Karadzic,'00 the Second Circuit examined a suit filed
under the ATCA against the Bosnian Serb leader Rodovan
Karadzic.0 °7 Even though the suit impacted U.S. foreign policy in
resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, 0" the Second Circuit
declined to dismiss the suit on political question grounds.
0 0 9
As the court explained:
Not every case "touching foreign relations" is nonjusticiable, and judges
should not reflexively invoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and
somewhat sensitive decisions in the context of human rights. We believe
a preferable approach is to weigh carefully the relevant considerations
on a case-by-case basis. This will permit the judiciary to act where
1004. The court found significance in Germany and Poland filing amici briefs in the case.
The opinion states:
Suggestive of the forbidden nature of the territory where plaintiffs ask this court
to tread is the fact that even at this early stage of the litigation the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland
have intervened as amici curiae to urge their respective views.
Id. at 284. However, the filing of an amicus brief by a foreign government, even to oppose the
litigation, should play little significance in a court deciding the case. American courts
routinely reject the views of foreign governments which, predictably, oppose litigation in the
United States against their private corporations. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,
480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. IlM. 1979); Diplomatic Note from the Canadian Secretary of State for
External Affairs to U.S. Ambassador, reprinted in 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 334, 336 (1979)
(opposing private antitrust litigation by Canada against private Canadian uranium
producers). For a general discussion of foreign governments opposing litigation against their
private corporations in the United States, and the use of amici briefs, diplomatic notes, and
blocking statutes by foreign governments to thwart such litigation, see BORN, supra note 12,
at 852-60.
1005. See discussion and notes supra Part VI.C. (discussing the slave labor cases that have
been filed to date).
1006. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
1007. See id. at 235-36.
1008. Karadzic was served with the lawsuit when he flew to New York to attend a United
Nations meeting on the crisis in Bosnia. See id. at 237.
1009. See id. at 238.
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appropriate in light of the express legislative mandate of the Congress
in section 1350, without compromising the primacy of the political
branches in foreign affairs. 10 10
As the Second Circuit noted, "[a]lthough these cases present
issues that arise in a politically charged context, that does not
transform them into cases involving nonjusticiable political ques-
tions."""n The same reasoning applies to the slave labor litigation
against German private industry.
3. Effect of the Dismissal of the Actions
As the above analysis of the two decisions has shown, the courts'
dismissal of these slave labor lawsuits was in error, and should be
overturned on appeal.
Contrary to published reports, the Iwanowa and Degussa /Sieme-
ns opinions were not the first cases to decide whether Holocaust
lawsuits could proceed in the United States. ° 2 As already dis-
cussed, both before the onset of the modern era of Holocaust
litigation and thereafter, courts have issued decisions denying and
granting dismissal of such suits.0 1 3
Nevertheless, the dismissals of the five lawsuits appeared to
significantly shift the offensive posture of Holocaust claimants and
their lawyers, who one year earlier achieved an important milestone
with the $1.25 billion settlement with the Swiss banks.' 14 Suddenly,
the plaintiffs' bar was faced with the prospect that other courts
might follow the precedent of the two New Jersey judges, and
likewise dismiss other pending Holocaust lawsuits.
Also significant, even if the two decisions are overturned on
appeal, is that aging Holocaust survivors suing these companies
1010. Id. at 249 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) and Lamont v. Woods, 948
F.2d 825, 831-32 (2d Cir. 1991)).
1011. Id.
1012. See, e.g., David Voreacos, Court Rejects Holocaust Survivors' Suit Against
Manufacturers, KNIGHT-RIDDERTRIB. Bus. NEWS, Sept. 14, 1999, at 19, available in 1999 WL
22015287 (stating that the Iwanowa and Degussa /Siemens cases constituted the "first time
judges have decided whether such lawsuits can proceed in American courts").
1013. For decisions denying motions to dismiss, see discussion and notes supra Part
IV.A.2.b.(i). For decisions granting motions to dismiss, see discussion and notes supra Part
IV.A.2.a.(iii).
1014. See discussion and notes supra Part III.
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might not be alive when the dismissals are reversed and the
lawsuits are allowed to go forward. Ford, Degussa, Siemens, and, by
association, the other companies being sued, therefore, achieved a
significant strategic victory with these dismissals.
The effect of Judge Greenaway's dismissal of the lawsuit against
Ford and Ford Werke A.G. is especially pernicious. Even though (1)
during the height of the war, slaves comprised fifty percent of the
laborers at Ford Werke A.G., allowing Ford to run its German
factory without having to pay half its work force; °15 (2) Ford
received benefits from Ford Werke A.G. during the war;0 16 (3) the
Ford Werke A.G. German plant was returned to Ford after the
war;17 and (4) Ford was allowed, for the next half-century, to
reinvest the profits it made during wartime from its use of slave
labor,01" "neither Ford nor Ford Werke has paid a single penny to
those persons who were forced to work [as slaves] at [its] Cologne
plant."0 19 In fact, Ford's position was that it had no obligation to
pay Iwanowa or any of its other slave laborers:
Germany and many nations of the world, including Russia and Belgium
-plaintiffs former and current homeland-have reached agreements to
compensate victims of Nazi persecution. Thus, any compensation to be
paid to plaintiff in this matter must be provided by the governments of
Germany, Russia or Belgium as part of the negotiated resolution of
claims involving the victims of Hitler's Germany.
10 20
1015. See Mulligan, supra note 833, at D1.
1016. See Plaintiffs Memoranda of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
at 13, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (Civil Action No. 98-959).
According to plaintiff, "as late as 1943, dividends of at least 5% were paid annually by Ford
Werke A.G. to Ford Motor Company." Id. But see Iwanowa Declaration of Burt Neuborne,
supra note 943, Exhibit B (providing 1994 statement of John Banning, Executive Director of
Overseas Business Planning, Ford Motor Co. that noted "Ford Motor Co. had no participation
in the operation or financial results of Ford of Germany while the United States was engaged
in World War IT').
1017. See Appendix Submitted In Connection With Plaintiffs Memoranda of Law in
Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss at 87, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp.
2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (Civil Action No. 98-959). In 1967, Ford received an award of $785,321
from the U.S. government as compensation for losses sustained from wartime bombing of the
Ford Werke A.G. plant in Cologne. See id.
1018. See Agreement on German External Debts, supra note 884. The London Debt
Agreement, until March 1991, insulated defendants from any outside claims to these profits.
See id.
1019. Letter from Allyn Z. Lite, Plaintiffs' Attorney, to The Honorable G. Donald Haneke
2 (June 12, 1998) (on file with author).
1020. Letter from Clyde A. Szuch, Defendant's Attorney, to The Honorable Joseph A
Greenaway, Jr. 5 (June 9, 1998) (on file with author).
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Unlike other German companies, neither Ford Werke A.G. nor
Ford has joined the German companies seeking to establish a "rough
justice" fund to compensate former slave laborers working for
German private industry during World War II."021
If the dismissal of the suit is upheld, Ford and Ford Werke A.G.
walk away scot-free. Degussa and Siemens, on the other hand, have
at least pledged to participate in the German slave labor fund.10 22
Of course, international law mandates a different result. Since
international law, even before Nuremberg, recognized individual
responsibility for war crimes, 1121 and since corporations, under both
U.S. and German law, carry a juridical personality, there is no
reason why corporations should escape liability for their war crimes
while individuals are held responsible. However, that is the result
of the two decisions.
On the other hand, the importance of the two dismissals should
not be overstated. Even if the dismissals turned the tide for these
types of lawsuits (a question yet to be determined), the mere filing
of such suits already has resulted in significant achievements. First,
until the lawsuits in the United States were filed, German industry
denied the slave laborers' claims for over half a century. Only after
the German industrialists began to feel the pressure of American
litigation did they agree to pay their still-uncompensated slave
laborers. Second, the filing of the lawsuits led directly to exposing
the widespread complicity of German, Austrian, and possibly
American, industry with the Nazi war machine. As a result of the
accusations against these corporate defendants in the lawsuits filed
in the United States, facts about participation of these industrialists
with the Nazis-solely for the sake of profit-either came to light for
1021. At oral argument, Judge Greenaway asked former Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, who represented Ford, why his client had not joined other companies in
negotiating a broad settlement fund for the survivors. Christopher responded: "Ford had not
been asked to join the discussions. If they are asked to become involved, I can assure you that
Ford will give every consideration to that." DavidVoreacos, FordFights Lawsuit by Holocaust
Survivors, RECORD (N.J.), Aug. 6, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 7109695.
1022. See Voreacos, supra note 1021, at Al.
1023. Regarding war crime responsibility, one source states:
Although Nuremberg laid the foundations for prosecuting war criminals, war-
crimes trials in one form or another date back at least as far as the Middle
Ages.... One of [Nuremberg's] most important contributions was its affirming
the principle of individual responsibility, that individuals-not only
government-are obliged to comply with international law.
FRANK NEWMAN & DAviD WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY AND
PROCESS 279 (2d ed. 1996).
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the first time or were resurrected from the long-forgotten
Nuremberg trials of half a century ago.
Even after the dismissals of the actions against Ford, Degussa,
and Siemens, the expectation is that the remaining slave labor suits
will not reach the trial stage, but will be resolved through the global
settlement fund that the German government and industry is
proposing to establish.' ° ' In the aftermath of the two dismissals,
Stuart Eizenstat, the U.S. government's representative to the
German slave labor talks, announced that the German companies
desired to continue negotiating with plaintiffs' lawyers and Jewish
representatives over the establishment of the fund.0 25
Two considerations should lead the Germans, even if they now
may be less fearful of American litigation, to want a "rough justice"
global settlement akin to the settlement achieved by the Swiss.
First, like the Swiss, the German companies are still under a threat
of sanctions being imposed by state and local governments. In July
1999, Alan Hevesi, Comptroller of New York City and the architect
of the sanctions that forced the Swiss banks to settle, threatened to
impose sanctions upon Germany if a settlement of the slave labor
claims is not achieved.' 26 Second, the German multinationals, who
do significant business in the United States, want to avoid the
negative publicity that fresh allegations, unearthed from new
historical research, might bring to them. Sensitive about their
image, the German companies badly desire to put their Nazi past
behind them.0 27
It appears that a global settlement of the slave labor litigation will
be achieved, and that the final payout-$5.2 billion as of March
1024. See 16 Companies Continue Talks on Claims over Nazi Slave Labor, L.A.TIMES, Sept.
15, 1999, at A5.
1025. See id.
1026. See John Authers, Threats of Sanctions Hang over Forced-Labor Talks, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 15, 1999, at 3, available in 1999 WL 21146587; Germany Has Not Done
Enough to Indemnify Jews, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, July 14, 1999, available in 1999 WL
2637740.
1027. See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Once More into the Dock with Wazi' Companies, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 24, 1999, at A27. That article states:
German companies are racing to follow the Swiss banks in paying up because
they want their brand names to be acceptable globally. Deutsche Bank is in the
process of buying Bankers Trust [of New York-a deal recently completed];
Volkswagen has launched a new Beetle; Daimler Chrysler doesn't want Jeeps and
Lebarons to become "Nazi" cars in the eyes of the public.
2000]
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20001028 will be significantly larger than the $1.7 billion that the
Germans originally offered. The dismissals of the litigation against
Degussa, Siemens, and Ford, however, did depress the final figure
that German industry and German government will eventually have
to pay to finally put to rest claims against them arising out of World
War II.
1028. See discussion and notes supra Part VI.B. For a recent discussion comparing and
contrasting the anticipated German settlement to the Swiss bank settlement, written by an
attorney for the plaintiffs involved in both settlements, see Barry A. Fisher, Holocaust
Haggle, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 10, 2000, at 6.
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VII. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
This section will discuss various Holocaust-era lawsuits filed in
the United States that were not covered in the previous sections.
A. Claims against Non-Swiss Banks
Swiss banks were not the only banks to deal with the Nazis.
During World War II, German, Austrian, French, and, it appears,
even European branches of U.S. banks participated in the looting of
assets held in their branches by Jews. Banks in other neutral
countries, like the Swiss banks, helped the Nazis to launder assets
stolen by them in occupied Europe. 29
On the heels of the Swiss bank litigation, suits were filed in U.S.
courts against other, non-Swiss banks for their dealings during the
war. As in the slave labor cases, all of the entities sued have
extensive business dealings in the United States.
1. Claims against the German and Austrian Banks
German and Austrian banks maintained close business relation-
ships with the Nazi war machine, and appear to have profited
handsomely from such dealings.
In February 1999, Deutsche Bank, Germany's largest bank, issued
an explosive announcement: An independent historical commission
reviewing the bank's wartime activities discovered that Deutsche
Bank financed the building of Auschwitz.0 30 Earlier, in July 1998,
the historical commission confirmed that Deutsche Bank profited
from gold plundered from Holocaust victims.0 3'
1029. See discussion and notes supra Part lI-A.1.b.
1030. See Deutsche Bank Admits Auschwitz Role, IRISH TMIES, Feb. 5, 1999, at 51 ("he
documents . . . also show that the Gestapo secret police and IG Farben, an industrial
conglomerate involved in implementing the Holocaust, had accounts at Deutsche Bank.");
Brian Milner, Auschwitz Role May Derail Bank Deal-German Institution's Revelation of
Activities during WarAdds Firepower to Holocaust Suits, GLOBE &MAIL, Feb. 6,1999, atA16
("Deutsche Bank disclosed that officials discovered documents showing a branch of the bank
in Nazi-occupied Katowice, Poland, had provided loans to construction companies with
contracts for facilities at Auschwitz, as well as an adjacent IG Farben chemicals plant.").
1031. The findings issued by the historical commission were widely reported in the press.
Some of the most explosive portions reported were as follows:
[Deutsche Bank] had bought more than 4.4 tons of gold from the Reichsbank,
the onetime central bank. "This gold business was normal business during the war,"
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An historical report of the Dresdner Bank, the second-largest
bank in Germany, found that in Nazi-occupied lands, "the saying
went, 'Right after the first German tank comes Dr. Rasche from the
Dresdner Bank. 10
3 2
The first class action filed against the German banks for their
wartime activities was filed in June 1998 in federal court in
Manhattan." 3 Plaintiffs, three elderly Holocaust survivors and all
U.S. citizens, 10 34 sued on behalf of themselves and on behalf of
10,0000 Holocaust survivors and victims' relatives. 35 Deutsche
Bank and Dresdner Bank AG, both headquartered in Frankfurt,
were named as defendants. 1 36 The lawsuit charged the two banks
with profiting from the looting of gold and other personal property
[stated Ronald Weichert, a Deutsche Bank spokesman]. At wartime values and
exchange rates, the gold was worth some $5 million, about one ninth of its estimated
worth today....
Deutsche Bank channeled gold transactions with the Reichsbank through
branches in occupied Austria and Turkey, then a self-avowed neutral power. Of
purchases totaling 4,446 kilograms of gold, the [historical] report concluded, 744
kilograms [1, 637pounds] were dental gold taken from Jews'teeth, wedding bands and
personal jewelry amassed in Berlin by an SS officer named Bruno Melmer.
Alan Cowell, Biggest German Bank Admits and Regrets Dealing in Nazi Gold, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1998, at A2 (quoting Ronald Weichert) (emphasis added). This gold is commonly
known as the "Melmer gold." See John Schmid, Deutsche Bank Says It 'Regrets'Nazi Deals,
IN'L HERALiD TRiB., Aug. 1, 1998, at 1. According to the historical report:
"Gold played a deciding roll [sic] in financing the import of strategic goods essential
to the Nazi war efforts .... The vast majority of the gold that Germany sold was
stolen: from central banks of vanquished countries, but also from individuals,
especially the victims of the Nazis' racist persecution-above all Jews."
Stolen Gold Tied to Top German Bank, Report Delves into Holocaust Plunder, CHI.TRIB., Aug.
1, 1998, at 10 (quoting the Deutsche Bank historical report). Even though the report found
no "hard evidence" that Deutsche Bank officials were aware that they were dealing in victims'
gold, the report found that the officials "could have known that the gold originally
belonged-and.., still belongs-to victims of Nazi Germany." Id. (emphasis added). Moreover,
"[t]rading most of the gold through its only overseas subsidiary, in Istanbul, the bank made
a profit from 1941-43 of $378,000, or $3.4 million today. The historians said the profit
represented 0.15 percent of the bank's total profits during that period." Id.
The German bank said in a statement that it "fully acknowledges its moral and
ethical responsibility for the darkest chapter of its history.'" Cowell, supra, at A2 (quoting a
July 31, 1998 statement of Deutsche Bank).
1032. Jenkins, supra note 1027, at A27.
1033. See Complaint, Watman v. Deutsche Bank, No. 98 Civ. 3938 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 3,
1998) [hereinafter Watman Complaint]. The complaint was fied by a group of attorneys led
by Edward Fagan of New York and Robert Swift of Philadelphia, both of whom are involved
in the Swiss bank litigation and other lawsuits involving World War II restitution. See id.
1034. See id. TT 4-6.
1035. See id. T 12.
1036. See id. TT 7-8.
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of Jews.""3 7 The complaint sought a total of $18 billion in compensa-
tory damages 10 38 and unspecified exemplary damages. 39
In October 1998, the lawsuit was amended to add two Austrian
banks, Creditanstalt and its parent bank, Bank Austria, as defend-
ants. 4'00 Creditanstalt was accused of both profiting from the
proceeds of slave labor: during the war, and of participating and




The Austrian banks claimed that they should not be held legally
responsible for participating in the theft of gold and other assets of
Jewish victims because Creditanstalt was taken over by Deutsche
Bank in 1938 as part of Germany's annexation of Austria.
0 42
Later that same month, the German banks were hit by a second
class action lawsuit, this one filed in federal court in Brooklyn, New
York, by another group of attorneys representing a different set of
Holocaust survivors and heirs.0 43 The lawsuit named Germany's
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, and Commerzbank as defend-
ants.' 0 " The lawsuit accuses the banks of refusing to return assets
of Jewish survivors, and of financing and profiting from Nazi slave
labor.0 45
1037. See id. T% 27-31.
1038. See id. 9 40, 45, 49, 52.
1039. See id. at Prayer for Judgment T C.
1040. See Austrian Bank Still Hopes for Out-of-Court Settlement over Nazi Gold, AGENCE
FR.-PRESSE, Oct. 7, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16614262.
1041. See Henry Weinstein, Austrian Bank Agrees to Pay $40 million in Settling Holocaust-
related Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1999, at A21. Specifically,
a document ... [filed] last year in federal court in Brooklyn described how
Creditanstalt officials, after the German annexation, set up a "Control Bank" to
efficiently seize Jewish-owned assets in Austria that were deemed economically
significant. The basic purpose of the Control Bank, according to the suit, was to
acquire as trustee significant Jewish properties for later sale to appropriate "Aryan
buyers." The suit also noted that the buyers were required to pay a "dejewing fee" to
the Control Bank to acquire the property.
Id.
1042. SeeAustria's Creditanstalt Bank to Face Suit in Nazi Gold Case, AGENCEFR.-PRESSE,
Aug. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16582007.
1043. See Complaint, Duveen v. Deutsche Bank, No. CV-98-06620 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 28,
1998) [hereinafter Duveen Complaint]. The group of lawyers filing this suit is headed by
attorneys Melvyn Weiss of New York and Michael Hausfeld of Washington, D.C., both of
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Subsequently, five other federal class action lawsuits were filed
against the German and Austrian banks in either the Southern or
Eastern Districts of New York. °46
Eventually, in March 1999, the seven cases were consolidated as
In re Austrian and German Bank Holocaust Litigation, 47 in the
Southern District of New York before Judge Shirley Wohl Kram,
when plaintiffs filed a consolidated class action complaint for all of
the lawsuits.
Earlier, in December 1998, Judge Kram appointed former U.S.
Senator Alfonse D'Amato 48 to act as a "special master," whose
duties would include working with the parties to craft a global
settlement of the various claims against the German and Austrian
banks.0 4
9
In March 1999, the two Austrian banks reached a separate
settlement with plaintiffs' attorneys. 50 This became the third out-
1046. See Complaint, Haas v. Bayrische Hypo, No. 99 Civ. 1586 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 3,
1999); Complaint, Bertysch v. Bank Austria, No. 99 Civ. 0302 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 15, 1999);
Complaint, Kahn v. Deutsche Bank, No. 99 Civ. 0190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 11, 1999);
Complaint, Elkan v. Creditsanstalt, CV-98-6996 (E.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 8, 1998); Complaint,
Mason v. Deutsche Bank, CV-98-07793 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 29, 1998).
1047. No. 98 Civ. 3938 (S.D.N.Y filed Mar. 17, 1999). Two of the class action plaintiffs also
filed separate, individual actions against Deutsche Bank. See Complaint, Haas v. Deutsche
Bank AG, No. 99 Civ. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11, 1999) (alleging that plaintiffs' parents'
substantial assets were confiscated by Deutsche Bank between 1938 and 1945, filed by
Gerhard Haas and Charlotte Haas Schueller, sole surviving heirs of their parents);
Complaint, Hammerstein v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 99 Civ. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11,
1999) (alleging the same cause of action, filed by plaintiffs Gabriele Hammerstein, relative
of composer Oscar Hammerstein II, Helen Nightengale, and Alice Nightengale Luhan). The
two separate actions are also being heard by Judge Kram.
1048. Senator D'Amato from New York was defeated in his bid for reelection in 1998.
D'Amato, as head of the Senate Banking Committee, was instrumental in forcing the Swiss
banks to settle the Holocaust claims against them, and earned the wrath of the Swiss for his
efforts. See A Distinguished Public Servant, N.Y. Tm4Es, Jan. 19,1999, at A18. Former Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was severely criticized by the Swiss for honoring
D'Amato after the settlement with the Swiss banks. See id.
According to Gregg Rickman, D'Amato's former legislative assistant, after his defeat,
D'Amato received a letter from David Vogelsanger, a one-time member of the Swiss Embassy
in the United States, stating: '"I should like to congratulate you upon your miserably failed
reelection. As a Swiss citizen, I am proud of the New Yorkers who have sent you where you
belong, on the dung-heap of cheap and corrupted politics." GREGG RIcKMAN, SWIssBANKSAND
JEWISH SoULs 284 (1999) (quoting letter from David Volgelsanger to Alfonse D'Amato).
According to the New York Post, Vogelsanger states that he was "banished" by the Swiss
Ambassador for his comments and now lives in Sofia, Bulgaria. Alpine Hiss, N.Y. PoST, May
24, 1999, at 8.
1049. See Daniel Wise, Key Parties Oppose Bank Austria Pact in Holocaust Suit, N.Y. L.J.,




of-court settlement in the modern-era of Holocaust litigation. 51 The
amount of the settlement, however, was small-$40 million-which
amounts only to $4 million in pre-World War II values.'0 52 Moreover,
$10 million, or one-fourth of the settlement, was allocated for
attorneys' fees and administrative expenses, leaving only a negligi-
ble amount to be distributed to the actual victims or their heirs.'0° 3
Originally, the World Jewish Congress threatened to "launch an
international print ad campaign targeting Bank of Austria/
Creditanstalt," but later agreed not to oppose the settlement. 10 54
In August 1999, Judge Kram appointed Simon Wiesenthal, the
world's leading Nazi hunter, to head a committee that would decide
how monies left over, after claimants with verifiable accounts with
Bank of Austria or Creditanstalt are paid, would be distributed.0 55
Wiesenthal's appointment, however, did not lead to an increase of
1051. The first was the $1.25 billion class action settlement of the Swiss bank case. See
discussion and notes supra Part M.D. The second was the settlement of the case involving
a Nazi-stolen Degas, in which plaintiffs obtained one-half ownership of the painting, valued
at $1.1 million. See discussion and notes supra Part V.A. Both cases were settled in August
1998.
1052. See George John, Bank Offers $92M for Holocaust Role, AP ONLINE, Jan. 31, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 9736890. Edward Fagan, one of plaintiffs' attorneys who negotiated the
accord, justified the settlement on the grounds that Bank Austria, in exchange, "will provide
us with documents that will open the way to the main vein of gold'.. .pointing to Germany's
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank [which took over the Austrian banks upon Germany's
annexation of Austria in 1938]." Id. (quoting Edward Fagan).
Unlike the Swiss banks settlement, the Austrian banks settlement is limited only to
the two defendant banks, and does not insulate other Austrian companies for their misdeeds
during World War II. It may well be, therefore, that the documents produced by the Austrian
banks as part of the settlement will become useful in supporting claims against Austrian
industry for its use of slave labor. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Chancellor Proposes to
Compensate Austria's Wartime Slaves, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2000, at A8.
1053. It remains unclear how many individuals will be eligible to receive payment from the
Bank of Austria settlement. Potential claimants have been estimated to be between 50,000
to more than 10 milllion. See Wise, supra note 1049, at 1.
1054. Compare World Jewish Congress Threatens Campaign against Austrian Banks,
AGENCE FI-PRESSE, July 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2638409 (stating that the World
Jewish Congress opposes the settlement), with Michel Moutot, Judge Approves Austrian
Bank's Compensation to Holocaust Survivors, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Jan. 6,2000, available in
2000 WL 2708173 (stating that the World Jewish Congress no longer opposes the settlement).
In later supporting the settlement, Elan Steinberg, of the World Jewish Congress stated: "We
particularly welcome the apology issued by Bank of Austria, as the issue of moral restitution
is just as important, if not more so, than financial restitution." Id.
1055. See Henry Weinstein, Simon Wiesenthal to Head Holocaust Reparations Panel, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999, at A15, available in 1999 WL 2183757. Simon Wiesethal, 90 years old,
is the founder of the Jewish Documentation Center, located in Vienna, Austria. See id.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the settlement sum: The Austrian banks' total payout still remained
at $40 million."56
In September 1999, notices began to be published in newspapers
worldwide announcing the proposed class action settlement against
the Austrian banks. 57 A fairness hearing was held on November 1,
1999 to determine whether the $40 million settlement should be
given final approval, and the settlement was approved by Judge
Kram on January 10, 2000.058
1056. See id. At the fairness hearing held before Judge Kram, Robert Swift, one of plaintiffs'
attorneys, defended the settlement amount as follows:
I would like to make a response to the comments of the objectors. The principle
response was to the adequacy of the amount, so let me address that first.
I think it would be an anomalous result were this Court to find that we could
not settle with two Austrian banks who have been forthcoming, both as to their moral
responsibility and their willingness to make a financial commitment to all class
members, if we said we cannot do it until we have payment for all persons injured by
the Third Reich.
Today we propose to make a settlement with two Austrian banks. There are
many others in Germany and in Austria who have responsibility, moral and financial.
We cannot deal with all of those at once, but there is an opportunity here, particularly
for the aged class members, who, were we to pursue litigation, would probably not see
any compensation in their lifetimes....
." We submit to you that the delay, expense and risk incumbent upon
rejection of this settlement is enormous and that we cannot, as counsel, recommend
to this Court that this settlement be put aside so that the vast numbers of class
members will receive nothing. A settlement, by its nature, is a compromise of claims.
In summary, your Honor, I believe that class counsel have acted responsibly,
that this settlement is fair and adequate and reasonable and it warrants the Court's
approval.
Transcript, Fairness Hearing before The Honorable Shirley Wohl Kram, In re Austrian and
German Bank Litigation, No. 98 Civ. 3938 (S.D.N.Y. transcribed Nov. 1, 1999).
1057. See To Victims of Nazi Persecution and Their Heirs Who May Have Claims against
Certain Austrian Banks Relating to the Holocaust, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, at All. Since
the notices were very similar to those published in the Swiss bank settlement, the Austrian
bank advertisements, to avoid confusion, stated: "THIS SETTLEMENT IS DIFFERENT
FROM THE SWISS BANK HOLOCAUST SETTLEMENT." Id. Like the Swiss bank
settlement, the Austrian bank settlement posted information on a Web site, and provided a
claim form for claimants to fill out. See Legal Notice by Order of the Court (visited Jan. 31,
2000) <http'//www.austrianbankclaims. com/main.asp?lan=en&sec=67>.
1058. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 1, In re Austrian and German Bank
Holocaust Litigation, No. 98 Civ. 3938 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 10, 2000).
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2. Claims against the French Banks
After Nazi Germany's conquest of France in 1940, French banks
began to ferret out and confiscate the accounts of their Jewish
account holders. Approximately 68,000 such Jewish accounts were
identified and then so-called "Aryanized." 59
The banks maintain that they had no choice but to comply with
laws forced upon them by the Nazis or the collaborationist French
regime.'O°6 Critics argue that the banks passively complied with
these anti-Jewish laws, and earned substantial profits as a
result.10 61
1059. See Summary of Lists Naming Individuals Whose Assets Were Frozen in Deposit-
Taking Institutions in 1941, UPDATE FROM THE MATTEOU COMM'N (The Study Mission into
the Looting of Assets in France), Sept. 1999, at 4.
1060. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Credit Commercial de France's Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint 183, Bodner v. Banque Paribas, No. CV-97-7433 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Dec. 17, 1997).
1061. See Complaint T 83, Benisti v. Banque Paribas, No. CV-98-7851 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec.
23, 1998) [hereinafter Benisti Complaint] ("[D]efendants and the Vichy authorities actively
cooperated and collaborated with the Nazis, in the systematic plunder of the Looted Assets.
The Defendants blocked bank accounts and seized countless of millions of dollars of Looted
Assets."); id. 86 ('The Defendants were so eager to ingratiate themselves with Nazi and
Vichy officials that they began seizing and freezing the bank accounts of their Jewish
depositors even before the relevant laws and regulations requiring them to do so were
promulgated.").
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In December 1997, the first suit was filed against the French
banks."62 It was followed, one year later, by a second suit.10 63
Both suits were filed in federal court in New York.0 64 In March
1999, in yet another replay of the Swiss banks litigation, a third
lawsuit was filed in California state court against the defendant
banks.0 65
The two federal lawsuits are class actions. The California state
suit is a quasi-class action, filed both individually and on behalf of
1062. See Complaint, Bodner v. Banque Paribas, No. CV-97-7433 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 17,
1997) [hereinafter Bodner Complaint]. The lawsuit was brought by sixteen plaintiffs that are
either elderly survivors of the Holocaust or heirs of victims who perished in the war. See
Second Amended Class Action Complaint 1-75, Bodner v. Banque Paribas, No. CV-97-7433
(E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29,1999) [hereinafterBodner Amended Complaint]. All are U.S. citizens.
See id.
The plaintiffs, or plaintiffs' heirs, are either former French nationals, or had escaped
to France from other countries after the earlier Nazi occupations of their homeland. See id.
Significantly, plaintiffs are all Jewish, and are suing on behalf of "the Jewish victims and
survivors of the Nazi Holocaust in France, their heirs and beneficiaries." Id. 77. Therefore,
unlike in the Swiss bank litigation, if the case is successfully resolved, non-Jewish victims of
the Nazis in France will not be able to participate in the resolution.
The defendants are six large French banks: Banque Paribas, Credit Lyonnais, Societe
Generale, Credit Commercial de France, Credit Anricole Indosuez, and Natexis. See id. IT
79-85. Originally, U.I.'s Barclays Bank was included as a defendant, because it held a
branch in Nazi-occupied France that allegedly participated in the looting of the accounts of
its Jewish depositors. Barclays settled the case, however, and is not included in the later
proceedings. See infra notes 1079-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Barclays
settlement).
1063. See Benisti Complaint, supra note 1061. This lawsuit was brought by an additional
eighteen Holocaust survivors, or heirs of victims. See id. 1-58. In contrast to Bodner, all
plaintiffs are aliens. See id. Like in Bodner, the named plaintiffs seek to represent only
Jewish victims who suffered in France during World War II. See id. 1 60 ("The Class of
Plaintiffs includes those aliens named herein and all other non-U.S. citizens similarly
situated who themselves or whose family members were the Jewish victims and survivors of
the Nazi Holocaust in France, their heirs and beneficiaries .... ").
The defendants include the same six French banks named in the Bodner action. See
id. 63-68. This lawsuit, however, added one additional French bank-Banque Nationale de
Paris-as well as two U.S. financial institutions: Chase Manhattan Bank and J.P. Morgan &
Co. ("J.P. Morgan"). See id. % 69-71. The American banks had branches in France, and are
alleged also to have participated in the confiscation of the assets of their Jewish depositors.
See id. 70-71.
1064. See Benisti Complaint, supra note 1061;Bodner Complaint, supra note 1062. The two
cases have not been formally consolidated, but are being heard by the same judge, the
Honorable Sterling Johnson, Jr.
1065. See Complaint, Mayer v. Banque Paribas, No. BC 302226 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar.
24, 1999) [hereinafter Mayer Complaint]. The lawsuit was filed by one plaintiff, Lily Mayer,
an elderly Holocaust survivor residing in Southern California. See id. 8-12. Strangely, the
lawsuit was brought in Northern California, in the California Superior Court in San
Francisco. See id. 7.
With the exception of Credit Commercial de France, the defendants are the same
French and American banks named in the Benisti action. See id. IT 15-22.
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the general public, under the California Unfair Competition Act
("UCA7). 0 66
The two federal cases were consolidated, and the defendant banks
filed motions to dismiss. °6 7
In the California state court lawsuit, defendants also filed motions
to dismiss, which are set to be heard in May 2000.1061
The French government came to the aid of the banks in the
federal cases by filing an amicus brief supporting dismissal. 10 69
According to France, "these proceedings infringe upon [France's]
sovereign duty to take responsibility for, and interferes with its
current efforts to address, the wrongs committed against residents
of France within its borders."0 7 0
The "current efforts" referred to are the creation by the French
government in 1997 of the "Prime Minister's Office Study Mission
Into the Looting of Jewish Assets in France," more popularly known
as the "Matteoli Commission" after its chairperson, former cabinet
minister and Resistance fighter Jean Matteoli.10 7 1
1066. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17206 (West 1997). As with all the other Holocaust-
era lawsuits filed in California, see text and notes supra Part IfI.B.1. (discussingMarkovicova
lawsuit against the Swiss banks), and Part IV.A.2.b. (discussing litigation against European
insurance companies), the complaint contains only one cause of action: violation of the UCA.
See Mayer Complaint, supra note 1065, 9T 42-46.
1067. The motions by the French banks, filed by some of the most well-known law firms in
the United States, essentially restated the same legal arguments first made by the Swiss
banks in the litigation against them, and, thereafter, repeated by other foreign defendants
in the subsequently-filed Holocaust-era suits. Compare Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Banque Paribas, Credit Lyonnais, Societe Generale, Credit
Commercial de France, CreditAnricole Indosuez, andNatexis, Bodnerv. Banque Paribas, No.
97-CV-7433 (E.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 1998) (arguing lack of standing, need for abstention, lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, forum non conveniens, statute of
limitations, and failure to join indispensable parties), with text and notes supra Part II.2.
(discussing Swiss banks' defenses).
1068. The arguments made by the banks in the California litigation essentially track their
motions to dismiss in the federal action. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities of
French Banks in Support of Demurrer and Motion to Dismiss or Stay on Grounds of
International Comity, Act of State Doctrine, Failure to Join Indispensable Parties, and In
Light of Proceedings In France, Mayer v. Banque Paribas, No. BC 302226 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed July 23, 1999). The banks also argue that California's UCA is not applicable since the
California statute: (1) cannot regulate out-of-state, including foreign, conduct; and (2) cannot
be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred before its enactment. See id. at 3-9.
1069. See Memorandum of Law of the Republic of France, Benisti v. Banque Paribas, No.
CV-98-7851 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 1999).
1070. Id. at 2.
1071. See TfHEPRIMEMINISTER'SOFFICE, EXTRACTSFROMTHESEcONDREPORTOFTHESTUDY
MISSIONINTOTHELOOTINGOFJEWISHASSETSINFRANOE § 1(1999). However, while the nine-
member commissionis supposed to determine what was taken, it cannot issue compensation.
20001
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Also weighing-in against litigation in the United States, and
concomitant pressure by American-based Jewish organizations
against the banks, is the organized Jewish community in France,
the third largest in the world after Israel and the United States. 72
To counter French government intervention in the litigation, Alan
Hevesi, the New York City Comptroller, filed his own amicus brief,
urging rejection of the dismissal motions.0 73
Hevesi addressed France's sovereignty argument directly:
At first, [France's] argument has some superficial appeal. However,
France's real sovereign interest in taking responsibility for and
addressing the events of the Holocaust is in exploring its own
responsibility for the persecution of French Jews and other minorities
See Jean Matteoli, UPDATE FROM THE MATTEOLI COMM'N (The Study Mission into the Looting
of Jewish Assets in France), Feb. 1999, at 1. Apparently, another panel will need to be created
to issue compensation based upon the Commission's findings.
According to Mr. Matteoli: "[W]e proposed the creation of a body that would examine
individual claims from victims of anti-Semitic legislation passed during the Occupation
M... This body.., is due to be set up very shortly .... We have committed ourselves to
submitting a final report before the end of the century." Id.
Taking a cue from the Swiss government's effort in public relations, the Matteoli
Commission began publishing an English-language newsletter describing its work. Compare
id., with Dialogue:Latest News from the Task Force on Switzerland-World War II(Mar. 1998)
(on file with author).
On September 10,1999, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin announced the creation
of a post-Matteoli commission to oversee compensation payments to individual victims. See
French Panel to Pay Jews Persecuted during War, CM. TRIB., Sept. 12, 1999, at 10, available
in 1999 WL 2911250 ("'To my knowledge, this marks the first time a state, other than
Germany, recognizes the principle of individual reparation. It's something we have been
waiting for years." (quoting Henri Hadjenberg, president of the Representative Council of
French Jewish Organizations, known by its French acronym CRJF)).
1072. See Craig Whitney, A Survivor Helps Track French Debt of Wartime, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1999, at A4. That article states:
While organizations representing Holocaust survivors have pressed Swiss banks for
over $2 billion in compensation for Switzerland's wartime handling of gold that the
Nazis seized from the Jews, Jewish groups in France have been less vocal, preferring
to put their trust in the integrity of the Matteoli Commission rather than use moral
persuasion on French financial and insurance institutions to make them contribute
to international funds for the victims.
Id.
1073. See New York City's Comptroller's Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae in Opposition to
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, Bodner v. Banque Paribas, No. CV-97-7433 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Apr. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Hevesi Brief]. New York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi heads the
Executive Monitoring Committee, "an association of public finance officers and regulators
that monitors and reports on Holocaust restitution issues to approximately 900 public finance
officers, public pension fund administrators, and state and local regulators and legislators
nationally." Id. at 1-2. For discussion of the critical role being played by the Executive
Monitoring Committee in Holocaust restitution, see text and notes supra Part III.C.3.
(discussing the effect of proposed sanctions on the Swiss bank settlement).
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and its own provision of restitution for the acts of the French
government and/or its citizens. Its purported interest in these cases,
which are private claims against private parties, amounts to a demand
to be the sole arbiter of all claims asserted by any French Holocaust
victim against any private defendant, and does not rise to a level
demanding deference from this Court.'0 '4
As to the U.S. interest in this litigation, Hevesi explained:
Indeed, this country, this State and this City'. 5 all have an enormous
countervailing interest in providing a forum in which U.S. citizens and
Holocaust survivors living elsewhere can reclaim property
misappropriated by French banks doing business here, which
overshadows whatever interest French government has in forcing the
plaintiffs to forgo litigating their claims. None of the legal theories
advanced by the French Republic-forum non conveniens, international
comity, or the Act of State Doctrine-requires this Court to decline to
exercise jurisdiction over these actions.'07 6
The U.S. Executive Branch, keenly aware of this litigation and the
interjection of France and the New York City Comptroller into the
proceedings, stayed out. However, in a not-too-subtle effort to force
the banks to settle, the U.S. House of Representatives' Banking and
1074. Hevesi Brief, supra note 1073, at 3. As Hevesi states elsewhere in the brief: "While
it is true, as the French government points out, that the Vichy government abetted and
approved of these actions, the claims of the survivors are not against the French government;
they are against the private financial institutions that allegedly took their property and never
gave it back." Id. at 10.
1075. The "constituency" of the Comptroller of the City of the New York includes "the
world's largest remaining community of Holocaust survivors and their heirs outside Israel,
many of whom are putative class members in these and similar litigations .... The
Comptroller has an enormous interest in assuring that these people receive a forum in which
to adjudicate their claims meaningfully and expeditiously." Id. at 1.
1076. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted). Later in the brief, Hevesi expounds on this theme:
There is no doubt about the cultural importance to the French people of coming to
terms with their history, but the simple fact that these private lawsuits against
private entities accrued in occupied France does not mean they violate French
sovereignty. Whether the misappropriation occurred with the explicit or tacit
approval of the French government, or whether Vichy government was itself
legitimate, simply is irrelevant to the disposition of the U.S. litigation, which
comprises straightforward commercial claims against the defendant banks.
Id. at 10. Hevesi adds a suggestion: "If the French government determines that the plaintiffs
are entitled to additional restitution from the public institutions that persecuted and
participated in the theft of their property, it may freely provide for it notwithstanding any
U.S. litigation against the private wrongdoers." Id. at 11.
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Financial Services Committee held hearings on the claims against
the French banks. 77
The timing of the hearings was also seen as sending a message to
the banks. The hearings were held in mid-September 1999, before
the dismissal motions had been ruled on, and while two of the
defendant banks were awaiting approval for a merger from bank
regulators in the United States.10 78
As of January 2000, none of the motions to dismiss banks in the
three actions had been acted upon.
Earlier, however, Britain's Barclays Bank ("Barclays"), one of the
defendants in the Bodner action, decided to settle.0 79 In July 1999,
Barclays agreed to pay $3.6 million to the families of its Jewish
customers in France who lost their assets during the Nazi occupa-
tion.0 8 0
The Barclays Settlement provides a good model for subsequent
settlements of Holocaust lawsuits.0 8 1 It also demonstrates, contrary
1077. See Anne Swardson, French Jews and Banks Fight Holocaust Lawsuits, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14,1999, atA26, available in 1999 WL 23303444. The Executive Monitoring Committee,
headed by New York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi, added to its September 1999 meeting
agenda the issue of the French banks. See id. This was also seen as "a way to pressure French
banks to settle the lawsuits." Id.
1078. See John Authers & Samer Iskandar, French Bankers Seek Compromise Plan in
Holocaust Battle with U.S. Campaigners, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 24, 1999. The $16.4
billion merger of Banque Paribas and Societe Generale would be the largest in the French
bank sector. See id. Because the French banks do extensive business in the United States,
domestic bank regulators have the power to delay the merger. See id.
1079. See SettlementAgreement, Bodnerv. Banque Paribas, No. CV-97-7433 (E.D.N.Y. filed
July 8, 1999) [hereinafter Barclays Settlement Agreement].
1080. The exact amount is $3,612,500, to be made in one lump sum payment. See id. 116.1.
1081. The provisions ofthe settlement appear straightforward and fair. For attorneys' fees,
Barclays agreed to pay, upon approval of the settlement by the court, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees
for "actual hours billed at usual and customary rates," in an amount not to exceed $500,000.
Id. 12.1-.2. Barclays will also pay class action notification and other expenses "up to an
aggregate of $400,000." Id. 8.2. Barclays' total maximum payout, therefore, is approxi-
mately $4.5 million.
Parties entitled to the settlement are "all individuals of, or deemed to have been of,
Jewish lineage or heritage... that were subject to discriminatory laws in effect in France
during the Occupation of France having or claiming to have Assets of any kind," held by
Barclays Bank in France during the German occupation. Id. 4.2.
The Barclays Settlement Agreement makes a provision for any nondistributed fuids
to be "contribut[ed] to one or more non-profit, charitable institution(s) in France to be used
for the purpose of advancing research and knowledge concerning the Holocaust including,
inter alia, research to assist Holocaust survivors and their heirs." Id. 7.3.
In the event that the French government establishes a payment procedure within one
year of the settlement by which any claimants to this settlement are paid, Barclays is entitled
"to a refund... up to a maximum of $800,000." Id. 7.5.
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to some skeptics, 82 that manageable settlements of Holocaust-era
claims can be achieved through the court process.0 83
B. Claims against Bayer and other German Pharmaceutical Firms
In 1999, in a new series of allegations against German companies,
German pharmaceutical firms were accused of engaging in cruel
medical experiments during World War II. Three suits making these
allegations were filed in 1999.
The lawsuit against Bayer AG makes an explosive allegation:
Bayer AG, the giant German pharmaceutical company and maker
of such drugs as Bayer Aspirin and Alka-Seltzer, participated in
grotesque medical experiments conducted at Auschwitz by the
infamous Nazi-doctor Joseph Mengele, the "Angel of Death."08 4
Dr. Mengele conducted his experiments at Auschwitz on 1500 sets
of twins and "individuals with any other physical abnormalities."0 5
Finally, "if members of the Settlement Class with aggregate claims of more than
$500,000" opt out of the settlement, Barclays has the option of not going forward with the
settlement. Id. 13.2. This provision allows Barclays to terminate the settlement if there is
major opposition to its terms.
1082. See supra notes 959-79 and accompanying text (discussing Iwanowa decision) and
supra notes 993-1011 and accompanying text (discussing Degussa/Siemens decision).
1083. According to a Barclays representative: "We are a bit different from the Swiss and
French banks.... We have sought not to have a drawn out legal battle." James Bone,
Barclays Settles with Nazi Victims, TIMES (London), Aug. 4,1999, at 15, available in 1999 WL
8013442.
1084. See Complaint I 1-5, Kor v. Bayer AG, No. TH 99-036-C M/H (S.D. Ind. filed Feb.
17, 1999) [hereinafter Kor Complaint]; see also Henry Weinstein, Suit Alleges Bayer Role in
Holocaust Experiments, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at A18, available in 1999 WL 2131125.
Kor also alleges that an associate of Bayer, SS Major Dr. Helmuth Vetter, conducted
medical experiments at three different concentration camps. See Kor Complaint, supra, T 28.
According to the complaint,
[plost-war publications report that Bayer participated in these experiments, giving
orders to SS [M]ajor Dr. HelmutVetter, who was associated with Bayer and who was
stationed in several concentration camps. Vetter performed medical experiments
using concentration camp inmates as human guinea pigs in Dachau, Auschwitz, and
Mauthausen. Dr. Vetter was sentenced to death by an American military court in
1947 and he was executed in 1949.
Id. For an excellent discussion of the Kor lawsuit and how it relates to the other Holocaust-
era lawsuits, see John Allen Jr., Victims No More, Auschwitz Survivor's SuitAims to Expand
Human Rights Law by Hitting Companies Where it Hurts, NAT'L CATH. REP., May 7,1999, at
3.
1085. Kor Complaint, supra note 1084, T 25. According to the complaint, "[b]etween 1943
and 1944, he conducted 'genetic experiments' on nearly 1500 sets of twins with the goal of
proving Hitler's racial theories." Id.
For treatises discussing Dr. Mengele's deadly work see LUCETIEMATALON LAGNADO
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The experiments researched "the effect of numerous bacteria,
chemicals and viruses on the human body." °86 One twin, "the guinea
pig twin," would be injected with the substance while the other twin,
"the control twin," would not.08 7 Frequently, the twins were then
killed to perform autopsies and compare the differences between
them.08 8 Fewer than 200 sets of twins, including the Mozes sisters,
survived the horrific experiments.
10 8 9
& SHEILA COHN DEKEL, CHILDREN OF THE FLAMES: DR. MENGELE AND THE UNTOLD STORY OF
THE TWINS OFAUSCHWITZ (1992); ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLINGS
AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 337-38 (1986); GERALD L. POSNER & JOHN WARE,
MENGELE: THE COMPLETE STORY (1986). At the end of the war, Mengele fled Auschwitz and
was on the run from the Red Army until he was captured by American forces. See POSNER &
WARE, supra, at 59-62. Even though Mengele was identified as a war criminal by the United
Nations War Crimes Commission and the Central Registry of War Criminals and Security
Suspects, "the inefficiency and lack of coordination among various arms of the U.S. occupying
forces, the near impossibility ofweeding war criminals out of millions of detainees, and above
all, his own vanity about the [blood group] tattoo," enabled Mengele to be set free. Id. at 63.
One of the ways American forces could identify SS members was through the blood group
tattoo. See id. Mengele "managed to convince the SS that the tattoo was unnecessary and that
any competent surgeon would make a cross-match of blood types and not rely solely on the
tattoo before administering a transfusion." Id. Mengele hid in Germany, evading arrest until
he escaped to Buenos Aires in 1949. See id. at 86-94. Ten years later, in 1959, Mengele moved
to Paraguay, believing he would be safer, and to develop a family business. See id. at 121.
Because Adolph Eichmann's capture by the Israelis instilled fear of his own capture, Mengele,
in 1960, moved to Brazil. See id. at 158. Mengele hid in Brazil until 1979, when he apparently
drowned in the Atlantic Ocean. See id. at 287-89. Since Mengele's family did not announce
his death, he was still being hunted by the West Germans, Americans, and the Israelis. See
id. at 292-325. Finally, in 1985, an exhumation of his bones provided proof of his death. See
id. at 325. For a detailed account of Mengele's life as a fugitive and his escape to Argentina,
see POSNER & WARE, supra; see also Christopher Walker, Fugitive Mengele 'Took Holidays in
Switzerland', TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 1999, at A13, available in 1999 WL 7973731.
1086. Weinstein, supra note 1084, at A18.
1087. See id.
1088. See id.
1089. See Allen, supra note 1084, at 4-5. Eva and Miriam Mozes survived the brutal
experiments until the Nazis abandoned Auschwitz in early January 1945. See id. at 5. The
sisters stayed at Auschwitz until January 27, 1945 "when the Soviet tanks rolled in." Id.
Shortly thereafter, Eva and Miriam returned to Romania and then emigrated to Israel. See
id. Eva married Mickey Kor, who was a survivor of Buchenwald. See id. He persuaded her to
move to Terre Haute, Indiana. See id. Today, she still lives in Terre Haute, selling real estate
and running her CANDLES museum and Holocaust education center. See id. at 3-4.
CANDLES stands for "Children of Auschwitz-Nazi's Deadly Lab Experiments Survivors." Id.
at 4. "[Eva] Kor founded the group in the 1980s to reunite the surviving Mengele twins. To
date, she has located 125."Id. "Through CANDLES, [Eva] Korhas publishedbooks, organized
conferences and trips to Auschwitz and operates a Web site [www.candlesmuseum.com]." See
id. at 4. Miriam married and lived with her husband in Israel until her death from cancer in
1993. See id. at 5.
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In February 1999, Eva Mozes Kor filed a class action lawsuit
against Bayer. 9 on behalf of all Holocaust survivors upon whom
medical experiments were performed using Bayer products or for
the benefit of Bayer.""91
In March 1944, Eva Kor, her identical twin sister, Miriam, two
older sisters, and her parents were deported to Auschwitz. 92 An SS
guard identified Eva and Miriam as twin sisters 0 93 and they were
taken to a special barrack'019 4 to be used by Dr. Mengele.0 95
1090. SeeKor Complaint, supra note 1084, 11. "Bayeris aninternational conglomerate that
manufactures chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and other pesticides." Id. "Bayer remains one of
the world's largest manufacturers... today, with offices throughout the Unites States and
the world." Id. 13. The corporate headquarters of Bayer AG are in Leverkusen, Germany. See
id. 9 10. Bayer AG is the parent company of Bayer Corporation, a U.S. company based in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. See Weinstein, supra note 1084, atA18. The instant lawsuit names
only Bayer AG, the German parent, as defendant.
1091. See Kor Complaint, supra note 1084, 1 12. That portion of the complaint states:
The Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 23 on behalf ofa Plaintiff class
composed ofall Holocaust survivors upon whom medical experiments were performed
using products manufactured or developed by Bayer (the "Bayer Products
Experiments Class"), or for the benefit of Bayer's research and development efforts
(the "Bayer Research Experiments Class").
Id. The two classes are defined as follows:
[1] The Bayer Products Experiments Class is composed of all Holocaust survivors upon
whom medical experiments were performed in any concentration camp using chemicals
or any other products or materials designed, developed, manufactured, marketed or
supplied by Bayer.
[2] The Bayer Research Experiments Class is composed of all Holocaust survivors upon
whom medical experiments were performed in any concentration camp which were
monitored, supervised, or studied in any way by Bayer for the purposes of Bayer's
research and development effort.
Id. While the number of putative class members is not known, Eva Kor estimates that
hundreds of class members exist. See id. 1 13.
1092. See id. 9 8. "[Eva Kor's] father and two older sisters were probably taken directly to
the gas chamber since their names appear nowhere in camp records." Allen, supra note 1084,
at 4.
1093. See Kor Complaint, supra note 1084, 91 8. According to the complaint:
Kor remembers an SS guard walking up and down the line of new arrivals
yelling zwillinge, German for twins. Her mother replied, "Is that good?" The guard
nodded yes, and Eva and Miriam were yanked away. Kor remembers crying and
turning to look at her mother-it would be the last time she ever saw her. She was 9
years old. On that first day, Eva's camp ID number was tattooed into her arm: A-
7063. Even then she was a fighter. It took two guards and two inmates to hold her
down, and she bit one of the SS guards before the tattoo was finished.
Id. 918.
1094. See Allen, supra note 1084, at 4. According to the complaint:
[c]oncentration camp inmates selected for medical experiments were kept in
separate barracks from the other prisoners, and sometimes were given preferential
treatment, and subject to grotesque physical and psychological experiments, including
experimental surgeries performed without anesthesia, transfusions of blood from one
twin to another, isolation endurance, reaction to various stimuli, injections with
chemicals and lethal germs, including injection of chemicals directly into the eyes to
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Eva Kor was forced to participate in medical experiments where
her arms were tied down and blood was taken until she fainted.0 96
She became ill and was taken to a laboratory where, according to
the complaint, Dr. Mengele and Dr. Koenig, a Bayer affiliate, visited
her.' 97 During the visits, more blood was taken until she fainted,
while "chemicals were injected into her other arm, causing her to
become more ill."' 98 She was taken to the hospital barrack because
the injections caused her legs and ankles to swell and turn red.'0 99
While Dr. Mengele and Dr. Koenig visited her to take her tempera-
ture, she was deprived of food, water, and other medical care." 0
According to the complaint, "[d]uring one such visit, Dr. Mengele
laughed and stated to Dr. Koenig that she would only survive for
two more weeks." 101'
Eva Kor alleges that Bayer supplied toxic chemicals to the Nazis,
which Dr. Mengele and Dr. Vetter used to conduct their experi-
ments.10 '2 She also alleges that these chemicals contained diseases
injected into concentration camp inmates to test the effectiveness of
determine whether eye color could be changed, sex change operations, and the
removal of organs and limbs. Mengele maintained a special pathology lab where he
performed autopsies on twins who died from such experiments.
Kor Complaint, supra note 1084, T 26.
As far as special privileges were concerned, Eva Kor stated she and Miriam were
allowed to keep their hair and their clothes. See Allen, supra note 1084, at 4. However,
according to Eva Kor, their hair was "soon swimming with lice and had to be removed, it
wasn't much of a privilege.'" Id. (quoting Eva Kor).
1095. See Kor Complaint, supra note 1084, 8.
1096. See id. 9. According to the complaint, "Eva's twin sister, Miriam also was injected
with chemicals by Dr. Mengele. After the war, Miriam experienced kidney difficulties, which
ultimately led to her death. During her treatment for that kidney disease, Miriam learned
that her kidneys never had grown to adult size due to her treatment at Auschwitz. Id. She
died at age 58 from cancer related to kidney problems. See Allen, supra note 1084, at 5.




1101. Id. While Eva Kor was hospitalized, Miriam was under constant SS guard. See Allen,
supra note 1084, at 5 ("[The guards were poised to kill Miriam as soon as Eva Kor died
.... By killing the other twin when one died, Kor says, doctors were able to perform
comparative autopsies.").
1102. See Kor Complaint, supra note 1084, 1. Eva Kor alleges that no statute of
limitations has begun to run because during the war, she did not and could not know that Dr.
Koenig was working with Dr. Mengele on behalf of Bayer. See id. 5. According to the
complaint, Bayer has refused to disclose any information relating to the claim and "[s]uch
information has only recently been made available to the Plaintiff and class members as
archived records concerning the World War II actions of Bayer and others have been made
available to the public."Id. S 24. Moreover, Eva Kor "only recently has been invested with the
legal right to sue ... Bayer as a result of the expiration of certain international tolling
agreements created by the victorious nations after World War II." Id. T 5.
[Vol. 34:1
2000] MISCELLANEOUS CASES
other Bayer drugs.""3 Finally, she alleges Bayer monitored and
supervised the experiments through Dr. Koenig, who recorded and
reported the results of the experiments to Bayer." 4 According to the
complaint, "Bayer monitored and supervised those experiments
[and] used them as a form of research and development for its
corporate benefit."110 5
The complaint asserts that "Bayer has been unjustly enriched by
its participation in involuntary medical experiments and by its
obtaining information from those experiments for research and
development."" 6 Moreover, Bayer utilized the information it gained
from the experiments to manufacture, market, and sell products
during and after World War II.1"07
The complaint sets out six causes of action against Bayer: (1)
violations of international law;"0° (2) conspiracy to commit viola-
tions of international law;"0.9 (3) civil assault and battery;"' 0 (4)
conspiracy to commit civil assault and battery;"" (5) unjust enrich-
1103. See id. T 1.
1104. See id. 2.
1105. Id.
1106. Id. 20.
1107. See id. S 3. Compare Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990), with Kor
Complaint, supra note 1084. In Moore, physicians, while treating John Moore for leukemia,
used his cells for lucrative medical research without his knowledge or permission. See Moore,
51 Cal. 3d at 124-25. Moore alleged that his physicians failed to disclose their economic
interests in his cells prior to the medical procedures that extracted the cells. See id. at 125.
Further, Moore alleged that his excised cells constituted a conversion of his possessory and
ownership interests in personal property. See id. at 134. The California Supreme Court held:
(1) a physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's professional judgment;
and (2) a physician's failure to disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of
action for performing medical procedures without consent or breach of fiduciary duty.
Id. at 129.
On the conversion cause of action, the court held that "the use of excised cells in
medical research does not amount to a conversion." Id. at 143. First, the court weighed two
important policy considerations, the patient's right to make autonomous decisions and the
protection of third parties who are engaged in socially useful activities, and found that
"liabilitybased upon existing disclosure obligations, rather than an unprecedented extension
of the conversion theory, protects patients' rights of privacy and autonomy without
unnecessarily hindering research." Id. at 143-44. Second, the court believed that the
legislature is better suited to decide such a policy question. See id. at 147. Finally, the court
reasoned that "enforcement of physicians' disclosure obligations protects patients directly,
without hindering the socially useful activities of innocent researchers." Id.
1108. See Kor Complaint, supra note 1084, TT 35-37.
1109. See id. 9 38-42.
1110. See id. 9143-48.
1111. See id. $T 49-50.
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ment;"' 2 and (6) accounting."13 Eva Kor demands compensatory
damages, disgorgement of illicit profits, the value of the information
obtained from the experiments, imposition of a constructive trust
upon the profits generated, an accounting for the value of the
information received from the experiments, punitive damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of the action."' 4
In June 1999, Bayer filed a motion to dismiss.15 While acknowl-
edging the terrible wrongs committed during World War II16 and
Bayer's possible involvement in such wrongs," Bayer maintained
that it simply cannot be sued in the United States by Kor for
activities committed in Europe during World War I1.18 Taking the
approach adopted by other European entities sued in U.S. courts for
their World War II activities, Bayer maintained that "[t]hreshold
principles of personal jurisdiction," 9 forum non conveniens,112 and
1112. See id. 51-55.
1113. See id. IT 57-59.
1114. See id. at Prayer for Judgment A-I.
1115. See Memorandum in Support of Bayer AG's Motion to Dismiss, Kor v. Bayer AG, No.
TH-99-036-C M/H (S.D. Ind. June 30, 1999) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Bayer
AG's Motion to Dismiss].
1116. See id. at 1. The memorandum states:
As [World War II] ended, the world learned the full scope of Nazi crimes. These
crimes were adjudicated and punished at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunals, and
the judgment of world opinion has been as harsh as Nuremberg's. This motion does
not-and could not-seek to diminish the judgment of history.
Id.
1117. See id. at 24-26 (citing historical treatises discussing Bayer's culpable involvement
with the Nazis). However, as discussed below, Bayer also distances itself from such wrongs
by placing responsibility on I.G. Farben, its former parent. According to Bayer, the present
corporation being sued, Bayer AG, is different from the guilty party, I.G. Farben, the
infamous German chemical concern that owned Bayer A.G. until 1951. See id. at 4-6; see also
id. at 12 ("Bayer AG neither takes solace in the acquittal of the I.G. Farben executives on the
medical experimentation claims, nor suggests that the evidence considered by the Nuremberg
tribunal (while clearly extensive) was absolutely exhaustive." (footnote omitted)).
1118. See id. at 1.
1119. As with every other Holocaust-era case going back to the Swiss bank litigation, Bayer
maintained that Indiana has: (1) no specific jurisdiction over Bayer because the acts
complained of occurred in Germany, not Indiana, and (2) no general jurisdiction over Bayer
because it is
not incorporated in Indiana; does not maintain an office in Indiana; is not qualified
or licensed to do business in Indiana... does not own any real property in Indiana;
has not and is not required to pay taxes in Indiana; does not have any Indiana phone
number or mailing address; and is not engaged in continuous or systematic activity
of any kind in Indiana.
Id. at 33. When making these statements, defendant refers to Bayer AG, the German
corporation, and not Bayer AG's wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, Bayer Corporation, which is
incorporated in Indiana (and headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania). See id. at 34.
For discussion of establishing general jurisdiction over a foreign corporate parent
through the activities of its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary, see supra Part IV.A.2.a.(iii).
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the political question doctrine".2 would be violated by the very
prosecution of this case. All mandate dismissal. .. ."
11 22
Bayer also maintained that plaintiffs' lawsuit is barred by the
Indiana statue of limitations. 1 23 Finally, Bayer argued, that, even
if Bayer committed violations of international law in its alleged
participation in Mengele's medical experiments, such international
law, whether in treaty form or under international customary law,
does not provide plaintiff with a private cause of action in the
United States. 2
As of January 2000, no ruling on Bayer's motion to dismiss had
been issued.
It may well be that, like in the Swiss bank litigation, the motion
to dismiss will never be decided. If, and when, the $5.2 billion
German slave labor settlement is finalized, 1 25 the medical experi-
ment claims against Bayer and other German pharmaceutical firms
are included in that settlement, thereby necessitating dismissal of
these lawsuits. 26
The subjects of these medical experiments will then be limited to
the modest lump-sum payment of a maximum of 15,000 German
(discussing Stahl v. Victoria Holding A.G.).
1120. See Memorandum in Support of Bayer AG's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1115, at
37-50. Again, the arguments in the Bayer brief for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens are almost exactly the same as those made in every other motion to dismiss filed
in the Holocaust-era cases. Compare id. at 37 ("Not only is this case being brought against a
purely German business, it is difficult to conceive of a matter in which the sovereign interests
of Germany are more palpable .... A myriad of facts illustrates the inherently German nature
of this case.. . ."), with Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds, supra note 164, at 6 ("[A]lmost everything about
these cases relates to Switzerland and very little relates to the Eastern District of New York
or even the United States.").
1121. See Memorandum in Support of Bayer AG's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1115, at
50-54.
1122. Id. at 27-28.
1123. See id.
1124. See id. at 54-63.
1125. For a discussion ofthe German slave labor global settlement, see notes and text supra
Part V.
1126. See Statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 814, at
3. "Payments [from the German Foundation Initiative] settlement shall include an inclusive
category for personal injury cases, including, but not limited to, medical experimentation
... as well as all other personal injury cases directly involving German companies." Id.
(emphasis added); see also Statement by Otto Graf Lambsdorff, supra note 813, at 4 ("ITihe
largest part of the 10 billion mark endowment is intended for direct payments to victims,
especially to former slave and forced laborers ... as well as for victims of... medical tests
.... ") (second emphasis added).
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marks, or approximately $7800, that is contemplated in the German
settlement.1 27
C. Claims Against Volkswagen for Maintaining a "Nazi Nursery"
One of the German companies that made extensive use of slave
labor during World War II was Volkswagen ("VW"). Founded in
1938 with a mission from Adolf Hitler to build a "people's car"-the
term Volkswagen in German-it had between 15,000 to 20,000
prisoners working as laborers."28
In August 1998, the first class action slave labor lawsuit was filed
against VW in the United States.1 29 One month later, VW an-
nounced the creation of a $12 million fund to compensate its Nazi-
era slave laborers."3 In February 1999, VW joined eleven other
German companies in proposing the creation of a German industry-
wide fund to compensate former wartime slave laborers.
1127. See supra notes 813-18 and accompanying text.
1128. See Wages of Sin, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 20, 1998, at 36, available in 1998
WL 8127010 ("Volkswagen employed 15,000 slave laborers in the final years of World War
II."); Carol J. Williams, VW Setting Up Fund to Pay Nazi-era Slave Laborers, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 12, 1998, at A6 ("As many as 20,000 prisoners were put to work at VW during the war
years.... [I]ts factories churned out grenade launchers, land mines and V1 rockets during
wartime.").
1129. See Complaint, Gross v. Volkswagen AG, Civil Action No. 98 CV 4104 (D.N.J. filed
Aug. 31, 1998); see also Survivors of Holocaust Sue German Firms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998,
at D3, available in 1998 WL 1886923.
1130. See Williams, supra note 1128, at A6; see also Volkswagen AG Humanitarian Fund
for GrantingAid to Former Forced Laborers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4,1998, at All (displaying fill-
page ad placed by Volkswagen publicizing the fund). Strangely, the advertisement does not
even provide an address or telephone number in the United States. Elderly Holocaust
survivors are directed to contact the Frankfurt office of the international accounting firm
KPMG. See id. According to the ad: "KPMG Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft AG has been
requested by Volkswagen AG and the Curatorium to disburse the financial aid, upon
examination and review of the documents, in an unbureaucratic, expeditious and swift
manner." Id.
1131. See supra Part VI.B.
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In May 1999, VW was hit with a different kind of lawsuit. Anna
Snopczyk, a seventy-eight-year-old Polish national, sued VW in
Wisconsin federal court for infanticide.
1132
According to the complaint, VW, in conjunction with its forced
labor program, operated a kinderheim-children's home, in German
-where infants born to VW's forced workers and to forced workers
on surrounding farms were taken.
33
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself, and on behalf of
parents of approximately 350 to 400 Polish and Russian children
who, between 1943 and 1945, were placed in VW's kinderheim and
died shortly thereafter. 34 The complaint alleges, based upon both
Nazi and Allied reports, that the babies were kept in deplorable
conditions and that, towards the end of the war, the mortality rate
of the babies reached 100%.".. Only one cause of action is alleged in
the complaint: "Torts in Violation of International Law:""
36
1132. See Complaint, Snopczyk v. Volkswagen AG, No. 99-C-0472 (E.D. Wis. filed May 5,
1999) [hereinafter Snopczyk Complaint]. According to the Associated Press, citing one of
plaintiffs attorneys, the lawsuit "was filed in Milwaukee partly because of the area's large
Polish population" and that "the lawyers hope the case would encourage others to come
forward." Jim Chilsen, Volkswagen Sued for 2Vazi Nursery, AP ONLINE, May 6, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 17800828.
1133. See Snopczyk Complaint, supra note 1132, %1 17-18, 20. According to the complaint,
VW's original kinderheim was in Wolfsburg, in close proximity to the forced workers' camp.
See id. T 25. This allowed the female workers to visit their children and breast-feed them. In
June 1944, however, the kinderheim was moved "out of Wolfsburg to a former prison camp
in Ruben, which was an eight mile walk from the [VW] factory.... This made it nearly
impossible for mothers to visit their children." Id.
1134. See Snopczyk Complaint, supra note 1132, % 1. According to the complaint, in 1941,
the Germans forcibly deported plaintiff, then 19-years-old, and her mother to Wolfsburg,
Germany. See id. 3-6. Plaintiff worked at the VW factory, and then at a farm near the
factory. See id. There, she fell in love with a Polish man who worked on a neighboring farm.
See id. In February 1945, plaintiff gave birth to a child, who was sent to the kinderheim in
Ruben operated by VW. See id. The child, a baby boy, died two months later. See id. Plaintiff
had to pay to have the child buried. See id.
1135. See id. T 20. The complaint states:
In March, 1943, Volkswagen established a maternity hospital and [klinderheim for
the Poles and Russians working in Wolfsburg. From 1943 to 1945, Volkswagen
operated these facilities without regard for the health or well-being of the mothers
and children, and through a course of genocide, killed 350 to 400 Polish and Russian
children under the age of 16 months. By deliberately providing inadequate care and
unsanitary conditions which caused the rampant spread of infection and disease,
Volkswagen caused the mortality rate of the day nursery to escalate from 25 percent
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By knowingly and intentionally causing the death of Polish and
Russian babies entrusted to its care, defendant Volkswagen violated
customary international law and the law of nations, including the
Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Convention, and the principles
of customary international law recognized by the Nuremberg
Tribunals, and committed torts under the laws of the United States,
requiring defendant to pay plaintiff Anna Snopczyk and the Class
members appropriate compensatory and punitive damages for the
brutal deaths of their children.
137
VW, in response to the lawsuit, referred to the allegations as "a
tragic chapter from one of the darkest times of modern history ....
The widespread practice of forcing infants and children to be taken
from their mothers and placed in special children's homes through-
out Germany was another manifestation of the inhumanity of the
Third Reich in World War II''113.
In 1999, it appeared that other companies may soon face similar
suits. A September 1999 "Holocaust-Related Claims Update Letter"
of the lead law firm filing the lawsuit against VW states: "Volks-
wagen was by no means the only employer who operated a
[linderheim. There were 316 [k]inderheim in Germany under the
Third Reich. We are currently investigating kinderheim run by
Ford, Krupp, and Anorgana, but would greatly appreciate any
information you have on other such [k]inderheim.""39
However, the December 17, 1999 preliminary slave labor settle-
ment with the German government and German industry also
covers the kinderheim claims."4 Consequently, if the settlement is
finalized, the ongoing lawsuits will need to be dropped, with the
kinderheim victims receiving only a modest payment of 15,000




1138. Chilsen, supra note 1132 (quoting Lyn Rahilly, attorney for VW).
1139. Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, E-Journal: Update on Holocaust-Related Class
Action Cases (visited Nov. 6, 1999) <http://www.cmht.com/cwholocaustletter.htm>.
1140. See Statement of Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart E. Eizenstat, supra note 814, at
3. 'Payments [from the German Foundation Initiative] settlement shall include an inclusive
category for personal injury cases, including, but not limited to, mothers of[klinderheim cases
.. " Id. (emphasis added); see also Statement by Otto Graf Lambsdorff, supra note 813, at
4 ("[Tlhe largest part of the 10 billion mark endowment is intended for direct payments to
victims, especially to former slave and forced laborers.., as well as for victims of... the
kinderheim cases .... ") (second emphasis added).
1141. See discussion and notes supra Part VI.B.
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D. Claims against American Companies
Accusations against American companies for their dealings with
Nazi Germany are not new. After the war, some U.S. government
reports named certain domestic corporations as profiting from the
Holocaust.""
In 1983, Charles Higham, a former writer for the New York
Times, published a book" 3 accusing various American blue-chip
companies of dealing with the Nazis during World War II. In the
book, Higham also accused certain U.S. government officials of
assisting these companies in such dealings.
In November 1998, the Washington Post carried an extensive
story". detailing alleged dealings by Ford Motor Company"4" and
General Motors ("GM")" 46 with Hitler's Germany.
In early 1999, President Clinton created a commission to deter-
mine the scope of Nazi-stolen assets still present in the United
1142. See Michael Hirsh,DirtyBusiness:America Had its Own Nazi Connection, NEWSWEEK
INT'L, Dec. 14, 1998, at 24, available in 1998 WL 8505046 (citing and discussing various
postwar government reports).
1143. CHARLES HIGHAM, TRADINGWIHTHE ENEMY: THE NAZI-AMRICANMONEYPLOT 1933-
1949 (1983).
1144. MichaelDobbs, Ford and GMScrutinizedforAllegedNazi Collaboration;Firms Deny
Researchers' Claims on Aiding German War Effort, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1998, at Al,
available in 1998 WL 22538114.
1145. For discussion of claims against Ford, see supra Part VI.C.1. and Ken Silverstein,
Ford and the Fiihrer, THE NATION, Jan. 24, 2000, at 11.
1146. In response to the Washington Post story, General Motors stated:
"The stale allegations repeated in The Washington Post were reviewed and refuted
by GM 25 years ago in hearings before Congress, when more individuals with
firsthand knowledge of the facts were available.... Such allegations, purporting to
portray GM as a supporter of the Nazi war effort, are slanderous and untrue and do
a great disservice to the thousands of loyal GM employees and their families who
worked for the U.S.-Allied cause in that war."
GM, Ford Deny They Aided Nazis, AP ONLINE, Dec. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 23034894
(quoting John Mueller, spokesman for General Motors).
Three weeks later, GM hired Dr. Henry Turner, a Yale University historian, to
research its activities in Germany during World War H. See GM Probing Former Ties to
Nazis, N.Y. POST, Dec. 23, 1998, at 34, available in 1998 WL 25332546 ('Dr. Turner's work
will help us achieve our goal of a complete accounting of GM's and Opel's activities during
World War II and to assess our responsibilities.'" (quoting John F. Smith, chairman of GM)).
Opel refers to Adam Opel, GM's German subsidiary. See id.
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States and also to investigate American companies' wartime
complicity with the Nazis."4
At present, it is unknown what findings the presidential commis-
sion will issue after it concludes its research. 1 48 From the informa-
tion available so far, it appears, however, that even American
companies are not completely guilt-free for their wartime activities.
1147. See New Commission Will Examine Assets in U.S., INT'L MONITOR, Mar. 1999. The
newly-created Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States
is composed of 21 members and is chaired by Edgar Bronfman, head of the World Jewish
Congress. See id. The primary goal of the Commission is to "study and develop an historical
record of the collection and disposition of specified assets of Holocaust victims in the
possession or control of the Federal Government ... after January 30, 1933." Summary of
S.1900, The U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998 (visited Nov. 6, 1999)
<http'//thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SN01900>.
According to the bill's sponsor,
[w]ith this legislation[,] we will create a commission that will seek to find the
disposition of the following assets in this country: dormant bank accounts of
Holocaust victims in U.S. banks; brokerage accounts, securities, & bonds; artwork &
religious/cultural artifacts; German-looted gold shipped to the U.S. ... and insurance
policies.
Statement ofSenatorAlfonse D'Amato Introducing S. 1900 (Apr. 1,1998) (visited Nov. 6,1999)
<http'//www.directblackation.com/rep bils/2heirs.htm>. Senator D'Amato explained why this
legislation is needed:
While we have sought answers from Switzerland and other nations on the
disposition of dormant bank accounts and Nazi gold, we have not pursued the issue
here in the United States. Today, we begin this search. Now we are obliged to set
history straight and correct any injustices in our own country. The United States has
a moral responsibility to address the same issues to which we have sought answers
from Switzerland and other nations in Europe. The spirit of American decency
demands no less.
Id. For current information on the Commission, see Presidential Advisory Commission on
Holocaust Assets in the United States (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http'//www.pcha.gov>. The
Commission held its first meeting on March 16, 1999. See PresidentialAdvisory Commission
on Holocaust Assets in the U.S., Press Release (visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http.//www.pcha.
gov/pr99317.htm>.
1148. In October 1999, the Presidential Commission issued its first report: a preliminary
study of the plunder by American troops of a train loaded with gold, artworks, and other
valuables stolen from the Hungarian Jews by the Nazis. See Progress Report on: The Mystery
of the Hungarian 'Gold Train', (visited on Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www.pcha.gov/goldtrainfinal
toconvert.html>. The train was captured by the Allies on May 16, 1945, eight days after V-E
Day. See id. According to the report, in a notable exception to the generally good effort of
American troops to restore property to its owners, both high-ranking Army officers and lower-
level personnel may have helped themselves to these valuables, rather than returning them
to the Hungarian Holocaust victims or the postwar Hungarian Jewish community. See id. For
articles discussing the Hungarian "gold train" report and its immediate aftermath, see
Michael Dobbs, Tarnished Gold, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,1999, atA3; Tim Golden, G.I.'sAccused
as Looters of Riches of Jews, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1999, at Al.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES
As summarized succinctly by Newsweek International:
Most Holocaust researchers still believe that U.S. corporate
collaboration with the Axis was marginal, especially compared with
activities by European firms in "neutral countries" like Switzerland,
Sweden, Portugal and Spain. But U.S. complicity may have been
greater than generally believed.... And so the search for Holocaust
assets, which began in the United States, may be coming full circle.
Nearly three years after U.S. groups representing Holocaust survivors
began a campaign against Swiss banks, a vast financial reckoning is
underway. 9
As already discussed, the American automotive giants, Ford and
GM, have been accused of benefitting from the Holocaust through
the use of slave labor by their German subsidiaries during World
War 11.1150
Two major American financial institutions, Chase Manhattan
Bank and J.P. Morgan & Company, have also been sued for the
confiscation of the accounts of their Jewish account holders in Nazi-
occupied France by their French-based offices.
The first Holocaust-related lawsuit to involve American banks
was filed in December 1998 in New York.1151 The lawsuit, filed
against Chase Manhattan Bank, J.P. Morgan & Co., and seven
French banks, accused them of confiscation and retention of bank
deposits and other assets of Jews in France after the Nazi occupa-
tion of France.1152 The suit was filed by seventeen Holocaust
survivors and sought class action certification on behalf of all Jewish
account holders whose accounts were "Aryanized" by the
defendants. 53
In March 1999, in a repeat of the strategy used in the Swiss bank
litigation,"54 the attorneys prosecuting the federal lawsuit in New
York fied a similar lawsuit against the same defendant banks in
California state court in San Francisco."55 Like the earlier Califor-
nia state suit against the Swiss banks, this suit, filed by a Holocaust
1149. Hirsh, supra note 1142, at 24.
1150. See supra Part VI.C.
1151. See Benisti Complaint, supra note 1061.
1152. See id. 77-94. For further discussion of this litigation, see supra Part VII.A2.
1153. See Benisti Complaint, supra note 1061, 9 59-60.
1154. See supra Part ILI.B. (discussing California lawsuits and other state actions filed
against the Swiss banks).
1155. See Mayer Complaint, supra note 1065, T 1.
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survivor in California, was also filed under the California Unfair
Competition Act ("UCA"). 1156
To date, the litigation against both of these American financial
institutions continues, despite an announcement in May 1999 by
Chase Manhattan that it had reached an accord to compensate
former wartime Jewish account holders and heirs whose accounts
were confiscated by the French branches of Chase Manhattan.' 5
American companies are not contemplating the establishment of
a private fund for compensating Holocaust victims and their heirs.
Moreover, they have not joined any international private fund for a
global settlement, such as the German industry fund.""5 Therefore,
newly-released historical findings on the role of American corpora-
tions during World War II may lead to American corporations being
the next set of defendants in Holocaust-era suits.
1156. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17206 (West 1997) (allowing individuals to bring
actions under California law, both individually and on behalf of the general public, for unfair
competition). This novel use of the UCA for Holocaust-era claims was never tested in
Markovicova v. Swiss Bank Corp., No. BC 996160 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 30, 1998),
because the lawsuit was dismissed shortly after its filing as part of the August 1998 global
settlement with the Swiss banks. See supra Part III.D.2. To date, no court has decided
whether the UCA may be used for such a purpose.
1157. See Chase Agrees to Plan for Holocaust Claim, L.A. TImES, May 15, 1999, at As,
available in 1999 WL 2158652.
1158. Ford and GM, whose subsidiaries in Nazi Germany used slave laborers during the
war, could join the German companies seeking to establish a fund for the former slave
laborers. See supra Part VI.B. So far, neither company has taken this step.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
An editorial in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz succinctly ex-
plained the impact of the various revelations being made today
about the financial misdeeds stemming from the Holocaust:
The Holocaust proved that the murder of the Jews and the annihilation
of whole communities was not only an outlet for monstrous anti-
Semitism, it was also good business. But it is precisely the willingness
of the world's nations today, some fifty-five years after the end of World
War II, to make the material calculations and search for stolen
property and return it, that raises questions which in the past were
possible to ignore.'...
The Holocaust did not occur in the United States, but in Europe.
Most Holocaust survivors reside in Israel, not in the United States.
It is the United States, however, that has taken on the burden of
delivering long-overduejustice to aging Holocaust survivors, thereby
tackling the difficult questions caused by the delay in dealing with
this long-neglected problem.
A discussion of Holocaust-era litigation is not static, since most of
the lawsuits discussed in this article are ongoing.
Undoubtedly, additional lawsuits will be filed in the future. As
long as one Holocaust survivor is alive somewhere in the world, and
an individual or a corporation doing business in the United States
is discovered to have been involved in misdeeds during World War
II, litigation of the Holocaust will continue in our courts. 160
1159. Eliahu Salpeter, Historical Justice and Money, HA'ARETZ (Israel), Mar. 24, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 17467955.
1160. Already, 1999 has seen a new category of lawsuits being filed stemming from World
War H: suits against Japanese companies for their wartime wrongs. Undoubtedly, these suits
were inspired by the litigation discussed herein.
The first suits filed were by American POWs who were forced to work as slave
laborers for private Japanese companies during the war. See Complaint, Levenbergv. Nippon
Sharyo Ltd., No. C 99-1554 BZ (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1999) (class action lawsuit by 79-year-old
retired U.S. Army Sgt. Ralph Levenberg against six Japanese companies who profited from
the forced labor of U.S. prisoners of war during WWH); Complaint, Tenney v. Mitsui & Co.
Ltd., No. BC 215028 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 1999) (individual lawsuit by 79-year-old retired
U.S. Army officer Lester Tenney against Mitsui for forced labor performed at Mitsui's Miike
coal mines in Omuta, Japan).
For articles discussing claims against the Japanese in light of the litigation against
private companies in Europe, see Abraham Cooper, Tokyo Must Address the Actions of Its
Wartime 'Killing Machine', L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1999, at B5, available in 1999 WL 2152705;
Sonni Efron, Japanese Steelmaker to Pay Slave Laborer, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1999, at A22,
available in 1999 WL 2146748; Donald MacIntyre, Wages of an. Old War: Korean Slave
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Laborers Trapped on Soviet SoilAfter World WarlIDemand Compensation from Japan, TIME
INT'L, Oct. 12, 1998, at 25, available in 1998 WL 21377522; Teresa Watanabe, California and
the West, Measure Urges Japan to Apologize for Atrocities, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1999, at A3,
available in 1999 WL 2189472; Teresa Watanabe, Japan's War Victims in New Battle, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at Al, available in 1999 WL 2187046.
For a Web site created by one of the plaintiffs' attorneys prosecuting these cases, see
Japanese WWII Claims (visited on Feb. 29, 2000) http'//www.japanesewwiiclaims.com>.
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HOLOCAUST LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES *
1. CONSOLIDATED SWISS BANK CLAIMS (In re
Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y.
consolidated April 1997)).
A. Settled Cases'
1. Rosenberg v. Swiss Nat'l Bank, No. CV-98-
1647 (D.D.C. filed June 29, 1998).
2. World Council of Orthodox Jewish
Communities v. Union Bank of Switz., No.
CV-97-0461 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 1997).
3. Friedman v. Union Bank of Switz., No. CV-96-
5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996).
4. Weishaus v. Union Bank of Switz., No. CV-96-
4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 3, 1996).
5. Markovicova v. Swiss Bank Corp., No. BC
996160 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 30, 1998).
B. Dismissed Cases
1. Meili v. Union Bank of Switzerland, No. 98
Civ. 0630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 14, 1998).2
H1. CONSOLIDATED GERMAN & AUSTRIAN BANK
CLAIMS (In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust
Litigation, No. 98 Civ. 3938 (S.D.N.Y. consolidated Mar.
15, 1999).
A. Class Action Complaints
1. Pending Cases
a. Haas v. Bayrische Hypo &
Vereinsbank, No. 99 Civ. 1586
(S.D.N.Y. filed Mar, 3, 1999).
b. Duveen v. Deutsche Bank, No. 99 Civ.
0388 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 15, 1999).
c. Kahn v. Deutsche Bank, No. 99 Civ.
0190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 11, 1999).
• Prepared with the assistance ofDaniela Saxa-Kaneko. This list does not include the
lawsuits filed against the Japanese corporations for their activities during World War II. For
an updated chronicle of such cases, see Japan, U.S. and World War II: The Search for Justice
Lawsuit (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http'//www.law.whittier.edu/sypo/fmlallawsuit.htm>.
1. These cases settled for $1.25 billion in August 1998, and a fairness hearing was held
in November 1999.
2. This lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed as part of the Swiss bank settlement.
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d. Mason v. Deutsche Bank, No. 98 Civ.
7793 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 29, 1998).
e. Watman v. Deutsche Bank, No. 98 Civ.
3938 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 3, 1998).
2. Settled Cases
a. Bertysch v. Bank Austria, No. 99 Civ.
0302 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 15, 1999). 3
b. Elkan v. Creditanstalt AG, No. 99 Civ.
0387 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 15, 1999).'
B. Individual Action Complaints
1. Pending Cases
a. Haas v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 99
Civ. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 11,
1999).
b. Hammerstein v. Deutsche Bank AG,
No. 99 Civ. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb.
11, 1999).
HI. FRENCH BANK CLAIMS
A. Pending Cases
1. Benisti v. Banque Paribas, No. CV-98-7851
(E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 23, 1998).'
2. Bodner v. Banque Paribas, No. CV-97-7433
(E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 17, 1997).
3. Mayer v. Banque Paribas, No. BC 302226
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 1999).
IV. INSURANCE CLAIMS
A. Class Action Complaints
1. Pending Cases
a. Winters v. Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A., No. 98 Civ. 9186 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 30, 1998).
b. Cornell v. Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A., No. 97 Civ. 2262 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Mar. 31, 1997).
3. A separate settlement was reached at the fairness hearing held on November 1,1999,
by Bank Austria and Creditanstalt for $40 million.
4. See id.




B. Individual Action Complaints
1. Pending Cases
a. Stahl v. Victoria Holding AG, No. 98
CV 3490 (C.D. Cal. filed May 8, 1998).6
b. Klein v. Adriatica Ins., No. BC 201983
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 8, 1998).
c. Sladek v. Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A., No. BC 188679 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed Apr. 2, 1998).
2. Settled Cases
a. Friedman v. Assicurazioni Generali
S.p.A., No. BC 193182 (Cal. Super. Ct.
filed Apr. 2, 1998).'
b. Babos v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.,
No. BC 188680 (Cal. Super. Ct. fied
Apr. 2, 1998).8
c. Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.,
No. BC 185376 (Cal. Super Ct. filed
Feb. 5, 1998). 9
V. SLAVE LABOR AND RELATED CLAIMS
A. Pending Cases' °
1. Suvarov v. Federal Republic of Germany, Civil
Action No. 99-3967 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 20,
1999).
2. Michelin v. Opel, Civil Action No. 99-2229
(D.N.J. filed June 7, 1999).11
3. Opatowski v. Opel, Civil Action No. 99-2228
(D.N.J. filed May 17, 1999).12
6. This case was originally filed in the Superior Court of California and was removed to
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The case was dismissed on
October 16,1998 and is currently on appeal to the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit.
7. This case settled in February 2000. The settlement terms are confidential.
8. See id.
9. This case settled in November 1999. The settlement terms are confidential.
10. A preliminary global settlement was reached in December 1999 for 10 billion German
(Deutsche) marks (approximately $5.2 billion).
11. This case was consolidated with Opatowski v. Opel, Civil Action No. 99-2228 (D.N.J.
filed May 17, 1999), on June 4, 1999.
12. This case was consolidated with Michelin v. Opel, Civil Action No. 99-2229 (D.N.J.
fied June 7, 1999), on June 4, 1999.
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4. Sakwa v. General Motors Corp., Civil Action
No. 99-2115 (D.N.J. filed May 7, 1999).
5. Rosenberg v. Continental AG, Civil Action No.
99-1892 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 26, 1999).
6. Nittenberg v. BMW AG, Civil Action No. 99-
0756 (D.N.J. filed Feb. 19, 1999).
7. Kempler v. DaimlerChrysler AG, Civil Action
No. 99-0418 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 28, 1999).
8. Solarczyk v. Bayer AG, Civil Action No. 99-
0392 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 28, 1999).
9. Stern v. Heinkel Holding GMBH, Civil Action
No. 98-5671 (D.N.J. filed Dec. 11, 1998).
10. Gluck v. Agfa-Gevaert AG, Civil Action No.
98-5248 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 19, 1998).
11. Spitzer v. Bayrische Motorenwerke AG, Civil
Action No. 98-5247 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 19,
1998).
12. Kohn v. Dichl GmbH & Co., Civil Action No.
98-4542 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 30, 1998).
13. Irom v. Heinkel Aggregatebau GmbH & Co.,
Civil Action No. 98-4502 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 28,
1998).
14. Rosenfeld v. Volkswagen AG, Civil Action No.
98-4429 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 23, 1998).'"
15. Jacobowitz v. Rheinmetall AG, Civil Action
No. 98C-4299 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 22, 1998).
16. Grosz v. AEG Aktiengesellschaft, Civil Action
No. 98-4397 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 11, 1998).
17. Anolik v. Fried. Krupp AG, Civil Action No.
98-4299 (D.N.J. fied Sept. 11, 1998).
18. Hirsch v. Fried. Krupp AG, Civil Action No.
98-4280 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 11, 1998).
19. Gross v. Volkswagen AG, Civil Action No. 98-
4104 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 31, 1998).14
20. Harmat v. Siemens AG, CV-99-2528 (E.D.N.Y.
filed May 4, 1999).
13. This case was consolidated with Gross v. Volkswagen AG, Civil Action No. 98-4104
(D.N.J. filed Aug. 31, 1998).
14. This case was consolidated withRosenfeld v. VolkswagenAG, Civil Action No. 98-4429
(D.N.J. filed Sept. 22, 1998).
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21. Polgar v. DaimlerChrysler AG, CV-99-2527
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 1999).
22. Chmielewska v. Siemens AG, CV-99-2238
(E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 1999).
23. Honzatko v. Volkswagen AG CV-99-2124
(E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 14, 1999).
24. Bressler v. Phillip Holzmann AG, CV-98-6335
(E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 16, 1998).
25. Gutwillligv. Steyer-Daimler-PuchAG, CV-98-
6336 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 16, 1998).
26. Katz v. Wurtembergische Metallwarenfabrik
AG, CV-98-6054 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 2, 1998).
27. Pollack v. Siemens AG, CV-98-5499 (E.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 30, 1998).
28. Schwartz v. Diamler-Benz AG, No. 98 Civ.
8383 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 25, 1998).
29. Mandelbaum v. Messerschmitt-Boelkow-
Blohm GmbH, No. 98 Civ. 7834 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 3, 1998).
30. Snopczyk v. Volkswagen AG, 99-C-0472 (E.D.
Wis. filed May 5, 1999).
31. Simon Wiesenthal Center v. Deutsche Bank
AG, BC 302420 (Cal. Super. Ct. fied Mar. 31,
1999).
B. Dismissed Cases
1. Vogel v. Degussa AG, Civil Action No. 98-5019
(D.N.J. filed Nov. 6, 1998) (dismissed by court
on Sept. 13, 1999).
2. Klein v. Siemens AG, Civil Action No. 98-4468
(D.N.J. fied Sept. 24, 1998) (dismissed by
court on Sept. 13, 1999).
3. Lichtman v. Siemens AG, Civil Action No. 98-
4252 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 9, 1998) (dismissed by
court on Sept. 13, 1999).
4. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, Civil Action
No. 98-3958 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 21, 1998)
(dismissed by court on Sept. 13, 1999).
5. Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d
424 (D.N.J. 1999) (dismissed by court on Sept.
13, 1999).
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6. Frumkin v. Holzmann AG, BC 206512 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Mar. 5, 1999) (dismissed by
court on Apr. 22, 1999)."5
VI. MEDICAL EXPERIMENT CLAHMS 16
A. Pending Cases
1. Kor v. Bayer AG, TH99-036-C M/H (S.D. Ind.
filed Feb. 17, 1999).
2. Kriegel v. Bayer AG, Civil Action No. 99-2270
(D.N.J. filed May 17, 1999).
3. Feuer v. Bayer AG, Civil Action No. 99-2210
(D.N.J. filed May 13, 1999).
VII. PROPERTY RESTITUTION CLAIMS
A. Pending Cases
1. Garb v. Republic of Poland, CV-99-3487
(E.D.N.Y. filed June 18, 1999).
B. Dismissed Cases
1. Haven v. Republic of Poland, 99 C 1727 (N.D.




1. Bondi v. A Painting by Egon Schiele known as
"Bildnis Vally [or "Wally"], 99 Civ. 9986
(S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 24, 1999). 17
2. United States v. Portrait of Wally, 99 Civ.
9940 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 21, 1999).18
3. Warin v. Wildenstein, Case No. 115143-99
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 27, 1999). 19
B. Settled Cases
15. This case was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs without prejudice.
16. These cases are covered by the 10 billion German (Deutsche) marks (approximately
$ 5.2 billion) settlement. See supra note 10.
17. This case involves the Schiele painting, Portrait of Wally.
18. See id.
19. This case involves the "Book of Hours" Manuscript.
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1. Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-C-6459 (N.D. Ill.
filed Sept. 24, 1996).21
2. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, No. C99-
5462 (W.D. Wash. filed July 31, 1998).21
C. Dismissed Cases
1. New York v. MOMA, No. 28012-98 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. filed Jan. 7, 1998).22
IX. CLAIMS AGAINST THE VATICAN BANKS
A. Class Action Complaints
1. Pending Cases
a. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 99-C-4941
(N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 15, 1999).
b. Zivkovich v. Vatican Bank, 00 CV 0801
(C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 25, 2000).
20. This case was originally filed in the Southern District of New York in July 1996. It
was subsequently transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. The case involved a Degas,
Landscape with Smokestacks, which is located in the Chicago Art Museum.
21. Across complaint by the Seattle Art Museum against Knoedler & Co. Art Gallery was
dismissed, and the Seattle Art Museum is appealing. The painting in this case, Oriental
Woman Seated on Floor, was sold by the Rosenbergs to Bellagio Hotel in Las Vegas after the
settlement. The settlement occurred on June 14, 1999.
22. The case involved two paintings by Schiele, Dead City III and Portrait of Wally. In
September 1999, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the actions by the
trial court.
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1. Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552 (Supp. 1998) (requiring that the
President establish the "Nazi War Criminal
Records Interagency Working Group" and
functioning to make public disclosure of Nazi
war-criminal records under the Freedom of
Information Act).
2. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No.
105-158, 112 Stat. 18 (1998) (providing the
following guidelines: (1) the President shall
direct the commissioner representing the
U.S. on the Tripartite Commission for the
Restitution of Monetary Gold to seek and
vote for an agreement with the 15 nations
that have a claim to the gold that those
nations will contribute all, or a substantial
portion, of the gold to Jewish charities that
assist survivors of the Holocaust; (2) the
appropriation of funds to be used for
Holocaust remembrance and education as
well as research and translation services to
further the restitution of assets to victims of
the Holocaust is authorized; and (3)
consistent with the Hague Convention of
1907, all governments should make a good
faith effort to return property, such as works
of art, to their rightful owners where such
works of art were stolen during the Nazi
era).
3. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of
1998, 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (Supp. 1998)
(establishing the "Presidential Advisory
Commission on Holocaust Assets in the
United States," which will conduct a
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thorough study on, and develop a historical
record of, the collection and disposition of
those assets).
B. Proposed Legislation
1. Justice for Holocaust Survivors Act, H.R.
271, 106th Cong. (1999) (adding an exception
to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for
cases involving lawsuits for money damages
against Germany, or areas controlled by
Germany, for the personal injuries of a U.S.
citizen that occurred during World War II,
provided the cause of action is brought
within 24 months of the enactment of the
exception).
2. Nazi Benefits Termination Act of 1999, H.R.
1788, 106th Cong. (1999) (denying federal
"public benefit" to anyone who participated
in Nazi persecution).
3. Nazi Benefits Termination Act of 1999, S.
1249, 106th Cong. (1999) (denying federal
"public benefit" to anyone who participated
in Nazi persecution).
4. Holocaust Victims Insurance Act, H.R. 126,
106th Cong. (1999) (requiring any insurer
doing business in the United States between
1920 and 1945 to disclose the records and
status of those policies in order to aid in the
recovery of insurance issued to victims of the
Holocaust).
5. Holocaust Survivor Tax Relief Act, S. 779,
106th Cong. (1999) (exempting Holocaust
reparations from individual federal income
tax).
6. H.R. 1292, 106th Cong. (1999) (exempting
Holocaust reparations from individual
federal income tax).
7. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission
Extension Act of 1999, S. 1520, 106th Cong.
(1998) (extending the deadline by which the
final report of the Presidential Advisory
Commission on Holocaust Assets in the
2000]
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United States is due and authorizes
additional funding).
8. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission
Extension Act of 1999, H.R. 2401, 106th
Cong. (1998) (extending the deadline by
which the final report of the Presidential
Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in
the United States is due and authorizes
additional funding).
9. Comprehensive Holocaust Accountability in
Insurance Measure (CHAIM), H.R. 3143,
105th Cong. (1998) (prohibiting 17 named
insurance companies from doing business in
the United States unless they disclose the
names of all Holocaust victims listed in Yad
Vashem's Hall of Names with whom they did
business and all Holocaust survivors listed
by the U. S. Holocaust Memorial Museum
with whom they did business).
10. Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of
1998, H.R. 4826, 105th Cong. (1998)
(requiring any insurer currently doing
business in the United States that sold
insurance policies between 1920 and 1945 to
people in Europe to disclose the records and
status of those policies).
11. War Crimes Disclosure Act, S. 150, 105th
Cong. (1997) (amending the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), to
provide for the disclosure of information
regarding individuals who acted under the
direction of, or in association with, Nazi





i. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6
(Deering 1999) (giving anyone
forced into labor without pay
by the Nazis, their
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sympathizers, or allies, for
any period of time between
1929 and 1945, the right to
file suit to recover monetary
compensation from the entity,
or its successor in interest, for
whom the labor was per-
formed; allowing suits to be
brought in superior court
either directly against the
entity or through a subsidiary
or affiliate; and suspending
any otherwise applicable
statute of limitations if the
action is commenced on or
before December 31, 2010).
b. Insurance
i. Holocaust Victims Insurance
Act, CAL. INS. CODE § 790-
790.15 (Deering 1998)
(allowing insurance com-
missioner to suspend the
operating license of any
insurer failing to pay any
valid claim from Holocaust
survivors until such claim is
paid).
ii. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.5
(Deering 1998) (providingthat
any Holocaust victim or heir
residing in California may
bring suit in superior court to
recover claims arising out of
insurance policies purchased
or in effect in Europe before
1945 from a specified insurer
and extending statute of
limitations to December 31,
2010).
iii. Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act of 1999, CAL. INS.
20001
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c. Tax
i.
CODE § 13800 (Deering 1999)
((1) requiring the insurance
commissioner to establish and
maintain the Holocaust In-
surance Registry that would
contain records and infor-
mation relating to insurance
policies issued by insurers in
California to individuals in
Europe that were in effect
between 1920 and 1945; and
(2) providing that any
Holocaust victim or heir
residing in California may
bring suit in superior court to
recover claims arising out of
insurance policies purchased
or in effect in Europe before
1945 from a specified insurer;
and extending statute of
limitations to December 31,
2010).
Holocaust Reparations Act,
CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 17155
(Deering 1998) (creating a tax
exemption for Holocaust
victims or their heirs for
income derived from the
settlement of Holocaust





i. Holocaust Victims Insurance
Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 626.9543
(1999) (providing that any
insurer doing business in




resolve, or settle claims made
by Holocaust victims, sur-
vivors, and their families,
provided that the claim is
made within 10 years of
enactment, and requiring that
insurers must make full
disclosure to the insurance
commissioner of all records
and information regarding
policies issued to Holocaust
victims between January 1,




i. H.B. 385, 145th sess. (1999)
(exempting from state tax-
ation income received or
recovered from foreign banks





i. Exec. Order No. 99-14, 23 Ill.
Reg. 8315 (1999) (excluding
Holocaust reparations from
state income tax).
ii. Illinois Income Tax Act, 35
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/203 (West
1999) (excluding any Holo-
caust reparations from





i. IND. CODE § 6-3-1-3.5 (1999)
(excluding reparations to
Holocaust victims from state
2000]
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taxation if they are taxed
federally and from consid-





i. MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. §§
7-203(1), 10-207(t) (1999)
(excluding reparations paid to
Holocaust victims or their





i. H.B. 3932, 181st Leg., 1999
(Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999)) (ex-
cluding certain assets of Holo-





i. 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 181
(excluding from state income
taxation income derived from
Holocaust claims settlements
or claims proceeds against any
individual or entity for bank
deposits, insurance proceeds,
or artwork owned at any time
during 1920-1945 that were





i. S.B. 1912, 81st Leg., 1999-






in settlement of Holocaust





H.B. 1332, 90th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2000) (exempting
from state income tax income
received by Holocaust victims
as reparation for Nazi
persecution).
ii. H.B. 1452, 90th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2000) (exempting
from state income tax income
received by Holocaust victims





i. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:6-29
(West 1999) (excluding Holo-
caust restitution and




i. Holocaust Victim Insurance
Claim Registry and Relief Act,
A.B. 422, 209th Leg., 2000
Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2000) ((1)
establishing the Holocaust
Victim Insurance Claim
Registry that would house
records and information re-
garding the insurance policies
of Holocaust victims and
survivors; (2) providing that
any insurer doing business in
New Jersey who is presented
2000]
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with a claim from an
individual the insurer knows,
or should know, is a Holocaust
victim must make a diligent
attempt to investigate,
resolve, or settle the claim;
and (3) providing that in-
surers must make full dis-
closure to the insurance
commissioner of all records
and information regarding
policies issued to Holocaust
victims between January 1,




i. Holocaust Victims Insurance
Act of 1998, N.Y. INS. LAW §
2703 (Consol. 1999) (providing
(1) assistance to individuals in
the recovery of proceeds from
insurance policies written to
Holocaust victims; (2) that
any insurer doing business in
New York who is presented
with a claim from an
individual the insurer knows,
or should know, is a Holocaust
victim must make a diligent
attempt to investigate, resolve
or settle the claim provided
that the claim is made within
10 years of the enactment of
this act; and (3) that insurers
must make full disclosure to
the insurance commissioner of
all records and information




January 1, 1929 and
December 31, 1945).
fl. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 18, § 352.22(aa) (1999)
(providing tax exemption for




i. S.B. 6092, 222d Leg., 1999-
2000 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999)
(exempting settlements of
Holocaust claims from state
taxation).
ii. A.B. 8983, 222d Leg., 1999-
2000 Reg. Sess (N.Y. 1999)
(exempting settlement funds
for Holocaust victims and




i. S.B. 1511 (1998) (excluding
Holocaust reparations and





i. Holocaust Victims Insurance
Relief Act, WASH. REV. CODE §
48.104.060 (1999) (requiring
any insurer who sold in-
surance policies in Europe
between 1933 and 1945 to
disclose all records and
information regarding those
policies to the insurance
commissioner).
ii. Holocaust Victims Insurance
Act, WASH. REV. CODE §
20001




assistance office to assist
victims in the recovery of
proceeds from the insurance
policies and/or other assets




i. H.B. 2162, 56th Leg., 1999
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999) (re-
quiring any insurer who sold
insurance policies in Europe
before 1945 to disclose all
records and information re-
garding those policies to the
insurance commissioner and
extends any applicable statute





i. S.B. 9, 1999-2000 Leg., 1999
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1999) (ex-
empting from state taxation
settlements for claims of
assets or assets actually
recovered from claims against




ii. A.B. 70, 1999-2000 Leg., 1999
Reg. Sess. (Wis. 1999) (ex-
empting settlements for
claims of assets or assets
actually recovered from claims
against Nazi Germany or any
Axis regime from state
taxation).

